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EVST
The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and
Resiliency (357 pp.)
Chairperson: Janet L. Finn
This thesis examines some understandings of public health threats posed by
contamination in Butte, Montana, which is part of the country's largest
Superfund site. The public outcry that has been recorded in other contaminated
communities, such as Woburn, MA and Love Canal, NY, has not m aterialized in
Butte. To explain the reasons for w hat federal and local officials have deemed
local "apathy," this analysis uses a theoretical fram ew ork of environm ental
sociology, an interdisciplinary theory that links political economy and local
culture, as well as tensions between global economic integration and local
subsistence.
People construct their social identities and relationships w ithin context of their
physical and social environments, and these social constructions of landscape
entail an ongoing relationship with the natural, built, and m odified physical
environm ent. The shift from the physical environm ent as the familiar
background of "home" to one of contamination entails renegotiations of
relationships w ith the land which often involve political disagreements, as well
as differing discursive frameworks for understanding "the environment." This
analysis points to multiple, and often conflicting, landscapes operating in Butte
w hich have been m arginalized by technocratic definitions of "contamination,"
"risk," and "participation." The analysis argues that the technocratic ahistorical
perspective does not consider the lessons learned from years of community
interaction with the Anaconda Mining Company. Also unconsidered is the real
possibility that local history is the locus of community resistance, a way of telling
a story very different from that told by the Anaconda Company and captive press
in the past, and by the federal government and ARCO, which purchased the
Anaconda Company properties, in the present. The tension between the
m eanings of local history and contamination have been unexplored. This
analysis also points to shortcomings in the risk assessment process and to public
health inform ation that has not been made available to Butte's people, and
argues that this lack of information relegates both local knowledge and
com munity medical problem s to personal "troubles " rather than a social
problem. It further indicates shortcomings in proposed "institutional controls,"'
developed to protect residents from hazardous waste that will rem ain when
cleanup activities are completed.
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INTRODUCTION
Butte, M ontana has gained national fame as T h e Richest Hill on Earth,"
"The Gibralter of Unionism," and the largest Superfund site in the country.
In published accounts to date, the larger-than-life history of the famed copper
mining tow n has been told as the story of corporation versus labor,
corporation versus state, im m igrant versus industrialized America, man
versus nature, and m iner versus death (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995;
Malone et al, 1993; Emmons, 1900; Writers' Program of the WPA, 1943). It is
also, as anthropologist Janet Finn (1995)1 reports, a story of community as
imagined by the Anaconda Company which, through its control of economic,
political, and social structures, created and m anipulated symbols of
community for popular consumption. A nd it is a story of how the people of
Butte, the consumers of that m anufactured community, internalized,
elaborated upon, fought against, and created their own notions of community
to which they then gave their loyalty (Finn, 1995).
It is all that; it is also a story of how the powerful forces of capitalism and a
belief in hum an mastery of the land shaped both the physical landscape of
Butte and the social constructions of landscape through w hich Butte's people
perceived and interacted with that dramatically altered landscape. Like the
restless earthquake-prone land they mined, the social constructions of
landscape of Butte's people changed through time. This analysis tells a story
of socially-constructed landscapes — past and present. It is a story of silences
and seeming contradictions w ithin fractures and faults, tremors, d ark tunnels
in dangerous ground, contested ground.
In 1986 the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated
1
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Butte a Superfund site. Agency investigation has uncovered 66 contaminants
in Butte's soil, air, and water. Yet there has been no organized public outcry
from Butte residents about potential health impacts of the staggering list of
toxics. This analysis seeks to explain w hy the public health outcry that has
erupted at other Superfund sites, such as Love Canal, NY (Greider, 1992) and
Woburn, MA (Brown, 1991; DiPema, 1985). EPA employees in Butte
(Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95) and county health personnel
(Dennehey, 9/21/95) have charged Butte's people w ith apathy; this analysis
argues that this may not be the case. This analysis presents other possible,
historically-grounded explanations for the apparent lack of public support for
the Citizens' Technical Environm ental Committee, the only local
environm ental activist group in Butte. In developing these alternative
explanations, the analysis argues for broader definitions of participation and
resistance than used under federal Superfund law. Consideration of broader
definitions leads to a different understanding of past and present social
landscapes and unearths a story of competing value systems, some operating
aboveground; some underground. It discovers many Buttes, often
contradictory. I start w ith the landscape I first saw in autum n 1994.

WELCOME TO BUTTE
An artist m ight have preserved the Novem ber night w hen the snow geese
arrived in Butte as a Christmas card illustration. In the lower left foreground
of the card, the large body of w ater in the Berkeley Pit would shine deep slate
blue against the backdrop of the craggy snow-covered peaks of the East Ridge.
In the u p p er right hand corner, atop the m ountains, the illum inated statue of
O ur Lady of the Rockies, arms open, would gleam a w hite welcome. In the
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left u p p er corner, the shimmering silvery V-shape of the arriving geese
w ould stand out in sharp contrast to the m idnight blue M ontana sky. The
same artist may have been too stunned to paint the scene w hen the sun rose.
The following morning 342 snow geese were dead. Most of the lifeless
birds, their white feathers stained rust from the metals in the Berkeley Pit,
floated limply on the water; a few of the geese had m anaged to fly away, some
flew almost 26 miles to Anaconda, before succumbing. Autopsies performed
on the geese have yielded conflicting results. Tests conducted at Colorado
State University for the ow ner of the Pit, the Atlantic Richfield Corporation
(ARCO), suggested the birds died as the result of ingesting a wheat fungus.
Tests conducted at the University of W yoming and M ontana State University
for the State of M ontana gave very different results, indicating the "caustic
materials caused lesions on the skin, while high concentrations of heavy
metals dam aged some inner organs (Missoulian, Dec. 7, 1995)." University of
W yoming veterinary pathologist Beth Williams described dam age to the
tested "birds’ esophagus and trachea as severe...This is the most dramatic I've
ever seen (Missoulian, Dec. 7,1995)." If Wilhams is correct the deaths of the
geese were ghastly, the equivalent of a hum an being ingesting lye and
suffering excruciating pain as the caustic substance ate through his gastro
intestinal tract.
The Berkeley Pit, a gaping 1,789-foot deep brow n and gray tiered vestige of
open pit m ining which covers 80 acres is part of a cluster of federal Superfund
sites in Butte, M ontana. Since 1982 w hen ARCO discontinued mining
operations and shut off the deep level pum ps, every day an estim ated five
million gallons of rusty colored toxic w ater seep into the pit through some
3,500 miles of underground mine tunnels, raising the w ater level in the pit by
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two feet each m onth (USEPA, 1993). There is no technology know n that can
perm anently rem ediate the vast toxic lake w hich is polluted by alum inum ,
arsenic, cadmium, copper, iron, lead, sulfate and zinc; the best solution
available is to pum p and treat the w ater w hich flows into the pit in
perpetuity. If the poisoned w ater rises to a level at w hich it meets the
groundw ater, public health risks w ould increase dramatically and the impact
on the local aquatic ecosystem w ould be "catastrophic in both nature and
extent" (USEPA, 1993: section 7.4). The contamination w ould follow SUver
Bow Creek into the Clark Fork River, then into the Columbia River Basin.
The Clark Fork is M ontana's largest river, carrying nearly twice the
flow of the Missouri or the Yellowstone. It runs northw estw ard for 320
miles and supplies over 90 percent of the flow into Lake Pend Oreille,
Idaho's largest lake. The Pend Oreille River drains the lake and flows
into the Columbia River in Washington. Besides their critical
importance for irrigation and drinking water. Lake Pend Oreille, the
Pend Oreille River and the Clark Fork support a struggling tourism
and recreation industry (Nielsen, 1988:7).

As a graduate student in the Environmental Studies program at the
University of Montana, I first saw Butte in September 1994. As a reporter and
editor for new spapers in the N ortheast I had covered Superfund sites but that
experience did not prepare me for the physical reality of Butte. I had never
seen a mining landscape, a shocking conglomeration of vast excavated areas,
towering piles of debris, uprooted boulders, and barren earth.
I was equally astonished to learn from Butte environm ental activist Mary
Kay Craig that there was no public outcry about health concerns resulting
from the contamination of soil, air, surface and ground w ater (Craig, 9/14/94).
The contaminated communities I had covered as a reporter had very vocal
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groups w orking to connect the illnesses they saw in their communities to
exposure to industrial poisons. I had read of similar concerned groups in
other contam inated communities — W oburn, M assachusetts (Brown, 1991)
and Love Canal, N ew York (Greider, 1992). This thesis is the result of my
attem pt to explain why there is no sim ilar action in Butte, w here a published
health study (Moore and Luoma, 1990) has indicated environm ental illness
may be a real cause for concern.
Jim Robbins (1994) reports that the Moore-Luoma 1990 study of 3,000 U.S.
counties between 1959 and 1972 showed that Silver Bow County, w here Butte
is located, was among 100 counties w ith the highest death rates for people
aged 35 to 74, and, in another study, Butte had the highest mortality ratio for
any county in the nation in 1950-51 and 1959-61, and the fifth highest in 1%971. Robbins also reports that a National Cancer Institute study of the average
mortality rate from lung, trachea, and bronchial cancer show ed that in
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and N orth Dakota, the rate was 25 per 100,000
people, plus or m inus four percent; in Silver Bow County and neighboring
Deer Lodge County, w here Anaconda, the home to smelting operations, is
located, the rate was twice that (J. Robbins, 1994). In search of answers for this
lack of public health outcry, I began to traverse Butte’s terrain — above
ground and below.
Above ground, Butte is startling to a newcomer. Turquoise banners
proudly proclaim the historic uptow n district which clings to the steep incline
of Butte Hill. They flutter from street lights that illum inate rows of rundow n
brick and stone buildings. Tom -up vacant lots interspersed w ith the eclectic
architecture on every block bring to m ind a punchdrunk prize-fighter's
rebellious gap-toothed grin. An occasional restored building only serves to
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reinforce the general seediness of a town dow n on its luck. H undred-foot
m etal gallows frames strew n across Butte Hill pierce the thin m ountain air, a
testam ent to Butte's m ining past.
Butte and m ining are synonymous. This is im portant. M ining fathered
Butte. Historians, mostly male (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959,
1972; Emmons, 1990) have presented Butte as the locus of workingmen's
struggles. The histories tell how w orking m en d ug out their livelihoods in
the form of ore from the depths of Butte Hill. They teU how the Copper
Kings and later, the Anaconda Mining Company, turned that ore into vast
fortunes. The relationship between Butte laborers and the land was
predicated on the extraction and exploitation of natural resources in the earth.
The scarred and torn up landscape of Butte which was barely discernible
through the miasma of smelter smoke at the tu rn of the century (Emmons,
1990) was a sign of the im m igrant laborers' ability to sustain themselves and
their families. The histories indicate that the ravaged earth allowed the
laborer to regard himself as a contributing member of American society, it
was the source of his self-esteem. And the Anaconda Company, purchased by
ARCO in 1977, was the source of economic security (Emmons, 1990). The
female voices of Butte in these male histories is m uted — w hen it exists at all.
On Main Street and Broadway, the red-brick Hennessey Building where
the Anaconda Company conducted its day-to-day business, still stands. Here
"the Company " carved an empire out of the vast copper deposits in the
depths of "the Richest Hill on Earth " and burrow ed a niche in the history of
Butte, the state of M ontana, and, ultimately, the national and global economy.
A lthough "the Com pany " has been gone more than a decade, the Hennessey
building is still a well-maintained large presence. Less visible, but likely more
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im portant, the lessons learned from years of interaction w ith the Company
may be present in the way in which Butte residents perceive their landscape
and fram e their futures today.
Walk a few blocks south to Park Street and turn west tow ard Montana
Tech, the former School of Mines. Small eccentric homes built by miners,
who expressed their visions of domesticity and comfort w ith turrets and
splashes of leaded glass, line both sides of the street.
"Old Butte" is a study in architectural ingenuity. The brick and clapboard
houses, built barely a hand’s w idth apart, reflect the personality and
creativity of their working class owners. The gingerbread trims, odd
turrets, occasional stained glass window, and often hodge-podge m elding
of material and design tell the stories of life-long labours and lives beyond
the reach of corporate dictates. They stand in sharp contrast to the rows of
tract houses subsidized by the company in more recent times w hen the
search for copper m eant the destruction of old neighborhoods. (Firm,
1994:18)

Up the Park Street hill at the entrance to M ontana Tech the statue of
Marcus Daly, one of the original owners and the most legendary symbol of
the Anaconda Mining Company, looks dow n at the d ty he helped to build,
the city that abruptly stops at the Berkeley Pit. Here and there a green law n or
lilac bush conquers a patch of barren soil.
This is Butte. The Black H eart of Montana. Ugly. Raw. Captive to its
mining past. A major part of the country's largest Superfund site. Proud.
Economically depressed. W orking class. Resonating w ith the histories of
im m igrant m en and women who, like my great-great-grandparents, fled their
European homes w ith few skills and a fervent belief in possibilities. Defiantly
alive.
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Butte is a constant flow of people daily researching their family histories at
the Silver Bow Archives on Q uartz Street. It is the AFL-CIO office in
Walkerville. It is a bright green T-shirt that proclaims, "Friends don't let
friends go to Butte on St. Patrick's Day." It is a carpenter w ith a Ph.D. in
philosophy. It is the Helsinki Bar and Steam Baths w here every March 16 the
Firms crown St. Urho who drove the grasshoppers out of Finland. It is the 90foot high statue of O ur Lady of the Rockies, a frail flash of w hite hope atop the
massive gray m ountains that frame the Berkeley Pit. It is Sunday m orning
breakfast at the M&M. It is a home on Platinum Street that has foregone the
usual picket fence for rails and mining cars filled w ith ore.
A nd this is Butte. Two eight-foot high bookcases in the Butte
Environmental Protection Agency office filled w ith neatly bound white
plastic-covered looseleaf notebooks, some four inches thick. These notebooks
docum ent the legacy of the Company's m ining operations — contamination
that has spread out from Butte to an area roughly equal to one-fifth of the
state of Rhode Island (J. Robbins, 1994). Four risk assessments examine the
possible environm ental and public health impacts of a contem porary witch's
brew containing lead, arsenic, cadmium, and carcinogenic volatile organic
chemicals. Soil, air, and w ater are contaminated.
Because of its purchase of the company in 1977, ARCO now casts a long
shadow over Butte from its local headquarters in nearby Anaconda. As a
potentially responsible party under federal Superfund law, the U.S.
Environm ental Protection Agency is m andating that ARCO finance much of
the cleanup of Butte.
Below ground, in the 3,500 miles of mine tunnels, are the forces —
geologic, political, and economic — that brought Butte to life and shaped the
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physical and cultural character of the place in the process. D uring my
research I often felt myself stum bling about in the labyrinth of tunnels,
puzzled by intersections, w ondering w hich tunnel to take, w hat level to crawl
through, surprised by sudden shafts of light. I found the silences of blocked
tunnels, the dead ends of caved-in shafts, and the persistence of water, drips
and flows, creating new formations in the earth. At tim es I felt lost in this
unfam iliar landscape, and overwhelm ed by my own ignorance as an outsider.
Stumbling about, I was directed by my ow n inner landscape, which has been
shaped by an Eastern Irish im m igrant working class culture, my experiences
as a reporter, my love for the land, and, although I cannot say just w here or
how it surfaces, my gender. Despite my best efforts to attain objectivity, the
forces of my ow n landscape will tend to overlay my research. My hopes for
objectivity are also im peded by the deep fascination, respect, and affection I
have developed for the place and its people.
The Butte I have found is contradictory, tough, gritty, and toxic. It is home
to roughly 33,000 people who daily grapple w ith the results of this 130-year
history - people who walk on contaminated soils, breathe fouled air, and
bathe, w ash dishes and drink polluted water. They are survivors, people with
their own histories and voices, their ow n concepts of quality of life, which
have not been heard. Theirs are complicated stories woven from the past and
present, the private and public, and the individual and social. I believe their
stories are im portant for w hat Butte can tell us about ourselves and our
relationship to the land.

STUDY QUESTIONS
The overriding question is why Butte seems so different than other
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Superfund sites. Is the public apathetic? From this point, a num ber of other
questions arose. What is considered participation and why is participation
considered in the terms established under the federal Superfund law? What
is resistance? Does resistance necessarily have to be overt, such as public
dem onstrations?
Digging deeper, w hat is contamination? Is it, as the EPA indicates in risk
assessments, a chronology of individual contaminants and a sum m ing up of
those contaminants to determ ine possible public health risks? Does
contam ination have other meanings, and are those possible other meanings
more compelling than the actual physical characteristics of the contaminants
themselves in shaping people's beliefs about health threats?
How has the contamination been presented to the people of Butte? Why
has it been presented as it has? Do the people of Butte have adequate
information, and, if they do not, why?
The ultim ate question may be: What does it m ean w hen the entire
history of a community, its sole reason for being, is intimately tied to current
notions of contam ination?

METHODOLOGY
Data collection involved both secondary and prim ary source material.
Secondary source m aterial included governm ent documents, local new spaper
articles, county archival information, and literature, w hich will be discussed
in the literature review. Individual interviews constitute the prim ary
resource; in addition, 1 attended two meetings of governm ent officials, Butte
and A naconda residents and Sandy Stash, ARCO's representative.
For the official characterization of risk and the extent of environm ental
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degradation the study relies upon EPA risk assessments, the state of Montana
N atural Resource Damage Claim, and Butte-Silver Bow governm ent
agreements w ith the EPA and ARCO related to lead contamination and the
developm ent of institutional controls to ensure protection from
contamination that will rem ain after the cleanup. Federal governm ent
census reports provided additional inform ation about education and
em ploym ent breakdow ns.
To determ ine how the contamination and cleanup have been presented to
the public, I turned to the Butte daily newspaper, the Montana Standard,
coverage.

The examination of coverage seemed especially im portant because

the public does not attend public hearings and information sessions
(Weinstock, 7/31/95; Dennehey, 9/21 /95; Crain, 9/21/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95)
nor does it seek information from the country public health departm ent
(Dennehey, 9/21/95) or the local EPA office (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald.
7/31/95). Additionally, people interviewed referred only to new spaper
coverage (with one exception (Ray, 10/24/95), who said that information
provided on local cable television was usually erroneous). Therefore, I
concluded that the new spaper is a prim ary source of information for the
majority of Butte residents.
I selected the period from January 1,1990 through December 31,1993 to
examine the environm ental coverage for a num ber of reasons. First, because
during this period, many of the risk assessments that are a routine part of
new spaper coverage were produced, for example, the Final Preliminary
Baseline Risk Assessment for Lower Area One, October 25, 1991; Revised
Final Baseline Risk Assessment for the M ontana Pole NPL Site, February 10,
1993; and Draft Baseline Risk Assessment for the Mine Flooding Operable
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Unit, December 15, 1993. Second, the EPA opened its Butte office in late 1989
which m ade agency representatives and records easily accessible to Butte
people. Third, Sara Weinstock, the EPA rem edial project manager, w as kind
enough to share her file of every environm entally-oriented story run by the
paper since the local EPA office opened. As will be indicated by referencing in
the study, new spaper coverage for certain specific events was also checked, a
task m ade easier by the Johnson Chronology in the Butte-SÜver Bow
archives.
Prim ary health data, which were difficult to access, came from two sources:
Emergency Medical Services records from the form er Butte-Silver Bow
Hospital w hich were available in the Butte-Silver Bow archives; and
M ontana Area H ealth Education Center publications. Reasons for the
m inim al am ount of inform ation from the M ontana D epartm ent of Health
and M ontana Tum or Registry will be discussed later in the public health
section of the thesis.
Interviews were conducted with federal, state, and local officials to identify
both those territories they claimed and the perspective each brought to the
cleanup. Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Jack Lynch declined to be
interviewed but did submit w ritten replies to the questions I asked of all Butte
people interviewed. M embers of the Citizens’ Technical Environmental
Committee, w hich functions through a federal EPA Technical Assistance
Grant (TAG) and is the only consistent source of environm ental citizen
action in Butte, also agreed to be interviewed. To obtain the perspective of
organized labor and history, I interviewed M arilyn Maney of the AFL-CIO; for
the historical perspective, I interview ed Mark Reavis, the county historical
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officer, and Ellen Crain, director of the Butte-Silver Bow archives. Although
Kathy Hadley, one of the founders of Citizens for Labor and Environmental
Justice, does not live in Butte, I interviewed her because this new group is
merging labor and cleanup issues, and because, as one of the founders of the
Clark Fork Coalition, she has been involved in the cleanup since the
Superfund designation, John T. Shea provided the perspective of both a
lifelong w orker of the Anaconda Company and current m em ber of the Butte
ARCO retirees club. Because the local new spaper presented the cleanup from
the perspective of local business and economic boosterism, I did not find it
necessary to interview a representative from the Cham ber of Commerce to
capture this perspective.
The questions asked were designed to determ ine if, among these few
people interviewed, the landscapes of people who spent their childhoods in
Butte differed from those of non-natives or late comers; if landscapes of non
natives were altered w ith length of residence in Butte and, conversely, if
natives who spent time away from Butte returned with an altered sense of
landscape. A series of questions focused on perceptions of public health
a n d /o r illness in Butte, and possible connections between the contamination
and illness. Another series related to issues of trust in county, state, and
federal officials. Those interviewed were also asked w hat they believed
w ould improve life in Butte, whether they believed it was possible to change
conditions, and, if they believed they could not affect change, to identify the
im pedim ent. A dditional questions related to w hether the Superfund
designation had affected local property values, and to determ ine support for
future mining in Butte and in the state of Montana. The lim ited scope of
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these questions was broadened by many interviewees who were kind enough
to expand on the themes under discussion. A list of questions asked is
included in the appendix.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
A social landscape can represent a collective local history, for example, the
mining landscape as representative of economic security, economic
development and corporate profits, or as the history of Butte, or as a
composite of all these things. It can also represent a threat, for example, the
EPA classification of Butte as a Superfund site. The social landscape concept is
useful for a num ber of reasons. First, it keeps the focus of the study upon the
interactions betw een the land and the institutions and individuals working
and living in Butte. Second, the m etaphor of a social landscape has the scope
to ground competing visions in the actual physical reality of Butte. And
third, it provides an organizational fram ework for the thesis. Following this
introduction, the thesis is organized into chapters, each dealing w ith a
particular type or types of social landscapes.
In Chapter 1, the theoretical landscape, which shapes the questions asked
and the nature of analysis brought to bear, is laid out. A literature review
section outlines the work, the majority of w hich is sociological, done in
contam inated com m unities.
In Chapter 2, the history of Butte is presented as The Contested Terrain of
Butte. H ere the developm ent of Butte and the Anaconda M ining Company
are explored w ithin the local, state, national and international political
economy. The historical arenas of conflict betw een labor and management,
corporation and state, local, state and federal governments, are grounded in
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the changing physical reality of Butte. Historical material is derived from the
w ork of local, state and corporate historians (Emmons, 1990; Malone, 1995;
Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959, 1972; Marcossen, 1957; W. Robbins, 1994) as
well as from oral histories available at Butte-Silver Bow archives. More
contemporary history is garnered from interviews, new spaper stories and
ARCO's (the Atlantic Richfield Corporation) Superfund publication.
Chapter 3, Superfund and Risk; The lim ited landscape of technocratic
discourse, examines the operative assum ptions and conflicts inherent in the
federal Superfund law and considers the nature and lim itations both of
bureaucracy and technocracy. This section also considers the implications of
the privileged discourse of science and the way in which that privileging has
usurped local knowledge.
Chapter 4, Local N ew spaper Coverage: The Standardized landscape,
analyzes four years of local newspaper coverage of issues related to
contamination, examining quantitative and qualitative coverage as well as
seeking the messages given about the m eaning of the contamination.
Chapter 5, Public Health: Subterranean landscapes, considers the historical
politicizing of public health issues, the local knowledge which contradicts
health information disseminated by the EPA, and the quality of present
health data. Serious shortcomings, both in inform ation presented and
scientific inform ation actually available, are indicated.
Chapter 6, The Social Landscapes: Diverse terrains, examines the social
landscapes of people interviewed. The chapter considers the different
landscapes of non-natives and natives, and draw s from the history of Butte to
indicate the threads from the past w hich have become woven into the
present.
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Chapter 7, "Conclusion: Community and landscapes of change," looks at
the contested visions of Butte and considers the potential for social change, as
well as possible courses of action, including lay epidemiology, that could
em power Butte's people. Because Butte does not exist in a vacuum, this
section examines the tension inherent betw een M ontana as the "Treasure
State" and the "Last Best Place," as expressed in proposals for both expansions
of existing mines and new mines and an initiative to strengthen w ater quality
standards related to mining. Finally, the chapter considers both the
relationship of Butte and M ontana to the international economy and the
implications of that relationship.

1 Finn's doctoral dissertation compares the differences in community which
were consciously fostered by the Anaconda Company in Butte, Montana and
Chuquicamata, Chile. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, I will focus
upon her findings in Butte only. However, my neglect of her Chilean data does
not adequqtely convey the authority of Finn's work.
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THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE
A num ber of theoretical frameworks, or models, each of which entails its
ow n set of assumptions, questions, and approaches to interpretation, directed
the way in which I set about answering the questions I raised in the previous
section. The overarching model, into which the others are nested, was
developed by environm ental sociologists William R. Catton, Jr. and Riley E.
Dunlap (1980). They coined the term N ew Ecological Paradigm (NEP) to
reflect a growing awareness among sociologists that hum ans and their
activities are not exempt from ecological constraints. My use of NEP entails
four assum ptions (Catton and Dunlap, 1980:34):
1. A lthough hum an beings have exceptional characteristics, am ong them
culture and technology, they are simultaneously one of many species that are
independently involved in the global system;
2. H um an affairs are influenced by intricate linkages of cause, effect, and
feedback w ithin ecological systems, as well as social and cultural factors, so it
is possible for hum an actions to lead to unintended consequences;
3. H um ans live in and depend upon a finite biophysical environment
which imposes potent physical and biological restraints on hum an affairs;
and
4. A lthough the inventiveness of hum ans and the pow ers derived from
that inventiveness may temporarily seem to deter physical and biological
restraints, ecological laws cannot be repealed.
Implicit in this paradigm is a tension between hum an use and the
maintenance of the land. Use of this model in Butte will entail consideration
of four broad areas: 1. past and present interactions of people w ith the land; 2.
17
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the unintended consequences of environm ental degradation in the form of
contaminated soils, air, and water; 3. the impacts of the contamination upon
the peoples' ability to live on and use the land; and 4. consideration of the
role that the developm ent of technology has played in rnining operations, in
current attem pts at cleanup, and in shaping peoples' perceptions of health
issues. Because these interactions, consequences, impacts, and technological
developments occur w ithin context of a local, state, national and
international political economy, I am also em ploying a m odel called regional
political ecology developed by Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield (1987).
The regional political ecology model places the issue of land degradation in
the social arena, and focuses attention on the political and economic processes
that shape the use of the land (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). This model
looks at particulars of the place study and then moves to analysis of the local,
regional, national and international political economy as it affects decisions
made about local use. A lthough this m odel is associated w ith Third-W orld
studies, it is useful in Montana, which has been portrayed by historians
(Toole, 1959,1972; W. Robbins, 1994) as a resource colony for Eastern and
West Coast financial interests. As such, the issues of absentee land owners,
decisions based upon considerations other than local interests, and the notion
of who bears the costs associated w ith environmental change, which are
common themes in Third-W orld research (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987;
Bryant, 1992; Feet and Watts, 1993), are relevant to the study of Butte,
M ontana. The conceptualization of M ontana as a resource colony implicitly
involves the notion of conflict between local and outside interests which is
borne out in many histories of Butte and Montana (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone
et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Emmons, 1990; W. Robbins, 1994).
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Geographers Richard Peet and Michael Watts (1993) suggest that the
political ecology framework be supplem ented w ith consideration of power,
the role of the state, and differences in discourse and culture. Because land
m anagem ent decisions are made w ithin a context of private (m the case of
Butte, corporate) interests and public interests, the thesis will continually
refer to assum ptions em bedded in the structures that shape social
organizations and relationships on both private and public levels. A lthough
the concept of "structure" is difficult to define, I am using a definition offered
by sociologist William Sewell (1992):
Structures, then, are sets of m utually sustaining schemas and resources
that em power and constrain social action and that tend to be
reproduced by social action. But their reproduction is never automatic.
Structures are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social
encounters they shape — because structures are m ultiple and
intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because resources
are polysémie [numerous] and accumulate unpredictably (Sewell,
1992:2).

Because no culture is monolithic and because the cultural schema will
intersect with individual schemas, there are also tensions involved in the
concept of schemas. An individual schema consists of a person's
tem peram ent and personality, as well as beliefs and attitudes resulting from
such things as family, social status, ethnic, religious and neighborhood
values, the type of and duration of education, and workplace experiences. A
cultured schema may incorporate social status, ethnic groups, religions, and
class issues into the broader notion of "American values."
In a capitalistic structure, resources tend to be unequally distributed which
makes challenging existing structures difficult for actors w ith minimal
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resources. W here environm ental concerns surface, law s and governm ent
policies tend to serve as an arena in which unresolved conflict is acted out
(Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). In other words, it is
possible to consider the political economy of capitalism as the prim ary (but
not sole) structure of influence in environm ental affairs in the United States.
Structures are dual in that they are both the m edium and outcome of
hum an action; as such, they are not deterministic. They can both inhibit and
encourage hum an agency, the opportunity for people to act independently of
the structure (Sewell, 1992).

Any consideration of structure and hum an

agency leads directly to the concept of power. I am working w ith a definition
of pow er structure developed by sociologist Dennis W enger (1978):
The patterned differentials between individuals, groups and
organizations in access to both authoritative and non-authoritative
sources of social power. In this context, social pow er refers to the ability
of a system com ponent to actualize its interests, w hether intentionally
or unintentionally w ithin the context of asymmetrical control of
various social resources or the reputation for such control. These
differentials in social pow er combine with those in prestige and
economic status to form the community's system of stratification
(Wenger, 1978:22).

The use of this definition in Butte will allow consideration of a broad range
and m ultitude of points of power, those that exist in institutional
relationships as well as "everyday forms of resistance (Dirks et al, 1994:5)."
Sewell’s use of "intentionally or unintentionally," as well as "various social
resources, " provides for consideration of areas, such as the passionate love
of many Butte natives for their local history (Reavis, 11/29/95), as a possible
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source of resistance. Equally important, it allows space to speculate upon the
way themes of conflict in Butte — labor/m anagem ent, public/private,
acquiescence/resistance, governm ent/citizens; governm ent/corporation; and
corporation/culture (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et al, 1976; Malone, 1995;
Emmons, 1990; Finn, 1995) — may have been internalized in both the culture
at large and in individuals. Further, Sewell’s use of the phrase "to actualize
its interests" is loose enough to apply tow ard developing an understanding of
the lack of public outcry (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95; Craig,
7/30/95) and participation in cleanup-related activities (Weinstock, 7/31/95;
Fitzgerald, 7/31/95; Craig, 7/30/95; Dennehey, 9/21/95) as expressions of
different priorities (Maney, 9/22/95).
The notion of discourse, which can be considered as another structure
(Peet and Watts, 1993), is helpful w hen looking at the relationship between
government agencies and residents:
A 'discourse' is a particular area of language use related to a certain set
of institutions and expressing a particular standpoint. Concerned with
a given range of objects, it emphasizes some concepts at the expense of
others (Peet and Watts, 1993:228).

To this definition, I add "clusters of non-verbal practices, as these create
and m aintain distinctions and identities (Creenough and Tsing, 1994:95)."
Knowledge of the environment...is socially constructed in
environm ental practices, and it is the practical significance of
knowledge that makes it already political. The intertwining of
knowledge and practice become particularly obvious w here multiple
frameworks for describing and using a single terrain are in
com petition.
Discourse creates objects of environmental knowledge and agendas
for environm ental action. For example, nature is made and unmade.
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claimed and unclaimed, through the production and deploym ent of
property rights discourses. Political disagreem ents about how to live in
nature — e.g., those that divide local farmers and national officials, or
those that divide environm ental activists and tim ber company
spokesm en — involve divergent discursive fram ew orks for
understanding the environm ent’ (Creenough and Tsing, 1994:95).

Different discursive frameworks may result from different understandings
or assum ptions of the meanings of concepts under discussion (Connolly,
1993). The result of this are num erous "essentially contestible concepts
(Connolly, 1993:10)." Many of these contestible concepts occur in the use of
w ords such as politics or democracy or participation in w hich a num ber of
other concepts are nested, e.g., w ithin any notion of politics, democracy or
participation there are assum ptions about freedom or individual rights, also
contestible concepts. Political scientist William Connolly (1993:14) refers to
these nested concepts, which are open to a variety of interpretations, as
"cluster concepts."
...We often find that various people jointly em ploying such a cluster
concept weight the importance of shared criteria differently; they might
also interpret the m eaning of particular criteria jointly accepted in
subtly different ways; and some persons might find it advantageous to
add new criteria to, or drop old criteria from, the established list, while
other groups object to such moves...When one or more of these
conditions prevail we have the makings of a conceptual dispute. Such
disputes have undeniably arisen in contemporary life over the concept
of poli tics...Contests persist over the proper interpretation of the partly
shared idea of politics, and we m ight say that its very characteristic as a
cluster concept provides the space w ithin which such contests emerge
(Connolly, 1993:14-15).

Often, in the analysis of the discourse of different groups, one group
emerges as dom inant (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Merchant, 1993;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
Schrader-Frechette, 1991). In these instances, the discourse of the dom inant
group contains claims to superiority, which privileges the dom inant group’s
discourse by portraying the discourse of less dom inant groups as inferior or
non-legitimate. In the United States, the dom inant discourse, often referred
to as technocratic discourse, is based on scientific claims to objectivity and
rationality (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Merchant, 1992; SchraderFrechette, 1991).
Inherent in technocratic discourse are assum ptions that: 1. nature is
composed of particles of m atter (atomism); 2. the universe is a natural order;
3. knowledge and information can be abstracted from the natural w orld
(removal of historical context); 4. problems can be analyzed in parts
(reductionism); and 5. sense data are discrete (Merchant, 1992). When these
assumptions, as incorporated into the scientific method, are applied to real
world situations, as is the case w ith risk assessment, the practitioners of the
m ethod claim that resulting decisions are objective, rational, and value-free
(Merchant, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). However, these
claims are increasingly being questioned (Merchant, 1992; Schrader-Frechette,
1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991). Analysis of the dominant
group's claims to a superior rationality often reveals that "reason, in a word,
is ideological (Peet and Watts, 1993:229)."
The use of the w ord "ideological " implies that there is no one superior
understanding or rationality; rather, there are groups and individuals who
share a range of concepts but share them imperfectly and incompletely
(Connolly, 1993:6)." The process of adjustment, extension, resolution,
accommodation, and transcendence of differences in these imperfectly and
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incompletely shared concepts provides "the space for political interaction
(Connolly, 1993:6)."
The language of politics is not a neutral m edium that conveys ideas
independently formed; it is an institutionalized structure of meanings
that channels political thought and action in certain directions...
By the terms of political discourse...! refer first to the vocabulary
currently employed in political thought and action; second, to the ways
in w hich the meanings conventionally em bodied in that vocabulary
set the frame for political reflection by establishing criteria to be met
before an event or act can be said to fall w ithin the am bit of a given
concept; and third, to the judgm ents or commitments that are
conventionally sanctioned w hen these criteria are met (Connolly,
1993:1-2).

However, the space in which political interaction is allowed can be
constrained w hen the dom inant ideology is used to repress a n d /o r subvert
less privileged discourse and, in so doing, discounts the local base of
knowledge (Connolly, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Peet and
Watts, 1993; Merchant, 1992; Greider, 1992; Bagdikian, 1990). There are
"connections between rationality, truth, discourse, and the global system of
pow er relations (Peet and Watts, 1993:229)."
These themes manifest themselves in w hat Peet and Watts (1993:230) refer
to as "regional discursive formations."
Certain modes of thought, logics, themes, styles of expression, and
typical m etaphors run through the discursive history of a region,
appearing in a variety of forms, disappearing occasionally, only to
reappear w ith even greater intensity in new guises. A regional
discursive form ation is, however, as im portant for the topics and
themes it allows — its absences, silences, repressed ideas, m arginalized
statem ents. In a regional discursive form ation even competing
notions often use the same m etaphors, interpret in similar ways,
perhaps even think w ith sim ilar logic,..We w ould argue that regional
discursive formations originate in, and display the effects of, certain
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physical, political-economic, and institutional settings, b u t that
discursive formations grounded in material, political, or ideological
pow er supremacies dem onstrate a continual tendency to extend over
spaces w ith greatly different characteristics and discursive traditions
(Peet and Watts, 1993:230-31).

So, in Butte, I am looking at a regional discourse interw oven w ith often
implicit understandings of the political economy of the overarching structure
of capitalism ! (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). In
this context, it is im portant to keep in m ind the economic assum ptions
em bedded w ithin the structure of capitalism: 1. the individual operates to
maximize his utility through the exercise of individual choice (atomism); 2,
individuals act after obtaining perfect information (reductionism); 3. the laws
of supply and dem and will always correct the system w hen it deviates from
its natural equilibrium, the norm (the universe is a natural order); 4. taste is
exogenous to the system, e.g., hum an choices are not influenced by the world
about them (removal of context); and 5. constant grow th is essential to
m aintain the system (Hunt, 1990). These assum ptions are very similar to
those underlying scientific and technocratic activities, a result of historical
congruences.
Historian Carolyn Merchant (1992) traces the shift in Western philosophy
and scientific thought that transform ed views of the earth as alive to a
commodity to be bought and sold — a transformation essential to allow largescale mining, clearing of forests, and dum ping of waste from newly
constructed factories into waterways, all of which was essential for
industrialization. This is not determinism. This shift in thought alone did
not preordain industrialization. Other factors converged over time; other
outcomes were possible.
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O ther factors that affirmed the shift in W estern thought included the rise
of Protestantism, the developm ent of a rationalized body of science and of the
scientific method, and the creation of a m arket economy (Hunt, 1990). The
m edieval sway of the Catholic Church, which had banned usury and the sale
of surpluses for profit, gave way to Protestantism which allowed and
encouraged pursuit and accumulation of profit (Hunt, 1990; Farganis, 1993).
Currency and political systems supportive of the need for expansion of the
new economic base were developed, and newly industrialized societies
became characterized by the division between property owners and wage
laborers (Hunt, 1990). The assum ptions of classical economics, the basis of
m odern W estern economics, were developed (Hunt, 1990).
D uring the seventeenth century, the socially accepted concept of a living
earth was replaced by a view of nature as a machine, and science became the
means to master the now-inanimate earth (Merchant, 1992). Science became
the means to develop technology^ which was needed to increase the new
capitalists' ability to amass profits, control their workforce, and create new
markets for their products (Hunt, 1990). The New W orld provided the
resources. The Puritan belief that the taming of the w ilderness was carrying
out the w ork of God was transform ed into the notion of Manifest Destiny, the
idea that the new Americans were entitled by divine right to possess the
continent by taking and tam ing the land of Native Americans (Shabecoff,
1993).
The m arket economy, im ported from Europe, dem anded surpluses to be
sold or traded for other commodities, the technology to clear the land, plant
the crops and raise cattle, and the permanence associated w ith the notion of
private property to be passed onto one's heirs (Shabecoff, 1993). Helped by
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federal government land grants, and urged on by railroad corporations which
had been given huge tracts of land by the federal government, and the
new spapers of the time, the new Americans m oved west, changing the
landscape to conform to the national ideal of progress and civilization
(Shabecoff, 1993). These changes in turn necessitated alterations in the way
the landscape was perceived by those who lived on and changed it (Shabecoff,
1993).
The economic logic of a com m odity-producing system based on
competition and economies of scale dem anded expanded production,
resulting in w hat sociologists Alan Schnaiberg and Kenneth Alan Could
(1994) refer to as the "treadmill of production." Schnaiberg and Gould (1994)
have identified seven characteristics of the treadm ill:
1. An increasing accumulation of wealth, through the ownership of
economic organizations that successfully use ecological resources to expand
production and products.
2. The increasing movement of workers away from self-employment, into
positions of employees who m ust rely on expanded production to gain jobs
and wages.
3. Increasing allocations of accumulated wealth to new er technologies to
replace labor w ith physical capital, thereby generating more profits for wealthholders, in order to sustain and expand their ownership in the face of
growing com petition from other w ealth holders.
4. Increasing activities of governments to facilitate the expanded
accum ulation of w ealth for national developm ent on the one hand and social
security on the other.
5. The net result of these processes is the increasing necessity for even
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greater ecological w ithdraw als and additions to sustain a given level of social
welfare.
6. The likelihood of ecological disorganization, or environm ental
degradation, is increased as economic pressures push tow ard greater
extraction of m arket values from ecosystems.
7. Societies become increasingly vulnerable to socioeconomic
disorganization as the ecological "resource base" (Schnaiberg and Gould,
1993:69) becomes more disorganized.
D uring the exploitation process, social and ecological systems evolve in
response to exploitation of the resources, rather than in response to each
other, which makes it less likely that, after stock resources are exhausted,
ecological and social systems are in a position to "co-evolve" (Norgaard, 1984),
to interact postively. These stock-resource exploitive developm ent costs
increase dramatically w hen the extractive process is enhanced by the
developm ent of technology. Resource economist Richard B. N orgaard (1984)
points to losses that occur because stock resources are unavailable for later
in v estm en t,3 and losses associated w ith returning to or accepting a less
advantageous developm ent path after the stock resource is depleted — such
as the millions of dollars now being spent to clean up Butte and related
Superfund sites. Because these losses, w hich economists refer to as
"externalities," are not counted as costs w ithin the fram ework of production
considered by classical economics, stock resources are overused.
Economist James K. Boyce (1994:169) maintains "the extent of an
environm entally degrading economic activity is a function of the balance of
pow er betw een the winners, who derive net benefits from the activity, and
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the losers, who bear net costs." He also argues that the greater the inequalities
of pow er and wealth, the greater the environm ental degradation. Outcomes
are guided by w hat Boyce (1994:170) refers to as a "power weighted social
decision rule," w hich predicts outcomes based on the w inners' marginal
benefits and losers' marginal costs.
...greater inequalities of pow er and w ealth lead to more environmental
degradation for three reasons: (a) the excess environm ental
degradation driven by powerful winners is not offset by the
environmental degradation prevented by pow erful losers; (b)
inequality raises the valuation of benefits reaped by rich and powerful
w inners relative to costs imposed on poor and less pow erful losers; and
(c) inequality raises the rate of time preference^ applied to
environmental resources by both the poor and the rich, by increasing
their poverty and political insecurity, respectively (1994:178).

In Butte, the regional discourse represents understandings of the local,
state, national, and global political economy. To address the global economy, I
will use world systems theory which posits a global economy based on a
world trade system w ith an international division of labor between the core,
the rich capitalist technology-developing countries that are home to
multinational corporations and value-added industries, and the peripheries,
poor countries or regions, characterized by low -skill/labor intensive
production and export of prim ary goods (W. Robbins, 1994). However, the
core is not monolithic; there are peripheries w ithin the core, for example, the
state of M ontana's economy occupies a peripheral position to the national
core. Montana, as a resource colony, is also the periphery in the context of the
global economy. The theory posits that terms of trade which are favorable to
the core intensify surplus extraction and the dependence of peripheral
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economies and that this economic imbalance is m irrored by a political
imbalance.
The division betw een developm ent and underdevelopm ent, betw een
center and periphery, between the colonizer and the colonized is
therefore complex, existing at several levels: national, regional, local,
w ithin segments of the local population itself; and in both intra- and
interclass relations. Critical to understanding new bursts of economic
grow th is recognition of the evolving dialectic betw een changes in
w orld capitalism and local economies (W. Robbins, 1994:15).

On its own, this theory w ould im ply a somewhat simplistic and
deterministic approach. However, w hen used in tandem w ith local, state,
national, and international politics, history, and cultural understandings, it is
useful as a variant of regional political ecology. What is im portant is that
local understandings of capitalism are arrived at by both individuals and
organizations in many different ways, and this results in a m ultitude of
understandings expressed as diverse, and often conflicting, priorities. Equally
im portant, is that many of these conflicting priorities have not been explored
in Butte w here many voices, opinions of people in their ow n w ords which
operate outside of discursive structures, have not been heard during the
cleanup process. There are possible explanations for the lack of Butte voices
— am ong them, tacit agreem ent w ith official definitions and solutions of the
problem, different priorities (Maney, 9/22/95), lack of understanding
(Dennehey, 9/21/95), disinterest (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Fitzgerald, 7/31/95;
Craig, 7/30/95), and socialization to a mining culture (Ray, 10/24/95; Waring,
10/21/95).
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Local voices, or non-privileged discourse, may be seen as a counter-claim,
as an assertion of the legitimacy of discounted forms of knowledge a n d /o r as
a form of resistance (Peet and Watts, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette,
1991; Cormolly, 1993; M ilbum, 1991; Brown, 1991; Stewart, 1990; Finn, 1995).
These are the voices of the periphery, voices that are heard in daily
interactions. The notions of counter-claims and silences are particularly
useful in looking at the process of risk assessment, new spaper presentation of
contamination and cleanup, notions of public health, and the importance of
local history in Butte. It is possible to consider counter-claims, silences,
government agency definitions and actions, new spaper coverage, notions of
public health, and visions of Butte as landscapes, as representative of peoples’
relationships w ith the land.
The landscape concept is useful for a num ber of reasons. First, it keeps the
focus of the study upon the interactions between the land and institutions
and individuals working and living in Butte. Second, the m etaphor of a
social landscape has the scope to ground competing visions in the actual
physical reality of Butte. And third, it provides an organizational framework.
A social landscape can represent a collective local history, e.g., Butte's mining
landscape as representative of economic security, economic developm ent and
profits, a contested history, or a composite of all these things. It can also
represent a threat, e.g., the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
classification of Butte as a Superfund site. When a landscape is transformed
from familiar background to threat, w hen a hometown is stigmatized as a
potential danger, individuals in the community m ust then renegotiate their
beliefs about the place or deny the reasons for the stigma label, thereby
denying any risk (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a).
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The material reality of mining-related waste has always been the major
constituent of Butte's landscape (Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1959,1972; W riters’
Program, 1943). The new material reality, which requires new negotiated
meanings, is the EPA’s designation of that landscape as toxic. However,
inherent in the Superfund label is the question of w hat that label actually
means to individual residents and to the contaminated com munity at large.
What is particularly im portant is how the m eaning of the designation is
presented to individuals in the community, e.g., the EPA presents
inform ation that quantifies and describes the contaminants, and from that
data the agency develops a risk assessment that calculates the probability of
illnesses that may result from exposure (Schrader-Frechette, 1991), The media
also "play an im portant role in the social construction of risk and safety
(Spencer and Triche, 1994:199)." Research into m edia constructions of risk
and safety suggest:
...the importance of news sources, economic and political power, and a
preference for monocausal frames in the social construction of news.
O ur results also suggest the importance of local cultural world views in
defining hazards and risks (Spencer and Triche, 1994:199).

In Butte, the m ining contam ination has been presented as simply the
legacy of the A naconda Com pany’s mining operations by both the EPA and
the Montana Standard. This is a lim ited definition. What goes unquestioned
w hen the contamination is presented in this way is how the Anaconda
Company was able both to convey the landscape of Butte as a mining
landscape, for example, the fame of Butte as ’The Richest Hill on Earth"
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(Finn, 1995). Also unquestioned is how the Company historically dealt w ith
health concerns of residents (Emmons, 1990) and the ways in which this may
shape health issues in Butte today. Further, this lim ited definition assumes
that all the im portant impHcations of contamination have been addressed
and put to rest. But that is not the case: what remains unexplored is any
consideration of who benefits and who pays from acceptance of this definition
of sole cause; and any recognition of the individual and social stresses
involved in renegotiation of the landscape. Politically, the larger question
this raises is whose landscape is being protected, changed, or exploited, or, as
Boyce (1994) suggests, who benefits and who pays. Because the issues raised in
contaminated communities may differ in many respects from other landscape
changes, such as the siting of business or urban spraw l or protection of
wilderness areas, 1 tu rn to a review of the literature on contaminated
com m unities.

LANDSCAPES OF CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES
Environm ental sociologists w orking in communities that have
experienced toxic exposures have developed a num ber of subfields. This
research is necessarily broad on scope. It comprises eight general and tightly
interw oven themes, w hich include:
1. structural issues em bedded in the federal Superfund law (Barnett, 1994;
Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992) and environmental law in general (Schnaiberg
and Could, 1994);
2. corporate practices (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992; Edelstein,
1988; Brown, 1991; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994);
3. the institutionalized practices of governm ent technocracies (Weber,
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19%; Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992; Lupton, 1993; SchraderFrechette, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988;
Freudenburg, 1993; Brown, 1991; Fiorino, 1990);
4. discursive practices (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Connolly, 1993; Milburn,
1994; Edelman, 1964; Greider, 1992; Greenough and Tsing, 1994; Brown, 1991);
5. public health issues related to contamination (Lappé, 1991; Cortese,
1993; H u and Kim, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Castleman and Ziem,
1988; National Cancer Institute, 1995; Bates, 1994)
6. class and gender issues in Butte (Finn, 1995), and as they relate both to
distribution of toxic exposures (Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Wolensky, 1991) and to the nature of toxic activism
(Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Bullard, 1993; Chavis, 1993);
7. economic issues related to com munity developm ent and natural
resource use (Greenough and Tsing, 1994; Freudenburg, 1992; Norgaard, 1984);
and
8. m edia coverage (Spencer and Triche, 1994; Bagdikian, 1990; Greider,
1992).
The following sum m ation of the literature will provide a sense of
common issues in Am erican contam inated com munities and, most
im portantly, will provide inform ation to help determ ine the ways in which
Butte is sim ilar and different from other contam inated communities. I am
using Edelstein's (1988:6) definition of contaminated community: any
residential area located w ithin the identified boundaries for a know n
exposure to some form of contamination. I supplem ent Edelstein’s
definitions w ith Finn's (1995:18) which captures the notion of process:
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community is a location, subject and product of the dynam ic interplay of
structures and practices.
At the core of this perspective [environmental sociology] is the
assum ption that people construct their social identities, organize their
conduct, and form associations in exchange relationships w ith their
built, modified and biophysical environments. Thus, environm ental
sociology suggests that the real issue is not the empirical qualities of
hazard agents per se or the concept of collective crisis occasions that is
of param ount importance, but how the aversive agent, of w hatever
type, alters the relationship between a community and one or more the
three types of environments: built, modified or natural...H ow, in other
words, do aversive agents alter relationships betw een environm ents
and communities, and how do some of these environm entcommunity changes shape the course of social change? (Kroll-Smith
and Couch, 1991b:294-95)

Although not unanim ously accepted, many researchers m aintain that the
dynamics of exposure to toxins are very different than those associated with
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, or floods (Davidson and Baum, 1991;
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991,
1994; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983; Erickson,
1991).
Why do technological disasters dim inish the long-term psychosocial
health of victims to a greater extent than natural disasters? Perhaps it
is because toxic spills, asbestos decay, or core meltdowns contaminate
rather than dam age ..they pollute, befoul, taint, rather thgm just create
wreckage and they scare hum an beings in new and special ways'...The
prim ordial antipathy to the thought of being poisoned requires little
commentary (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:62).

The anticipatory fears associated w ith toxic exposure speak to the
symbolism of contamination, to the dread of poisoning. Edelman (1964:6)
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notes that a symbol, in addition to representing something other than itself,
also "evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated
through time...which are useful because they help in logical thinking about
the situation and in m anipulating it." He points to tw o basic types of
symbols: the referential w hich are "economical ways of referring to the
objective elements in objective situations"; and the condensation w hich
"evoke the em otion associated w ith the situation."
Examples of referential symbols w ould include statistics, such as those
used in risk assessments, and figures used in a cost-benefit analysis.
Condensation symbols operate on another level — "a check of the imm ediate
environm ent is missing (Edelman, 1964:6)." No example of symbol is either
solely referential or condensation; however in a situation that entails
controversy or conflict, the condensation symbol may take precedence
(Edelman, 1964).
Practically every political act that is controversial or regarded as really
im portant is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol...[which]
symbolizes a threat or reassurance...Because the meaning of the act in
these cases depends only partly or not at all on its objective
consequences, w hich the mass public cannot know, the m eaning can
only come from the psychological needs of the respondents; and it can
only be known from their response (Edelman, 1964:7).

Equally useful in analyzing how the victims and agencies respond to
contam ination are Edelm an s notions of the symbolic forms of rite and myth:
Ritual is m otor activity that involves its participants symbolically in a
common enterprise, calling their attention to their relatedness and
joint interests in a compelling way. It thereby both promotes
conformity and evokes satisfaction and joy in conformity (Edelman,
1964:16).
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A lthough it is difficult to imagine the "joy " of a risk assessor, it is possible
to consider the process of risk assessment as a ritual of referential symbol
collection in the service of a common enterprise w hich brings satisfaction,
and to think of the m utual acceptance of the m eaning of the symbols, as an
expression of conformity. The construction and use of m yth serves to
reinforce the ritual just as the ritual reinforces the myth. In the instance of
contaminated communities it is possible, depending upon whose perspective
is taken, to consider the technocratic activities involved in rem ediation as a
m yth constructed about hum an independence of the physical environm ent
and the ability of technology to control nature (Catton and Dunlap, 1980).
From the perspective of many victims of contamination, protection of
hum an health and the environment may also be a m yth (Edelstein, 1988;
Greider, 1992; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Brown, 1991).
Kroll-Smith and Couch (1991:63) have coined the term "chronic
technological disaster"' to differentiate hum an-caused disasters from the
natural. Among the most im portant differences between CTDs and natural
disasters are those related to cause, duration, uncertainty, the quality of
community support, and the nature of relief efforts (Davidson and Baum,
1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994;
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983). Equally important
are the stigma " (Edelstein, 1988), and distributional issues related to the
likelihood of exposure. Researchers have found that poor and working class
communities are more likely to experience CTDs in their neighborhoods or
w orkplaces than w ealthier communities (Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Greider,
1992; Chavis, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Boyce, 1994;
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Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Wolensky, 1991).
CAUSE
The fact that CTDs are caused by hum an actions, rather than occur as acts
of God, colors the way in w hich victims respond (Davidson and Baum, 1991;
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994;
Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983). N atural forces are generally viewed as
uncontrollable; technology, controllable (Davidson and Baum, 1991; KrollSmith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994;
Edelstein, 1988; Baum et al, 1983).
...technology is supposed to be regulated and managed; there is a
common belief that since we created technology, we should be able to
control it. Further, technological accidents represent violations of
expectations and assum ptions about the world, and this may also
contribute to a sense of loss of control...
Loss of control created by technological mishaps may have farreaching implications. Disasters of this sort may have a w ide spread
im pact on confidence in technological systems in populations not
directly touched by such disasters. Society at large may feel more
vulnerable and distrustful of authorities who are supposed to protect
them. Technological catastrophes may also create dangers which do
not quickly abate (Davidson and Baum, 1991:35).

Because CTDs are caused by hum an action and because people assume that
technology is controllable, CTDs also create a potential for long-term stress
effects in victims (Davidson and Baum, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990,
1991a; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991, 1994; Edelstein, 1988). Two theoretical
models suggest that assignment of responsibility for the CTD is im portant
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). The first model posits that by assigning blame
the process becomes controllable and, therefore may be averted in the future;
the second is based on the notion that peoples' sense of a "just world" is
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threatened by "unpredictable or uncontrollable outcomes (Davidson and
Baum, 1991:37)." So, the assignment of responsibility, or blame, "may be one
way that victims cope w ith their experiences, explain events, and regulate
emotional responses (Davidson and Baum, 1991:37)."
However, research conducted at Three Mile Island up to six years
following the 1979 disaster indicates that stress-related symptoms, which
often include depression, are more likely to be reduced if victims blame
themselves, rather than others. The rationale for the effectiveness of self
blame in stress reduction is that self-blame returns a personal sense of control
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). This is problematic because, given the nature of
"technological accidents," it is more likely that victims will blame others for
their problems, creating social conflict and community dysfunction, and thus
continue to suffer from higher levels of stress during the assessment and
cleanup which are often long-drawn-out affairs, and for years afterwards
(Davidson and Baum, 1991:50).
DURATION
N atural disasters generally result in a "brief moment of terror followed by
an easily defined sequence of inventory, rescue, remedy, and recovery (KrollSmith and Couch, 1991:63)." However, CTDs frequently entail many years of
testing, quantifying, and planning before cleanup begins (Kroll-Smith and
Couch, 1991a; Erikson, 1991; Edelstein, 1988).
CTDS tend to trap a portion of a population in the w arning and threat
stages, freezing them in extended periods of apprehension and
dread...Long-term exposure to w arning and threat, particularly w hen it
is unevenly distributed throughout the population, places severe
dem ands on the coping resources of a population (I&oll-Smith and
Couch, 1991a:63).
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The longer the duration of the "warning and threat stages" and "the more
those stages become institutionalized,...the greater will be the toll on the
affected populations (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991:63)."
UNCERTAINTY
Unlike natural disasters such as tornados, earthquakes and floods, which
leave visible signs of destruction, contam ination is often invisible (KrollSmith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988).
...because the effects of human-caused disaster may not be readily
visible, not only is the occurrence subject to differing interpretations,
but key decisions (e.g., regarding testing, protective measures, and
remediation) may be based on those interpretations. Therefore,
consensus about the cause, course, and possibly outcomes of the crisis is
less likely than w ith natural disaster. Furthermore, because there may
be no visible damage, each family is forced to make its own
determ ination of the significance of the contamination. The lack of
shared beliefs about what has happened opens the way for conflict
w ithin the com munity and betw een the com munity and potential
helpers... (Edelstein, 1988:7).

The uncertainty about the implications can devastate a community (KrollSmith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; D avidson and Baum, 1991; Edelstein, 1988;
Brown, 1991) by undercutting any shared notion of an "objective reality"
w hich often results in "different claims about danger (Kroll-Smith and
Couch, 1991a:63)."
Subjectivity is related to uncertainty. People facing the threat of
chemical contam ination or asbestos poisoning live in a chronic threat
of contingency loss. The greater the degree of contingency or
uncertainty, the greater the need to construct symbolic claims of the
scope and the seriousness of the threat...Several studies suggest that
these symbolic claims 'may be more im portant in determ ining chronic
stress and m ental health effects than is the actual threat or danger
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posed' (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:63).

It is not unusual to find a contaminated community to m apart by
conflicting claims about the nature and extent of the risk presented by toxins
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Erickson, 1991; Brown, 1991;
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992).
THE QUALITY OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT
In addition to conflicts related to uncertainty about the impact of the
contamination, the abihty of the community to respond is often constrained
because the problems related to contamination are so complex that
communities m ust rely upon state or federal agency resources (Kroll-Smith
and Couch, 1990). The technical activities begin w ith an assessment of risk —
this is where the uncertainties often result in conflict.
Because appraisal is a subjective analysis, varied interpretations of a
given event are likely. While some systems take a threat seriously,
others may engage in defensive avoidance. Factors affecting appraisal
include the beliefs of the appraiser, the knowledge of the threat, the
threat’s visibility (e.g., am ount and kind of publicity), and the
significance of the threat.
Once a threat is perceived as legitimate, the affected system may be
forced to continue its existing practices. Thus, for example, most toxic
victims remain in their homes despite concerns over risk of continued
exposure. Some victims will cope w ith this imbalance...by engaging in
a form of denial (Edelstein, 1988:13).

The divisions in the community related to uncertainty also act to
undercut community support for victims. Kroll-Smith and Couch refer to
symbolic constructions of danger as "threat belief systems,” and note that
beliefs "which are internalized ” and "located deeper in the psyche than
perceptions" are "far less easily modified" than perceptions (1991a:63).
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The tenacity of beliefs is explained in part by the fact that they are social
phenom ena. While perceptions issue from sensory stimuli, beliefs are
constructed in conversation, among people who agree that the w orld
or a portion of it is sacred, safe, dangerous, w orthy of trust or distrust,
and so on...Collective agreement strengthens the hold beliefs have on
believers. Perceptions are much more private matters, easier to revise;
to violate a belief, however, is to risk censure and disapproval. Thus,
em bedded in beliefs is a moral claim on believers. They are required to
emote and behave in ways consistent w ith the social reality symbolized
by the beliefs (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:63).

In the uncertainty created by toxic exposure, communities are often
divided into "believers," who "are more likely to have had uncom m on
health problems and other direct experiences that they had related to
chemical exposure," and "non-believers," who "had few er direct impacts
from chemicals and relied on their ow n limited experience and that of close
acquaintances (Edelstein, 1988:48)." The clash between believers and non
believers can become intense, as individuals seek out people w ith similar
beliefs to form support networks (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a; Brown,
1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988).
What emerges are competing views of the same local w orld; it is
dangerous and uninhabitable; you should be concerned; no, the
environm ent is safe and habitable; you should get control of yourself.
Phenomenologists refer to this type of cognitive conflict as reality
disjuncture' and suggest that it can be the source of considerable
psychosocial stress...The social validation necessary to affirm the
individual’s trust that the w orld is as he or she sees it is transformed
into a source of conflict. The very nature of claims-making activity
ensures that the conflict is not over w hatever verifiable inform ation is
available about the hazards. Rather, the dispute is between people who
perceive their antagonists as able but unw illing to cooperate in a
realistic' and 'justifiable' definition of the threat (Kroll-Smith and
Couch, 1991a:65).
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There is no "painless way out" of toxic exposure situations (Edelstein,
1988:93)
Denial allows for a psychological balance to be m aintained but does not
address the external risks. Action involves recognizing the risk, a
frightening prospect in its own right (Edelstein, 1988:93).

Research indicates there is a narrow latitude in which messages divergent
to a person's beliefs may actually act to alter those beliefs, and the more
strongly held the belief the narrow er the latitude of acceptance for divergent
messages (Milburn, 1991). On a community level, that narrow latitude may
be further reduced because believers may be viewed as threats to local
property values or jobs (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Edelstein, 1988).
Frequently the corporate polluter "appears to receive less than its share of
blame," and, as was the case of Hooker Chemical at Love Canal, the
community's "anger and blame may be modified w hen the polluter is a
major source of em ploym ent (Edelstein, 1988:80). "
H ooker was also active in trying to minimize public concern over
health threats. Interestingly, while efforts by the state health
departm ent to allay panic met w ith public anger. Hooker was not
similarly vilified... (Edelstein, 1988:80).

A nother principal employer, Dow Chemical in M idland, Michigan, took a
sim ilar approach w hen dioxin contamination was discovered. The company
"actively m anaged public perception of its responsibility, " stressing "the
m inuteness of the quantities of dioxin found, " producing a brochure called
"The T ruth A bout Dioxin," and m aintaining the community "was a better.
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healthier place because of the corporation (Edelstein, 1988:80)." Despite
indications the corporation previously had lied about dioxin and secretly
edited a key EPA report, "many residents firmly backed the corporation
(Edelstein, 1988:80)." Corporate ability to deflect public anger can have an
adverse affect on governm ent agencies w orking in the com munity —
although victims m ay excuse corporate behavior, they view governm ent as
the agent to protect them, as the source of accurate information, and as the
regulator of corporate behavior (Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). Therefore, the
anger in the community is often directed at the governm ent agency that is
m andated to help (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider,
1992).
THE NATURE OF RELIEF EFFORTS
In a natural disaster relief efforts tend to focus on hum anistic activities,
e.g., providing shelter, food, and medical supplies for affected citizens; in
CI'Ds relief efforts are technically designed to dispose of the contaminant
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). The situation is further com pounded by the
technocratic tendency "to define chronic technological disasters as
engineering puzzles rather than as hum an or social problems, and to assign
to technical agencies the lead role in managing the crisis. The engineers and
other specialists who staff such agencies are used to tackling technological, not
hum an, problems... (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990:29)." Victims, w ho very
understandably have an emotional reaction to their exposures, are not
reassured by engineers who are speaking a very different language and
addressing a very different set .of concerns (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; KrollSmith and Couch, 1991a; Greider, 1992). One of the prim e directives of
governm ent agencies w orking in contaminated com munities is to avoid
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panic (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Brown,
1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). The federal Superfund law, CERCLA (the
Com prehensive Environm ental Response, Com pensation and Liability Act of
1980), one of three federal laws that regulate hazardous materials, directs EPA
action in contam inated

c o m m u n itie s .^

The EPA defines hazardous waste as

"either toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or reactive materials w hich can be
transm itted through all environm ental m edia — air, water, biota, and land
(Hird, 1994:5)."
The Superfund law is prem ised on the notion that the polluter pays. In
the language of the law, potentially responsible parties are identified by the
federal EPA and ordered to pay for the cleanup of sites the EPA has placed on
the N ational Priorities List. However, there are "limits to the law," (Yeager,
1991) the result of the political economy in which the law operates (Yeager,
1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). Unresolved is the inherent
tension betw een environm ental protection and the needs of an overarching
economic system predicated on profit and accumulation (Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). Social regulation is forged from a
conflict between the corporate drive for profit and the public insistence that it
be protected from the pollution that results from industrial production
(Schnaiberg and Could, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). Thus,
there is a tension betw een maintaining the existing social order while, at the
same time, maintaining the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those being
governed. To juggle both contradictory goals, regulation is intended to order
the inherent conflict and channel it though interactive decision-making
bodies: legislature, adm inistrative agencies, and the courts (Barnett, 1994).
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Regulation therefore allows a perpetuation of conflict. The resulting
system embodies contradictions and prom otes neither efficiency nor
equity (Barnett, 1994:48),

W ithin context of the Superfund law, this conflict m anifests itself as
disputes over w ho will pay the toxic debt and the impact of this conflict on
interdependent funding and enforcement (Barnett, 1994). Because cleanup
costs are high, interested parties exercise political and economic pow er to
affect regulatory outcomes. In the case of Superfund, industry can use
"significant economic resources" to delay im plem entation by challenging
federal and state agencies in court while sim ultaneously using "significant
political power" to appeal to the White House and influence Congressional
oversight (Barnett, 1994:47). W hen the public agrees that the "polluter pays,"
but, in reality, the action taken is symbolic and the cost is actually socialized,
distributional outcomes m ust be hidden, so "public perceptions m ust be
m anipulated (Barnett, 1994:47)." This m anipulation has occurred in the
financing of the Superfund program through a feedstock tax, which is actually
paid by consumers, and in the argum ents that Superfund sites are not a
serious threat to hum an health (Barnett, 1994). Additionally, poor regulatory
outcomes are frequently blam ed on bureaucratic inefficiency or too aggressive
and accommodative regulators, rather than on inadequate funding.
However, inadequate funding provides too superficial an explanation of
governm ent agencies' activities (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and
Could, 1994).
Agencies, such as the EPA, are caught in the m iddle of the unresolved
private/public conflict (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and Could,
1994). To negotiate this dangerous territory, agencies minimize the
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political opposition of regulated industries by em bodying legal m andates into
"a series of apparently neutral, technical decisions (Yeager, 1991:40)." The
result is that decisions are m ade on the basis of limits im posed by the law, e.g.,
amounts of specific substances that trigger action versus am ounts of the same
contam inant that are viewed "acceptable," as well as technical requirem ents
and feasibility and cost-benefit analysis (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). The
technocratic approach has serious implications: first, it limits discourse about
contamination; and second, reliance upon cost-benefit analysis both assets the
importance of private production over the public interest, and places legally
prohibited corporate conduct in the realm of moral ambivalence, thereby
constraining the condemnation necessary to the deterrent effect of law
(Yeager, 1991). This creates additional tensions because many victims of
contamination view their plight in a larger context than that used by
technocrats and, often, victims' concerns are framed in the language of moral
outrage (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette,
1991; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Clarke, 1991).
These tensions frequently surface as the conflict between competing belief
systems: technocrats believe that the contaminants and their potential
impacts are measureable, and that these measurements are sufficient to both
identify the risk and design a cleanup, or remediation, plan; victims tend to
look to issues of ethics, justice, and the imm easureable implications, such as
future illnesses and impacts upon future generations (Edelstein, 1988;
Schrader- Frechette, 1991). The Superfund law m andates that the EPA
consider long-term effectiveness, reduction of toxicity, mobility, volum e of
contaminants, short-term effectiveness, im plem entability and cost; once this
is done, the agency m ust consider state and community acceptance of a
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cleanup plan (Hird, 1994). To mediate these often conflicting criteria, the
agency relies upon risk assessment which is predicated on the notion that
defensible "hard science" will provide an objective basis for decision
(Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Schrader-Frechette,
1991; Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991). However, objectivity is likely
impossible because "victims are not the only people who construct their
reality socially; we all do, even those of us who call ourselves scientists (KrollSmith and Couch, 1991a:65)." The dichotomy betw een the "objectivity" of the
risk assessor and the "subjectivity" of the victim is difficult to justify
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991). It "is incompatible w ith form ulation of any
scientific theory or analysis to explain causal connections" because during the
developm ent of theory or analysis, value judgm ents m ust be made, e.g., the
process entails the use of normative evaluative criteria in the selection of
options (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:43).
The real issue is w hether an evaluation is normative in a way that is
misleading, incomplete, question begging, or implausible...risk
assessment can be objective and testable, but not wholly value free
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:45-46).

Critics of risk assessment typically focus upon the reductionist and
exclusionist nature of the risk assessment process, as currently utilized
(Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Schrader-Frechette,
1991; Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992). There are other grounds for criticism. Risk
assessors are inclined to underestim ate risk probabilities because many
assessments are conducted by assessors closely associated w ith the technology
under evaluation so are sym pathetic both to the technology and to those
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im plem enting it, and because it is extremely difficult to identify all the
possible risks, assessors generally "assume unidentified risks are zero
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:134)."
In many contaminated communities, the risk assessment process has
become the focus of conflict between victims of exposure and government
officials (Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Greider, 1992;
Brown, 1991; Clarke, 1991). Victims often question what they see as arbitrary
threshold limits, e.g., under legally established threshold limits it is possible
that one family's home will be subject to cleanup action w hile the home of
the family next door which may have five parts per billion less of the same
contam inant is not (Edelstein, 1988). Victims ask for explanations of illnesses
in their neighborhoods that they associate w ith exposure (Kroll-Smith and
Couch, 1991; Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). They fear future
health effects and the impact on the next generation (Kroll-Smith and Couch,
1991a; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992). However, the EPA, which is oriented
tow ard technical solutions, has few physicians on its staff to address these
concerns (Yeager, 1991). So, once the threat has been discovered and
disclosed, beyond technical explanations, "government is unable to provide
further clarification (Edelstein, 1988:77)." Victims, often angry because their
questions are unansw ered, may become suspicious of governm ent (Edelstein,
1988; Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). This
suspicion is often intensified by agreements (orders of consent) that
governm ent officials reach w ith polluters, w hich are viewed as representing
the polluter rather than victims (Edelstein, 1988). Accusations that
governm ent officials have not rem edied the problem, that citizens' concerns
have been ignored are frequently the result of these deepening suspicions
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(Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
The result is an "expert-judgement strategy," (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78)
the behef that risk can be reduced to some characteristics w hich can be
determ ined only by experts or that experts only are capable of distinguishing
betw een "actual" rather than "perceived" risk. The strategy also manifests
itself in the assessors' presupposition that a technological risk is defined
purely in term s of m easureable physical impact even though social impact
includes "increased traum a or decreased civil liberties' as part of the risk itself
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78). The resulting conflict between experts and
victims is further intensified because the Superfund law confines public
participation to attendance at meetings and comment on governm ent
proposals — limitations which often anger victims (Fiorino, 1990; Greider,
1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
There are a host of problems w ith risk assessment as currently practiced
(Lappé, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991). In terms
of public health issues related to exposure, the risk assessment process
overlooks synergies, relies upon thresholds which im ply beneath a certain
exposure level there is no health risk, and has insufficient inform ation about
many of the chemicals found at Superfund sites (Lappé, 1991). Additionally,
final risk assessment figures are probabilities only; not a guarantee of illness
or health (Cortese, 1993). Further, research into the historical developm ent of
workplace threshold limit values (TLVs), the standards beyond which people
should not receive exposure, indicates a questionable level of corporate
influence on the developm ent of these standards (Castleman and Ziem, 1988).
Also, in their attem pt to avoid panic, governm ent officials may w ithhold
inform ation from the public (Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988) which only
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intensifies victims' suspicion that their plight is m ore serious than officials
are willing to acknowledge.
Even w hen governm ent agencies determ ine that contam ination poses a
public health threat, victims find it difficult to prove their illnesses are related
to exposure (Lappé, 1991; Brown, 1991; Cortese, 1993). Statistics may prove
that a particular illness is associated w ith or correlated to a contaminant in
the neighborhood, how ever a correlation does not constitute causality (Bates,
1994).
In terms of the strength of an association, it is true that the stronger it
is, the better evidence it provides tow ard causality. However, such
factors as poor exposure measurement..., variability in outcome..., or
the fact that we are studying multifactorial disease (such as asthma), all
will act to weaken w hat might otherwise be a strong association. In
other worlds, unless exposure and outcome are well characterized, we
cannot dismiss a weak' association as necessarily representing reality
(Bates, 1994:62).

To victims who see a pattern of illness in their neighborhoods, the
distinction between association and causality is arbitrary (Brown, 1991;
Greider, 1992). Public skepticism of this sort resulted in the first case of what
has since become know n as lay or popular epidemiology in W obum,
Massachusetts (Brown, 1991). Popular epidemiology is a "process by which lay
persons gather scientific data and other information, and also direct and
m arshall the know ledge and resources of experts in order to understand the
epidemiology of disease (Brown, 1991:135)." Because the public considers
public health in a much broader context than experts, popular epidemiology
tends to be far m ore inclusive than professional epidemiology.
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Popular epidemiology takes into account social structural factors,
involves social movements, utilizes political and judicial approaches
to remedies, and challenges basic assum ptions of traditional
epidemiology, risk assessment, and environm ental regulation (Brown,
1991:135).

Popular epidemiology, w hich consisted of intensive surveying conducted
by residents in W obum , also provides a way to research medical information
about possible exposure effects, inform ation w hich is often difficult for
victims to obtain (Edelstein, 1988: Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991). Some members
of the medical profession (Lappé, 1991; Cortese, 1993) m aintain that
environm ental degradation poses a serious threat to public health.
The physical environm ent is the m ost im portant determ inant of
public health...[and] protection of the environm ent and preservation of
ecosystems are, in public health terms, the most fundam ental steps in
preventing hum an illness (Cortese, 1993:1).

Yet, physicians working in contam inated communities often lack the
training to answer their patients' questions about toxic exposure (Cortese,
1993), so victims’ concerns are often dismissed by their family physicians
(Edelstein, 1988). The victims' medical problem s thus become a personal
"trouble" rather than a social problem (Edelstein, 1988). The privatization of
a public problem results in the failure to acknowledge or address the public
problem. Popular epidemiology may provide a basis to to acknowledge that
public health impacts of contamination are a public problem and to challenge
the official failure to address the issue (Brown, 1991).
STIGMA
How ever, w hatever route victims may take to challenge governm ent
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determ inations of the problem or cleanup plans, they are bound to encounter
some resistance w ithin their communities (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b;
Edelstein, 1988). Some of the resistance is the result of the uncertainty of
exposure effects which is open to different interpretations (Kroll-Smith and
Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988); some is related to the stigma attached to
contaminated communities (Edelstein, 1988). The com munity w ithin the
boundaries draw n by government officials is stigmatized by the
contamination, it is m arked as "deviant, flawed, spoiled, or generally
undesirable (Edelstein, 1988:14)."
When the m ark is noticed, it changes in a negative and discrediting
way how the observer sees the victim, whose identification is now
spoiled. And because we tend to assume that people deserve what
happens to them, stigma readily invites a tendency to blame the victim
(Edelstein, 1988:14).

The contaminated community becomes both a place to avoid and the
source of "anticipatory fears (Edelstein, 1988:14)." Thus, victims tend to see
themselves differently:
...in part, because they fear dreaded health impacts such as cancers,
threats to unborn children, and cross-generational genetic effects.
Victims also discover that others see them differently as well. Their
homes and neighborhood are dow ngraded by observers who exhibit
anticipatory fears' about the place.
Anticipatory fears are perceptions of threat associated w ith future
outcomes that are connected casually to current happenings (Edelstein,
1988:14).

D uring the process of mobilizing to challenge official definitions of the
problem a n d /o r official plans to rem edy that problem, activists m ust take
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their concerns into the public arena (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider,
1992). This often brings them into direct conflict, not only w ith the
governm ent officials they challenge, b u t w ith members of their ow n
community (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991). A common result of stigma
associated w ith the label of contaminated community is reduced property
value and difficulty in selling property w ithin the boundaries of
contam ination (Edelstein, 1988).
...real estate agents often aggravated already high tension by reminding
residents that it was community-generated publicity that had given
Legler its bad name. This was truly a dilemma; w ithout publicity,
residents had no means of pressuring governm ent for assistance
(Edelstein, 1988:67).

So victims are trapped in a double-bind: to ensure that possible health
effects of exposure are addressed they m ust take their case to the public; yet, in
so doing, in addition to exacerbating tensions w ithin their community, the
publicity they generate often makes it harder for them to sell their own
homes and relocate. Unlike the corporations often responsible for the
contamination, most victims do not have the financial means to abandon
their property, take a tax loss, and relocate to a presumably safer place
(Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). Instead, victims are trapped in a situation
they believe to be dangerous to their own and families' health.
DISTRIBUTION
A lthough not universally accepted, many researchers report that toxic
exposures are correlated to income and race: the poorer, and often, less white
the community, the more likely it is to be exposed to contamination (Chavis,
1993; Greider, 1992; Bullard, 1993; Buttel and Flinn, 1978; Wolensky, 1991).
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Further, many communities w ith existing pollution may be view ed as good
candidates for more polluting industries (Bullard, 1993). The reasoning for
this is circular: better to site such an industry in an already contaminated
conununity than to place a pristine community at risk (Bullard, 1993; Greider,
1992; Edelstein, 1988), Also problematic is that communities w ith pollution
may be less sensitive to the impact of additional polluting industries (Bullard,
1993; Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). Activists in these contaminated
com m unities have become know n as the environm ental justice movement
which consists, primarily, of grassroots groups (Bullard, 1993; Chavis, 1993;
Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993). Many of these groups have been accused of
suffering from the NIMBY, Not In My Back Yard, syndrom e (Bullard, 1993;
Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993). Members reply that they are fighting to
keep poisons out of everyone’s back yard (Bullard, 1993; Greider, 1992). These
groups have been the subject of much research, prim arily focused upon the
risk beliefs of members (Freudenburg, 1993). The majority of the research
stemmed from examinations of differences between expert and lay risk
judgments, which, experts charged, were the result of lay ignorance and
irrationality (Freudenburg, 1993).
However, sociological studies have dem onstrated "repeatedly that
ignorance and irrationality are not the significant issues," so it is time to
consider both the "nature of rationality' and the risk-related implications of
the social division of labor (Freudenburg, 1993:913)." As technological
approaches become more and more elaborate, the very real possibility of risk
associated w ith system failure becomes an issue (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Freudenburg, 1993). Sociologist William Freudenburg (1993:915) uses the
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term "recreancy" to address the possibility that the intricate division of labor
in technocratic bureaucracies "may increase societal vulnerability to cases
w hen duties are not carried out properly — w hether the fault' is one of
individual actors or of a broader system in w hich im portant responsibilities
may fall through the institutional cracks."
Research indicates that technocratic charges that public concerns about
toxic waste facilities or other land uses deem ed undesirable by a community
are based in "ignorance/irrationality or of undesirable selfishness" cannot be
supported (Freudenburg, 1993). Research further indicates often citizens,
rather than authorities, discovered problems related to contam ination
(Freudenburg, 1993). Also, studies have shown that citizen activism is
generally a response to governm ent inactivity or failure w hich is an
im portant part of recreancy (Freudenburg, 1993). Much of the literature
(Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Freudenburg, 1993) reflects this
type of recreancy. The possibility of recreancy could be very im portant in
Butte w here controls will be implem ented to m onitor land use in areas
where contamination will remain (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Craig, 7/30/95;
ARCO/ Butte-Silver Bow, 1993).
Researchers point to the possibility of social change in contaminated
com munities (Wolensky, 1991; Wenger, 1978; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a;
Greider, 1992; Chavis, 1993; Bullard, 1993; Cable and Walsh, 1991; Brown,
1991). The thesis will consider this possibility in Butte.
The following chapters will examine the specifics of Butte in relation to
the general themes of the literature, pointing out those instances w here Butte
differs and the possible implications of those differences.
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1 This paper considers capitalism because that is the structure of the
American economy; this is in no way to indicate that contamination does not
occur in other economic structures. Clearly, the documented pollution in
Eastern Europe indicates that state socialism has been no kinder to the
environment or more protective of human health than Western industrialized
capitalism. The commonality between the two systems is very likely a belief in
the Human Exemptionalist Paradigm (Catton and Dunlap, 1980).
2 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of "technology" will be that of
Jacques Ellul (1991): technology is not merely machinery or equipment; it
includes the assumptions of rationality and manipulation, as well as a
hierarchy of technocrats to ensure both continued development of new
technology and proper applications of existing technology.
3 These costs are what economists refer to as "opportunity costs," the net
benefit that has been foregone because the resources used can no longer be
used for their next beneficial use.
^ Boyce (1994) defines time preference in terms of "the willingness to trade
present benefits (or costs) for future benefits (or costs). People with a higher
rate of time preference place greater weight on the present." (176)
Environmentally degrading activities often generate short-term benefits and
long-term costs (Boyce, 1994; Greider, 1992; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994).
5 The other two laws are the federal Toxic Substances Control Act, which
regulates the introduction and use of new hazardous chemicals, and the
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which regulates disposal of
hazardous wastes into the air, water and land, and imposes a system to track all
hazardous wastes (Hird, 1994).
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THE CONTESTED TERRAIN OF BUTTE
Some 80 to a 100 million years ago, propelled by gigantic shifting plates
and vast cauldrons of steaming lava, the Rocky M ountains groaned up
through the earth's trembling crust. The massive eruption was followed by
the emergence of enormous seas, lakes, and sw am ps which, two million years
ago, disappeared in a frigid flow as boulder-strewn glaciers from Canada crept
south, scouring the newly-formed landscape. Four times the ice cap advanced
and receded, leaving giant folds of earth, U-shaped valleys and stony cirques,
horns, and aretes in its wake. This is M ontana - the product of almost
incomprehensibly pow erful subterranean geologic forces (Malone et al, 1993).
Butte, M ontana balances on granite rocks from the Boulder bathoHth, a
massive body of plutonic rock, formed of fire, then cooled. The batholith
destroyed and melted much of the structure it invaded, leaving giant
fractures and faults, and minerals. In the upper 100 to 200 feet of weathered
bedrock it left deposits of copper and other metals — in time, this legacy
brought Butte into existence (USEPA, 12/15/93).
H istorian K. Ross Toole (1959) maintains that the bounty that resulted
from these violent vagaries of nature - huge tracts of conifers populated by
fur-bearing animals, seemingly never-ending plains darkened for miles by
bison herds, and massive m ineral deposits - preordained M ontana’s
developm ent pattern as a "colonial economy."
Nature, not the evil designs of men, decreed that M ontana be a place
w ith a colonial economy. The object of men had to be to trap it, mine
it, shoot it, and get out. Every one of the salient industries has been
extractive, from beaver through beef to copper. The capital required for
frantic exploitation, w hether of furs, cattle, silver, lumber, or copper,
had to come from the East and as Eastern capital flowed westward,
control and the bulk of the wealth flowed eastward (Toole, 1959:9).
58
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A lthough Toole’s w ork chronicles, and is critical of, the state's treatm ent
as a resource colony, he treats Montana as if it were an exception, singled out
for its unique characteristics, as a land of promise (W. Robbins, 1994).
H istorian WilUam G. Robbins (1994:4) refers to this focus of "attention on the
evolution and expansion of the nation-state and on the positioning of the
West w ithin an insular ideological context, " as an exceptionalist tendency."
The focus is problematic because it leaves unquestioned the fact that "like
other empires before it, the United States has generated a series of
legitimizing myths to sanction its push to the w estern sea," (W. Robbins,
1994:4) leading to the notion that somehow the American culture stands
"apart, independent and unique from the experience of other nations (W.
Robbins, 1994:5)."
A lthough the exceptionalist theme is recurrent in studies of American
history, it is especially and most glaringly obvious in interpretations of
the American West...in w hat has become the great American myth, it
was above all the promise of the West that loomed largest; for it was
there that people w ould find the answer to their quest for a better life.
Reality, in that special sense, was less im portant than the symbols
through which people perceived a larger design; indeed, in that
scheme, symbol and m yth passed for reality. In an approach that has
been called a "trium phalist literature," the easy virtues of dram a
served as a substitute for explanation and interpretation.
A more inclusive understanding of W estern America rests in the
ability to grasp the full m eaning of capitalism: the set of values and
perceptions associated w ith that phenom enon, its structural
framework as expressed in social and political relations, and its
pervasive reach through American life... (W. Robbins, 1994:6-7).
Toole leaves unquestioned how it came to be that M ontana was seen as a
place to "trap it, mine it, shoot it, and get out. " Toole’s statement assumes
that, given M ontana's natural resources, no other developm ent path was
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possible; that is not the case. It is true that developm ent patterns in a
capitalistic system turned M ontana into a resource colony, however Toole
presents his history as a struggle for equitable distribution of profits rather
than questioning if there were another alternative. He assumes the model of
capitalism was inevitable. It is also true that the developm ent path taken
assumed that man, as the master of the earth, will control the natural world
w ith new technologies created through applied science (Merchant, 1992).
However, m ankind did not always look at the earth through that lens of
mastery, nor was such a shift in thought an inevitability.
A num ber of factors — among them, a new vision of the earth as inert
(Merchant, 1992), the developm ent of protestantism w hich encouraged the
accumulation of wealth and search for profits (Hunt, 1990), the emergence of
a rationalized body of science incorporated into the scientific method which
stressed objective, value-free, ahistorical, and reductionist knowledge
(Merchant, 1992), and the development of a free-market system of economics
(Hunt, 1990) — combined to create a worldview that fostered the creation of
Montana as resource colony.
The state's resources were discovered in the m id-nineteenth century. By
mid-1862, the gold mines of California, Nevada, and Colorado were in
decline, prospectors had m ade new discoveries along the w estern slopes of
the Rockies in Idaho, and the new Mullan Road provided an established
route to the Idaho mines; four years later M ontana was the second largest
United States gold producer; only California produced more (Malone et al,
1993). Little technology was needed - miners had only to pan along streams
to find the placer gold that the combined forces of time, wind, glacial ice, rain
and chemicals had eroded from large veins of ore and swept, in the form of
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dust, flakes, or nuggets, into streambeds (Malone et al, 1993). After the short
lived placer gold rush, the boom town of Silver Bow City, was almost deserted
— just 241 of its 5,000 people were left (J. Robbins, 1994).
But Butte's future d id not rest on gold. Some thought that silver was the
key to Butte's future (Malone et al, 1993). Federal governm ent policies,
designed to facilitate the "opening u p " of the West, greatly enhanced mining
in Butte. By 1876, stimulated by the arrival of the railroad in western
Montana in the first three years of that decade, and by passage of the 1872
federal M ining Law, silver mines were beginning to produce in Butte.
Montana's silver boom drew w ealthy investors who began to dom inate the
scene (Malone et al, 1993).
The federal Mining Act was an open invitation to m iners to stake their
claims. Among the encouraging provisions: the granting of "a right to
mine"; a miner's right to say a claim has been m ade and tie up the land from
further use by other miners, public users, and the United States government;
the right of the m iner to use the property fully as long as the use is
"reasonably incident to mining, " which has been interpreted to mean the
right to construct a home, cut timber, graze cattle, and divert water; the
creation of a constitutionally protected property right that exists from the
m om ent a m iner makes a discovery; the inability of the federal governm ent
to w ithdraw lands from m ining use unless the governm ent pays a m iner
w ith a patented claim the value of the mineral rights and the land; and the
lack of a restriction upon the num ber of claims that can be accumulated by an
individual or corporation (Wilkinson, 1992).

For $2.50 a placer m iner could

stake a claim; for $5.00, a quartz m iner — the fees have never been increased
(W ilkinson, 1992).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
In 1872 William A. Clark came to Butte 0. Robbins, 1994). Four years later,
Marcus Daly arrived to assess silver properties for Salt Lake mining investors
(Malone et al, 1993). Daly brought to Butte both the technology to mine silver
and the first outside capital and expertise 0. Robbins, 1994). Because quartz
mining, unlike placer mining, required corporate organization and capital, it
fostered the banking and legal professions (Toole, 1959). And quartz mining
created a host of new industries - the mines' need for tim ber created the
timber industry, processing requirements brought forth stam p mills and
reduction plants, shipping required roads. In addition to miners, the
companies needed support personnel (Toole, 1959).
In 1880, N ew Yorker Michael Hickey, who had nam ed his Butte company
after the giant anaconda snake, sold the property to Daly. In search of
desperately needed capital for expansion, men such as William Andrew
Clark, Samuel T. Hauser, Marcus Daly, and others regularly visited cities in
the East or Far West. More and more, policy decisions were made by
investors with no knowledge of Butte or M ontana (Toole, 1995). By 1883, the
Montana territory was the second largest supplier of silver, a position it held
until the mid 1890s. But the global market for silver was unstable, largely
because so much of the silver w ent to the manufacture of coins used as
currency. W orld silver prices rose and fell on government monetary policies
(Malone et al, 1993). In 1893 a severe economic depression wreaked havoc on
the silver industry. Convinced that the national silver purchase program
was the major cause of the depression. President Grover Cleveland prevailed
upon Congress to repeal the silver purchase act, ending mandatory
governm ent purchase of the metal. ^ The economies of mining states were
devastated by falling silver prices (Malone et al, 1993).
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Butte, however, had more than silver to mine - it had vast copper
deposits. After 1893, copper became the most im portant product of Butte's
mines. The invention of incandescent lights and the telephone created a
need for copper wire to criss-cross the rapidly industrializing country.
Thomas Edison's pioneer plant alone used 128,793 pounds of copper for
wiring and equipm ent (Marcossen, 1957). In 1881, the Union Pacific railroad
tracks arrived in Butte (J. Robbins, 1994). Butte was here to stay.
In addition to large capital investments, copper m ining needed a stable
work force. Butte prom ised a fair living and job stability. Miners came in
droves. By 1895 Butte's 6,400 miners took home $640,000 each m onth for
their part in producing more than one-quarter of the w orld's copper
(Emmons, 1990). They w orked in the Alice, Glengarry, M ountain Con,
Bluebird Trail, O rphan Girl, Anselmo, Original, Lexington, Travona,
Neversweat, Nipper, Rarus, "Wake up Jim," and Badger State Mines. They
lived in Dublin Gulch, Seldom Seen, Nanny Goat Hill, Chicken Flats, and
Dogtown. They drank in The Alley Cat, Open-All-Night, Bucket of Blood, Big
Stope, Graveyard, and Pay Day. (Writers' Program, 1943) They answered to
Buckets, Paddy the Duck, Goggle-eyed Tom, Danny the Dawg, Two-Bit Billie,
and Swede M urphy (Duffy, undated).
These colorful characters created a braw ling wide-open anomaly - a city
distinctly eastern in its im m igration population, Catholicism, politics, and
industrialization scrambling u p a remote W estern mountain. They were
serviced by saloons and w hat was reputedly the largest red-light district in the
West (J. Robbins, 1994). Their stories have entered the realm of popular
mythology, creating a history that is larger than life (Writers' Program, 1943).
As Butte developed, the only commonality between the brash city and the
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rural state was found in their w eather and newness, historian David
Emmons (1990:62) notes:
There was no congruity between the city and the state, little sense of a
common past and even less anticipation of a shared future.
Butte w ould pay a price for its differences w ith the rest of the state.
Perhaps the most immediate price was Butte’s isolation from the rest of the
state, combined w ith a largely im m igrant population w ith no firm sense
of American social reality, which gave the Anaconda Company and other
major m ining companies a free hand to construct the type of community
most helpful to their interests (Finn, 1995; Emmons, 1990). It was the Irish
who acknowledged, and celebrated, their differences from the rest of the state
by referring to their home as "Butte, America (Emmons, 1990). " Other
difference-related problems w ould surface later in Butte's history.
Butte was exploding. From the Flats at 5,400 feet above sea level north up
the steep incline of Butte Hill to Walkerville at 6,500 ft, tiny m iners’ homes
crept up the hill, huddled together against the cold and w ind. On the west
end of town, the men who came to be called the "Copper Kings" constructed
mansions of brick, stained glass, and turrets in Eastern fashion. The changes
were fast and furious. The national need for copper was voracious (Malone,
1995; Emmons, 1990; J. Robbins, 1994).
Marcus Daly’s newly formed Anaconda Mining Company was the largest
m ining operation in Butte. In search of the vast amounts of lum ber
necessary to fuel the smelters, and timbers to shore up mine tunnels, Daly
formed a logging company which, w ithin a few years, illegally denuded the
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m ountains near Butte (J. Robbins, 1994). The company also began to generate
pow er for its furnaces. It spread into other commercial holdings - real estate,
farm land, hotels, railroads, w ater and electrical companies. By 1895, w hen
Daly reorganized the Anaconda Copper Mining Company as a public
company, most M ontanans referred to it as "the Company (J. Robbins, 1994)."
The landscape had changed dramatically:
They had roasting heaps dow n around the smelters. Down in
Meaderville and dow n at Clark's Reduction Works and so on. Boston
and M ontana smelters, things like that. They p u t out such a poisonous
atmosphere that it killed everything. All the grass, every doggoned
thing that grew around Butte. It was the most desert-like area you
could imagine. All the trees on Timber Butte. Gee, that used to be
covered with beautiful trees, but 1 never paid too much attention to
them because I was too small at the time they were
flourishing...w hopping big pine trees killed...and all the timber on East
Ridge as far as the smoke reached.
Sometimes the smoke was so thick in Butte that they had to put
bells on the teams. You couldn’t see across the street...Just a bare desert
out on the Flat. There was great big desert storms that came up
whenever there was a strong wind... (Looking Back on Butte Hill;34).

In the lexicon of the times, this was progress. The copper was used to
develop other burgeoning industries. Corporations w ere m aking huge
profits. The West was being won, reshaped to meet production standards,
and the land was dying under the onslaught. Blinded by smelter smoke, and
caught up in a fundam ental struggle for survival that depended upon
meeting production quotas, Butte's im m igrant workers settled in (Toole,
1959; Malone, 1995; Robbins, 1994; Emmons, 1990). The environmental
degradation was the price to be paid for steady jobs w hich meant the married
miners could p u t food on the family table and try to ensure their children did
not have to go dow n into the mines (Enunons, 1990). Father Sarsfield
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O'Sullivan, a Roman Catholic priest in Butte, w atched the im m igrant miners
adjust to life in Butte:
... The average imm igrant, as distinct from the m iner from
Pennsylvania,...if he d id n 't manage to get out of the mines himself, he
w ould do anything to get his son out. Even when I was graduating
from high school [in Ireland] we were shipping out my generation..
"The im m igrants w eren't people w ho thought. Oh, isn't m ining fun.
Down in dark and dangerous holes... (Oral history transcripts: 1)
A round Butte there is a lot of beautiful nature, but everything is
about nine miles away from you. You don't experience nature until
Spring w hen you w ent for a hike. Kids played on dum ps. Butte was in
a beautiful setting and yet it was divorced from nature. (Oral History
Transcript 5)

Ironically, the deeper the miners dug into the earth, the more
disconnected they became from the natural world. The tow ering gallows
frames, m ine dum ps, and slag heaps on Butte Hill were viewed as the life of
the community - both as the economic security that sustained them, and as
the trium ph of their struggles to survive in the dark and frightening tunnels
beneath the Hill (Enunons, 1990). The forces of the natural world, which they
daily faced beneath Butte Hill, were justifiably feared because so often they
brought death.
Meanwhile the Anaconda Copper Mining Company was burrow ing into
every facet of the lives of M ontana's inhabitants. By 1900, Anaconda
employed nearly three-quarters of the state's wage earners (Toole, 1972).
With every new m iner and every foot deeper into the earth, more capital was
invested and alternative developm ent paths less likely to be considered. The
miners kept coming. By 1888, smelter smoke had killed trees and vegetation
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and a national m agazine described the m iners’ housing as "hovels - untidy,
neglected, and oppressive (Emmons, 1990:74)." Three years later, the Butte
Interm ountain reported that 1,134 people lived in 141 houses in the Irish
working class T hird W ard and, that in this entire area, there was no new
vegetation from 1890-1891 (Emmons, 1990).
The vast gulf between the w ealth of the Copper Kings and the poverty of
the workers was becoming more apparent w ith every m iner’s shack
constructed on w hat Finn (1995) refers to as borrow ed land, ” land that might,
in the future, be claimed by the mining companies as they traced the veins of
ore through the depths of Butte Hill. Somehow the culture created w ould
have to minimize and offer an acceptable explanation for that uneven
distribution of wealth. In the larger culture, the notion of equality was
fostered. Writers of the day, like Horatio Alger, popularized the notion that
hard w ork and perseverance w ould bring success in America. The
possibilities were endless. But, in Butte, everyone w orked hard - miners
w orked dangerous jobs and women struggled to hold their families and the
new community together. More of a sense of possibilities was needed in this
harsh place.
In Butte, the Catholic schools, which serviced a larger area than
individual public school districts, brought many children of m anagem ent and
labor together, fostering the notion of a community less bound by class
distinctions (Finn, 1995). Their familiarity as children likely also served to
m ediate some of their inevitable m anagem ent/ labor conflicts w hen they met
in the w ork force as adults. As the city grew, shared experiences also
reinforced a sense of classless community. Gala affairs were held at Columbia
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Gardens, the oasis of green W.A. Clark gave to the town, and Anaconda funds
helped to m aintain (Finn, 1995). Residents shared theater performances,
movies, lunch and dinner at restaurants strew n about the city's ethnicallydiverse neighborhoods. This rough western city rapidly became a
cosmopolitan center (Robbins, 1993; Malone et al, 1993). U nder that veneer of
culture shared by all, the working class neighborhood and associational
groups offered pockets of identity - sometimes offering community strength,
and sometimes heightening ethnic and class tensions (Finn, 1995).
Butte's largely Irish Butte Miner's Union, form ed as the result of the strike
of 1878, had benefited both from Marcus Daly's sympathy, or paternalism, and
the ongoing feud between Copper Kings Daly and W.A. Clark, and later, F.
A ugustus Heinze (Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1959). The Butte Miners' Union's
role as the birthplace of western mining unionism, and as the first local of the
Western Federation of Miners, had earned Butte the title the "Gibraltar of
Unionism (Emmons, 1990)." Buffered by Daly, Butte developed a very
different culture than the mining camps in Idaho and Colorado that would
soon become the scene of violent labor conflicts (Emmons, 1990). The Butte
union was dom inated by im m igrant Irish who saw the union as a way to
maintain the job security that the Irish enclave needed both to survive so far
from home, and to work for Ireland's liberation from the British.2 Union
control was greatly assisted by Daly, whose preferential treatment of the Irishdom inated union, "blurred class distinctions and contributed to w orker
conservatism (Emmons, 1990:190)."
...the working Irish could never be persuaded that he [Daly} was an evil
man. By their cultural standards, to assign evil to Daly was selfproscriptive. It dam ned them aU. (Emmons, 1990:193)
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Daly's preference also perpetuated the notion that the Irish were entitled
to have some control over the labor force and that they had a say in the way
their community developed (Emmons, 1990). A ided by Daly, the Butte
Miners' Union w on an eight-hour day, dem anded, and got, a closed shop
(Emmons, 1990). But the degree of cooperation from the more pow erful
would soon radically change, creating rigid divisions between labor and
m anagem ent, and bringing to light fault lines running through the union's
m em bership.
In 1887, the mining industry was faced w ith the prospect of losing possible
foreign investment, the result of a provision in the federal Alien Land Law
which restricted foreign investment in territories. Two years later, the federal
Omnibus Bill notified M ontanans if they drew u p a proper constitution, they
would be immediately granted statehood. That same year, 1889, Montana
became a state (Malone et al, 1993), open for business.
The Copper Kings sought capital. After the company's 1895
reorganization. Anaconda's stock had found a home in Boston, the copper
headquarters of the United States. Boston institutions had purchased the
Boston and M ontana and the Butte and Boston mines, and, in 1897,
consolidated them (Toole, 1959). Also, in 1897, W.A. Clark incorporated his
massive holdings, which included a smelter and refining complex in Great
Falls, as well as banks, retail stores, lum ber properties, coal mines, and street
car systems (Robbins, 1994). By 1909, official promotional literature referred to
M ontana as 'The Treasure State." It was — for some.
Across the country, the m erger m ovem ent gathered m om entum after the
election of 1896, the first in which corporate money and corporate-owned
publications were brought to bear, in this case, against the rapidly growing
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Populist Party (Goodwyn, 1978). The m erger movement, designed for greater
corporate efficiency, also allowed for more corporate control, a fact that caused
some concern in M ontana w here local stockholders were always in the
minority (Toole, 1959). M ontana’s fears led to a legal challenge to
consolidations m ade w ithout m inority stockholder consent, a challenge
which was upheld by the state's Supreme Court (Toole, 1959). Corporate
response took the form of a bill to allow stock transfers w ithout minority
consent - M ontanans' first indication of the extent to w hich the executives of
the New Jersey-based Standard Oil Trust had tunneled into the state's
political economy (Toole, 1959). The group of capitalists intended to buy the
Anaconda Company, along w ith other Butte properties, and consolidate.
Montana stood little chance against the combined forces of "a great N ew York
bank, a great railroad, and a great oil company, aligned in concert... (Toole,
1959:165). " The legislature passed the bill over a gubernatorial veto allowing
allowing Anaconda, to become the Amalgamated Copper Company, owned
and controlled by Standard Oil (Toole, 1959).
The presence of Amalgamated did not end the Daly-Clark w ar which had
already cost the state a seat in the U.S. Senate and a great deal of
embarrassment. Amalgamated officials, who had carefully researched the
international and national copper market, and the Butte operations, had
overlooked the am bitious F. A ugustus Heinze who had formed the M ontana
Ore Purchasing Company in 1893, and later opened a smelter in Meaderville
(Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995; Robbins, 1994). Heinze had discovered he
could use both the apex provision in the 1872 Mining Act, and well-paid-off
local judges to appropriate Amalgamated's ores (Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995).
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The intersection of a vein at the surface is know n as the apex. U nder the
M ining Act, the physical existence of a vein m ust be established w ithin the
surface boundaries of claim ownership. However, the ow ner of that claim
has a right to follow that vein from the surface dow nw ard, even w hen it
leads under the surface holdings of another miner. Because of faults and
fractures, the veins often break off into many fine veins, and sometimes are
even cut off by a large rock. In the case of veins that are lost near the vertical
side walls of a claim, w ith similar veins of identical ore below or beside it in
an adjoining claim, geologists, and the courts, determ ine w hether the vein
below or beside the original is a continuation of the original (J. Robbins, 1994;
Malone, 1995). Heinze had studied the law, and stacked the local court
(J. Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995).
Cloaked in cash-lined judicial garments, by 1902, Heinze employed 37
lawyers, involved in almost 100 lawsuits on m ining property w orth close to
$200 million (Toole, 1972). An electric orator, Heinze played on M ontana's
suspicion of the outsider. Standard Oil, painting himself as a local David
fighting an Eastern Goliath (Robbins, 1994; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1972).
Unable to win the w ar of words. Amalgamated acted. On Oct. 22,1903, the
Company announced the shutdow n of its M ontana operations, except its
new spapers which it could use to present its case to the public (Toole, 1959;
Malone, 1995). Ten thousand workers were imm ediately laid off (Toole,
1959). W ithin a week of the announcement, roughly 80 percent of the state's
wage earners were out of w ork (Toole, 1959). The ground was no longer solid.
M ontanans were shocked into the terrifying realization they were totally
dependent upon one enorm ous out-of-state enterprise. Governor Joseph K.
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Toole's office was overwhelm ed by anti-Amalgamated mail. Heinze fanned
the anti-Amalgam ated sentiment (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone, 1995). Many
Butte miners, betrayed by the company that, during Daly's tenure, they
thought of as benefactor, flocked to H einze’s standard (Toole, 1959. 1972;
Malone, 1995).
Nine days after the shutdow n announcement. Amalgam ated set out its
terms on the front page of its new spapers (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995).
Montanans could go back to w ork if the governor called a special session of
the legislature to pass a "fair trials bill" which would allow a change of venue
if one of the litigants charged judicial bias (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995). For a
month, while Amalgamated's agents scurried about the state w ith printed
petitions asking the governor to call the special session, the shutdow n
continued, wearing dow n the hungry populace (Toole, 1972). Faced w ith
economic ruin. Governor Toole called the special session w hich convened on
Nov. 10, passed the Fair Trials Bill, and adjourned (Toole, 1972). Montanans
were employed again.
However, the terrain was different - not only had the Company recreated
the landscape of Butte, both above and below ground; it had clearly delineated
the boundaries of the new political landscape (Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995).
The union, which had operated inside shared boundaries in Daly's time, was
now fenced out. The effect of the shutdow n on labor was long-lived and
deep, setting off years of internal struggle. Even the unions had finally
pressured for the special session, belying the strength implied in the title
"Gibraltar of Unionism (Toole, 1972:123)."
The shifting terrain led to changes in mine operations, alterations that
weakened the Irish ability to control the w ork force. Amalgamated had
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purchased W.A. Clark's holdings (Toole, 1972), and, in 1906, bought Heinze
out (Malone et al, 1993). H einze's departure constituted another betrayal:
w hen Heinze sold out to Amalgamated, the only hope the miners had of
escaping the yoke of the N ew Jersey trust was lost (Toole, 1972). Once its
corporate adversaries had been eliminated. Am algam ated saw no need to
court the Irish or the workers (Emmons, 1990). A m algam ated's labor policy
was form ulated in N ew York — it "was based on an inherent hostility to
labor organizations, to strikes, to bargaining (Toole, 1972:126),"
It was a fractured union that confronted the vast pow er of Amalgamated
(Emmons, 1990; Toole, 1972; Malone, 1995). Suspicions ran ram pant among
union members. Amalgam ated began to infiltrate the Butte local to further
buttress its position.
As of 1900, Amalgamated began to infiltrate the Butte M iner’s Union
w ith its own men, w ith trained detectives and w ith others instructed to
sow dissension. By the time of the shutdow n of 1903, Amalgamated
was satisfied that labor would protest feebly at best. Their [sic] appraisal
was accurate. (Toole, 1972:126)

Beneath the surface of the company's betrayal of the union, another
chasm developed. The company, which in Daly's time w as a part of their
lives at social events and funerals, was now something apart, mysterious,
operating behind closed doors on the sixth floor of the Hennessey Building.
Faced w ith the company's secrecy, the workers struggled to fill in that chasm,
using all they had - "myths, truths, and lies. (Finn, 1995:287)."
Anaconda has a num ber of large black automobiles, with lownum bered license plates; bystanders say The Com pany’s out!' m uch as
they m ight say The elephants are loose! w hen these leave the
Hennessey Building for unknow n destinations (Gunther, 1947:169).
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So, beneath the surface, the workers created another landscape, scarred by
betrayal. And, worse than the company's betrayal, was that which came at the
hands of their own, the com pany’s plants. The workers were not naive, they
learned quickly that loyalty to the workers played no part in the corporate
ethic; but they had expected loyalty from their own (Finn, 1995).
As the more conservative faction led the Butte local to the right; the WFM
moved to the left, the result of dire conditions and events in Leadville,
Cripple Creek, and Telluride, Colorado; in the Couer d'Alenes; and Goldville,
Nevada (Emmons, 1990). Given the need of the Irish enclave for security and
the Irish dom inance of the Butte union, the union's conservatism was
compatible w ith its mission to guard the jobs that were essential to keep the
enclave intact (Emmons, 1990). Recognizing that m arried men were less
volatile than the single hard-drinking miners who originally settled Butte,
the Anaconda company carefully fostered a family-oriented community
(Finn, 1995). The company was successful. The large Irish family structure,
w ith older children in the labor force and non-working mothers, the 73
percent of Irish miners who ow ned their own homes, and the 434 w idows
w ith 1,117 children in 1910, also dam pened labor radicalism in Butte
(Emmons, 1990).
Here then was a union - the largest in the United States and
potentially one of the most radical - whose leaders had unchallenged
control, revealed strong craft biases, bought company stock, perm itted
hiring officers to retain membership, tolerated company stores and
subscription "health plans," favored corporate consolidation, and
declared socialism 'a dead issue.' And this is only a partial list of union
offenses... (Emmons, 1990: 229).
The union health plan did nothing to help m iners suffering from m iner’s
consumption, a debilitating lung disease caused by exposure to silicate dust
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(Emmons, 1990). N or did the M ontana Supreme Court when, in 1900, it
ruled that companies cannot be considered "negligent," and, although a
business m ust use "reasonable diligence" to provide a safe w ork area, this
could not be continuously required in a m ining area w here w orkm en
constantly change their w ork place (Johnson Chronology). Further, agitating
for mine safety w ould have violated the BMU constitution and bylaws
because all "politics" were excluded for fear of "dissension and disharm ony
(Emmons, 1990:229)."
In 1911, the state mine inspector testified he had never received an official
BMU complaint (Emmons, 1990). But, lack of official complaints about
conditions in the mines, not w ithstanding, Butte had more than its share of
hazards:
...Mortuary records for 1906-07 list scores of death from acute
alcoholism, drug addiction, syphillis, suicide (usually from carbolic
acid), and stabbings and gunshot wounds. A dd to these typhoid fever
and, as additions to the enormous toll among the miners, the deaths of
children in falls dow n abandoned and unm arked mine shafts...
In addition to these hazards, there was the constant threat of
tuberculosis and related respiratory diseases. Between 1911 and 1916
Butte’s death rate for all forms of TB was 237.45 per 100,000, more than
twice the national average... Residence in no other M ontana tow n was
remotely as lethal. Butte's mortality rate for all respiratory disease was
513.8 per 100,000; in Missoula, only 120 miles to the west, the rate was
207.7 (Emmons, 1990:72).

Ellen Crain (1996), director of the Butte-Silver Bow Archives, says, "In
1890, m ining m en in Butte were the highest paid in the nation for that kind
of work. One m an a day died of TB; one m an a week in a mine accident."
Life in Butte was risky business, both above and below ground. Given the
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imbalances of pow er between the "Copper Kings" (Malone et al, 1993; Malone,
1995; J. Robbins, 1994) and workers, residents had little choice other than to
adapt. And adapt they did, producing a local culture that inadvertently
supported the imbalances by priding itself on its toughness and survival
skills. Butte's kids handled chores around the house and m ade money on the
side doing odd jobs, selling newspapers, and occasionally pillaging
neighborhoods to "pick up" a few things to bring in a little cash from the
paw n shops. Butte’s kids grew up w ith a well-chronicled penchant for battles
between neighborhood gangs and sometimes breathtakingly dangerous
pranks. They were risk-takers and proud of it. Butte was different and so
were they (Writers’ Program, 1943).
Olga Sontum, born in 1893, remembered the smoke:
You could hardly see to get to school. You couldn’t see 20 feet from
you and it never hurt any of us. Now they’re yelling so much about all
that. It's foolish, isn’t it? (1-2, Oral History Project)

Later in the interview, Sontum referred to her father, who w orked for a
time as a solicitor for Montana Power Company. A lthough he died young,
she did not connect his illness or death to the smoke or other potential health
problems in Butte:
...But he got sick, he had lung trouble and one thing or another so he
couldn’t work steadily and he died in 1907 (1-2, Oral History Project).

That was life in Butte where miners w ho lived into their forties were
considered "old," w here miners had, on average, a 15-year w orking life in the
mines (Emmons, 1990). Perhaps because they were so aware of how they
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differed from the rest of the state, and of the difficulties they encountered in
making a home in this harsh steep place, their loyalty to Butte was absolute:
Butte people possess a fierce civic pride, the like of w hich can be found
in few places. They love the camp w ith such an intense devotion that
it blinds them to the physical bleakness and ugliness of the town.
When away they are clannish. In Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
W ashington, New York, or w herever there are num bers of former
Butte residents, one will find them getting together socially. The
principal topic of conversation will invariably be happenings in the
old camp, current and past (Writers' Program,1943:24).

That loyalty implies a shared reality, a m utual understanding of
m eanings and cultural nuances that were not understood outside of Butte.
Perhaps, though, that loyalty was not merely a random ly occurring
development. Finn (1995) notes, that Anaconda Company officials played a
large part in constructing a community that w ould inspire such loyalty from
residents, while sim ultaneously deflecting attention from the harsh realities:
Butte became know n as "The Richest Hill on Earth," a nam e the
community still wears w ith pride as if the mere evocation could
restore its depleted wealth (128).

The hard working, hard drinking miner became the prototype of working
class m en (Finn, 1995). However, jobs, provided by Anaconda, were essential
to maintain this w orking class pride and to sustain the place Butte families
were creating as home. This became more difficult as the union's attem pts at
control of job assignments in the 1907 contract were quickly undercut both by
an anti-labor national political climate and by A m algam ated's assemblage of a
disposable w ork force — m igrant laborers (Emmons, 1990).
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That addition to the labor force in Butte allowed the m ining companies to
change to pow er drills, which were frequently referred to as "widow-makers
(Emmons, 1990)." The new drills increased the am ount of silicate dust which
miners early knew was a cause of m iner's consumption, although the mining
companies denied the connection. They also eliminated m uch of the need
for craftsm anship by m aking a m iner out of anyone "strong enough to lift
one and reckless enough to go underground w ith it (Emmons, 1990:248)."
The m igrant laborers, who just w anted to "make enough money to go home"
were seen as careless by the settled miners (Emmons, 1990:245). Ironically, the
anticipated passage of the state's workm en's compensation law, gave further
im petus to hire m igrant workers - companies w ould not have to pay
survivors of foreign nationals (Emmons, 1990).
Safety aside, the new miners also threatened to erode both the more
settled miners' sense of teamwork and their w ork as craft:
W ork became lonelier and, after the introduction of machine drills,
less a function of honed skills and more a test of brute strength...
...New drills meant enforced idleness for the skilled m en too old or
broken to lift them, a dim inished status for those who could lift them.
Indeed, there were no real miners left, only workers ranked by the
machines they tended rather than the skills they had learned
(Emmons, 1990:239).

Demeaned by technology, economic security threatened by the new
"disposable" miners, their union beset w ithin by ethnic and political
differences and the presence of "company spies, " the labor force became
increasingly restive (Emmons, 1990). Occasional Socialist party victories in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
Butte d ty elections from 1903 to 1910, and increasing radicalism in the
WFM likely fostered A m algam ated’s suspicion of labor. M igrant laborers, at
least, could not vote in local elections. By 1910, the A naconda mines’ labor
force included more than 1,000 new imm igrants and less than 1,000 Irish
(Emmons, 1990).
As the composition of the w ork force changed, conditions in the mines
appeared to become more dangerous (Emmons, 1990). A lthough it is possible
that the mines were m ore dangerous in 1896, before the non-English speaking
workers arrived, from 1910 through 1914, the death rate in A naconda’s
mines, excluding deaths from respiratory illnesses, was more than six times
that from accidents m British mines (Emmons, 1990). An average of 4.68 men
of every thousand w orking in A naconda’s Butte mines w ere killed from 1910
through 1914 (Emmons, 1990). N orth Butte M ining Com pany records show
15 underground accidents that resulted in injuries and deaths in a w ork force
of 576 in 1907; 70 injuries and deaths in a w ork force of 714 in 1911; and 291
injuries and deaths in a w ork force of 769 in 1913 (Emmons, 1990). The BMU
and Ancient O rder of Hibernians paid out ten times more sick and death
benefits in 1910 than they did in 1878 and 1899 - another indication that the
mines were more dangerous and the Irish less able to control their w ork
assignments (Emmons, 1990). The num bers of half-brothers and half-sisters
attested to the danger of their work, former Anaconda employee John T. Shea
says;
There are more half-brothers and sisters in Butte than 1 ever saw
anyw here else — the result of w idow s rem arrying. Such a high rate of
accidents here in Butte. The Irish controlled the Con and a few of the
other big mines. The Ancient O rder of H ibernians had a fund for
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widows. It [the sense of community] was great. You didn't call anybody
a half-brother (10/24/95).

The associational funds for widows and burials, which were desperately
needed in the harsh reality of Butte (Emmons, 1990), inadvertently performed
another function: they privatized medical and death benefits, m aking what
may otherwise have become public concerns a personal trouble.
In addition to loss of control over job assignments and an increase in
w orker accidents, the conservative orientation of union leadership was
threatened by the existence of the local Socialist party and growing numbers
of Wobblies, members of the radical International W orkers of the World
(Emmons, 1990). The Socialist party had gained strength rapidly since it first
appeared in Montana in 1902 (Emmons, 1990). In 1911, it had joined forces
with the International Workers of the World to elect a Socialist city
governm ent in Butte (Malone et al, 1993; Emmons, 1990). Founded in 1905 in
opposition to capitalism, the IWW advocated conflict, w orker solidarity, and
the creation of one industrial union to which all workers, skilled and
unskilled, would belong. Butte labor leaders had played im portant roles in
organizing the national IWW, w hich had gained a substantial following in
Montana's lum ber camps and mining towns (Malone et al, 1993).
The company did not idly sit by as radicals gained in numbers (Emmons,
1990). In 1912, the Anaconda Company fired almost 500 Finnish miners it
had identified as socialists (Emmons, 1990). The fired Finns then dem anded
the BMU avenge them, calling a strike, if necessary, to recover their jobs.
BMU mem bership voted almost four to one against a strike. Many Finns,
who had not left Butte, boycotted the BMU, paying only those dues essential
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to retain their jobs (Emmons, 1990). Union mem bership fell dramatically —
from 7,000 in February 1913 to less than 4,000 in May 1914, in a w ork force of
11,000 (Emmons, 1990). Anaconda's "divide and conquer" tactics were
effectively further w eakening the existing fault lines of ethnic and political
differences in the labor force (Emmons, 1990).
The company found an additional way to keep control of job assignments
out of union hands in 1912 in the form of the "rustling card" system which
required all prospective miners obtain a card to allow them to look for a job
(Emmons, 1990). Resentment and fear that the card w ould be used to blacklist
intensified, manifesting itself in June 1914 w hen more radical BMU members
refused to show their cards to BMU representatives at the Black Rock and
Speculator Mines (Emmons, 1990). That action led rapidly to other
dem onstrations of displeasure, including an attack on one of the companysponsored symbols of com munity and union pow er in Butte, the annual
Miners' Union Day parade (Finn, 1995). The day after the challenge to the
rustling card system, dissidents disrupted the parade that celebrated the
founding of the W orkingmen's Union in Butte in 1878 (Finn, 1995).
However, even some of those marching did not support the union. Cliff
Hodges reports:
As a smaller num ber of the miners than usual lined u p for the parade,
something seemed to be wrong. The spirit of fun and joviality that
always was present at such occasions in the past were sadly lacking and
the somber faces of the participants implied that they w ould not have
been there except for the fact that a penalty would be levied against all
union members who refused to parade (A-12, Oral History Project).
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The rioting continued. A group of BMU progressives form ed a new
union, the Butte Mine W orkers’ Union (Malone et al, 1993). Shots w ere fired
and two m en killed, as an angry crowd gathered outside the Butte Miners'
Hall at the union's June 23 meeting (Malone et al, 1993). A group of men,
possibly Wobblies or members of the new union, set of a series of dynam ite
blasts that levelled the hall after the BMU leaders and police had fled (Malone
et al, 1993). The surface terrain was now as threatening as that below ground.
On Aug. 30,1914, the Parrot Mine hiring office was dynam ited (Toole,
1972; Emmons, 1990). The following day. Governor Stewart declared martial
law and sent in the National Guard to occupy the city (Emmons, 1990; Malone
et al, 1993; Toole, 1972). The new union's leaders were tried and imprisoned,
the city's Socialist m ayor and sheriff were removed from office after a
summ ary grand jury investigation (Malone et al, 1993). O n Sept. 9, Anaconda
announced it w ould not recognize either union (Toole, 1972). The Gibraltar
of Unionism was pulverized by the combined forces of corporate and
governm ent pow er and carefully fostered intensification of existing divisions
w ithin the labor force (Toole, 1959; Malone et al, 1993).
After the trust had consolidated Clarke's and Heinze's holdings, there was
just one major operating subsidiary w hich rendered the trust "an
anachronism." (Malone et al, 1993:273) This, coupled w ith the federal
government's threat to double-tax holding company profits, was likely
responsible for the liquidation of the trust in 1915 (Malone et al, 1993). From
that date, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company was independent (Malone
et al, 1993).
Standard Oil's departure notw ithstanding, under the surface, labor's
resentm ents continued to simmer. Farmers, whose Populist Party had been
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crushed by corporate money and influence in 1896, were also seething
(Malone et al, 1993). By late 1916, the Non-Partisan League, founded in N orth
Dakota, took root in eastern Montana (Malone et al, 1993). In Montana, the
league charged that farmers had to support the costs of state government
because the Anaconda Company was not paying its fair share of taxes (Malone
et al, 1993).
Further contributing to unrest in Butte, m any Irish im m igrants were
adam antly opposed to entering World War I on the side of England
(Emmons, 1990). Three days after the national draft registration was ordered,
in association with the Finns, and probably the Wobblies, Butte’s Irish PearseConnolly Club led a large rebellious anti-draft protest m arch w hich ended in a
"small-scale riot (Emmons, 1990:363)." On June 8, three days after the march,
flames roared up the Granite M ountain shaft of the Speculator Mine
(Emmons, 1990; Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1972). The fire, w hich killed 165 of
the 410 m en who went to w ork on that night shift, became the worst disaster
in the history of Butte mining (Emmons, 1990). On June 11, the Metal Mine
Workers' Union, w hich had been formed on June 5 in response to the draft
registration order, called for a strike against all the mines (Emmons, 1990).
The deaths occurred because a state law had never been enforced in Butte
(Toole, 1972). M ontana law m andated metal bulkheads that could be opened;
the Speculator mine used stationary cement bulkheads (Toole, 1972). The
trapped miners had no means to escape the roaring flames and poisonous
gases:
Many of the dead miners had been found piled against cement
bulkheads, their fingers w orn to the bone. (Toole, 1972:143)
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The com pany-owned Butte Post reported the fire w ith telling omissions —
no m ention was m ade of the cause of the disaster or of improvem ents that
could avoid such future horrors (Toole, 1972). It m aintained that Butte had
better-than-average working conditions and charged that a strike bulletin
referring to "intolerable” working conditions merely represented the
Socialist-IWW invective (Toole, 1972:143). The com pany's representation of
the m iner had changed from that of a hard worker, to an ungrateful paw n of
radicals.
Given the new spaper charges of "G erm an/Irish" antiw ar influence, the
presence of the IWW and federal troops, this strike which threatened the
country's wartim e copper supply was likely doom ed to failure (Emmons,
1990). However, even w ithout the fire, Butte's workers w ould have walked
out in protest of the use of the rustling card to ensure w ork crews in the
dangerous mines, the seven- and fourteen-day layoff system, inadequate
wages, inflation, and tyrannical shift bosses and foremen (Emmons, 1990:366).
These work conditions had radicalized many of the older men who had voted
against support of the Finns three years previous (Emmons, 1990).
Despite facts to the contrary, the company-owned paper insisted that
Butte's workers enjoyed the "highest" pay in the w orld, better living
conditions than any other camp, and few fatalities (Toole, 1972). The facts
included (Toole, 1972): a U.S. D epartm ent of Labor study that found 80
percent of Butte's wage earners in debt, and the city's cost of living far higher
and wages lower than anyw here else in the country; 17 men killed in an Oct.
16, 1915 mine accident; 21 men killed in a Feb. 14, 1916 accident; from 1910 to
1913, in A naconda-owned mines only, 162 men were killed in work-related
accidents, and 5,795 miners lost time as the result of injuries on the job.
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Additionally, U.S. Health Service data indicated, in 1917 and 1918, largely as a
result of poor ventilation w hich could have been corrected by technology in
existence, "at least 20 percent" of men who had w orked underground for five
years or more, had miners' consumption. Those figures do not include the
deaths that occurred w hen periodic influenza epidemics occurred in Butte,
where residents' lungs were already weakened by exposure to silicates and
smoke from processing ores. This is Herb's account:
There was an influenza epidemic came along in 1918 and five of the
seven (members of the speaker’s family), were stricken. I laid in the
front room in the big folding bed and looked out the w indow . 1 could
see in the Catholic Cemetery, three or four funerals in there at one
time. It was really a terrible, terrible situation. The paper was just full
of obituaries every day, just a long list of them. (Looking Back from the
Hill: 13)

Poor communities, those that are both economically and politically
m arginalized, often have m ultiple problems. Butte was, and is, no exception
to this synchronicity. Mining and urban-type overcrowding were not the
only sources of potential health problem s or annoyances in Butte, Ann
recalls:
We used to have all that smoke from burning garbage at the dumps.
Where Safeway on Front Street is, there was a dum p there, and Silver
Bow Creek used to run under that. There was a wooden sidewalk
there. Talk about stink. There was no garbage collection. Well, there
was no garbage, just mostly ashes 'cause you’d b u rn everything in the
stove...and the odors. People had cows. They'd take the m anure to the
dum p. And stink! 1 know. We had pigs to haul that out there, and, by
the time you got there, you were half dead. Oh, and Hansen's Packing,
they used to butcher and slaughter. You couldn't breathe in the
sum m ertim e from the odor. Where we lived over that way, we used

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
to really get the brunt of it. If there was a w ind carrying it. I'm telling
you, you had to close all the windows. So we were used to all these
high potent odors and dust and everything. Sometimes you w onder
how you existed. (Looking back at the Hill: 62)
While denying the brutal reality of Butte, the company-controUed press
w ent on the offensive, calling strikers "cowardly agitators," and "IWWs, Irish
zealots, and German sympathizers (Toole, 1972:135)." By June 29, more than
15,000 men were on strike in Butte, Anaconda, and Great Falls (Toole, 1972).
Their only voice was the Butte Bulletin w hich evolved from a strike bulletin
to a radical labor paper but its circulation was small (Toole, 1972). Although
there were industrial workers in Anaconda and Great Falls, Butte, in its
physical size and urbanization, was unlike any other place in Montana. Few
outside of Butte knew the reality, and few had any sympathy for the strikers
(Toole, 1972). Again, the differences between Butte and the rest of the state,
worked against Butte. As did the company's control of the press, and the
company's spies (Toole, 1972).
To ensure victory, the company, which had first used Pinkerton detectives
against labor in 1914, now imported squads of detectives to infiltrate the
union:
By late July there were more than 200 detectives in Butte - nearly as
many detectives as IWWs. Their fundam ental assignment was to
harass strike leaders, to w ork their way into the union, and to report to
the Company. To labor they were goons' who formed goon squads.'
They were widely feared (Toole, 1972:147).

On Aug. 1, 1917, Frank Little, an outspoken IWW organizer who had
arrived in Butte to convince the newly-formed Metal Mine W orkers' Union
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to join forces w ith the Wobblies, was brutally m urdered (Toole, 1972; Malone
et al, 1993; Emmons, 1990). Six masked vigilantes had dragged him out of his
boarding house, beaten him, tied him to the back of their car, and dragged
him to the outskirts of tow n where they hanged him from a railw ay trestle
(Toole, 1972). They left the sign of the vigilantes - "3-7-77" - on Little’s
maimed body (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). The num bers referred to the
dimensions of a grave: three feet wide; seven feet long; and 77 inches deep
(W riters’ Program, 1942: Toole, 1972). The m urder has never been solved
(Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 2993). Today, in w hat can be construed only as an
am biguous message, M ontana's state troopers w ear 3-7-77 on their uniform
insignias. Three thousand people m arched in Little’s funeral cortege; along
the sidewalks, thousands more watched silently as the largest funeral Butte
had ever seen passed by (Malone et al, 1993). That silence indicated dangerous
ground beneath which rage festered.
Wartime emotions blazed - Little's anti-war speeches had triggered the
equivalent of a witch hunt for German-sympathizers in the state (Malone et
al, 1993). A lthough most of the state’s press did not condone Little’s m urder,
coverage continued to fret about the subversives in their m idst (Malone et al,
1993). The Montana Council of Defense, the M ontana Loyalty League, and
other state organizations w arred on the IWW and the N on-Partisan League
(Malone et al, 1993). On Aug. 11, the federal governm ent sent troops into
Butte (Malone et al, 1993). Faced w ith com pany-hired detectives, the
invective of the company press, anti-union public sentiment, and federal
troops, the strike petered out and the MMWU workers returned to w ork
(Malone et al, 1993). The search for traitors continued (Malone et al, 1993).
Between September 1914 and April 1920, the national guard and federal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
troops occupied Butte six times (Malone et al: 278). Butte's residents were
learning an im portant lesson: even w hen alliances were m ade w ith other
laborers - e.g., the Irish and the Finns - the balance of pow er was weighted
heavily against them.
Thirteen days after Little's m urder, in response to frantic reports from his
constituents, M ontana's senator, H enry L. Myers, introduced an anti-sedition
bill (Toole, 1972). A lthough that bill w as buried in the Senate's Judiciary
Committee, it was passed by the state legislature as the M ontana Sedition Law
on Feb. 22,1918 (Toole, 1972). The same bill was later rescued by Montana
Senator Thomas Walsh and passed as the federal Sedition Act on May 16,
1918 (Toole, 1972).
Thus a federal law which was probably more restrictive of traditional
American freedoms than any legislation since the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798 was directly traceable to violence and conflict in Montana
and the lynching of an IWW agitator in Butte (Toole, 1972:154).

M ontana's Sedition Act and Crim inal Sedition Act outlaw ed the IWW,
and, more im portantly, made labor agitation dangerous business (Toole,
1972). The company profited — not only did it avoid the expense of
improving conditions in the mines, it was able to brand all union activity as
seditious and unpatriotic (Toole, 1972). Charges of unpatriotic behavior
notwithstanding, in 1918, Butte's workers struck again (Toole, 1972).
The Bulletin, which had continued to publish after the 1917 strike was
broken, called A naconda Vice-president Cornelius Kelley to account for his
refusal to deal w ith the union and jabbed at the federal troops that had
rem ained in the city until, under the guise of the sedition acts, Butte police
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and federal troops raided the Bulletin offices as part of an anti-IWW
campaign (Toole, 1972). Bulletin editor, W.F. Dunne, and his staff were
arrested, charged w ith sedition and turned over for prosecution (Toole, 1972).
The strike was broken (Toole, 1972). Dunne was convicted of sedition in 1920,
and fined $5,000, how ever the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
decision (Toole, 1972).
The federal government needed copper and that required loyal workers to
dig it up and process it, as well as continued corporate investm ent to sustain
the national economy. Butte officials knew well the city w as dependent upon
the company's jobs and tax revenues. All systems w ere oriented tow ard
development, regardless of impact on workers. The end of the w ar brought
no relief for the worker; fear of Bolshevism replaced fear of the Hun, keeping
patriotic sentiments high and anti-union vigilance alive.
Butte continued to sim m er and occasionally to boil over, b u t federal
troops were still there and they had become expert strikebreakers. The
Company reduced its expenditure on detectives substantially. The
press turned its attention from the l.W.W. to the N on-Partisan League
(Toole, 1972:196).

The company press prospered and served the company well in its fight
against reform of the state’s tax structure w hich had originally been designed
by the mining companies (Toole, 1972). In 1917 and 1918, the company press
fought off changes that w ould have cut into profits (Toole, 1972; Malone et al,
1993). A lthough the A naconda Company seemed involved in all aspects of
the state, it never left "fingerprints (Toole, 1972:219). " This w as the case with
the company's purchase, at some point between 1917 and 1920, of the
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M issoulian from Joseph Dixon - the date of purchase and other details of the
sale were never published (Toole, 1995).
At the close of W orld W ar I, M ontana’s m ining and lum ber industries,
like the rest of the national economy suffered, through the adjustm ent to a
reduced peacetime dem and for their products (Malone et al, 1993). However,
M ontana's economic dow nturn was even harsher because local agriculture
was also suffering from years of drought (Malone et al, 1993). A lthough the
national economy rebounded by 1922, M ontana's crisis continued until the
rains returned in the mid-1920s (Malone et al, 1993). As a result of the exodus
of failed farmers, Montana was the only state to lose population in the 1920s
(Malone et al, 1993). This loss had a profound impact on the state's
demographics: as younger families left, the state was left w ith a population of
the very young and very old; few young and m iddle-aged adults remained
(Malone et al, 1993).
As prosperity vanished, so did optimism. M ontana lost more in the
postw ar depression than its m arginal farmers. To a considerable
extent, it also lost its self-confidence and its faith in the future.
(Malone et al, 1993:291)

The mood in M ontana was conservative - the result of a congruence of
interests shared by corporate and associational interests, and voters concerned
about "big government, excessive spending, and m aintaining the status quo
(Malone et al, 1993:291). " For the most part, the state's economy relied upon
the A naconda Com pany and an assortment of other equally conservative
interests - five railroad companies, coal, oil, lumber, and smaller metalm ining firms, bankers, merchants, chambers of commerce, and the
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Stockgrowers’ and Wool Growers' Associations (Malone et al, 1993).
However, labor was increasingly more restless, and the M ontana Labor
League joined the N on-Partisan League's dem ands for reform (Malone et al,
1993). This presented the company w ith a serious problem - it had no club
w ith w hich to beat dow n the desperate farmers (Toole, 1972), Faced w ith a
choice between outspoken Democrat Burton K. Wheeler, w ho was supported
by the Non-Partisan League, and m oderate Republican Joseph Dixon, who
supported tax reform, the company chose to turn its press against Wheeler in
the 1920 gubernatorial election (Toole, 1972). Dixon w on and pressed for tax
reform (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). The company lobbyists, often also
legislators, went to w ork against reform:
Lobbying in the Montana legislature was part art, part cold cash, part
rubber-hose bludgeoning, and part cajoling, all of which was mixed in a
perpetual stag drinking room, prohibition not w ithstanding. The
Company ran the only legislative information agency that existed, a
service rendered gratis to all senators and representatives...They also
provided, gratis, a bill-writing service... (Toole, 1972:259)

The company buried Dixon's tax reform bills in committee, introduced
extraneous, harmless (to the company) bills, guaranteed to inflame voters'
passions and set to w ork on Com pany-owned editorial pages, debating, in
length and passionately, the fate of their manufactured bills (Toole, 1972).
The end result was that the public was completely unaw are of economic
matters (Toole, 1972). Dixon's reforms failed; the session adjourned (Toole,
1972).
In w hat had become its standard operating procedure to indicate
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displeasure, the company shut dow n operations for nine months (Toole,
1972). A lthough copper stocks were high and copper prices low, the company
gave no explanation. "It is probably that most M ontanans got the message,"
Toole notes (1972:265). The unem ployed in Butte understood all too well
w hat the com pany’s message meant. Closures and strikes m eant struggles to
meet basic needs and, inevitably, falling behind in the daily business of living:
When there were strikes, we w ould just about starve... W hat we used
to do was charge the groceries. The grocers w ould come to your house
and take your order and then deliver it the next day. They were
independent grocers. They would carry you for maybe five or six
months, for the duration of the strike. It was such a hardship to pay
that off. It would be maybe a year or two years to get back on their feet.
(Looking Back on the Hill: 57-58)

Again, the company did not shut dow n its press during the closure (Toole,
1972). The invective continued. Dixon took his case to the people, but could
not match the audience of company-owned papers (Toole, 1972). His tax
reform attempt of 1923 also failed (Toole, 1972; Malone et al, 1993). In 1924,
although Dixon lost his bid for re-election, his tax reform initiative passed
and, through the next several years increased the state tax base by an
additional $300,000 to $400,000 annually (Toole, 1972). A dditional taxes
notw ithstanding, the Anaconda Company grew, becoming an international
enterprise, and incurring heavy debt in the process (Malone et al, 1993). In
1922, the company, already the w orld's greatest producer of brass, a copper
alloy, became the w orld w ide leader in copper fabrication with the acquisition
of the American Brass Company (Malone et al, 1993). Confronted w ith high
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labor and operating costs in Butte, the company sought new cheaper sources
of copper and found it in the Guggenheim family-owned mines in Chile's
Andes Mountains. In 1923, Anaconda paid $77 m illion for the Chilean
mines, w hich included the vast open pit mine at Chuquicam ata (Malone et
al, 1993).
"The Richest Hill on Earth" became a m inor player overnight, a province
in Anaconda's copper empire. "The company was able to create a
transnational community of labor w hile residents w ere tied to a more
circumscribed sense of place (Finn, 1995:128)." In 1928, the company expanded
further, buying W.A. Clark’s remaining properties (Malone et al, 1993). In
1929, it acquired the Green Cananea Copper Company in northern Mexico
and created another fabricating subsidiary, the Anaconda Wire and Cable
Company, w ith plants at Great Falls and outside M ontana (Malone et al,
1993).
Until the late 1920s, the Company press attacked the Company's enemies.
However, in the early 1930s, the Company press changed tactics: instead of
directing vitriol at its enemies, it ignored them. Space on the news and
editorial pages was now filled w ith problems far from Montana, a technique
called "Afghanistaning " by journalists (Malone et al, 1993). The journalistic
"talent departed w ith invective (Toole, 1972:273)." No ever knew w hat
precipitated the decision to change tactics (Toole, 1972). Nor did anyone
know, at any given time, how many papers the company owned or controlled
(Toole, 1972).
Some tried to find out. Shocked at the state of the press in Montana, in
1919 U pton Sinclair reported that the company owned all but two of the daily
papers in the state (Toole, 1972). In 1931, a w riter for The Nation adm itted
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there was no way to obtain accurate ownership figures, but felt the Company's
influence on the entire press of the state was "pervasive and corrupting.
(Toole, 1972:274). ” In 1947, John G unther wrote, "Anaconda, a company aptly
nam ed certainly has a constrictorlike grip on much that goes on, and
M ontana is the nearest to a colony’ of any American state, Delaware alone
possibly excepted (1947:155)." The company's control of the state press "is
unique in America (Gunther, 1947:171). " In the early 1950s, a T im e magazine
reporter sent to do an "in-depth" study of this "unique captivity," w ired his
editors he could not do the story because it was like trying to "get in a solid
blow in a battle against feathers (Toole, 1972:275)." In 1952, an am azed Denver
Post reporter found enough information to write a series in w hich he referred
to M ontana as "the last outpost in America of feudal journalism" and
charged that not only did the papers not report the news, but "indulged in
Afghanistanism." (Toole, 1972:275) Anaconda’s control of the press was also
criticized by the New Republic and the London Economist (Toole, 1972).
M ontanans complained, calling the company papers "monuments of
indifference" and "a dedication to the status quo." (Toole, 1972:275)
The Great Depression altered the company-fostered status quo. Because
the M ontana economy still relied heavily upon copper mining, w hen the
Great Depression devastated the copper industry, the state's mining towns
suffered greatly. A Consumer's Council survey of 1934 found that five of
every six children in Butte were not sufficiently nourished (Malone et al,
1993). A commerce departm ent survey of the same year, found that 64
percent of Butte's homes needed repair, nearly 20 percent had no indoor
toilets, and almost 30 percent had neither baths nor showers (Malone et al,
1993). Butte struggled w ith poverty until, gradually, the mines began to
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produce again. John T. Shea, president of the ARCO Retirees Club, w as a
child in Butte during the 1934 strike and the depression.
I went through the 1934 strike here. It was horrible, but my dad and the
miners got fresh air. He worked for the WPA, two weeks on and two
weeks off. We got WPA clothes. Everybody looked alike in those days.
We got our m eat at city hall in Walkerville. Got beans and canned
stuff at Veterans' HaU. We'd go dow n w ith the little red w agon (Shea,
10/24/95).

U nder Roosevelt's New Deal, encouraged by legislation supportive of
unionism, labor movements regained strength across the nation. The
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, w hich succeeded
the W estern Federation of Miners, led a campaign to w aken the Butte Miners
Union from its torpor and, w ithin weeks, had 4,500 new members (Malone et
al, 1993). On May 8, 1934, over 6,500 Mine Mill and Crafts union members
walked off the job. Company guards and labor organizers faced off again
(Malone et al, 1993). Four months later, in a major victory, the union won
both recognition of the union and a closed shop, two things that Anaconda
had denied for 20 years (Malone et al, 1993). Union members also w on wage
increases and a 40-hour w ork week. Equally important, faced w ith the
community unease at the possibility of Anaconda's abandonm ent, they
forged an agreem ent w hich allowed union w orkers to m aintain the mines
during future strikes. This agreem ent allayed union fears of im pending
closure of Butte's operations and afforded the company protection from
financial losses that might result from equipm ent dam age (Finn, 1995).
Butte’s post-depression prosperity was imm ediately visible to visitors:
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W hen the mine wheels are turning and copper is selling high, Butte
goes in for luxuries. A casual visitor is always surprised at the high
percentage of bright, large, new-model automobiles driven by the
miners. When the shutdow n comes, as it always does, the finance
companies get them back as they have before...Five out of ten women
w ear fur coats.
They might be dyed rabbit, but they are fur, and if prosperity perches
on the Hill for two or three years in a row the coats will be
predom inantly m ink (W riters’ Program, 1943:26).

The community had internalized the concept of mining it and getting
out. It had adjusted to the boom and bust. The cars and furs represented
symbolic benefits, a "cultural wage," that allowed the workers to identify with
the interests of managem ent while stiU occupying a w orking class position to
pow er (Ewen, 1988). These trappings of power, available to some of the
working class some of the time, fostered further divisions among people who
might have otherwise identified w ith each other (Ewen, 1988). These
divisions became a factor in the 1970s after labor had sacrificed its social
agenda for pay raises, cost-of-living adjustments and protection for workers
with highest seniority (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992).
Even in prosperity, life in Butte was not easy, John T. Shea says:
The mines were such a hard life. My generation grew up during the
Depression. We were raised in tough neighborhoods w here you had to
take care of yourself. The one thing my father preached was 'Get that
education.' We had two choices: get an education and get a job
downtown; or go partners w ith dad in the mines. Dad said if 1 did that
he'd break my neck.
But I was a craftsman, a rope man, and World War II changed
things, changed our ways of looking at things. We w eren't going to
take any grief. W ere equal, if not more, because I gave my all. After
World War II you d o n ’t hold dow n the masses anymore. You saw the
whole world. I was in three countries, saw 33 of the 48 states and I was
only a kid. Your whole attitude changes. I was taught I’m just as good
as the rest of the guys (Shea, 10/24/95).
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Big cars and furs were the norm in Butte during the increased dem and for
copper in World W ar II. But, again, the end of the w ar produced another
upheaval in Butte's labor force. Once more, Butte w as the scene of violence
during the 1946 strike w hen bands of men, women, and children sacked the
homes of non-union scabs (Finn, 1995). Cutbacks cost jobs and nationally a
growing anti-com m unist sentim ent gained m om entum (Malone et al, 1993).
The Congress of Industrial Organizations expelled the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers Union in 1950, after determ ining Com munists had gained influence
over the union’s leadership (Malone et al, 1993). M ineworkers, the majority
of w hom were not communists, but w ere loyal to the union of their fathers,
were not inclined to join the union to w hich the CIO had given jurisdiction
(Malone et al, 1993). It took 17 years for the CIO and the United Steelworkers
of America to convince the Butte union to join the steelworkers (Malone et
al, 1993). After World War 11, mining unions saw steady declines in
mem bership and strikes became a perm anent part of the landscape in Butte
(Malone et al, 1993). However, the ever-present concern that Anaconda
w ould close its Butte operations was reduced w hen the company announced
the "Greater Butte Project," a cave-block mining plan that indicated the
company's commitment to Butte (Malone et al, 1993).
In 1951, the union was again on strike, part of an industry-w ide action
against the mining giants during the Korean War. From Aug. 27 to Nov. 14,
the Montana Standard reported the course of the strike: President H arry S.
Trum an's invocation of the Taft-Hartley Act emergency provisions; his
injunction against the 40,000 m en still on strike nationally; the court-issued
injunction ordering the workers back on the job; the return of the M ontana
workers on Sept. 7; and the contract, retroactive to June, that was signed on
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Nov. 14, giving workers raises from 64 cents to $2.96 a day.
Also in 1951, the question of how many new spapers the Anaconda
Company controlled was finally answered w hen The Fairm ount Company, a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Anaconda Company, applied to the Federal
Communications Commission to purchase a radio station in Great FaUs. To
meet w ith FCC regulations, the company divulged it:
...owned all the stock of the Post Publishing Company (Butte Daily Post,
evening); Standard Publishing Company (Montana Standard, Butte,
m orning, and Sentinel, evening); 72.49 percent of the M ontana Record
Publishing Company (Helena, Independent Record, evening); 33.3
percent of the Western M ontana Publishing Com pany (Western News,
weekly, Libby); and 90 percent of the Mineral Publishing Co. (weekly,
Superior)...total circulation of Company newspapers, 89,934; total
circulation of all independent papers in the state, 69,552. (Toole,
1972:277)

Only one daily new spaper in the state — the Great Falls Tribune — was
not owned by the company (Toole, 1972). The other independent papers were
weeklies w ith small circulation, which only added to the authority of
Anaconda's papers. The captivity theorists were correct — for all intents and
purposes. Anaconda controlled the state's press, doled out inform ation as it
saw fit (Toole, 1972).
Sometimes the company's carefully gathered inform ation failed it.
Within three years of its onset, the cave-block plan proved too costly, and the
company undertook open-pit mining, a method which had been avoided
previously because it meant "blasting away large parts of the city (Malone et
al, 1993:324)." Faced w ith profit losses. Anaconda exercised its right of
em inent dom ain and undertook open pit mining, creating the Berkeley Pit in
1954 (Marcossen). The city which had been born as a result of mining was
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now, quite literally, going to be eaten up by it. Local officials, fearful of their
workers' positions in a global economy and of the loss of corporate revenues
needed to sustain the community, were already overcom mitted to
m aintaining m ining operations. There was no going back. Then, an omen
perhaps - the earthquake of 1959.
For 25 years, the Pit gobbled u p neighborhoods, forcing thousands to accept
whatever the company offered for their property, and relocate to the Flat,
south of town. Some did not w ait for the company as the following M ontana
Standard stories indicate: 17 fires in vacant or abandoned houses and other
buildings in Big Butte-Center ville-Walker ville area between May 1 and Dec.
1, 1962; J.C. Penney and 10 other businesses destroyed in a $3 million fire of
unknow n origin in December 1972; three uptow n shops and the Copper City
Chevrolet storage facilities were destroyed in a fire in December 1974; and
another unsolved arson in A ugust 1978 prom pted the fire chief to direct his
staff to enforce fire and building codes more strictly. Insurance policies paid
more than the company, so businesses, fearful of the loss they would suffer at
the com pany’s hands, opted for larger insurance paym ents instead, one
resident explained.
The Berkeley Pit reshaped the landscape both above and below ground.
Above ground, the pit devoured communities, including the long-established
neighborhoods of M eaderville and McQueen. Exiled, the former residents of
the Hill created new neighborhoods on the level ground of the Flat, which
was formerly claimed by the city's cemeteries. Less and less time seemed to
come betw een troubling announcements. Rumors. Rumblings. Events.
Loss.
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Community officials sought federal funds to cope w ith the changes and
preserve the city's historic place. After being denied federal Model Cities
funding in 1967, the city was successful in 1968 (Montana Standard). But that
good news w as undercut by a 1970 company pam phlet w hich reported that Pit
operations were far from profitable. A lthough more than 275,000 tons of ore
and waste were removed each day from the open pit operations, this was lowgrade ore. As a result, five tons of m aterial had to be rem oved to recover only
10 to 12 pounds of copper ore. This m eant to recover approximately $5 w orth
of copper, after processing, the company had to blast, load, and transport more
than 10,000 pounds of ore and waste and the pit (Anaconda M ining Company,
1970).
New arenas of contested terrain surfaced. The question of where to
relocate the Butte uptow n business district, which lay in the path of the
expanding Pit, became a hotly disputed subject in 1970. U ptow n merchants
organized to fight for their right to stay on the Hill (Montana Standard). The
question became more urgent w hen W oolworth's moved off the Hill, the
Finlen Hotel suffered a partial collapse, and the old Metals Bank was sold
(M ontana Standard). Two years later, planning studies had m ade it painfully
clear that Butte m ust move from the H ill (Montana Standard). The company,
which had refrained from comment throughout the debate, broke its silence
at the end of 1972 w hen it announced it w ould mine the Hill and
recom mended a move southw ard as being in the city's best interest (Montana
Standard). However, the company did not suggest a timetable for the move;
nor did it commit itself to funding the move (Montana Standard).
Faced w ith the voracious appetite of the pit, residents sought to preserve
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the only natural land that rem ained - the Columbia Gardens.

This was the

locus of community contact w ith the natural world as play, celebration, and
ritual. Butte's perennial escape from drudgery in the harsh bowels of the
earth, from slag-heaped and m ine-dum ped playgrounds, from dust and dirt
ground into clothes and bodies. Alarmed by the company's planned
construction of the East Continental Pit, the community sought corporate
assurances that the gardens w ould be spared. O n Novem ber 12, 1973,
Columbia Gardens burned to the ground, the result of a fire of mysterious
origin (Montana Standard). A lthough suspicions related to the convenient
tim ing of the fire still rum ble under the surface in Butte, no "fingerprints"
w ere found at the blackened scene that once was the source of community
pride.
Mary Kay Craig, who was living out of state w hen the fire occurred,
remembers her shock at the loss of Columbia Gardens:
W hen I was still here they started doing open pit mining. The Pit grew
and grew. My friends — a lot of my friends lived out w here the Pit is
now, in Meaderville and McQueen. I went to Columbia Gardens. That
disappeared. 1 just couldn't believe the people in Butte w ould let that
happen. But I talked to someone recently w ho said he favored it for
jobs, so the mining w ould go on for years( Craig, 7/30/95).

Also, in 1973, predicting that more em ployment w ould result, the
company began to dig in the Continental-East Pit, just east of the expanding
Berkeley Pit (Montana Standard). That same year, the company paid $800,000
to acquire the Holy Saviour Church and other property in the path of the
Berkeley Pit's expansion (Montana Standard). O n June 30, 1974, parishioners
celebrated the final Mass in the 72-year-old Holy Saviour Church in
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McQueen. The parish school was later used as a mining research building,
the rectory was moved to be used as the Holy Spirit rectory, and the church
itself was buried w ith rock from the Berkeley Pit (Montana Standard).
Faith in local officials was likely eroded w hen former Butte Mayor Tom
Powers, w ho had brought the Model Cities program to Butte, was charged
w ith bribery, offering false evidence, and preparing false evidence in a state
workm en's compensation scandal at the close of 1974 (Montana Standard).
The Pit continued to grow. The company opened the Kelley mine; closed
the rem aining underground mines (Malone et al, 1993). The company
opened the East Continental Pit. The layoffs continued. The strikes
accelerated in frequency and in length- 1954,1959-60, 1962, and 1967-68, the
longest in the state's history (Malone et al, 1993).
Steadily, the expensive underground mines closed down, and the
hardrock miners and smeltermen became a vanishing breed. Open-pit
mining is highly autom ated and requires far fewer employees than
underground m ining does. Butte, once the economic and political
center of the state, saw its population and political pow er crumble away
(Malone et al, 1993:325).

N ew spaper headlines proclaimed the erosion of the tax base and
devaluation of property. The loss of revenue threatened a loss of community
services and local governm ent jobs. The sense of family tradition and
continuity that had always provided comfort through the tough times was
ripped apart as the grief-struck community watched their younger people
leave Butte in search of that now-elusive corporate-produced commodity, a
job. From 1980 to 1988, Butte’s population dropped from 50,600 to 43,200
(Malone et al, 1993). The older people who stayed in Butte w ondered how
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they w ould survive economically. W orried that the devastated community
w ould see an increase in family violence, county Domestic Violence Program
employees geared up for an increased dem and for their services (Maney,
2/21/95). M arilyn Maney, who served as director of the county Domestic
Violence Program, says:
We had anticipated w e would see an increase in violence against
women; in fact, it stayed pretty level. We did, however, experience an
increase in the suicide rate among men...This is not to say the shelter
did not have heavy usage. We saw family breakdow n b u t as far as I
know there has not really been a detailed study (Maney, 2/21/95).

Because suicide is not considered a crime, the state is unable to break out
figures of suicides during that period which w ould make it difficult, but,
given the possibility of local records, not impossible to tally the hum an costs
of the shutdow ns. There were fleeting moments of hope. Many hoped the
1971 Chilean governm ent nationalization of A naconda’s Chilean mines
(Malone et al, 1993) w ould restore Butte to its former privileged position in
the company's hierarchy. The company was forced to rely more heavily on
mines in Montana, Arizona, and Nevada but, because of its untenable
financial situation, continued to cut back in M ontana (Malone et al, 1993). In
the mid-1970s, the company cut more, eliminating 700 to 1,000 jobs in Butte
and Anaconda; in February 1975, the company announced 1,500 more layoffs
(Malone et al, 1993).
A further glim m er of hope followed the 1976 announcem ent that the
federal D epartm ent of Labor was investigating to see w hether 1,000 workers
laid off by the Anaconda Company w ould be eligible for trade adjustment
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assistance under the federal Trade Act of 1974 which allowed workers who
believe they are, or will be, unemployed as a result of increased imports, to
petition the secretary of labor for assistance (Montana Standard). But the good
news was always followed by the bad.
Also, in 1976, as a result of disagreement about w here to relocate the
business district, the city council rejected the Anaconda Company's offer of
$13 million in cash and in-kind contributions to fund the move (Montana
Standard). As the dispute about relocation continued, the company's poor
financial condition was taking its toll on the community: the county's taxable
valuation dropped 26 percent because the company showed no profit in 1975
and was assessed no net proceeds tax in 1976. County officials warned the
layoffs and decreased services w ould likely result from the loss of tax revenue
(Montana Standard). The following year, the Anaconda Company appealed
its tax bill in the m iddle of the fiscal year, jeopardizing some $1.4 million of
county tax revenue (Montana Standard).
In 1977, in reply to residents who continued to fight to save the uptow n
area, once the scene of bustling commercial activity, the company discouraged
a search for investors to revitalize the area:
Anaconda says the uptow n has millions of tons of low grade copper and
it m ight w ant to mine it but is not sure when. The community will
have to wait until the company decides w hether it can afford to mine
the uptown. The Berkeley Pit w on't be mined out for 20 years and a
dome-shaped deposit beneath the pit m ust be m ined before the uptown.
Mining the dom e will take 20 to 25 years, the company says. Anaconda
discouraged renovation saying it could not afford to buy the uptow n if it
were redeveloped (Montana Standard,!fH1978).
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In 1977, the Atlantic Richfield Corporation's (ARCO) purchase of the
company brought some desperately needed tax dollars to Butte's sagging
economy {Montana Standard). However, com petition from South American
and African copper mines, and the developm ent of satellite communications
systems and fiber optics which reduced the dem and for copper, forced ARCO
to continue the already established pattern of layoffs (Malone et al, 1993). As
the layoffs and uncertainty continued, in 1982, the com munity drew on its
real natural resource — its people — forming the Butte Com munity Union,
"an organization of people in Butte who lack economic and political pow er
and who organize, educate, and em power people to identify and satisfy their
needs through altering pow er relationships to change an unfair system and
give the poor a voice; and to assist all people who are able to seek and find
suitable em ployment (BCU fact sheet, 1989). "
Employment was desperately needed: a 1985 BCU survey of 171
households in Central Butte found that 70 percent w ere below the lowmoderate income level and and 61 percent were below the low income level.
By 1989, the group, which had roughly 200 paid members and a mailing list of
500, had been involved in three law suits fighting to retain the General
Assistance Program for unem ployed people; a fourth law suit forced the state
to retain optional Medicaid Services of eyeglasses, hearing aids, and dentures.
BCU research and action forced the state to end the "archaic and
dehum anizing practice of allowing low-income people to see only one doctor
and one dentist (BCU fact sheet, 1989). " The group's General Assistance
victory w as subsequently undercut by an opposition who changed the state
constitution so that the indigent, elderly, and disabled were no longer
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guaranteed assistance (O’Sullivan, 3/23/96). "So that sort of backfired," Sister
Kathleen O'Sullivan, one of the board members of the group, says.
On the local level, the group forced the school board to reinstate the
Elementary Hot Lunch Program, organized to get one m ore pharm acy to fill
prescriptions for people receiving General Relief and Aid to Families w ith
D ependent Children, conducted a comprehensive study of the lowest income
neighborhood in tow n and m ade suggestions to improve it, and organized a
tenant group in a subsidized housing complex. The group also was
responsible for the park at the Emma Mine Site (BCU fact sheet, 1989), saved
the Fox Hotel, and came a few votes short of increasing the state's m inimum
wage (O'Sullivan, 3/23/96). O'Sullivan, a Roman Catholic n un who was
working in Butte, found herself drafted as a board m em ber and "had to learn
a new vocabulaiy. Through it all I discovered w hat the Gospel was about. "
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96)
It w as a powerful group. Bob McCarthy [the first director] knew w hat
he was doing. He was a person w ith a passion for justice, he
instinctively knew, smelled, injustice. We got a [Roman Catholic]
Campaign for H um an Development grants, plus Presbyterian and
other church grants. We were always fundraising and grant writing.
Bob had to go on welfare for a while because we were out of money
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96).

The group w orked for "jobs and justice " and was not afraid to confront
directly w hen it was necessary. "BCU was looked upon as a sort of threat to
the status quo," O ’Sullivan (3/23/96) says. By picketing the state secretary of
labor's office in Helena the group got the secretary to correct the
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unem ploym ent figures he had been using. "Unem ployment in Butte was 17
percent, not 7 percent. He was using incorrect figures and w asn't portraying
the correct situation (O’Sullivan, 3/23/96)." When the governor visited
Butte during the fight to retain General Assistance, the group erected a
cardboard house on a vacant lot to illustrate the plight of the poor
(O'Sullivan, 3/23/96). In the late 1980s, the group found itself struggling with
internal divisions and hired a mediator.
My interpretation was that some people seemed to resent anyone who
was not low income on the board. O ur m ediator w as a volunteer who
did well, but it didn't work out. A year later the N ational Campaign
for H um an Development started to fund — money to hire a m ediator
— for these situations but ours came a year too soon. We got w ord we
were going to be voted off the board so we resigned. They tried to
continue but they couldn't keep it going, they couldn’t get funding
(O’Sullivan, 3/23/96).

The group left a legacy that includes M ontana Family Shares, a state-run
charity that exists on donations from workers' paychecks, m uch like United
Fund, and, as im portant, a continuing tradition of a community that helps
itself.
However, the community had to rely on state assistance when, in 1978,
environm ental concerns surfaced in the form of radon gas. Environmental
science researchers found high levels of radiation in slag produced by the
Stauffer Chemical plant west of Butte. The slag had been used by M ontana
Concrete industries during the 1950s for housing, school, hospital and
commercial construction in southw est M ontana. The com pany's sales
records were turned over to the state and a $78,000 study was launched to
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determ ine if radon gas em itted from the cement building blocks pose a health
hazard. Throughout 1979, the state investigated, eliminating both building
blocks and paving as a source of radon contamination, and turning to possible
radiation emissions from fractures and fissures in the ground into certain
homes as an explanation. The federal H ousing and U rban Development
agency m andated radon testing on homes in Butte and Anaconda before
approval for federal mortgage loans (Montana Standard).
As the community fought to save the uptow n area, w orkers protested the
loss of their jobs. In 1980, a picketer during the Anaconda Smelter closure
carried a sign that read, "We need JOBS, not just clean air," (Montana
Standard) a testament to corporate ability to equate job loss w ith
environm ental regulation rather than corporate practices in the arena of
global capitalism (Edelstein, 1988). In 1981 the feared shutdow ns began w hen
ARCO closed the Kelley shaft (Montana Standard). The following year, the
corporation closed the Berkeley Pit operations (Montana Standard). Workers
and county officials struggled w ith the loss of the personal and community
finances. Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Don Peoples estim ated that the
1,000 jobs that rem ained in the Berkeley Pit sustained 2,700 other jobs in Butte
(Montana Standard).
In 1983, ARCO suspended m ining operations in Butte, laying off the
rem aining 700 employees and shutting off the pum ps which allowed metalscontaminated w ater to flow into the Pit (Malone et al, 1993). The shutoff of
the pum ps took the community by surprise. Local officials were presented
w ith a done deal, former state Representative Fritz Daily says:

People ask why the people from Butte didn't stop this. At m idnight
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April 24, 1982 ARCO shut the pum ps off and at noon the next day
ARCO told the people of Butte they'd put the pum ps off. The area was
already flooded. (12/8/95)

In another of the ironies that constitute Butte’s history, ARCO shut off the
pum ps on Earth Day (CTEC and Women's Voices for the Earth, 1996). As the
Berkeley Pit began to fill, the company gave assurances that the influx of
w ater w ould drive oxygen out of the mine workings u n d er the Hill, thus
preserving timbers and preventing collapse {Montana Standard). It also
announced that its newly-installed system of wells in the Summit Valley,
near the Flat, w ould detect any encroachment of m inew ater into the Summit
Aquifer {Montana Standard). However, the state Bureau of Mines was
concerned because the company did not announce plans to m onitor either
surface w ater or the effect of increased volume flowing into Silver Bow Creek
and waterways dow nstream {Montana Standard). The bureau also questioned
if the estimated 70 degree average tem perature of the w ater in the Pit w ould
create a steam and fog problem during cold w eather inversions {Montana
Standard). There was no American precedent for a mine flooding of this scale
— even company officials adm itted no one knew w hat w ould happen
{Montana Standard).
Suddenly there were new fears: groundw ater flow as a source of poisons.
Corporate m aneuvers continued. The company refused to abrogate its claim
to the Hill {Montana Standard). If copper prices increased, the mines and pit
could be dew atered, company officials announced, therefore, this w as not a
perm anent closure so the company w ould not pay supplem ental benefits to
laid-off workers {Montana Standard).
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More contested ground emerged. In 1982, Butte’s religious community
and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Western M ontana sent representatives to
an ARCO shareholders meeting in Los Angeles to ask for fair treatm ent for
those laid off, and for corporate reinvestment of tax write-offs in Butte
{Montana Standard). A group of laid-off workers formed the Coalition for
Benefits to put pressure on ARCO (Montana Standard). ARCO resisted. Relief
came in the form of a Congressional extension of supplem entary
compensation — 7,953 claims for the additional four weeks of
unem ploym ent benefits were filed in M ontana alone (Montana Standard).
A nother flicker of hope accompanied the announcem ent of M ontana
millionaire D ennis W ashington's purchase of the old A naconda/A RC O
properties in Butte. Union members, delighted with the prospect of mining
jobs, offered to help Washington, the new owner of the East Continental Pit,
set up the operation; however, once established no union jobs were
forthcoming (Finn, 1995).
U ndaunted, the community threw its support behind the dream of a Butte
m an who had prom ised if his wife survived her bout w ith cancer he would
build a statue in honor of mothers. In the early 1980s, unem ployed workers
began to plan the project that would become Our Lady of the Rockies, a 90foot steel statue. Against all odds they raised the funds to construct the statue
and convinced the departm ent of defense to loan them a helicopter to place
the statue on the East Ridge, overlooking the Berkeley Pit. To an outsider, the
combination of the welcoming open arm s of the Lady of the Rockies and the
vast toxic léïke in the Berkeley Pit is sufficiently incongruous to be startling.
Mark Reavis, the county's historic preservation officer, was a newcomer in
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Butte w hen the mines were closed and the community em braced the Lady of
the Rockies project. At first, he was baffled, but quickly understood why this
90-foot statue was so important:
This town had a real problem in 1982. It had to make a decision
w hether to live or die. There was a certain community
acknowledgement that we had to build something new. The statue
was a sign we were still here, despite all those community
controversies. It was a real critical time w hen they p u t the statue up
there. I saw a real change. The town stopped and took a look at
themselves (Reavis, 11/29/95).

John T. Shea, who is still involved w ith the operation of O ur Lady of the
Rockies Chapel on M ain Street, believes the faith of Butte, as expressed in the
construction of statue, gave the em battled community new life:
I worked on O ur Lady of the Rockies. I got laid off in 1983 and w ent to
w ork [on her] in 1984. When they shut the mines down, they said they
were going to bury us in that hole dow n there, the Pit. It was tough.
My sister died in 1983, the 14th of July, right after I got laid off on June
30th.
We started the statue in 1984. In January 1986 W ashington opened
up and brought 300 jobs. We’ve been going up ever since." (10/24/95)

Yet, more new dangers came to light — arsenic, the evacuation of 14
families at M illtown, cadm ium , U.S. Environm ental Protection Agency
investigations, lead (Montana Standard). The 1986 designation of the city as a
federal Superfund site initiated w hat has become almost 10 years of
environm ental cleanup. N ew spaper stories featured new jargon —
rem ediation, operable units, m axim um contam inant levels, risk assessment,
feasibility studies. News stories about dioxins, volatile organic chemicals,
W alkerville, Silver Bow Creek, the Colorado Tailings, and the M ontana Pole
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Plant (Montana Standard). Also in 1986 Chief Executive Don Peoples
announced the county anticipated losing over $800,000 in taxes because of
reduced valuations (Montana Standard). The reductions were attributable to
the already delinquent Port of Montana, Anaconda Minerals now owned by
ARCO, and the Safeway Warehouse during fiscal 1986-87, as well as a loss in
federal revenue sharing and aid to the transit system, and in rent from the
local welfare office which was moving from the courthouse to new quarters
(Montana Standard). Given the financial straits of individuals and businesses
in the county, tax increases to compensate for the $800,00 loss were not
realistic. Peoples said. Instead, the county would have to drop 33 employees
from the payroll and decrease the valuation of county property to "an
unheard of low" of roughly $39 million in 1986, com pared to $60 million in
1975. (Montana Standard,! I SI SS).
In 1990 the EPA became a perm anent presence w hen it opened a Butte
office in the basement of the copper-doored large gray stone courthouse on
the corner of Granite and M ontana Streets.
This was Butte. A century of different lessons learned in diverse ways.
Boom and bust. Illness. Consolidations and divisions. Death. Differences.
Trust and betrayal. Giving and taking. Burrowing and tunnelling. StiUed
voices. Silences. Rumors. Rumblings. Whispers. Eruptions. Disruptions.
Profits. Loss. Changing contours. Grief. N ew boundaries. Shifting
landscapes.
These are the forces that have shaped both Butte's physical landscape, and
the way in w hich Butte's people perceive that landscape. It is a remarkably
single-m inded history of frontier capitalism and industrialization that
extracted every resource practicably possible from both the land and Butte’s
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people. It is a history of exploitation on a vast scale. It is a history of a place
that had just one reason for being, a place that has assum ed the status of
m yth.
This is nothing like you’d expect. The dow ntow n's located on a hill.
This is totally based on mining. It has no reason for existing other than
that. Most towns are based on things like transportation or water. But
everything about Butte is about m ining— w hen they first laid out the
original tow n site, it was related to the mines in operation at the time.
You can trace the developm ent to geology, in the frames that follow
the arc of the Hill, the track that connects all the headfram es. This
wasn't a Western mining camp; there was too m uch of it [the ore]
(Reavis, 11/29/95).

Too much ore — enough to inspire wars between pow erful men, to
attract tens of thousands of imm igrants in search of jobs, to spaw n a vast
international corporation w ith investors willing to do w hatever was
necessary to maintain profits, to hold local, state, and federal governments
hostage to their share of taxes on those profits, to create a place in which every
resource — hum an and nonhum an — was put to one end only.
That ore had existed for millennia until hum ans discovered a use for it
and developed technology to extract it. It should be kept in m ind, w hen
considering Butte, that the presence of the ore was not responsible for hum an
events any more than the chemicals that leach out of the gutted earth are
responsible for the toxins in Butte today. The responsibility resides in hum an
assum ptions em bedded in political and economic institutions, em bedded so
deeply they remain unquestioned; yet they are the background which shape
our relationships w ith each other and w ith the land. It is those assumptions
that drive the federal law m andating the cleanup of Butte.
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1 Cleveland's actions were the result of an ongoing battle between the
proponents of the gold versus the silver standard. The battle was heated
because bankers and wealthy elites who had purchased government bonds
during the Civil War insisted upon being paid back in gold. Had silver
prevailed, they would have had less return on their money. The conflict would
come to a head in the election of 1896. For a full discussion, see Goodwyn in
works cited.
2 Because this thesis is primarily concerned with the socially constructed
landscapes of Butte, it does not include references to Emmon's consideration of
the immigrant Irish national identity and related issues. Thus, this thesis
gives a necessarily oversimplified recapitulation of Emmon's work.
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SUPERFUND AND RISK
The Limited Landscape of Technocratic Discourse

The practical quest for a defining "hard science" has mythic qualities and
may be as elusive as the proverbial Holy Grail. The EPA has scientists; ARCO
has scientists. Claims of "scientific objectivity" notw ithstanding, EPA
scientists, state of Montana scientists, and ARCO scientists find little common
ground. The terrain of "hard science" has become as contested as any other
ground in Butte. This thesis argues that the contest has resulted from the
allocation of w hat are unresolved and properly political issues to the realm of
science.
In 1986, as Butte struggled w ith the loss of mining - a loss of both
economic base and cultural identity - the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) designated the city a federal Superfund site, precipitating an influx of
technocrats to w ork in both public and private spheres. Decisions made about
the health threat posed by contamination and the extent to which it should be
cleaned up will be m ade by these technocrats; another instance of outsiders
making im portant decisions for Butte natives. The technocratic approach to
Butte is not founded in the social realities of the place. Rather, federal agency
employees and contracted private sector technocrats are m andated to solve a
presum ably technical problem w ith the presum ption that their skills can be
applied universally (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Merchant, 1992). Their goal is
to measure the contaminants, assess the degree of risk posed by the
contaminants, and clean them up to agreed-upon standards, and to develop
new technologies to accomplish their tasks (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Yeager,
1991). This is in no way an assertion that scientific research is unim portant.
115
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The research conducted in Butte is important, both for Butte and other
contam inated communities. What is at issue here is not the scientific
research itself, rather it is the institutionalized assum ptions that determ ine
the definition of the problem and scope of the w ork (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Merchant, 1992; Kroll-Smith and Couch 1991a; Brown, 1991). This section
will argue that the technocratic approach reduces a complicated social
problem to a narrow technical problem, and, in so doing, both camouflages
and reinforces the reality of inequalities of wealth and pow er that produced
the contamination (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 1993; Boyce,
1994; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994). Equally
important, the technocratic approach leaves little latitude for public
participation (Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
With the exception of Sara Weinstock, the EPA public affairs officer in
Butte, most of the researchers working in Butte are not natives. This fact is
im portant because the newcomers’ lack of connection to the place and its
history allows them to m aintain their belief in the possibility of objective,
rational solutions to a seemingly technical problem (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider, 1992). Once social issues, such as the
impact of the toxic label which stigmatizes the community, have been
factored out, it is possible for researchers to look at the contamination in
Butte as another resource to be mined, as a marketable commodity to be sold
as an em ploym ent and research material. Technologies developed in Butte
can be m arketed as solutions for future contamination; and, if an officially
sanctioned cleanup can be accomplished in Butte, the status quo can be
m aintained — hierarchical relationships, patterns of discourse, issues of who
pays and who benefits will rem ain unaddressed. Given the federal
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governm ent's interest in m aintaining economic stability, w hich is
dependent upon tax revenues from continued corporate profits (Schnaiberg
and Could, 1994), it is not surprising to find that federal grant money has been
the im petus for much of the high-tech research in Butte. For example, $3.5
million to develop a Waste Technology Center in Butte (Montana Standard,
10/4/1990); $12 million to develop a process using magnets to upgrade the
value of coal which would be very useful to ARCO Coal, the company's
division in charge of the Superfund projects (Montana Standard, 10/17/1990);
and $15 million for the Berkeley Pit to become a test site both to develop
cleanup m ethods and to extract the metals, that rem ain in the contaminated
water (Montana Standard, 12/12/1990). Within context of Butte's history, this
is simply another variation of "mine it and get out. "
However, there are local economic benefits to this new form of mining,
Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Jack Lynch points out:
..in a sense they have been a real economic boon to Butte-Silver Bow.
The num ber of engineering, environm ental, investigation, and
rem edial firms currently doing business here as well as the major
expenditures on cleanup have proved in many ways beneficial. (Lynch,
10/25/95)

The marketing of contaminants has been a boon for the local economy.
The community desperately needed the additional revenues which the
newcomers brought in the form of property taxes from businesses and
individuals who relocated in Butte a n d /o r purchases from local businesses.
"Superfund's doing some good, " John T. Shea, president of the ARCO
Retirees Club, (10/24/95) says wryly. "It's making millionaires out of two
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contractors." The 1990 federal census indicates that Butte-Silver Bow has a
higher percentage of managerial a n d /o r professional specialty occupations
and of technical, sales and adm inistrative support personnel, 25.6 percent and
32.1 compared to the state which has percentages of 24.1 and 28.2,
respectively. Unfortunately, the the economic benefits of rem ediation have
not filtered dow n through the workforce, Butte-Silver Bow’s unem ploym ent
rate is still higher than that of the rest of the state. The 1990 census figures
post Butte’s unem ploym ent at 9.7 percent, compared to a state rate of 7
percent (1994 County and City Data Book).
The cleanup of Butte is governed by CERCLA, the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
commonly called Super fund. The 1980 Superfund law and the Superfund
A m endm ents and Reauthorization Act of 1986 regulate cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste^ sites, such as those created by mining operations
in the B utte/A naconda area. The law is prem ised on the notion that the
polluter pays." In the language of the law, potentially responsible parties
(PRPs), identified by the federal ERA, pay for cleanup, often called
remediation, of those sites that have been placed on the National Priorities
List. The Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO), which bought the
Anaconda Company in 1977, has been identified as the prim ary potentially
responsible party for Butte’s Superfund sites, which are part of a group
referred to as the Clark Fork Complex.
The EPA took control of the contaminated lands surrounding Anaconda
and Butte in December 1982 and November 1986, respectively. Cleanup of
Butte and the other sites which are part of the Clark Fork Complex is a
massive undertaking. (See m ap of the U pper Clark Fork Superfund Sites in
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the appendix.) For the 100 years of mining operations in Butte,
m ining-related toxins ran dow n Butte Hill into Silver Bow Creek which
recovers discharge from storm drains, secondary effluent from the Butte
Sewer Treatm ent Plant, and groundw ater underlying the Butte Reduction
Works (USEPA, 1991). After leaving Butte, the creek flows southw ard where
it empties into the U pper Clark Fork River near Warm Springs Pond
(USEPA, 1991).
The 340-mile Clark Fork River is one of the M ountain West's largest
rivers, w ith nearly twice as much w ater as the Missouri and Yellowstone
(Nielson, 1988). The Clark Fork watershed drains a 22,000-square mile basin
which receives about 33 million acre-feet of water a year from rain and snow
— roughly half of this yearly precipitation reaches the Clark Fork River; the
rest evaporates or is used by plants (Sarver, 1994). Because groundw ater
movement through the Clark Fork aquifers is rapid — ranging from three to
60 feet per day — the water is very clean (Sarver, 1994). However, that rapid
movement means that contaminants w ould spread quickly (Sarver, 1994).
The entire Superfund site includes 20 square miles of tailings ponds, 175
square miles of soil and plants contaminated by air pollution from smelting
operations, 30 square miles of unusable agricultural land, and 150 miles of
contaminated river bed along Silver Bow Creek in Butte and the Clark Fork
River (Montana Standard, 10/15/1991). The geographic area involved is so
massive — running from Butte southw est to the M illtown Dam, just 26
miles east of Missoula (see Milltown Reservoir m ap in the appendix) — that
EPA scientists have divided it up into operable units, based on geography and
type of contamination (USEPA, 1991). A list of toxins identified at the
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operable units referred to in this section and related illnesses is included in
the appendix.
The operable units in Butte contain a toxic brew of m ining-related
contaminants — including lead, copper, arsenic, cadmium, and mercury, and
dioxin and PCP (pentachlorophenol). (See m ap of Silver Bow Creek/ Butte
Area Superfund Site Operable Unit Locations.) To simplify the discussion,
this analysis will refer only to the following operable units in Butte: the Mine
Flooding Operable Unit, known as the Berkeley Pit; Lower Area One; Area
One; and the M ontana Pole Treatm ent site.

THE BERKELEY PIT
The Mine Flooding Operable Unit, also known as the Berkeley Pit, covers
14 square miles, and includes the flooded underground mine workings
connected to the Pit, the Yankee Doodles Tailing Pond, The Montana
Resources' Concentrator, Silver Bow Creek, and the alluvial groundw ater
that is connected to the Berkeley Pit and Silver Bow Creek (USEPA,
12/15/1993). The site is bounded to the south by Silver Bow Creek, to the east
by the East Ridge / Continental Divide, to the north by the northernm ost
limits of the Yankee Doodle Tailings Pond, and to the west by Missoula
Gulch. Part of the site is w ithin Butte city limits, the rem ainder is owned by
M ontana Resources and other m ining companies.
The bottom of the Pit was located at elevation 4,265 feet w hen mining
operations ceased in 1982 (USEPA, 12/15/93). The total depth of the Pit,
which covers 800 acres, from the bottom to the highest point on the rim is
1,780 feet. The chemicals evaluated for public health risk include: arsenic,
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cadmium, lead, sulfate, and zinc. Those evaluated for ecological risk include:
alum inum , arsenic, cadmium, copper, iron, lead, zinc, along with hardness
and pH. Because scientists have concluded that residents will not be exposed
to the chemicals unless the water level in the Pit rises to m eet the
groundw ater level in the East Camp bedrock aquifer, their estimates of public
health risk are based on possible scenarios that w ould result in contaminated
water meeting uncontam inated water, or from an overflow of the Pit water.
Using a conservative methodology, more protective of hum an health,
scientists assum ed that any exposure to the carcinogenic chemicals in this
operable unit is to be avoided. Threshold limits, below w hich exposure is
considered safe, are not used for carcinogenic chemicals. For chemicals
classified non-carcinogenic, threshold values were used to determ ine
exposure risks.

LOWER AREA ONE
The Lower Area One (LAO) is the dow ngradient portion of a larger unit,
called Area One (USEPA, 1991). LAO, which contains the Priority Soils
Operable Unit, is located west of Montana Street to below the Colorado
Tailings.

(See Lower Area One map in the appendix.) The two primary

sources of contamination in this unit are the Colorado Tailings and the Butte
Reduction Works. Chemicals identified as posing risk to hum an health are
arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, and zinc; chemicals of ecological concern
are alum inum , arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, iron, lead, silver, and
zinc USEPA, 1991). This contamination, prim arily the result of milling
activities over the years, has polluted Silver Bow Creek. Further degradation
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has resulted from direct discharges of effluent from the Butte Sewage
Treatm ent Plant into Silver Bow Creek.
Unlike the Pit, there is public access to this contamination. Children have
been observed playing in the section of Silver Bow Creek adjacent to the test
site, and d irt bikes have been observed in the Colorado Tailings area (USEPA,
1991), W ithin the LAO there is the Butte Sewer Treatm ent Plant, a livestock
stockyard, a city-council asphalt plant, a privately-owned asphalt plant,
autobody shop, restaurant and bowling alley. Currently there are currently no
homes w ithin the area (USEPA, 1991).
The contaminants are spread by groundw ater and surface water flow. The
groundw ater occurs in fractures and weathered zones but the system is not
clearly understood, partially because of the netw ork of underground mine
shafts and tunnels in the bedrock under Butte Hill (USEPA, 1991). Surface
w ater flow is the result of Silver Bow Creek, Blacktail Creek, the Metro Storm
Drain, Missoula Gulch, and Butte Sewer Treatm ent Plant discharge (USEPA,
1991). Carcinogenic chemicals on the site include arsenic, lead (which was not
considered carcinogenic by the scientists working on the Mine Flooding Unit),
and possibly zinc, which has been associated w ith the growth of tumors
(ESEPA, 1991). The greatest incidence of increased cancer as a result of the site
is associated w ith drinking contaminated groundw ater, which is unlikely
because this is not a residential area (USEPA, 1991).

AREA ONE
The risk assessment for Area One has not been completed, how ever the
agency has completed a Draft Baseline Risk Assessment for Lead in the
Priority Soils O perable Unit, which includes Butte and W alkerville, and
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extends from the Missoula Gulch eastward to the Berkeley Pit, and from
Walkerville south to Timber Butte (USEPA, 2/11/94). The EPA will
address risks related to the cadm ium and arsenic associated w ith this area
w hen the risk assessment is prepared. The lead is the result of waste rock
dum ps, railroad beds constructed of mine waste, mine tailings, smelter
emissions, and other mine-related materials associated w ith mining, milling,
and smelting, which ceased in Butte in 1910 (USEPA, 2/11/94). The
contamination has been spread by surface runoff and wind. Samples of soil
were taken from 142 residential yards of a total 1,604 in this area. Fifty percent
of the residences sam pled had environm ental lead concentrations that result
in a predicted 95 percent probability a child would have a blood lead level
higher than the EPA limit of 10 micrograms per liter of blood. Children up to
age six and pregnant women are most at risk from lead (USEPA, 2/11/94).

MONTANA POLE TREATMENT SITE
The 45-acre M ontana Pole Treatm ent site off West Greenwood Street (see
Montana Pole map in the appendix), which operated from 1947 until the
company went out of business in 1984, is contaminated w ith carcinogens,
including pentachlorophenol (PCP), dioxins, furans, and over 100 types of
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, the result of chemicals used to treat timber
products (USEPA, 2/10/93). The Colorado Smelter wastes and mill tailings
are located to the west and north of the site, a federal government manganese
stockpile site and the former Butte Reduction Works are directly north, and
the M ontana Power Company's transform er maintenance and storage facility
lie to the west and north. A partially reclaimed gravel pit, as well as a blasting
and explosive pow der company lie to the south of the site, which is
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surrounded on the east and west sides by active railroad lines. There are
residences w ithin a quarter mile of the site to the east and west.
A lthough the greatest chance of exposure on the site comes from PCP, the
most potent of the cancer-causing chemicals are the dioxins/furans (USEPA,
2/10/93). Other chemicals on the site include arsenic, chromium, copper,
lead, other phenols, and zinc. Contaminants are spread by surface w ater and
wind. The risk associated w ith ingestion of groundw ater from this site was
estimated as one additional cancer in each 1,000 people. G roundw ater is
currently being treated to remove the contaminants.
All but a very small part of Butte is a Superfund site. Throughout the city
there are three million cubic yards of old mine tailings, rocks, dirt, arsenic,
lead, cadmium, and mercury. From 1988 to the sum m er of 1995, the EPA
removed half a million cubic yards of mine waste (Weinstock, 7/31/95). On
the EPA's 1,200-site National Priority List, which ranks sites by the threat they
produce to hum an health and the environm ent, the Silver Bow Creek Unit,
which includes the Berkeley Pit, is num ber 20, and the M ontana Pole Plant,
num ber 735 (J. Robbins, 1994).
Yet few people in Butte participate in the cleanup process. And the few
who do — prim arily members of the Citizens Technical Environmental
Committee (CTEC), which was established under an EPA technical assistance
grant (TAG) to translate Superfund jargon into recognizable English — cry
foul. CTEC's composition has changed over the years, moving from a
m em bership of scientists and m ining engineers from M ontana Tech, the
former school of mines, in Butte, to lay membership, more of the type
associated w ith toxic waste grassroots groups (Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992;
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KroU-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Wolensky, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). Another
group, the Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition, based in Missoula, is primarily
concerned w ith the cleanup of the Clark Fork River. The Coalition is a wellestablished, hierarchically organized group, more representative, in structure,
of the large national environm ental groups, e.g., the N ational A udubon
Society and the Sierra Club.
Activist complaints, such as those raised by CTEC members, are not
unusual. From its passage. Superfund has been the subject of controversy
(Barnett, 1991; Yeager, 1991). Public fears of hazardous waste reached a fever
point in the 1970s with the publicity related to the Love Canal site in New
York (Greider, 1992; Brown, 1991; Hird, 1994; Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991).
And, according to a recent national survey, those fears have not subsided - 66
percent of respondents rated the danger posed by hazardous waste sites as
"very serious." (Hird, 1994:5) Concerns about health impacts of hazardous
waste were ranked higher than the dangers related to nuclear accident
radiation, pesticide residues, contaminated tap water, ozone layer destruction,
acid rain, and every other environmental problem listed (Hird, 1994).
Given the political economy of Superfund, and other major
environm ental laws, conflicts betw een government agencies and the public
are inevitable, some analysts say (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994). Economist H arold C. Barnett m aintains that Superfund has
failed because of conflict over who will pay the toxic debt and the impact of
this conflict on interdependent funding and enforcement decisions at federal,
state, and local levels.^ Because of the unresolved conflict between the
corporate search for profit and public fear of the health impacts of
contamination, interested parties often find it necessary to become involved
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in the cleanup process (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992). However,
the notion of public participation as negotiation put forw ard by the EPA is
misleading (Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1998; Barnett, 1994). Implicit in the
concept of negotiation is an equal distribution of pow er for all parties. But hat
is not the case because corporations have far more resources at their disposal
than do the citizens affected by corporate practices (Barnett, 1994; Greider,
1992; Brown, 1991; Yeager, 1991). The effectiveness of the law is undercut
because the inform ation-driven decision-making system favors those parties
w ith the financial and technical resources necessary to negotiate w ith agency
officials (Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992). The end result is the
disenfranchisement of the concerned public w hich does not have the
resources to participate in the m ultitude of decisions (Yeager, 1991; Greider,
1991).
In Butte, this unresolved conflict between private and public, manifests
itself in relationships between federal, state, and local governments, ARCO,
and CTEC members who believe they have been shut out of the debate. It
surfaces in disputes over "who pays," "how clean is clean," definitions of risk,
and perm anent versus im perm anent solutions.

WHO PAYS?
The question of w ho will foot the bill for the reclamation of Butte and
related Superfund sites has become an ongoing battle. The Superfund,
financed by taxes on petroleum products and 42 chemicals, is used to clean up
land-based sites which pose an immediate threat to hum an health and the
environm ent prior to recovery from responsible parties, and to clean up sites
for w hich there is no responsible party (Barnett, 1994). Because on some sites
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it is impossible to identify the responsible party, as in cases of "midnight
dumping," or, in other cases, businesses that may be responsible have gone
out of business years prior to discovery of the contamination, the
governm ent m ust absorb the cost in some cases. However, w hen the
responsible parties can be identified, under federal and state Superfund laws,
those responsible parties m ust pay.
The EPA and state of Montana m aintain that ARCO is the prim ary
responsible party. In June 1989 the EPA filed a lawsuit against ARCO to
recover $6.3 million which the agency had spent to replace the arseniccontaminated w ater supply at Milltown, relocate 37 families at Mill Creek,
and demolish the Anaconda smelter, each part of the Clark Fork Complex
{Montana Standard, 2/11/1990). The state of Montana has filed a $635.4
million lawsuit against ARCO for damage to natural resources (Montana
NRDP, 1994). The state charges that 11,590 acre-feet of groundw ater has been
injured by m ining operations in Butte and that contaminated surface w ater in
Silver Bow Creek is a source of hazardous substances to injured aquatic
resources dow nstream (Montana NRPD, 1994). Additional dam age has been
done to surface water, soil, river sediments, plants, fish, w etlands and wildlife
(Montana NRDP, 1994). The dollar am ount of the lawsuit is based both on
the cost of restoring the environm ent to a less-than-pristine state and on the
lost revenues for tourism and recreation that resulted from the pollution.
The state gave ARCO a break w hen w aived its right to collect even more
money for damages done to tourism and recreation before the passage of the
federal Superfund law {Montana Standard, 5/12/1995).
But ARCO claims it has no responsibility for cleaning the Clark Fork River
of the pollution that resulted from m ining and smelting operations in the
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Butte area. In February of 1990, the company asked the court to dismiss the
EPA’s $6.3 million lawsuit (Montflufl Standard, 2/11/1990). In 1991, the
company listed 46 defenses against liability, including: laying the
responsibility on the state because the state "aided and abetted miners for
more than a century;" claiming that state and federal Superfund lawâ are
unconstitutional; claiming that the pollution occurred before the Superfund
law was created; maintaining that because much of the waste was created
during wartime, when the miners w orked extra shifts to meet Departm ent of
Defense dem ands for copper, the contamination is the result of "acts of war;
and charging the company cannot be held liable for dam ages caused by an
"act of God {Montana Standard, 7/28/91)." ARCO’s defenses provoked angry
responses from environmentalists. Peter Nielson of the Clark Fork Coalition,
said it is absurd for ARCO to blame the state for environm ental dam ages at a
time w hen the m ining companies, and especially the A naconda Company,
controlled the state {Montana Standard,7/2811991).
Also in 1991, ARCO sued M ontana millionaire Dennis W ashington for
"untold millions," claiming that W ashington, the ow ner of M ontana
Resources which is still m ining in the East Continental Pit, and associated
mining companies were sending contaminated w ater into the Berkeley Pit
{Montana Standard, 10/8/1991). ARCO claimed that 1.5 million gallons of
heavily polluted w ater from MRI's operation has flowed southw ard into the
Berkeley Pit from the Yankee Doodle tailings ponds and precipitation, and
that MRI’S polluted w ater constitutes the prim ary contam inant of the Pit
{Montana Standard, 10/8/1991). Two and a half weeks later, ARCO officials
announced they w ould file a lawsuit against two EPA contractors because
their "shoddy work" caused 68 percent of the contam ination at the site
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(Montana Standard, 10/25/1991). Sandy Stash of ARCO said the contractors
allowed treated water to return to groundw ater w ith a PCP level of 1600 parts
per million even though the EPA drinking w ater standard for PCP is one part
per billion (Montana Standard, 10/25/1991). ARCO also charged that EPA
personnel were aware of the spread of contamination and did nothing about
it (Montana Standard, 10/25/1991).
These conflicts are inevitable because the im position of cleanup costs on
the corporations deemed responsible for the contamination presents a real
threat to the "treadmill of production." (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994) ARCO's
lawsuits and m aneuverings are not the result of evil intent; they are directly
related to the economic need to grow to survive, to produce profits to
compete w ith other firms for lim ited expansionary funds (Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994). Millions of dollars spent on cleanup pose a real threat to the
profit side of corporate balance sheets. So corporations will go to great lengths
to minimize threats. Those lengths include the creation of the Coalition on
Superfund, which was created w ithin months of Congressional passage of the
reauthorization am endm ents in 1986, to analyze how Superfund w orked and
recommend im provem ents (Greider, 1992). Founding members included
General Electric, Dow, Du Pont, Union Carbide, Monsanto, and AT&T,
"leading culprits in hazardous waste pollution," and major insurance
companies which stood to lose huge am ounts if their clients were held
responsible for the pollution they created (Greider, 1992:42).
The Superfund Coalition's initial budget, $840,000 a year, was targeted at
obtaining high-quality "research " and building alliances in "industry.
Congress, the adnunistration, academia, think tanks, the m edia and select
environmentalists (Greider, 1992:43)."" The goal was to convince the public
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the law was not working w hen it came up for reauthorization in five or six
years. This type of lobbying is part and parcel of w hat former journalist
William G reider calls "mock democracy," a governm ental form that appears
to involve "free and open political discourse, but is shaped and guided at a
very deep level by the resources of the most powerful interests (1992:43)."
Other participants come and go in the political debate, especially
unorganized citizens, who cannot always afford continuous
involvement. They are temporarily aroused by an issue, see reforms
enacted and then move on to other concerns. But the corporations do
not go away from the legislative debate, even in the off-seasons....[they]
are always at the table, fighting over the same points year after year. It
is their business to be there. Their profits depend on the outcomes
(Greider, 1992:43).

Corporate tactics in the late twenty-first century are far more sophisticated
than those of the Anaconda Company earlier in the century. ARCO, along
with the Chemical M anufacturers Association, the Am erican Petroleum
Institute, and the insurance industry have proposed settlement strategies
designed to increase the portion of cleanup financed by the Superfund, place
greater emphasis on negotiation, and provide m ore incentives for voluntary
settlement - all in the name of efficiency (Barnett, 1994). The corporations
argue that these reforms will reduce astronomical am ounts currently paid to
attorneys and, therefore, free up more of the money now spent on legal costs
for cleanup (Barnett, 1994). It may be possible that less money would be spent
for lawyers but that is no guarantee that the money saved w ould go into
cleanup rather than corporate profits.
ARCO has suggested that problems created before final Resource
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Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste regulations were
adopted in 1981 be subject to less stringent liability than those created after
adoption (Barnett, 1994). Prior to passage of RCRA there were few regulations
and no requirem ents that companies docum ent hazardous materials, so, if
ARCO’s suggestion were adopted, it w ould be far more difficult for
government to prove corporate responsibility, virtually guaranteeing that
taxpayers fund more cleanups (Barnett, 1994). Because the company
discontinued mining operations in Butte in 1982, it is conceivable that
ARCO's recom m ended "improvement" of Superfund w ould virtually let
ARCO off the hook for cleanup, leaving taxpayers to pay billions of dollars.
ARCO also is seeking the abandonm ent of joint and several liability as a
basis for negotiation, claiming it discourages settlements and voluntary
cleanups and forces companies willing to settle w ith the EPA to then sue
other responsible parties to recover costs (Barnett, 1994). Because in many
cases, there are num erous responsible parties for a particular Superfund site,
the joint and several liability provision is designed to allow the EPA to target
the most financially stable PRP to recover rem ediation costs (Barnett, 1994;
Greider, 1992). That PRP m ust then initiate legal action to recover costs from
other responsible parties (Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). ARCO argues, since
the courts generally use the same evidence as the EPA, the agency could
reduce transaction costs if it apportioned liability prior to negotiation and
agreed to fund any balance that may have resulted from the activities of
insolvent or unidentified parties (Barnett, 1994). EPA officials disagree
(Barnett, 1994).
Because the agency m ust stay w ithin the budget voted by Congress and
cleanup costs are so high, EPA officials argue that cleanup of sites w ould be
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dragged out interminably if the agency had to resort to the courts to
determ ine the proportions paid by each PRP before beginning rem ediation
(Barnett, 1994). Because many sites consist of a mixture of toxins,
determ ining the fair share is complicated, difficult, and time-consuming, so
ARCO's "improvement" w ould "effectively remove such action from
Superfund," EPA officials argue (Barnett, 1994:298). State officials support the
EPA. In May 1995, Montana's chief deputy attorney general told a Senate
subcommittee that Congress w ould "be ripping off Montanans" by
eliminating retroactive liability and limiting dam age aw ards to the cost of
cleanup (Montana Standard, 5/12/1995:1).
The financial stakes are high in Butte. Cleanup costs may run as high as
$1 billion; the EPA has already spent over $30 million (J. Robbins, 1994)) and
much of the planned cleanup has not yet begun. Cancers and other serious
illness may also be an issue (Craig, 7/30/95; Waring, 10/21/95; Brown, 1991;
Greider, 1992; Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991). Those hum an costs are far more
expensive than currency. And they are far harder to prove (Greider, 1992;
Cortese, 1993; Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994). The thesis will consider these costs in
a later section.
While ARCO lobbies to effectively eliminate its liability, it runs full-page
advertisem ents and expensive television ads in M ontana, touting its
responsible behavior as a "partner " in cleanup, subtly m aking the point that
others should also pay (ARCO, 1995). At the end of its 76-page full-color
Environmental Action Plan for the Clark Fork River, ARCO (1993) addressed
its complaints w ith Superfund more directly, criticizing liability provisions
under the law. In the com pany’s discussion of the M ontana Pole site, it says:
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As the result of a $25 lease by the Anaconda Company several decades
ago, ARCO today is implicated in a Superfund site it never operated
and faces liability that could run to tens of millions of dollars. Years
have now passed since the initial contamination was discovered.
Studies have been done, costs are mounting, but final action is still to
be decided.
Few can blame American business and industry for protesting the
current scheme. Lawyers and consultants profit as private and public
resources dw indle. Ultimately the environm ent loses as substantive
cleanup is delayed... (ARCO, 1993:Issues section).

ARCO’s publication and its circulars, distributed in the local newspaper,
do not m ention the profits the company is still reaping from the other
properties it obtained from the Anaconda Company (Craig, 7/30/95). Nor do
they m ention that ARCO itself is responsible for many of the delays, e.g. legal
actions (Montana Standard), it cites as reason to am end the federal Superfund
law. However, ARCO’s advertising which has been decried by local activists,
has been effective in some quarters. The appeal to simple equity strikes a
responsive chord in many. The notion of fair play is deeply im bued in most
Americans, especially when contradictory data have been omitted. John T.
Shea, president of the ARCO retirees club in Butte, says he and the majority of
retirees question the distribution of cleanup costs. The Anaconda Company,
not ARCO, was responsible for the pollution (Shea, 10/24/95).
...I grant ARCO has a lot of money. A lot of guys in the club have the
same opinion. When you pay $58 million to clean up...The biggest and
foremost worry here is about pensions. I’d hate to lose my ARCO
pension. This club (totally funded by ARCO) has been a great thing to
these guys and their wives who never w ent out so m uch as in the last
10years. (Shea, 10/24/95)

In this case, ARCO's oversimplified equity argum ent has connected with a
very valid concern - loss of pensions which have been earned, and are
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needed to survive and maintain a social life. ARCO is using a common
corporate ploy. In 1987, corporations spent $941 million in print and
broadcasting m edia on image advertising - designed to prom ote images and
political attitudes rather than to sell products (Greider, 1992). Although
m arket research shows the ads do not dim inish the public distrust of business
in general, it does reduce animosity tow ard the individual companies that
advertise (Greider, 1992). So;
Americans are saturated in feel good' messages about the largest
business corporations. Dow Chemical, notw ithstanding its notorious
reputation as a polluter, portrays itself as an old friend of nature.
AT&T saves eagles. IBM teaches children in the ghetto... (Greider,
1992:339.

And ARCO, as it works in W ashington D.C. to reduce its liability, touts
itself as a responsible "partner" in cleanup, and producer of golf courses from
toxic tracts (ARCO, 1993,1995). It is noteworthy that corporations who are
supportive of the current Congressional bent to eliminate the social "safety
nets" for the marginalized poor, are so insistent upon m aintaining them for
themselves - the limited liability they espouse falls into a category of "safety
net," protecting corporations and their insurance companies from the risks
inherent in corporate expansion. While the discussion of how to overhaul
Superfund during its upcom ing reauthorization is debated, cleanup of Butte
suffers delay after delay. Many of the delays to date have been related to the
second problem identified by Barnett (1994): enforcement on the federal,
state, and local level.
In Butte, the enforcement-related conflict revolves about EPA standards,
w hich determ ine the m axim um "safe" levels of exposure for toxins, and the
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process of risk assessment by which the EPA determines if a site should be
listed on the National Priorities List (Barnett, 1994). The risk assessment is
also part of the health assessment required in the 1986 reauthorization
(Barnett, 1994). On a regular basis, corporations challenge the threshold
levels, concentrations beyond which exposure is declared harmful, as
overprotective (Greider, 1992), Victims of exposure and some medical
professionals argue the EPA standards are not protective enough (Greider,
1992; Brown, 1991; Schnaiberg, 1988). The question that is still unanswered is
"how clean is clean."
In Butte, this unansw ered question manifests itself in debates about
cleanup standards, and in conflicts between federal, state, and local
governm ent agencies.

HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?
The federal Superfund law is driven by a m andate to protect public health
and the environment while complying w ith applicable or relevant and
appropriate state regulations (Hird, 1994). But does protection mean no risk,
no additional risk, or acceptable additional risk? In making its
determ inations about rem ediating a given site, the EPA m ust consider long
term effectiveness, reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume of contaminants
through treatment, short-term effectiveness, im plem entability, and cost
(Hird, 1994). Once this has been accomplished, the agency m ust consider
"modifying criteria," state and community acceptance of a cleanup plan (Hird,
1994:143).
Often these criteria conflict (Hird, 1994). To justify its decisions, the
agency relies upon risk assessments, estimations of the probability of
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developing cancer or other health problems as the result of exposure to toxins
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). Much of the testing
and risk assessment process is based on associations betw een exposure and
disease — the stronger the association, the better the evidence for causality
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Bates, 1994)). But factors, such as poor exposure
measurements, variability in outcome, or the fact that some illnesses, such as
asthma, are often the possible result of num erous sources, will weaken the
association (Bates, 1994). Therefore, unless exposure and causality are wellcharacterized, a weak association should not be dismissed (Bates, 1994).
Arguably, exposure and causality have not been well-characterized in Butte
where, as will be discussed in a later section, health studies, other than for
exposure to lead, have not been conducted and reporting of illness is
incom plete.
D uring the risk assessment process, information available on dose and
expected response from exposure to a specific chemical or metal, is expressed
by standards which are the result of testing, done on animals and, less often,
on people (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Lappé, 1991). In developing an
assessment, chemicals and metals and the specific levels found of each are
analyzed separately for each pathway of exposure that might exist, e.g.,
ingestion, dermal contact, inhalation (Bates, 1994; USEPA, 2/10/93, 2/15/93,
2/11/94). By comparisons of the established threshold limits for each
chemical through each pathw ay to the actual am ount of the chemical found
at the site, risk assessors calculate mathematically the risk posed by each
chemical (Bates, 1994; USEPA, 2/10/93, 2/15/93, 2/11/94). The risks are then
added u p to determ ine if the site should be cleaned up (Bates, 1994; USEPA,
2/10/93,2/15/93,2/11/94).
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These calculations are used to justify decisions for action or lack of it. But
w hat do these elaborate calculations really tell anyone? Predictions are
complicated by the long period of time it often takes cancer to develop to a
stage at which it can be diagnosed, by the fact that some people do not develop
cancer even after exposure to a carcinogenic, and by the mobility of people
who may be living hundreds or thousands of miles away from where their
cancers may have been initiated when the diagnosis is m ade (Lappé, 1991).
There is a large, rapidly-growing body of literature on the subject of risk
assessment (Lappé, 1991; Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1983). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recapitulate the
argum ents so the thesis will consider only those issues relevant to Butte.
Although scientists are careful to point out the lim itations of risk
assessment, those limitations - and there are many - are frequently ignored
when the assessments are used to justify cleanup policy (Greider, 1992;
Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). The risk assessment
process is predicated on the notion that defensible hard science will provide
an objective value-free basis for decision (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Greider,
1992; Edelstein, 1988). This is rarely the case (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). The concept of risk is a social construct, which
entails a consideration of the distribution of risks under discussion; this does
not occur in the risk assessment process as currently structured (SchraderFrechette, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
It is not possible to exclude normative decisions, entailing values, during the
form ulation of a scientific theory or explanation of causal connections
because value judgm ents are m ade at every step along the way (SchraderFrechette, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988), e.g. w hat to study, how to study
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it, w hat to exclude from the study, how to determ ine w hat constitutes
evidence for the theory or for causality. The selection of options to reduce or
eliminate risk also involve norm ative criteria (Schrader-Frechette, 1991;
Greider, 1992).
The limitations in the risk assessment process are challenged on a regular
basis by victims of exposure to contamination (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a,
1991b; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1991; Brown, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
Sometimes the limitations are also challenged by corporations (Greider, 1992;
Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991). For the past five years, ARCO has
challenged both federal and state standards. In March, 1990, ARCO asked an
appeals court to strike dow n the EPA standards for lead contamination of soil,
calling the standards "arbitrary and capricious {Montana Standard, 3/6/90)."
The standards, above which the presence of lead is dangerous, especially to
children, were set by the federal Centers for Disease Control (Montana
Standard,316190).
In A ugust 1991, ARCO sought to define a num ber of conditions, "upsets,"
from which it would not be held liable for failure to meet w ater quality
standards and any associated impact dow nstream on the Clcirk Fork River
(Montana Standard, 8/11/1991). The "upsets" consisted of weather and
seasonal conditions w hich are routine in southw est M ontana, including high
winds, high water flows in the spring, lack of biological activity in winter,
increased biological activity in the summer, and "roll-over" of ponds in the
spring and w inter (Montana Standard, 8/11/1991). Clark Fork Coalition
spokesm en charged the corporation w ith an attem pt to avoid accountability
for effects of normal and anticipated w eather conditions (Montana Standard,
8/11/1991).
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Also in A ugust of 1991, ARCO announced it no longer planned to clean
up residential yards in Butte to the 2,000 parts per million standard to which
it had previously agreed {Montana Standard, 8/15/1991). ARCO spokesman
Sandy Stash said the standard was too low to affect health and that the
corporation was pushing the EPA to adopt a new lead standard of 2,500 to
3,000 parts per million for residential yards {Montana Standard, 8/15/1991).
The EPA had originally set the level at which ARCO had to clean up
residential yards at 1,000 parts per million {Montana Standard,8l8l 1991).
However, after the corporation challenged the standards in court, the agency
and corporation negotiated the 2,000 parts per million standard {Montana
Standard, 8/8/1991), EPA Assistant Director Don Pizzini said the EPA was
considering am ending the 2,000 ppm level to 2,500 or 3,000 but had not
reached a decision {Montana Standard, 8/8/1991). In November 1991, EPA
Montana Director John Wardell w arned Butte-Silver Bow officials that ARCO
was becoming even more resistant to cleanup projects and creating further
delays {Montana Standard, 11/21/1991). The Montana D epartm ent of Health
and Environmental Science also challenged the EPA lead standards. The
state’s standard of 1,000 part per million was more protective than that
negotiated by ARCO and the EPA {Montana Standard,8/8/1991).
H ard science notw ithstanding, there is am ple room for disagreem ent
among scientists; clearly there are limits to scientific rationality. Critics of risk
assessment question scientific claims to rationality and objectivity, frequently
focusing upon the reductionist and exclusionist nature of the risk assessment
process (Greider, 1992; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991). SchraderFrechette (1991:128-129) reports that "researchers have concluded risk experts
typically overlook six common "pathways to disaster":
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1. Failure to consider the ways in which hum an error can cause
technological systems to fail, as at Three Mile Island, or w ith the Geographic
Information System which will be used to m onitor future use of
contam inated land in Butte;
2. Overconfidence in current scientific knowledge, even though such
inadequate scientific knowledge caused such catastrophes as the 1976 collapse
of the Teton Dam - a complaint often voiced by critics of the plans to clean up
the Berkeley Pit;
3. Failure to appreciate how technical systems as a whole function, which
will likely be an issue w hen the institutional controls, w hich will be discussed
in a later section, are im plem ented in Butte;
4. Failure to take into account chronic, cumulative effects, as in the case of
acid rain, or the conglomerate of health risks in Butte;
5. Failure to anticipate inadequate hum an responses to safety measures,
such as the failure of Chernobyl experts to evacuate immediately;
6. Failure to anticipate "common mode" failures sim ultaneously affecting
systems designed to be independent. (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:128-129)
More problematic than w hat is included in a risk assessment is w hat is not
(Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994; Schrader-Frechette, 1991). For example, because
synergistic effects, the possible interactions of chemicals that produce effects
greater than the sum of each individual chemical, are unknow n, synergies
are omitted. However, at every site in Butte, there are m ultiple metals and
chemicals which may well create more, or less, of a risk together than can be
calculated. Exposures are usually m ultiple and complex, former public health
official Marc Lappé (1991) notes. In addition, chemical contaminants in
drinking w ater can act in ways that occupational experience doesn't
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adequately anticipate (Lappé, 1991). By passing through the liver before
entering the body generally, substances absorbed through the gastro-intestinal
tract may be activated by the liver into more hazardous chemical byproducts
(Lappé, 1991). This may well be the case w ith chemicals w hich are not
considered carcinogens or toxins and, therefore, screened out of the
assessment (Lappé,1991).
Further, the concept of thresholds may well be a "red herring" because it
implies that below a certain exposure level there is no health risk (Lappé,
1991). This may not be the case. Some toxic chemicals acquire different
properties from one dose to another; low doses affect hum an systems also,
especially in the developm ent of organ systems of an embryo or fetus; and
even "infinitesimal" doses "can in theory start a cascade of heritable changes
in a single cell that lead to cancer (Lappé, 191:122)." Although EPA does not
use thresholds for chemicals that have been classified as cancer-causing, it
does use thresholds for chemicals which have not been classified as cancercausing (USEPA, 1991,1992,2/10/93,12/15/93,2/11/94).
Testing to determine adverse affects is slow and costly. For that reason,
little or nothing is know n about health effects of many chemicals found at
Superfund sites (Lappé, 1991). However, lack of knowledge is no guarantee
that these chemicals do not pose health risks (Lappé, 1991). At the Montana
Pole Treatm ent Plant site — just one of the many contaminated sites in Butte
— toxicity values are unavailable for 11 of the chemicals found in
groundw ater and an additional 13 chemicals were omitted from the risk
assessment because they were found at levels below established thresholds in
the groundw ater (USEPA, 2/10/93). Another 31 chemicals found in the
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groundw ater were retained for consideration in the risk assessment (USEPA,
2/10/93). Equally num erous lists of chemicals on the M ontana Pole site were
considered in analyses of surface water, soil and sediments (USEPA, 2/10/93).
After screening out chemicals for which there are no toxicity values and
which occurred in each m edium below threshold level, the risk assessment
identified 12 chemicals of concern for soil, 11 for surface water, and three for
sediments (USEPA, 2/10/93). Much is not know n about the chemicals at the
site and, given the num bers of chemicals found, the possibilities for
synergistic effects are great at the Montana Pole Plant site. A lthough PCPs,
volatile organic chemicals, dioxins and furans have not been found at the
other Superfund sites in Butte, there is still a possibility of synergistic effects
between the metals which contaminate soil, air, and water.
Further, research into the historical developm ent of w orkplace threshold
limit values (TLVs), the standards beyond which people should not receive
exposure, indicates a questionable level of corporate influence upon
developm ent of those standards (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). This is relevant
because much of the data used in health and risk assessments has been
developed from workplace inform ation because it is so difficult to assess
impacts outside of controlled situations (Castleman and Ziem, 1988; Lappé,
1991). Researchers found they could not access unpublished corporate
"documentation" for nearly one sixth of the "documented" workplace TLVs,
thus precluding scientific scrutiny (Castleman and Ziem, 1988). Researchers
expressed great concern that the TLV committee, responsible for setting
standards, accepted uncritically industry "assertions based on scant
unpublished data' (Castleman and Ziem, 1988:554)." Three of the
contam inants — copper, manganese and com pounds, and silver and
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com pounds — found in Butte Superfund sites are on the researchers' list of
TLVs for which unpublished corporate data was im portant (Castleman and
Ziem, 1988). Government reliance on industry inform ation to establish
discharge limits and set standards is problematic, especially in light of the fact
that:
Some 65,000 chemicals are m anufactured in the U nited States every
year, and for many there is little knowledge of their toxic effects, either
alone, or in their m yriad combinations (Yeager, 1991:219).

Beyond the possibly questionable practices entailed in setting threshold
limits, there are other problems. Risk assessments consider only the risks
related to the site under study — they screen out other risks that subject
groups may be exposed to simultaneously, such as other Superfund operable
units, landfills, and biological contaminants in drinking water. In addition to
the M ontana Pole site, Butte residents are exposed to other potential public
health problems, including:
1. Other contaminated operable units (USEPA, 1991, 1992, 1992, 1994);
2. Possible contaminants from the former tow n landfill (Craig, 7/30/95).
Although, in June 1995, CTEC filed a request under the Freedom of
Information Act for information related to the type and extent of
contamination associated w ith the form er tow n landfill, no response has
been forthcoming as of February 1996 (Craig, 7/30/95). However, landfill
contamination commonly results in exposure to carcinogenic volatile organic
chemicals, the result of the dum ping of solvents and other chemical cleaners
(Lappé, 1991).
3. Air pollution. Butte is located in an area of the state that exceeds
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standards for particulates stipulated under the federal Clean Air Act. These
particulates have been associated w ith respiratory problems (Bates, 1994).
4. Biological contaminants in the w ater supply. The city has been under a
federal order to w arn residents to boil water from the tap prior to drinking
{Montana Standard).
5. Exposure to large am ounts of chlorine used to m inim ize the biological
contaminants in the water, w hich likely created the presence of carcinogenic
trihalomethanes which were detected in excess of state standards in Butte
w ater in 1993. Butte-Silver Bow w ater operations chief Mike Patterson said
this was the first time the water supply had exceeded the state standard of 100
parts per billion, and that trihalom ethane was dangerous only in long-term
exposure (Montana Standard, 1/ 6/1994). However, his inform ation on the
implications of exposure was faulty.
The two most common trihalom ethanes are chloroform and brom oform
(Lappé, 1991). Chloroform has been shown to produce liver cancer in all
animal assays; bromoform, although less thoroughly tested, has "potent
kidney and liver toxicity of its own (Lappé, 1991:220)." The National
Academy of Sciences has estimated that at the 100 parts per billion standard,
the cancer risk from chloroform (if it were the only chemical ingredient in
the trihalomethanes) is one in 100,000 (Lappé, 1991). In 1981, case-control
studies show ed a clear relationship between exposure to chlorine-treated
municipal w ater supplies and an increased incidence of bladder, rectal, and
colon cancer, especially in municipalities that relied on surface or shallow
aquifers (Lappé, 1991). A lthough not all epidemiological studies have found
the same cancers, Kenneth Cantor of the National Cancer Institute believes
"the chlorinated organic molecules that form in drinking w ater from
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chlorination coupled w ith those that are unintentionally added combine to
create a carcinogenic risk (Lappé: 221)."
...in a penultim ate study involving tens of thousands of people at risk
from contaminated w ater systems. Cantor has show n a convincing
dose-response relationship between the levels of halogenated
contam inants (estimated from the am ount of contam inated drinking
water ingested) and the occurrence of bladder cancer.
W hat makes Cantor's findings all the more disturbing is that the
communities he studied were all on drinking w ater that had been
treated according to the rules,' that is, the w ater met federal drinking
water standards (Lappé, 1991:221).

Equally disturbing, and unm entioned in the Montana Standard news story
that alerted residents to problems w ith their drinking water, is the fact that
trihalomethanes are often correlated w ith the presence of carcinogenic
volatile organic chemicals, including 1,2-dichloroethane, trichloroethylene,
and 1,1-dichloroethylene (Lappé, 1991) — chemicals often found at landfill
sites in the United States and which could well be present at Butte's
municipal landfill. These three chemicals have been associated with certain
cancers of the digestive and urinary tracts. In Woburn, Massachusetts, the
presence of trihalomethanes was the first indicator of the volatile organic
chemicals that were associated w ith a cluster of childhood leukemia (Lappé,
1991; Brown, 1991). Another study in N ew Jersey found females, probably
because they were more likely to drink w ater at home during the day than
males who w orked outside the home, had higher leukemia risk in regions of
the state w here high levels of volatile organic chemicals were found (Lappé,
1991).
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In addition to omission of other potential sources of public health risks,
although the Butte risk assessments m ention "sensitive populations," the
calculations are done assuming a fairly uniform population. As was the case
in the influenza epidemics, w hen Butte residents whose health was
weakened as a result of the environm ent died in great num bers (Emmons,
1990), the health effects of other sources and kinds of contamination in Butte
may well affect how people will respond to the chemicals listed in the risk
assessments (Lappé, 1991). Also, poor nutrition, which has historically been
problematic in Butte because of poverty (Emmons, 1990), and a lack of
medical care, which is often the case w hen people whose health insurance
coverage was supplied by their jobs lose those jobs, create greater health
vulnerabilities in people. Yet, such things are not factored into the
assessments.
Given the unresolved conflict between economic structure and
environm ental protection, it is not likely that such real-w orld issues will ever
be incorporated into the process, even in the very unlikely event that policy
required such inclusion. The reason, again, is not evil intent, but rather the
structure of bureaucracies. To endure over time, the bureaucracy m ust
suppress rivalries, m ust collectivize decision making so no one person can be
held accountable for any given decision (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
Consequently the strategy emerges of compromise, of not pressing
problem s to the point of defining a single overriding objective, and of
creating a complex and obscure tradition in which each subunit can
find its place. To keep the subunits from fearing for their sectional
interests, the hierarchy avoids adopting a single overriding goal,
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983:91)
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Bureaucrats are apolitical, tend to construct "only closed static systems of
thought",..and react to new law or policy changes "as if they were only a
further elaboration of the original system (Douglas and W ildavksy, 1983:91)."
Most alternatives most of the time are not considered as candidates for
adoption. "Only a few ideas - those best know n and closest to existing
program s - are given attention (Douglas and W ildavsky, 1983:91)." In other
words, bureaucracies tend to appropriate reform efforts into their existing
perceptions of reality, tend to interpret and adm inister law and regulations to
uphold the status quo. For this reason, Douglas and W ildavsky (1983) report,
hierarchical decision-making tends tow ard the rem edial and serial, as the
same problems are confronted again and again, confronted, in the case of
Superfund, because the fundam ental issues of who pays and how clean is
clean have not been addressed (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991). The result of this
type of decision making is that the ability of the hierarchy to "control the
future by planking dow n its procedures," assures that the hierarchically
construed notion of "a rational order" will be fulfilled (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1983:93-94). Above all, that "rational order" m ust include the
continued existence of the bureaucracy (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983).
Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures
which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying
com munity action' over into rationally ordered societal action.'
Therefore, as an instrum ent for 'societalizing' relations of power,
bureaucracy has been and is a pow er instrum ent of the first order - for
the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus (Weber, 1996: 119).

Protected by data and buffered by bureaucratic structure, technocratic
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agencies can successfully avoid consideration of social issues. This is essential
to m aintaining their control; if some suffer as a result, so be it (Douglas and
W ildavsky, 1983). The bureaucracy represents w hat Douglas and Wildavsky
(1983) refer to as "the center," as opposed to "the border."
...It will also put the maintenance of the whole system above
individual survival — this time the system is the bureaucratic
organization. It frankly believes in sacrificing the few for the good of
the whole. It is smug about its rigid procedures. It is too slow, too
blind to new information. It will not believe in new dangers and will
often be taken by surprise. It will accept large risks if they appear on a
horizon beyond its institutional threshold of concern... (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1983:101).

One of the hallmarks of a successful bureaucracy is that employees
internalize the organization's values and goals (Weber, 1996). Internalization
goes far deeper than parroting the company line. It means that the employee
has adopted the organization's worldview as his own. To this end, the agents
of socialization - schools, in particular - are oriented tow ard inculcating
beliefs, values, self-concepts, types of solidarity and fragmentation, as well as
modes of personal behavior and development, that will perpetuate, validate,
and allow for the smooth operation of economic institutions and
bureaucracies to maintain the status quo (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
Obviously, there are bureaucrats and technocrats who care about people.
However, trapped in the "iron cage" (Weber, 1996) of bureaucracy, they m ust
express their concern in the m anner of the bureaucracy, which is paternalistic,
dispensed according to rules, and technical. It is paternalistic in the sense that
it is expressed by the government agency's plan, a plan that is sufficient to
am eliorate the problem as the agency defines it, but is not necessarily the
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problem that citizens define. It is bureaucratic in the sense that everything
goes through agency channels and follows the agency timetable. Government
agencies are organized as clearly segmented units, each w ith its own limited
area of responsibility. It is not unusual for one departm ent to be unaw are of
inform ation another departm ent has on the same site until, at a point in the
process which is never entirely clear to an outsider, the different departm ents
meet to share information. The end result is that anyone who seeks a full
picture of the status of any project m ust try to piece together an overview on
his or her own. Victims of contamination often feel a sense of urgency
(Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991; Brown, 1991; Edelstein, 1988; Greider, 1992).
There is real need to know what they are facing and how it will be resolved.
This urgency is not shared by bureaucracies whose timetable is generally
defined by law - usually in terms of years.
The caring is technical; that is the agency orientation and that is how it
both defines and solves problem. Yet, that is often not w hat victims need:
The victims’ plight is further com pounded by the fact that relief efforts
aren’t humanistic, but are, instead, technical activities designed to
elim inate the contaminant (Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991a:62).

Government agencies, such as the EPA, differ from corporate
bureaucracies in that governm ent bureaucrats m ust deal w ith inputs from
both corporations and the public (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and
Gould, 1994). As noted previously, control often lies in the hands of those
w ith the greatest inputs into the system. However, the nature of inputs is not
stable over time. It can be argued that, throughout the 25 years of its
existence, the EPA, caught in the m iddle of unresolved environm ental
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conflicts, has had to heed corporate concerns and, in some cases, internalized
those concerns into its operating procedure (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994;
Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). It can also be argued, to a lesser extent, the
agency has, especially in the early years w hen environm ental groups were
vocal, tried to reflect the concerns of those groups also (Yeager, 1991; Barnett,
1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994). This is the tension between the
contradictory dem ands of m aintaining the existing social order while, at the
same time, maintaining the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those
governed (Yeager, 1991; Barnett, 1994; Schnaiberg and Could, 1994).
Further, the EPA is not monolithic. The agency has hired people like Sara
Weinstock in Butte who is trying to educate the agency away from its
technical stance tow ard a greater understanding of the communities the
agency enters. As a public affairs officer, Weinstock has a very dem anding
job. It is she who m ust deal w ith every party involved in the cleanup. It is
she who m ust explain agency decisions and, given the m agnitude of the
stakes, emotions often run high when cleanup is discussed. It's Weinstock, a
small attractive down-to-earth blonde w ith a w ide grin, who plays the point
position in the EPA's Butte office. It's not unusual to find her explaining
some facet of Superfund on the phone and signalling to someone else
standing by her desk waiting for information, while, in the background, her
computer, on w hich she's trying to complete an agency report, glows. It's also
not unusual to find engineers going through reports and talking about the
tables clustered in the center of the small room. Weinstock's dom ain is
crow ded and, often, hectic. This is no nine to five job; Weinstock also attends
frequent night meetings. A Butte native herself, Weinstock is w ell-equipped
to recognize there are emotional issues involved in the cleanup:
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When we (the EPA) came in in 1988 our first meeting was in
Walkerville. We were closing Alice Baseball Field. People in their 80s
said they played on that field — and so did I. I think it's the grieving
cycle - denial. You can't send in male engineers to deal w ith an
emotional issue. The engineers say, Tm not a psychologist. That’s
w here we make our mistake. I've been at several conferences pushing
the EPA on this. Explain to them [the people of Butte] that it's not their
fault their kid was put in this situation and then they can go on.
(7/31/95)

Weinstock’s approach w ould go far to address the complaint that the
nature of agency response is so often technical. (She raises issues that will be
addressed in a later section.) Her knowledge of Butte is a real asset for the
agency. However, given her limited terrain as an agency employee and the
structural constraints and unresolved issues cited earlier in this section,
Weinstock may well be fighting a losing battle with the agency. But, the battle
she fights is important because it is vital that alternative perceptions of the
agency role are brought consistently to the table.
In light of the fine line that the EPA m ust walk between environmental
threats (posed by Superfund sites), economic concerns, and conflicting
political pressures, it is not irrational that the agency has apparently set
internal limits related to the scope of rem ediation it requires. The nine
criteria in SARA to evaluate cleanup remedies are: compliance with
standards under federal laws; reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume;
short-term effectiveness; long-term effectiveness and permanence;
im plementability; cost; community acceptance; state acceptance; and overall
protection of hum an health and the environment (Hird, 1994). After passage
of SARA, EPA headquarters "advised the regions to consider effectiveness,
ease of implementation, and cost in selecting a rem edy and to choose the
rem edy that provided the best balance among these factors (Barnett, 1994:
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240)." From this vague directive w ith the implication of cost-benefit analysis,
the regional offices shifted to a greater awareness of cost, causing a firestorm
of criticism (Barnett, 1994).

PERMANENT V. IMPERMANENT SOLUTIONS
A H azardous Waste Treatm ent C ouncil/environm ental group report,
after reviewing 75 of the agency's records of decisions (RODs), found, despite
Congressional instructions to use perm anent treatm ent rem edies w herever
and whenever possible, 68 percent of the remedies the agency selected in 1987
failed to use any treatm ent on the contaminant (Barnett, 1994). Partial or
ineffective treatm ent options were used in another 24 percent; in only eight
percent of the 75 RODs was a perm anent treatm ent used w hen possible
(Barnett, 1994). The report also found the agency "ignored existing
environmental standards, set cleanup goals unscientifically, exempted
Superfund cleanups from the environm ental regulations it im posed upon
waste managem ent facilities, and generally ignored the im pact of Superfund
sites on natural resources (Barnett, 1994:243)."
A follow-up study of the 150 RODs issued in 1988 found at 54 percent of
sites cleanup standards had not been established for groundw ater, surface
water, or soil (Barnett, 1994). Also, at sites where standards were set, the
agency relied on risk assessments instead of objective standards and criteria
(Barnett, 1994). Further, the risk assessments "often contained suspect and
unsubstantiated assumptions," e.g., people w ould stay away from
contamination (Barnett, 1994:244). The follow-up report also found
continued reliance on im perm anent remedies, and indicated that, often,
contam inated groundw ater was w ritten off rather than cleaned (Barnett,
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1994). When the agency addressed contamination, it often called for
alternative w ater supplies, plugging wells or institutional controls to prevent
use (Barnett: 244).
In Butte, CTEC members have consistently, and unsuccessfully, rem inded
the agency that its remedies should be perm anent (Montana Standard). They
argue that the agency's preference for im perm anent solutions has resulted in
w hat appears to be the w riting off of the water in the Berkeley Pit (USEPA,
12/15/93), in the agreement signed by Butte-Silver Bow and ARCO that calls
for the im plem entation of institutional controls to protect public health from
the contamination that will rem ain after the cleanup is completed
(ARCO / Butte-Silver Bow, 1993), and, to a lesser extent, in the agreement to
retain "historic mining waste (ARCO / Butte-Silver Bow, 1993). "
A few Butte residents are involved w ith the Citizens’ Technical
Environmental Committee (CTEC). U nder the Superfund reauthorization of
1986, the EPA was authorized to give grant money. Technical Assistance
Grants (TAGs), to citizen groups in Superfund communities to help the
community translate the technical jargon of rem edial investigations,
feasibility studies, risk assessments, health studies, and records of decision
(Barnett, 1994). The grant money can be used for such things as hiring experts
and print newsletters to keep members of the community abreast of
developments (Barnett, 1994). However, there are real limits on TAG
recipient activities, which will be addressed later in this section.
Butte's 28-member CTEC committee originally included 10 M ontana Tech
officials, several engineers or professors, four Anaconda Company officials,
two legislators, two doctors, a health board member, the county sanitarian, a
representative of the N ational Center for A ppropriate Technology, and a
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m em ber of the Clark Fork Coalition (Montana Standard, 2/26/1990). The
composition is now more representative of residents, rather than scientists
(Craig, 7/30/95). The only sustained and published criticism of EPA plans
have em anated from this committee. M ontana Environm ental Inform ation
Center board member John Ray says (10/24/95), "Before May Kay [Craig] got
into it, CTEC was ARCO operated."
Even before the shift to a predom inantly non-scientist membership, the
committee challenged the EPA's decision to allow the Pit to fill to elevation
5,450 feet (Craig, 7/30/95). The EPA had originally set 5,270 feet as the critical
point at which the contaminated w ater in the Pit w ould reach the
groundw ater in Butte's alluvial aquifer, but, after negotiations w ith ARCO,
the EPA raised the leveP to 5,450 feet (Montana Standard, 2/26/90). The EPA
and ARCO m aintained the w ater level in the Pit w ould not reach the 5,450
feet level until 2009; CTEC members argued that even the original 5,270 feet
level was too high because the Pit w ater could reach the groundw ater through
the Old Pittsmont Mine workings at level 4,970 feet (Montana Standard,
2/26/90). Nor were CTEC members comfortable w ith the thought that
landslides in the earthquake-prone area could displace enough w ater to rise
the level of the Pit w ater to a critical point w ithin a m atter of minutes
(Montana Standard,!/26/1990).
The following May, the committee argued that the EPA should consider
draining the Pit and treating the w ater because the contaminated w ater in the
Pit could hurt Butte-Silver Bow's economy and pollute the area groundw ater
(Montana Standard, 5/25/1990). T he consequences of that are extremely
serious, " Bill MacGregor said. "We w ould become the next Mill Creek
(Montana Standard, 5/25/1990)." Residents of Mill Creek, near Missoula,
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were evacuated as one of the first responses to the contamination. Creighton
Barry, also a CTEC member, said Butte residents should be asked about w hat
they w ant left w hen the reclamation w ork is complete:
Nobody's ever recognized that maybe we don't w ant to have a
poisonous lake {Montana Standard, 512511990).

"If it (the water leaving the Pit) happens, how are we going to plug the
dike? We can't plug the dike, it's too late...It's far better to err on the side of
safety than on the side of some environmental disaster, " Rep. Fritz Daily
argued (Montana Standard, 5/31/1990). Committee member Floyd Bossard
said the group wanted a study on the social and economic effects of leaving
the water in the Pit and that the study should be included in the EPA's
cleanup plans (Montana Standard, 5/31/1990). Their concerns were not just
about the probability of a future event - one resident, w orried because a
swam p near his home becomes dam p w hen the w ater level in the Travona
Mine rises, asked how often he should test his w ater (Montana Standard,
5/31/1990).
Neither the EPA nor ARCO saw the need to adjust the critical level
dow nw ard. Dailey, frustrated by the lack of official response, ultimately
brought and fought unsuccessfully for passage of a bill before the state
legislature to establish fines of $25,000 a day for those who contaminate
groundw ater w ith industrial wastes and hazardous substances (Montana
Standard, 1/31/1991). Passage of the bill would hold ARCO responsible for
the contamination caused by flooding the Berkeley Pit, Daily said (Montana
S ta n d a rd ,!/31/1991).
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CTEC members also questioned why the risk assessment and earthquake
report discounted the possibility of seismic activity even though the risk
assessment reported, if the contaminated w ater escaped, hum an health would
be seriously jeopardized (USEPA, 12/15/93). Because risk assessors are prone
to w hat a lay person would call understatem ent (Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992;
Schrader-Frechette, 1991), the unusually strong language used to describe the
effects of the release of the contaminated w ater in the Berkeley Pit into the
environm ent is startling:
The resulting impact to the local aquatic ecosystem...w ould be
catastrophic in both nature and extent (USEPA, 12/15/93:Section 7.4).

Critics' fears of earthquakes were given more credence in June 1995, when
a new spaper story reported that state and local officials were surprised to learn
that earthquake ratings had been updated seven years previously, in 1988, by
the International Conference of Building Officials. As a result of that update,
Butte is in a zone of probable major damage (Missoulian: 6 / 30/1995). Those
who remember the 1959 earthquake are acutely aware that it can happen
again, current CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says (7/30/95). Thirty six years
after the fact, Craig still can describe vividly the shock of w aking to the jolt, of
the m irror falling from her wall beside her bed (7/30/95).
Schrader-Frechette calls this divergence of w hat is considered possible the
expert- judgm ent strategy" — the belief that risk can be reduced to some
characteristics which can be determ ined only by experts or that experts only
are capable of distinguishing "actual" rather than "perceived " risk. The
strategy also occurs w hen assessors presuppose that a technological risk is
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defined purely in terms of measurable physical impact; an erroneous
supposition because social impact includes "increased traum a or decreased
civil liberties" as part of the risk itself (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:78).
Catastrophic potential and the fact that low-probability / high
consequence situations are often the product of societally-imposed (as
opposed to privately chosen) risks may also explain risk aversion.
There is evidence that the psychological traum a (feelings of impotence,
depression, rage) associated w ith the imposition of a particular hazard
is greater than that associated with the choice of a private risk of the
same probability...people are typically more averse to the lowprobability/high consequence situation (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:90).

The failure of risk assessors to assume that public preference, w hen it is in
disagreement with the expert preference, is the "result of misperceived
probabilities, not a legitimate value system," goes "hand in hand with
assessors' tendencies to define ethical and political issues as merely technical
ones... They assume, incorrectly, that agreement about technical m atters is
sufficient for resolving normative disputes (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:98)."
Psychologist Michael Edelstein notes that, once a governm ent agency
makes a decision, it is likely to use a "scientific rationale to legitimate it,
dismissing problems w ith their (citizens') reasoning. Once locked into this
position, the agency defends it stubbornly. Thus, w hat may begin as an open
inquiry under the scientific method is transform ed into a distorted approach
under the guise of science (1988:121). "
There is a synergy that operates in w hat Edelstein refers to as "Citizen's"
and "Regulator's Bind. " (1988:124) The more rigidly the agency defends its
choices, the angrier the public; the angrier the public, the more rigid the
agency defense (Edelstein, 1988). But there are also other constraints. As
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angry residents seek to publicize their concerns, they enhance the "stigma"
associated w ith a "contaminated community," often earning the animosity of
groups such as realtors and chambers of commerce which w ant to dow nplay
the existence of contamination (Edelstein, 1988). Also, by seeking answers,
the activists increase their ow n stress levels for frequently protracted periods
of time because of the time gap, often up to five years, betw een definition of
the problem and cleanup (Edelstein, 1988).
In contrast, regulators’ bind involves the frustration involved w ith acting,
as public servants, to solve a complicated problem while faced w ith regulatory
limits to their actions, political realities, lim ited resources, and their own
individual perspectives tow ard the task at hand (Edelstein, 1988).
Bureaucratic organization structures create fragm ented patterns of
work and responsibility that result in dehum anizing practices and
make likely overlapping, confusion, gaps in offered response, and poor
coordination am ong different agencies working in the same
community. Such regulations may also be subject to regulatory capture
in the sense of having a built-in conflict of interest in favor of one side
of a controversy, most often corporate, not citizen, interests (Edelstein,
1988:123).

Government officials also confront the difficult task of w alking the fine
line between actual danger and false claim (Edelstein, 1988). In some cases,
there are no clear standards, and, there are often "gray areas ' (Edelstein,
1988:123) even w hen standards exist. Above all, governm ent officials must
avoid causing public panic (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991).
...governm ent agencies are typically secretive about environm ental
health risks. They w ithhold information on the basis that it will alarm
the public, that the public does not understand risks, or that it will
harm the business climate...(Brown, 1991:144).
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To this end, governm ent officials tend to cloak themselves in the science
of risk assessments, which provide both justification for agency actions and
an institutional distancing from the actual politics at hand (SchraderFrechette, 1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). This ability to
limit discourse - to frame the question and constrain the debate - is a
powerful, although subtle means of control (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown,
1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). It is an effective way to assure that issues
are dealt with as a technocratically oriented authority w ants them to be
(Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992; Edelstein, 1988). The
result is w hat Edelstein (1988:125) refers to as "constrained communication" actions by private or government groups to structure and limit public
communication, w hich distorts communication. Among his examples of
constrained communication, Edelstein cites "giving of false reassurances,
w ithholding of information, responding slowly, taking inadequate actions,
draw ing arbitrary boundaries, using insensitive and incomprehensible
language, denying citizens' perceptions and fears, and hiding behind scientific
reasoning for political decisions (Edelstein, 1988:125)."
CTEC members in Butte have charged that ARCO, the EPA, and local
government officials are guilty of using all of Edelstein's examples (Montana
Standard). In this context, the risk assessment becomes the battleground and,
as such it is invested w ith great symbolic content.
Every symbol stands for something other than itself, and it also evokes
an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated
through time...Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to
the objective elements in objective situations. Such symbols are useful
because they help in logical thinking about the situation and in
m anipulating it (Edelman, 1964:6).
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To the risk assessor and governm ent official who relies upon that
assessment to justify policy, the assessment is an expression of an objective
reality, it is a referential symbol. However, Edelman (1964) notes, no symbols
are ever totally referential; there is always a condensation symbology
involved. Condensation symbols evoke the emotion associated w ith the
situation.
The condensation symbols for the risk assessor and the policy-maker come
into play w hen the risk assessment is questioned. The use of mathematical
symbols as means to express reality allows for further distancing - potentially
life-threatening chemicals are divested of terror w hen they become formulae
that can be m anipulated (Griffin, 1978). In the m anipulation of the
mathematics, the risk assessor, and the policy-makers who rely upon this
m anipulation, can be lulled into a sense that he or she can control the
outcomes. In this sense, the risk assessment is a claim (Connolly, 1993) - a
claim both that the assessor's view is the only valid representation of the
landscape in question and that that landscape can be controlled. When critics
question the risk assessment, they are also implicitly questioning the
objective reality that the assessor and policy-maker has described and, thus,
threatening comfort levels, at least momentarily.
In Butte, the environm entalists who question the risk assessment on the
Pit are reacting to the condensation symbology of the risk assessment. For
them, the existence of the "poisonous lake" represents a threat to both
economic and emotional security (Montana Standard). They view the
negotiated critical w ater level w ith some suspicion. To them the Berkeley Pit
is far more than a vast am ount of w ater which can be broken dow n into
isolated mathematical formulae and probabilities. It is a very real fact of life -
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it looms over the U ptow n and the Flat, dominating the Butte landscape.
Implicit in the critics’ criticism is a claim of the landscape as threatening, very
likely uncontrollable. It is a source of alarm.
Thus, both groups are talking about very different landscapes. It is possible
that notions of participation also differ.

Participation
However, most residents of Butte do not participate in the cleanup,
earning them the labels of apathetic or ignorant of public health issues (Craig,
7/30/95; Weinstock, 7/31/95; Kirkpatrick, 7/31/95; Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Federal and state officials maintain it is not possible to involve an unwilling
citizenry. The EPA has gone to great lengths to seek public involvement Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) tells of preparing public notices of meetings, along
with fact sheets, at every stage of the process. When the public appeared not
to notice, Weinstock w ent to the schools to send fact sheets and notices home
w ith the students.
We had inform ation nights....W e had an inform ation fair at the
Copper King [a large motel w ith function rooms in Butte]. We had big
maps, fact sheets. We had 100 people. If you have 25 it's a good
meeting. 1 can rem em ber only three meetings w hen we really had a
turnout, outside of the EPA, state, contractors and the newspaper.
Until you get a bulldozer in the neighborhood, even w ith the
newspaper, school fliers, radio, and TV...
For the majority, even w ith lead, there was denial w ith the
children’s health. But if you got a new fence, OK. (Weinstock, 7/31/95)
County public health director Dan Dennehey (9/21/95) agrees with
W einstock's assessment:
The agency [EPA] does a real good job about w hat cleanup operations
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will be and w hat the health risks are.. For me it's easy, but for the rest
of the community... They w on't even read a one-page
handout. They're apathetic. I've been at meetings w here the only
people there are bureaucrats. If they [the public] come to the meeting,
they're more concerned about the impact on their property.
We invite people to serve on an ad hoc committee, create the most
diverse group we can to study and debate. On the lead issue we had
twenty people. We had a num ber of public hearings, we had two or
three people from public health, one public hearing at [Montana] Tech,
one CTEC hearing.
We've been screening since 1990. If you ask about lead, people will
have heard about it... (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
Dave Kirkpatrick (7/31/95), a former Montana Standard reporter who now
works for CDM Federal Programs Corp. in the EPA's Butte office, says
unfamiliarity w ith bureaucratic procedures may account for some hesitancy
to become involved. But, even factoring in the unfam iliarity with
bureaucracy, the lack of participation is noteworthy.
It's not unconunon to have 30 people in the room and only 10 of them
are legitimate public. Interest is stunningly low.
There were probably only 30 to 50 people at the Pit meeting. They
w anted the Pit elevation lowered; not for public health, but to mine...
When the Pit decision came out, there was not one call from a
legitimate person, just contractors.
At the Butte Priority Soils Time Critical Removal Action public
meeting, no one showed up. I went to cover it for the paper, but no
one was there. There had been ads in the paper for it.
All the time I covered government, there was little response. But
one time a hydroseeder at the Anselmo [mine] went nuts. People
called me like crazy then (Kirkpatrick, 7/31/95).

However, there are very few people who attend any meetings, never mind
all of them. Weinstock (7/30/95) remembers one w ell-attended meeting
(discussed at length in the media section) related to an arsenic spill that
occurred on Second Street in 1978 or 1979.
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There was at least one percent arsenic in some of those yards. What
surprised me was that their lawsuit was never followed through.
People at Timber Butte had a lawsuit against ARCO and they
won...There is a lawsuit ongoing for all the people on the hill (relating
to the w ater company; not the Superfund cleanup)... (Weinstock,
7/31/95).

There is an enormous difference in the costs of participation in a class
action suit as opposed to a small neighborhood group. The failure to follow
through w ith the lawsuit may have been the result of inability to pay lawyers'
fees, take time off from work to meet w ith attorneys and attend court dates,
a n d /o r maintain the emotional stamina needed to fight the system. The
failure to pursue the lawsuit may be more reflective of a recognition of the
powers weighted against the neighborhood than an indication of apathy.
Butte's historic preservation officer Mark Reavis (11/29/95) agrees with
Kirkpatrick that bureaucratic procedures are problematic for the public. He
points to governm ent officials' use of acronyms, e.g. ROD for Record of
Decision and RA for Risk Assessment, and to the years that it takes to make
decisions as im pedim ents to public involvement:
When we did the [historic] preservation, every time they used an
acronym we'd yell at them. There's no reason to communicate with
the public that way. We've tried to participate in designs, but the
process is cumbersome.
How can you really expect to hold their [the public's] interest for all
those years? Even when decisions are made, changes happen in the
field. There's nothing in the track record that w ould show that any
public participation w ould have changed the course. In the [local]
government, though, people have w orked w ith it and that has had an
impact. (Reavis, 11/29/95)
However, even local governm ent officials get w orn dow n by the longdraw n out complicated process. Butte-Silver Bow Health Director Dan
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Dennehey (9/21/95) leans back in his chair and groans w hen asked about the
interm inable meetings.
The Superfund issue is so broad. The Priority Soils Unit, the Old
Works, the Rocker operable unit ...We’re taking an operable unit at a
time, but people don't go to meetings every week. It gets to be mindboggling - RTFs, RODs, proposal and planning meetings, Streamside
tailings....(Dennehey, 9/21/95).

Underlying all of these comments about the public’s lack of participation,
there appears to be an assum ption that public concern is m easurable only by
terms of participation established by federal law. This is an eith er/o r
definition of participation: either an actor spends hours attending public
meetings, poring over rem edial investigation/feasibility studies, risk
assessments, seismic reports, and records of decision, and subm itting w ritten
comments during public comment periods; or the actor does not care about
the outcome. However, there are a num ber of problems w ith this
assumption, among them the possibility that actors are interested but cannot
pay the transaction costs associated w ith this definition of participation, that
actors have defined a very different problem than that w hich the governm ent
is addressing, a n d /o r that they do not believe that their participation, as
narrowly defined, will change policy (Greider, 1992).

Transaction Costs
Participation on the governm ent's terms is time-consuming. The EPA
office is crammed w ith volumes, three large bookcases full, on the Superfund
sites. Most of these volumes are w ritten in the jargon of technocrats and,
because they are w ritten for other technocrats, concepts and connections
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between them are rarely explained. Mary Kay Craig, president of CTEC and
former Clark Fork Coalition employee, spends hours each day on Superfundrelated activities, much of it poring over inform ation and seeking
translations of the scientific jargon (7/30/95). Then she attends meetings at
night:
The sources of information I have are agency docum ents - RIs, FSs,
RAs, ECAs, and I've read all those things myself.. I've even read
the appendices. A lthough I'm not trained as a hydrologist or geologist,
if you read enough of this stuff you leam to understand it. Also,
people have been very helpful - even people w ho don't always agree
w ith me, like Floyd Brossard who used to be on CTEC. I appreciate that
because there are people who make it personal if you don’t agree with
them.... a hydrologist at M ontana Tech spent half an hour on the
phone w ith me, explaining this stuff to me. Most of the people at
agencies have spent a lot of time w ith me. I've spent hours and hours
and hours on the phone w ith scientists.
Now, I try to have the student staff [of CTEC] on the phone.
They've got engineering mentors at the agency, and they call ARCO.
They know w ho you have to ask to get w hat you need to know. You
often get a better overview from someone who's not a specialist, who
attends every meeting." (Craig, 7/30/95)

Working people, especially parents, may have neither the time nor the
energy, or other resources, such as a car to get to government-sponsored
public meetings in Rocker or Anaconda, or the money to hire a babysitter.
Further, at meetings, the discussions are conducted in jargon and comments
are m ade without background information, making it very difficult for a
newcomer to understand w hat is happening. Protocol at every such meeting
I have attended, in Butte and in Massachusetts as a reporter, is fairly rigid:
officials conducting the meeting sit at a table at the front of the room; the rest
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of the room is divided into two sections w ith an aisle dow n the center for the
public. A newcomer might not realize that protocol dem ands the first few
rows on each side are the dom ain of personnel from other involved agencies
and members of the press and that from that point on one side of the aisle
belongs to opponents; the other to proponents of w hatever is under
discussion. This is often som ewhat daunting to newcomers, who, nervous
and uncomfortable, tend to stand at the back of the room.
Since she was told in 1992 that some Butte citizens stopped attending
government-sponsored public meetings because felt they were being "batted
down" and made to look stupid, CTEC meetings include a "word warden" to
screen out jargon (Craig, 1996)

Different Problems
The EPA, state, and environmental groups are addressing technical
problems — w hat kind and how much of a cleanup will occur where and
when? A lthough this is im portant, this technical orientation assumes that
Butte's quality of life can be m easured in the contaminants identified by the
EPA. But others in Butte who may define both quality and contamination
differently are effectively silenced by the narrow param eters of officially
sanctioned discussion. This is a very serious problem.
The quality of democracy is not m easured in the contentment of the
affluent, but in how the political system regards those who lack
personal advantages. Such people have never stood in the front ranks
of politics, of course, but a generation ago, they had a real presence, at
least more than they have now. The challenging conditions they face
in their daily lives were once part of the general equation that the
political system took into account w hen it decided the largest economic
questions. N ow these citizens are absent from politics — both as
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participants and as the subjects of consideration (Greider, 1992:183).

"Whose quality of life?" Marilyn Maney asks (9/22/95). Through years of
working w ith the Butte Public Archives' labor history - she is president of the
Butte archives - and her job retraining laid-off workers for the Montana state
AFL-CIO, Maney has developed a formidable knowledge of Butte. Butte
people are perfectly capable of determ ining what's im portant to them, she
says hotly. The "vitality and strength and quality of life" in Butte comes from
its working class background which has a very different ethos than that of the
professionals who have arrived to oversee the cleanup, she maintains.
There are different kinds of contamination, Maney notes, and some forms
are more dangerous than others. Butte's communal w orking class culture
runs the risk of being contaminated far more by the cleanup professional's
middle-class individualistic and competitive ethic than by existing mining
waste, she says.
This is a working class culture that takes care of each other. This is a
quality of life I don't believe I would have had somewhere else... The
quality of my life, quite frankly, is much higher than those I know
from other places. A lot better than just the physical.
We know entirely w hat's im portant to us as our livelihood. And
that's reclaiming our right to speak for ourselves (Maney, 9/22/95).

The serious economic issues related to the end of m ining and Superfund
designation are beyond the scope of Superfund, EPA officials have repeatedly
told I0 C9 I officials (Montana Standard). This effectively excludes issues that
have just as m uch impact as the contaminants on residents; their comments
on their priorities are dismissed. This is very different than apathy. Mark
Reavis also disputes the apathetic label:
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I don't think it's apathy. If someone was willing to listen to them. I've
seen older people stand up and tell their story. It's politely received but
public participation has been nothing more than a process. Some
people have tried to make a difference (Reavis, 11/29/95).

As Marilyn Maney (9/22/95) aptly p u t it, the people of Butte can identify
w hat's im portant to their quality of lives and speak for themselves — but,
because the hum an values of Butte have been discounted, there is no
common language w ith w hich to speak to authorities.
...The public's broad political values have been preem pted by other
materials — arcane rules draw n from economics, law and science —
that provide the main grist of inform ation politics. On issue after
issue, the public is belittled as self-indulgent or m isinformed, incapable
of grasping the larger complexities known to the policy-makers and the
circles of experts surrounding them. That complaint, though
sometimes correct in the narrow sense, masks the nature of the
conflict.
The real political contest, on issue after issue, is a struggle between
competing value systems — the confident scientific rationalism of the
governing elites versus the deeply felt hum an values expressed by
people who are not equipped to talk like experts and who, in fact, do
not necessarily share the experts' conception of public morality...
(Creider, 1992:54).

Especially in a place like Butte, the inherently elitist nature of technocratic
agencies and professionals working in the field will have to be
radically altered, before any public support can be earned. Among the
necessary alterations is the elimination of a professional bias that
automatically assumes the w orking class is opposed to environm ental
reforms. Buttel and Flinn's research (1978) also indicates that the generally
accepted belief in w orking class hostility to environm entalism is overstated:
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... In terms of theory of the U.S. class structure, restraint should be
im posed on utilizing environm ental attitude studies to suggest the
narrowly, self-interested, undemocratic, or overly materialistic
behavior of the U.S. working class. Second, our data suggest that mass
environm ental beliefs may be more accurately characterized as
expressions of generational - rather than class - interests (Buttel and
Flinn, 1978:446).

Butte has an elderly population, Ellen Crain, director of the Butte-Silver
Bow Archives, notes:
O lder people who lived in their houses for 100 years and ate out of
their gardens don't see a problem. The younger people are more
educated, more informed... For the elderly, it's low on their priority
list. They've already fought their wars (Crain, 9/21/95).

The age of the population could be a significant factor. The 1990 census
reports that twenty-two percent, 7,392 of a 33,941 total population, of people
living in Silver Bow County were over 60 years of age (U.S. Dept, of
Commerce: Table 140). Research conducted by sociologists Frederick H. Buttel
and William Flinn (1978) indicates that both aw areness of environm ental
problems and support for environmental reform is strongly correlated w ith
age4 and length of residence, with younger people being more aware and
supportive. During the years of layoffs as mining w ound down, the younger
workers left Butte; those who had reached retirem ent age or were eligible for
pensions tended to stay (Malone et al, 1993). Consequently, the majority of
Butte's elderly population are long-term residents. However, the situation in
Butte is far too complex to attribute to one cause, such as a given percentage of
elderly long-term residents.
There is also another factor operating here. When, working class people
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question environm ental reforms it is almost always interpreted as hostility to
environm entalism , rather than as an expression of a more im m ediate
concern, that of providing food for families (Buttel and Flinn, 1978). And,
even w hen this priority is recognized, it is often treated as narrow self-interest
by researchers who, by dint of their education, do not expect to find
themselves in that situation (Buttel and Flinn, 1978). This suspicion of
working-class values may be a factor, especially when, as will be discussed in a
later section, m ost of the researchers and environm ental groups working on
the Superfund sites are not Butte natives. This class-based suspicion is
com pounded by the fact that Butte has historically been the "other," the
chattel of the Anaconda Company which held the state hostage
(Malone, 1995). Researchers who have considered working class
environm ental beliefs have often assum ed that "liberal environm ental
reforms compete for funds w ith welfare state agendas, as well as pose threats
to working class economic security (Buttel and Flinn, 1978:438)."
H owever true or false that assumption may be in a particular situation, it
is too narrow a way of looking at the working class, which is traditionally
defined in the research by education, income and occupation (Buttel and
Flinn, 1978). (The issue of "class" in Butte will be considered in a later
section.) This narrow perspective also ignores the contributions that working
class communities like Love Canal and W oburn have m ade to
environm ental thought, (Brown, 1991) and the potential of workers as a
possible base of support.
The poor quality environm ents of many w orking class families, plus
the hostility of some workers to (corporate) targets of environm ental
reform, may lead a substantial num ber of w orking class families to
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favor environm ental im provem ent ... m any researchers have
underestim ated the extent to which environm ental issues affect low
socioeconomic status' families and how the w orking class represents a
substantial nascent support base for the environm ental movement
(Buttel and Flinn, 1978:435).

By addressing just one narrow symptom of a multi-faceted social problem
(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987) the EPA and other governm ent and national
environmental organizations have both effectively alienated a possible base
of support and allowed corporations to frame pollution in the misleading
jobs/environm ent duality (Edelstein, 1988). Established environm ental
groups, like the Clark Fork Coalition, who focus their argum ents on the
quality of the land and water, to the exclusion of jobs, also contribute to the
maintenance of the duality (Creider, 1992). Too often, environm entalists and
workers meet at hearings, representing opposing points of view (Creider,
1992). Recognition of the importance of well-paying jobs to sustain
communities w ould "lead to different kinds of public policies — transitional
assistance to threatened workers or small businesses, " (Creider, 1992:218)
which w ould likely bring the community together, rather than divide it.

Narrow Definitions of Participation
The notion of participation may well be an "essentially contestible
concept," (Connolly, 1993:10) open to a w ide range of interpretations. The
definition of participation in federal law is narrowly constrained to comment
upon technocratic definitions and plans; activists' definition is often broader
(Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Creider, 1992). It is possible that some people in
Butte may not either accept the EPA's constrained definition of participation
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and / or believe that their participation w ithin such narrow param eters, will
be unable to change policy.
In 1991, in response to a call from the Land Use Task Force, a 15-member
citizen committee, for individual neighborhood developm ent plans, just one
neighborhood, Centerville, responded (Montana Standard,8/19/1991).
Centerville residents w anted the New Butte Mining company to sell its
properties in their neighborhood to develop sidewalks and install street lights
and to m onitor vacant lots. But one Centerville m an said;
The thing is, after all this paperw ork is done, is anything going to get
done? By the time we re 65 is there going to be a sidew alk in
Centerville? The reality is that in Centerville we've been waiting
seven years just for stop signs (Montana Standard, 8/19/1991).

This may indicate that some residents, accustomed to governm ental
inaction and lack of response, decline to spend time on w hat they anticipate
to be futile attempts. Or it may indicate that residents are tired of fighting the
powers that be on the terms established by the powers that be. The issue of
w hether participation had any impact on agency decisions surfaced at a
meeting about an EPA plan to dum p Colorado Tailings from Butte into an
area near the O pportunity Ponds, roughly 26 miles dow nstream from Butte.
Residents of the area in which the tailings w ould be dum ped charged the EPA
with reached a decision before holding hearings on the plan. One resident
said:
People are pretty well disgusted. When they [the EPA and ARCO] were
here the last time, they basically told us the decision had been made,
now go home and cry (Montana Standard,^/!?/91).
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"Most people in tow n just don't see any point in resisting w hen the plan
is a foregone conclusion/’ the reporter wrote (Montana Standard, 6127191). A
former county commissioner said people w eren't "screaming" because, "Feed
the candy to the kid and he's quiet. I'm talking about this golf course and the
new pasture dow n there...They've been spoon-fed stuff about the golf course
(Montana Standard, 6/27/92)." He was referring to the golf course ARCO is
building on contaminated land near the former smelter in Anaconda.
In communities, like Woburn, Mass. (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal
(Creider, 1992), victims moved outside the system to fight back, W oburn with
a lay epidemiology study (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal w ith w hat Lois Gibbs
calls the politics of "rude and crude (Creider, 1992:214). " Victims in W obum
and Love Canal expressed a sense of betrayal because the governm ent that
they believed existed to help them did not do so adequately. Lois Cibbs
describes her experiences at Love Canal:
Generally, people at first have a blind faith in government. So w hen
they go to EPA or the state agency and show them that there is a
problem, they think the government will side w ith them. It takes
them about a year before they realize the government is not going to
help them. They see the agencies studying them to death. That's when
they become really angry — radicalized.
When I started, I believed democracy worked. I believed everything
1 had learned in civics class. What I saw is that decisions are made on
the basis of politics and costs. Money. (Creider, 1992:167)

Given the history of Butte, its people may have never know n the luxury
of blind faith in the governm ent because the governm ent itself w as so often
seen as the enemy. As noted earlier, between September 1914 and April 1920,
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the national guard and federal troops occupied Butte six times, always with
the intent of sustaining a status quo that was heavily weighted against Butte's
working people (Malone et al, 1993; Toole, 1959). A nd in 1951 President
Trum an applied the Taft-Hartley Act against the striking miners (Malone et
al, 1993), Federal and state law was often used against the community, and
government was often viewed, justifiably, as an adjunct of the Anaconda
Company (Toole, 1959). This was hardly a climate in w hich people would
develop a sense of a benevolent government. Given the passion of Butte
residents for their history (Reavis, 11/29/95), the role of government is not
likely to be forgotten.
Also, it is oversimplistic to assume that lack of governm ent sanctioned
forms of participation or direct public challenges such as those seen in
Woburn, Mass. (Brown, 1991) and Love Canal (Kroll-Smith, 1991a; Creider,
1992) automatically assumes acquiescence.
There is the sense that everyday life and culture, in which people
implicitly conform to' or accept' their situation, should not always to
be contrasted w ith dram atic 'social movements,' in which people
question or challenge the status quo. Instead, while organized social
movements rem ain enorm ously im portant in understanding largescale transformation, much can be learned to by attending to everyday
forms or resistance' as well (Dirks et al: 5).

Given Butte's labor history and the fact that the boycott was an invention
of Irish peasants resistance to landowners, some residents may choose not
participate as a form of resistance. Their silence may be the equivalent of a
boycott by an "aggrieved " (Wolensky, 1991) population. It is also possible that
some adults have come to feel powerless to influence events in which
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corporations and governm ent agencies are involved, and, instead, direct their
energies into areas where they can accomplish change. This could well be
attributable to lessons learned in years of interaction w ith the Anaconda
Company, and in the current imbalances of pow er between Butte residents,
governments at the local, state, and federal level, and ARCO.
Additionally, the environm ental movement itself is fragm ented, stratified
along class lines.
The [environmental] movement is splintered into m any different
pieces, including different social classes that do not even talk to one
another, much less try to work out a common political agenda. On one
end are Ivy League lawyers, urbane and well educated and completely
comfortable in the inner circles of government. On the other end are
the thousands of home-grown neighborhood activists, utterly skeptical
of government and engaged in rude and crude' politics at the factory
gates (Creider, 1992:213-14).

In Butte the issue of class and environmentalism may be best illustrated
with a story. Although Butte was designated a Superfund site in 1986, Butte's
people w ere on their own. Environmental groups in the state have never
m ounted a dem onstration to focus attention on the possible public health
impacts of the contamination on Butte's people, even w ith the 1990
publication of the Moore and Luoma health study, which indicated the
possibility of serious health problems in Butte and called for a detailed study.
Yet the gruesome deaths of 342 snow geese in the Berkeley Pit in November
1995 resulted in a memorial service which was planned, publicized and
attended by environmental groups across the state. (The study and memorial
service will be discussed in a later sections.) This is in no way to minimize
the horror of the birds' death; it is merely to illustrate the relatively low
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position of Butte's people in the m ainstream environm ental pecking order.
Also, environm entalists frequently appear to be apprehensive about
expanding participation to allow working-class people and anti
environm entalists to shape governm ent policies. The following comment is
fairly typical:
Don't forget that Wise Use has just as m uch right as you to be involved
in citizen participation. Would you rather Gary Irgm an decided w hat
was to be done on the Clark Fork or a roomful of Wise Users versus
you? I'd rather Gary Irgman decided — a caring biologist and public
servant even though he happens to be a bureaucrat.

There is an assum ption here again of either/ or, in this case, the educated
scientist or members of a group, the Wise Use, that is perceived by
environm entalists to be anti-environment. There is no sense of an
understanding that in a democracy all voices should be included, or of the
possibility that exclusion may have led to some of the anti
environmentalism that is so feared. The argum ent of exclusion seems to rest
upon the same kinds of argum ents that were used against giving former
slaves and women the vote: they just w on't be sm art enough to make the
"right " decisions.
Fearfulness aside, there is some recognition in some quarters that the
broader values of citizens should be included in decision making. Daniel J.
Fiorino (1990), an employee of the EPA, maintains that more citizen
participation is needed to improve the technocractic orientation of large
bureaucracies because: lay judgm ents about risk are often m ore sensitive to
social and political values that expert models do not acknowledge;
technocratic orientation is often incompatible w ith dem ocratic ideals which
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presum e citizens are the best judge of their own interests; and effective lay
participation in risk decisions makes them more legitimate, which leads to
better results. Fiorino's analysis of five participation m ethods finds
shortcomings in each method: 1. public hearings involve am ateurs, but do
not share authority, allow limited scope for discussion, and do not promote
equality; 2. initiatives allow am ateurs direct involvement, shared authority, a
potential for discussion, and some equality; 3. public surveys involve citizens,
provide limited shared authority, rarely generate discussion, and do not
promote equality; 4. it is unlikely for citizens to participate in negotiated rule
making which offers the most opportunity for shared authority, discussion
and equality; and 5. citizen review panels involve am ateurs w ith limited
authority in discussion w ith some involvement (Fiorino, 1990). To
circumvent the shortcomings of each method, Fiorino (1990) suggests one
mechanism be used to complement another.
In science policy, there are additional reasons to actively engage the
public in decision making (Brown, 1991; Schrader-Frechette, 1991).
Some governm ental agencies and scientific com munities have sought
public involvement in science policy. As [Sheldon] Krimsky notes,
public participation provides for a just input from involved and
affected people; it may even offer illum ination from the perspective of
those affected; and it may increase legitimacy. Yet even w hen lay
participation has been attempted, lay members of advisory boards and
panels are given insufficient information and training, and are granted
inadequate power. Perhaps the central flaw in official approaches to
public participation is that it is viewed as a formalistic process —
simply good politics.' This is a shortsighted perspective, since public
involvement is truly a question of good science' since it changes the
nature of scientific inquiry. O ur investigation of popular epidemiology
has provided many examples of data that w ould have been unavailable
w ithout conununity input. If scientists and governm ent fail to solicit
such data, and especially if they consciously oppose and devalue it.
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then that data may be lost (Brown, 1991:145-46).

As it stands, despite Sara Weinstock's understanding of Butte and her
caring approach, the unresolved conflicts in the federal Superfund law and
bureaucratic structure of the EPA have combined to disparage local
knowledge in Butte. And, although, as indicated above, Butte’s people have
not reacted like some victims in other communities, there is no basis to
assume that Butte residents are apathetic or do not care. Butte is not
monolithic; there are simply too many variables and possible explanations to
label the community.
One of the variables is that of local new spaper coverage. Assuming that,
for the majority of these people, their perceptions of Superfund issues are
shaped by the coverage provided in the local newspaper, the M ontana
Standard, the thesis will now turn to an analysis of four years of that paper's
reporting on Superfund.
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1 The EPA defines hazardous waste as "either toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or
reactive" materials which can be "transmitted through all environmental
media - air, water, biota, and land." (Hird: 5)
2 A thorough discussion of the debate about Superfund's effectiveness or
ineffectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. Both Yeager (1991) and
Barnett ( 1994) offer excellent analyses.
3 That level is given as 5,410 feet in the Mine Flooding Unit Risk Assessment,
indicating there may be some uncertainty.
Interestingly, Buttel and Flinn (1978) posit that environmentalism in the
young may be a generational form of resistance, of rejection of parental
values.
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LOCAL NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
The S t a n d a r d i z e d Landscape

Since the majority of Butte's people are not involved in the day-to-day
business of Superfund cleanup issues, the quality of the local news coverage is
im portant because the new spaper coverage puts the events into a
recognizable context for the community. It is this coverage that daily helps to
shape the way readers interpret the meaning of the Superfund label and
cleanup activities, and then integrate that m eaning into their lives and their
notions of their com munity.
O ur picture of reality does not burst upon us in one splendid
revelation. It accumulates day by day and year by year in mostly
unspectacular fragments from the w orld scene, produced mainly by the
mass media. O ur view of the real world is dynamic, cumulative, and
self-correcting as long as there is a pattern of even-handedness in
deciding w hich fragments are im portant. But w hen one im portant
category of the fragments is filtered out or included only vaguely, our
view of the socio-political w orld is deficient. The ultim ate hum an
intelligence - discernment of cause and effect - becomes dam aged
because it depends on knowledge of events in the order and
significance in which they occur (Bagdikian, 1990:xvi).

Butte’s only daily new spaper, the Montana Standard, is part of the Lee
Enterprise chain, the group of papers bought from the Anaconda Company in
1959. Writing in 1976, local historians (Malone et al, 1993) described the
im provem ents that the ow nership change brought to the papers: im proved
personnel policies and mechanical facilities; expanded and im proved news
staffs; establishment of a state news bureau in Helena; the addition of the
180
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New York Titnes News Service to supplem ent Associated Press wire service
coverage; and encouragement to staff members to upgrade their skills by
attending conferences and seminars.
At long last, M ontanans had access to objective and professional news
reporting (Malone et al, 1993:368).

Given the removal of w hat John G unther (1947) called the "Gray Blanket"
from the majority of M ontanan dailies, and the Lee corporation’s
improvements, M ontana's delight at the changes w rought by Lee Enterprises
is understandable. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, a
comparison of Montana Standard coverage in the early 1970s w ith that of the
1990s might be interesting because, as will become clear in this section, some
of those improvem ents seem to have disappeared over the years.
However, changes in coverage or not, the local historians (Malone et al,
1993) pointed to two im portant trends; the first, the professionalism of
journalism; the second, the changing patterns of ow nership, from families or
local ow nership to fewer and larger outside firms. Both trends are im portant
to an analysis of the world according to the Montana Standard.
Ben Bagdikian's (1990) research into the characteristics of chain
new spapers in The Media Monopoly, provides some insight about the
coverage of the Montana Standard. A former reporter and dean of the
University of California/Berkeley Journalism School, Bagdikian (1990) writes
that after purchase of a newspaper, chains typically make four general
changes: 1. introduce cosmetic alterations of page design and m akeup to give
the impression of m odernity, and quietly reduce the am ount of serious news;
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2. reduce local news coverage (experienced news reporters are expensive) and
replace the local news w ith inexpensive syndicated features; 3. reduce the
news staff and hire inexperienced reporters; and tone dow n the editorial
page. A fghanistanism is fairly common and local editorials are relatively
bland to avoid upsetting advertisers.
The Montana Standard possesses all of the characteristics Bagdikian
associates with chains. These characteristics affect a new spaper’s coverage, for
the worse, but there are other aspects of coverage that are harder to quantify the role the new spaper's m anagem ent sees for the paper w ithin the
community, the paper’s relationship w ith local authorities, and the p aper’s
overall political orientation. Because local m edia are generally more aware of
local issues and concerns, especially of ’local political, economic, and social
consequences of reporting practices (Spencer & Triche, 1994:199)," an analysis
of the paper’s environmental reporting patterns is a useful way both to map
the landscape presented daily to readers and to determ ine the forces that
landscape, in turn, exerts on the paper. An analysis should consider: w hat is
reported and how w hat is reported is presented; w hat is not reported; w hat
are typically the reporters' news sources; whose voices are reported; how
events are defined; and the paper's editorial stance. Both the quantitative, the
num ber of news stories, and the qualitative, the substance, of the coverage is
im portant.
However, because new spaper staff w ork under budgetary and institutional
constraints, these also m ust be considered in any analysis. Most editors and
reporters are draw n to journalism for reasons other than m aking money:
some are generalists by nature and so are attracted by the variety of issues they
will cover and the different people they will meet; others see the job as a
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means to both learn themselves and educate the readers about im portant
issues; some are draw n by the desire to be know n in their communities; and
some w ant to shape people’s thoughts. Journalists, like members of any
other profession, are fairly diverse in interests and orientations. But most
w ant to do a good job. And most w ork under very stressful conditions. So,
when looking at the paper’s coverage, it is im portant to rem em ber that
reporters and editors will generally do the best with w hat they have.

QUANTITATIVE COVERAGE
From Jan. 1, 1990 through Dec. 31, 1993, the Montana Standard ran a total
of 732 news stories, editorials, letters to the editor, and columns, which
covered national, state, and local environmental issues. Given that there are
365 days in a year and that this coverage is for a four-year period, or 1,460 days,
this averages out to one news story, letter to the editor, editorial, or column
related to national, state, andjor local environmental issues every two days.
This is a very low rate of environmental coverage, l Astonishingly low in
light of the size of the Superfund site and the m yriad of environm ental issues
on the state and national level.
Eighty-five news stories focused on state environmental issues, including
14 relating to the state's natural resource dam age claim - making coverage of
state-related environmental issues 11.5 percent of the Montana Standard’s
732-story total environmental coverage. Forty-five news stories,
predom inantly from the Associated Press wire service, covered national
environm ental issues, making national coverage just 6.4 percent of the total.
Tw enty-three percent of the new spaper's total environm ental coverage was
related to coverage of Anaconda and streamside (along the Clark Fork River
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and Silver Bow Creek) Superfund issues. The rem aining 59 percent, 432 news
stories as well as letters to the editor, editorials, and columns, of the 732 total
consisted of coverage of environm ental issues in Butte. However, a
breakdow n of the 432 total for Butte, indicates that 14.4 percent of the
coverage was not related to Superfund issues; just 369 covered activities
connected to the Superfund sites. And, of this 369, five percent consisted of
letters to the editor, w hich are not generated by new sroom personnel. This
means just over 80 percent, 350 news stories, editorials and columns, of the
total 369 stories related to Butte Superfund coverage was actually produced by
the newspaper. When this 350 total is brought back to the 1,460 days in the
four-year period being analyzed, this translates to one story, editorial, or
column about Butte Superfund sites every four or five days. This is a
painfully low rate of both overall environm ental and Butte Superfund
coverage.

QUALITATIVE COVERAGE
The Montana Standard's Superfund coverage in Butte during this fouryear period is equally poor qualitatively. In general, although the majority of
the news stories are reasonably well-written, the coverage is restricted to a
recitation of cleanup actions, is devoid of any understandable or m eaningful
context, relies exclusively on authorities as sources, fails to include voices
other than ARCO, local, federal or state authorities, and members of the
Citizens’ Technical Environm ental Committee (CTEC), and defines events
narrow ly.
In the Montana Standard's case, the most striking aspect of Butte coverage
is w hat has not been covered. Of the 369 news stories, editorials, letters to the
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editor, and columns, only three (all w ritten in 1990) provided any substantive
inform ation about health effects of exposure to the metals or chemicals
referred to in the story. Only ,8 percent of all Superfund coverage in Butte
over a four-year period gave the readers an indication of the health
implications of exposure.^ In only one of these three stories is the type of
health effects - in this case, cancer - near the top of the story (Montana
Standard, 6/14/1990). This is a story about the meeting to which Sara
Weinstock referred in the previous section. This is also the only story that
quotes concerned residents. After discovering a site where arsenic, lead and
cadm ium had been dum ped 12 years previously, the EPA had slated seven
yards in the area for immediate emergency cleanup, and brought in a
toxicologist to w arn residents to keep their children away from the site where
arsenic. Not only children are affected, one resident said:
There's a lot of sick people in that neighborhood. I know. I'm a nurse.
(Montana Standard, 6/14/1990)

H ealth officials replied that more time would be needed for cancers related
to the exposure to develop. Furthermore, the toxicologist said, about 25
percent of the general population will get cancer anyway so officials have no
way to know w hether the spilled concentrate is causing cancer in the area
(Montana Standard, 6 /1 4 / 1990). Three things are noteworthy about this
story.
First, that the EPA is so quick to negate local knowledge and, invariably,
w hen pressed, falls back on the incidence of cancer as a given for some of the
population. As a rule of thum b, governm ent environm ental agencies use
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statistics w ith certainty to assure people of protection w hen siting issues are
on the table; they use different statistics, and uncertainty, to discount
residents' claims after exposure.

And, while the statistics are bandied about,

w hat goes unquestioned is why 25 percent of the population is expected to
develop cancer.
Second, although a reporter m ight not be expected to be aware of cancer
statistics, that same reporter should spend some time after the meeting or, if
necessary, w ithin the next few days by telephone, obtaining additional
national data about the prevalence of cancer, types of cancer, and official
interpretations of the data. From there, the reporter should contact the state
and local health departm ents seeking further local data. The results of these
interviews should run as a follow-up story, and then, appear in sum m arized
form in every story in which cancer incidence is m entioned. The idea behind
this is that every news story should be put into an understandable context so
that a first-time reader w ould get a grasp of the total situation. This did not
happen.
The third noteworthy aspect of this story is that it was never followed up.
Common journalistic procedure w ould entail a visit to the neighborhood to
interview the residents and p u t forth their historical awareness of the
num bers and types of illness am ong families in the neighborhood. No such
story ever ran in the Montana Standard.
The other two stories from 1990 that referred to health effects, printed
inform ation about effects well past the point at which new spaper readership
surveys show that most readers reach - in the sixth paragraph in one story; in
the eleventh paragraph in the other. All new reporters are trained to w rite in
a style commonly called an "inverted pyram id," w hich means the reporter
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leads w ith the most im portant components of a story. This format is based on
two premises: first, it simplifies an editor's job because he or she can save
editing time by cutting the less im portant paragraphs at the end to shorten the
story for a small newshole; and second, because, as reporters are taught from
day one, both in journalism schools and on the job, readers rarely read past
the headline and the first paragraph, the lead, of a story. So, information
im portant to readers m ust be w ithin the first two or three paragraphs of the
story, especially if the headline does not refer to health risks, as was the case
in both of these stories. Placement of health effects in the sixth and eleventh
paragraphs of both stories is the equivalent of burying the information.
Even more startling is that the EPA risk assessments were rarely
mentioned, and in the few instances they were, were never explained.
Standard operating procedure for journalists covering Superfund sites is to
use the risk assessments as one of the focal points of coverage. The risk
assessments are the source of the reporter's inform ation about w hat illnesses
are associated with each metal and / or chemical on the contaminated site. As
a matter of routine, in the course of covering Superfund sites, the reporter
interviews the agency responsible for each risk assessment to obtain a
translation of the jargon to present to the public in terms of probability of
increased cancers and other illnesses, and the types of cancers and illnesses
associated with the contaminants on-site. This inform ation, w ritten in a clear
calm manner, is far more im portant to the public at large than recitations of
the num ber of tons of dirt moved or gallons of water cleaned.
Also noteworthy is, although the adverse impacts of lead on children,
including retardation in severe cases, were m entioned in the paper's stories
on lead, no mention was m ade of the fact that in both Anaconda and Butte
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high schools, rates of learning disorder and cognitive disorder are nearly
twice the rate averaged among the state's 21 largest schools (Tuholske, 1993).
Anaconda and Butte have the dubious distinction of ranking first and second
for both disorders (Tuholske, 1993).
In addition to omission of health information, another interesting aspect
of the Montana Standard's coverage is the m anner in w hich Superfund
issues were presented during this four-year period. The breakdow n of
coverage, which is presented graphically in the appendix, is as follows:
• 38 percent of the coverage, 142 stories, presented cleanup issues in a
routine m anner, e.g., moving dirt from one place to another, establishing
m onitor wells, so many yards scheduled to be cleaned up. There is occasional
reference in these stories to carcinogenic chemicals, but no additional data is
given and the reference is usually buried w ithin the story.
• 76 stories, 21 percent of the coverage, were oriented tow ard the
economic benefits of high tech industries coming to Butte to develop
techniques to separate the metals from the water in the Berkeley Pit or clean
the contam inants from the soil.
• 32 stories, 8 percent, were concerned with conflicts between ARCO and
the EPA a n d /o r state government.
• 6 percent was in the form of 22 editorials.
• 21 stories, 5.7 percent, deal w ith the economic boost that development of
Butte as a mining history park will bring to the community.
• 21 stories, 5.7 percent, refer to the blood lead tests and studies done on
Butte children. A lthough all the stories refer to the danger to children and
pregnant wom en from lead exposure, good detailed inform ation on the
effects of lead exposure are not part of these stories. The possibility of
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synergies was never raised as an issue.
• 19 stories, 5 percent, of the total 369 Butte Superfund coverage, came in
the form of letters to the editor.
• 17 stories, 4.6 percent, were focused upon conflict betw een levels of
government, e.g., federal and state, state and local.
• 10 stories, 2.7 percent, were oriented to the economy.
• 2 percent of the coverage came in the form of eight columns on the
editorial page.
• .2 percent of the coverage, the one story referred to above, consisted of a
public health warning.
Excluding the voices of members of the Citizens' Technical
Environmental Committee (CTEC), only five Butte Superfund-related stories
in the four-year period included voices of Butte people, other than local
officials - just one percent of all coverage. All other coverage was presented
through the voices of participants, arguing in technical term s - e.g., disputes
over threshold limits, potential solutions, elevations of the Pit.
The reasons for and dangers of reliance upon organizational sources of
information will be explored later in this section. For now, it is sufficient to
stress the importance of including Butte voices in coverage of Superfund
issues. As part of routine Superfund coverage, the reporters should go out
into the neighborhoods where cleanup activities are taking place and
interview residents.
Given the scale of the contamination, the most am azing aspect of the
Montana Standard's coverage is that, unlike the majority of the daily
new spapers in the United States, this new spaper has no designated trained
environm ental reporter.
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There are four basic messages stressed by the Montana Standard's news
coverage over the four-year period. The cumulative impact of these messages
includes the notions that:
1. the Superfund cleanup is a technical procedure only and, as such, has
little relevance, other than as an occasional source of armoyance, to the lives
of people in Butte;
2. cleanup standards are little more than arbitrary num bers over which
ARCO, government agencies, and CTEC members squabble;
3. technology will save Butte by developing solutions to mine the mining
waste and, in so doing, bolster Butte's sagging economy; and
4. Butte's history can be mined to attract tourists.
Now here in the Butte Superfund coverage is the contam ination presented
as a social issue or is reference made to other Superfund sites and possible
similarities to Butte, e.g. income levels, types of contamination, public health
issues, population impacts, geographic locations. Also, now here in the Butte
Superfund coverage has there been an attem pt to look at the political
economy of Superfund. This type of coverage w ould entail consideration of:
the num ber of Superfund sites in the United States; they location of the sites;
identification of the most common PRPs and w hether they are still in
business; how profitable their operations are; how many people they employ;
w hat is know n about health impacts of those sites; w hat kinds of cleanup
solutions EPA has allowed; how much the PRPs at other sites have paid for
cleanup; and how much have taxpayers paid. These w ould be reasonable
places to start questioning, and much of this data is available in EPA
com puterized data banks.
A n additional shortcoming is that nowhere in the Montana Standard's
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Butte Superfund coverage has there been an attem pt to take a hard look at
ARCO, e.g. an analysis of corporate balance sheets that indicate profits m ade
and losses declared, reference to the corporation’s lobbying to gut the
Superfund law, or any indication when corporate-issued statements differ
from its actions. However, in fairness to the Montana Standard, this type of
corporate coverage is very rare in the mass media. The reason for this will be
considered later in this section.

EDITORIAL STANCE
The paper's editorial positions have come under fire from CTEC members
and other environmentalists who charge that the paper takes a pro-ARCO
position. Through letters to the editor, the critics are talking back. After the
paper ran an editorial that charged CTEC w ith overstepping the legal
constraints that prevent recipients of federal technical assistance grants from
taking advocacy positions, CTEC president Mary Kay Craig (7/31/95) brought a
copy of the law to the editor to show him that CTEC was operating legally.
"He said he d idn’t care about the law. That [the content of the editorial] was
his opinion," Craig recounted after her meeting.
George Waring expressed his frustration in a letter to the editor:
According to Mr, Lewis the Citizens' Technical Committee that's
staying on top of the Superfund cleanup shouldn't be informing us of
the pros and cons of the various options available. Why not?
Certainly the Montana Standard isn't perform ing that function. All we
get are ARCO handouts printed on the front page.
What this town badly needs is a non-ARCO newspaper. The old
Copper Collar is sure locked back in place (Waring, 10/21/95).
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This points to another serious structural constraint operating against
activists. Because there are such high transaction costs in the Superfund
inform ation-driven process, citizens frequently find they m ust hire
professionals to help them translate and assess official definitions of the
problem and proposals for cleanup plans (Brown, 1991; Creider, 1992). The
EPA recognizes this imbalance in its provision for Technical Assistance
Grants (TAGs); in Butte, CTEC operates with such a grant. But there are
strings attached; TAGs preclude any activity that could be construed as
overstepping narrow definitions of advocacy. Members of committees
operating under TAGs frequently find themselves walking a tightrope w hen
taking a position on a cleanup option. They are always vulnerable to charges,
like that m ade by the Montana Standard, that they are overstepping the
bounds. The end result is that TAG committee positions tend to be self
censored by legitimate fear of loss of funding (Greider, 1992).
The strings are even more tightly draw n w hen citizens m ust rely upon
grants from non-governmental organizations, such as foundations (Greider,
1992). The federal tax code is structured to allow wealthy corporations and
individuals to fund "activities that are really self-interested expression
(Greider, 1992:5)."
Under the federal tax code, tax-exempt grants are fully deductible for
the donors only if the recipients stay clear of partisan politics, and
many organizations accept these lim itations on their politics. They
may develop educational issues’ or create civic projects' for citizens
but they cannot take these concerns into the arena of accountability that
matters most to those in pow er — elections (Greider, 1992:219).
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The federal tax code assures that the wealthy have the ability to "define the
political agenda for others... The overall effect of political charity, as one
m ight expect, is mostly conservative — guaranteed to preserve the
status quo. Charity is another form of political pow er (Greider, 1992:219)."
In addition to struggling with the constraints of the TAG grant, activists in
Butte also contend w ith instances of faulty reporting. The day after a July 1995
meeting about the state’s plan to address contamination along Silver Bow
Creek, state officials, CTEC members and myself were am azed to read an
account of the meeting that bore no resemblance to that which we attended.
The Montana Standard reporter, liberally quoting ARCO project manager
Sandy Stash, announced that no support for the state plan had been expressed
at the meeting. This was simply not the case.
To someone unfamiliar w ith the news business this looks like the paper is
taking a position. Sometimes that is the case; other times it is the result of an
inexperienced reporter who has had difficulty locating the comments w ithin
the context of the complicated issues under discussion. Advocates at public
meetings would be well advised to preface their comments w ith an indication
of support or opposition. In this case, the story was w ritten by an
inexperienced reporter who likely did not understand the implications of the
comments made by those who preferred the state's plan to that proposed by
ARCO. Stash and critics of the state plan were much more direct in their
comments than were the proponents.
However, CTEC president Mary Kay Craig notes, the reporter "makes no
attem pt to speak with anyone after the meeting than ARCO." The paper has a
slant, she says:
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The point of view is you have to get every buck out of ARCO in terms
of economic growth. Forget why Superfund came here in the first
place. I said (Superfund came to Butte) for the protection of hum an
health and the environment. The paper cut out health. A lthough at
least this article [about the meeting referenced above] said there were
some environm entalists concerned about hum an health
and the environm ent. They call you an environm entalist because they
disagree with you and, in a mining town like Butte that makes you not
credible (Craig, 7/30/95).

Research indicates that activism in contam inated com munities is always
difficult. Further, corporate activity often makes activism even harder in
those based on resource extraction:
...Overall, the pattern suggests that resource-exploiting industries may
have been able to avoid political responsibility for w orker layoffs —
and in fact, by contrast, have been able to develop politically useful
allies — by blam ing environmental regulations, and not their own
practice, as the key reasons for shutting dow n their operations
(Freudenburg, 1992:326).

John Ray, CTEC member and board member of the M ontana
Environm ental Inform ation Center, characterizes the Standard's orientation
as more pro-developm ent than pro-ARCO. The coverage is:
...very much filtered through "what's good for Butte is economic
development. " The paper takes things very much at face value. Six
years ago I w ouldn't have said that; it had a more balanced approach.
It's not prom oting a pro-ARCO position; but Butte development. It's
not a strong environm ental paper. The Standard has no
environm ental reporter...It pays low wages, gets people right out of
school...
Given Lee Enterprise's nature...they w ant to be in w ith the powers
that be. They w on’t rock the boat. They'll pick a little on local
government but less now than six years ago (Ray, 10/24/95).
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Analysis of editorials and columns over the four-year period shows a
pattern more complicated than a simple pro-ARCO orientation, which bears
out Ray's assessment. Of 22 environmentally-oriented editorials: two were
pro-EPA; one very strongly anti-ARCO; three advocated a good timely
cleanup,; one spoke for the public right to know about decisions being made;
one addressed the need for planning to address future environmental risks
(although the subject of this editorial was a site in Helena); and one insisted
that the ERA move its offices to Butte. Together, those editorials accounted
for 41 percent of the editorial coverage. Editorials critical of the ERA
accounted for another 41 percent. The remaining 18 percent of editorials were
distributed as followed: 9 percent relating to other environm ental issues in
the state; 4.5 percent stressing the need for technological solutions to Butte's
Superfund cleanup; and 4.5 percent informational.
Of the eight columns, three were w ritten by Standard staff, and of these
three, two were critical of the ERA. Of the remaining five: John Ray urged a
cautious interpretation of the lead study results; John W ard ell of the ERA
corrected six inaccuracies in a Standard editorial; a column critical of the ERA
was picked up from Mining Engineering magazine; a free-lance writer raked
ARCO's publicity campaign over the coals; and ARCO replied to the freelance
writer. From 1990 through 1993, the paper's opinion page ran a gam ut of
sentiments. Three of the eight columns were critical of the ERA.
However, it is in the national environm ental stories picked up from the
wire services, w here an anti-governm ent agency sentim ent surfaces.
Roughly 32 percent of these national environm ental stories consisted of
criticism of the agency, e.g. ERA officials shredded incriminating documents.
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EPA is too large, EPA budget should be cut, EPA health reports are faulty, EPA
doesn't collect all the money that is due it. Given the m inimal national
coverage, the large percentage of critical copy selected from the wire services
does give a sense of anti-EPA overtones over time. But it is not solely the
selection that gives a sense of bias, it is the m anner in which the issues that
are w ritten about are framed.
The production of news also involves ideological, political, and
economic factors. Events may be framed in ways that tend to confirm
or reformulate a dom inant ideology. This may result from a reliance
on organizational sources of information, but it can also result from
the pow er that different organizations can wield. Economic factors
include constraints imposed by deadlines, sales and advertising, the
assum ed beliefs of news sources and the public... (Spencer & Triche,
1994:201).

In any field, there are constraints. For reporters, the most common are
deadlines and the timeliness of stories. Deadlines are the bane of a reporter's
existence. Far too often, a reporter m ust file a story w ithout the additional
inform ation he or she w ould like to include or w ithout comments from an
interested party because it was too late to call that person, or he or she was out
of town. And, missing inform ation or comments notw ithstanding, the
deadline m ust be met. Most experienced reporters will try to get the
additional inform ation or contact the interested person the following day to
do a follow-up story but sometimes, given a large beat, the followup may be
postponed because another story or two is planned for the following day and
the next day, and the next. Timeliness is another constraint. All too often an
involved story that may take weeks to gather will go by the board as reporters
chase breaking stories. O ther institutional constraints w ill vary from
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new sroom to newsroom.

CONSTRAINTS IN THE S T A N D A R D NEWSROOM
The most common common im pedim ent to good new s production is
understaffing. There is no way around it - good new sgathering takes time,
and time is something that reporters working for an understaffed paper do
not have. The Montana Standard has a very small staff: four full-time
reporters for Butte; and two bureau reporters who cover Anaconda and other
outlying areas w ithin the paper’s circulation area (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
Publisher Norm Lewis, who joined the paper as editor in January 1994
reorganized the news staff, eliminating the use of stringers, part-tim e
reporters who are called in for additional coverage, and put the stringer
budget into full-time reporters (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). Although, given the
tendency for reporters to be restricted to their own beats, the elimination of
stringers may reduce some flexibility, it has the advantage of both consistency
in coverage and a staff that is more aware of the local issues and players than
stringers m ight be. Also, full-time personnel tend to be more committed to
their jobs than part-tim e or occasional employees.
But, adjustments or not, the paper, which has a circulation of 16,000, has a
small staff and the Superfund cleanup is just one of many other issues in
Butte (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). Local government issues - municipal services
such as w ater provision and landfills, zoning ordinances to channel future
developm ent and protect existing sources of water, and taxes among the
standard staples. Schools m ust be covered - curriculum, funding, school
sports, and features about programs that bring schools and community
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together, special projects, and gifted students. Crime and fire stories m ust be
written. Features on local people are needed. Businesses news and Butte's
sizable elderly population m ust be covered. And, for this city of some 30,000
people, there are just four full-time reporters to do all that for seven papers a
week (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
Each of the four reporters who cover Butte have very large beats (Van
Fossen, 11/14/95). One covers w hat M anaging Editor D rew Van Fossen calls
"cops and courts," as well as w riting occasional features; the second covers
business stories in additional to producing the Sunday business page and
writing business briefs; the third covers education, in addition to general
assignment stories and features; and the fourth handles city/council
governm ent and Superfund. There are also two bureau reporters - one who
covers Dillon, Sheridan, Twin Bridges, Virginia City, and the Big Hole area;
the second covers Anaconda - and a three-member sports staff - one works
five nights; the other two one night apiece (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).
One city editor is responsible for reporter supervision, story planning,
assignments, and editing everything from obituaries to news stories (Van
Fossen, 11 /14/95). He works 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. five days a week and a half
day the remaining two days. This is the editor's preferred schedule. Van
Fossen explains:
He likes it like that. He lives at the newspaper. One of the reasons I
was hired here is that we re so opposite we complement each other
(11/14/95).

The paper currently has one full-time photographer and is hiring another
(Van Fossen, 11/14/95). One of the bureau people also takes photos. Four
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copy editors, who w ork two to a shift in four 10-hour days round out the staff
(Van Fossen, 11/14/95). This is an extremely small staff for a daily newspaper.
The next most common im pedim ent to good coverage on any new spaper
is inexperienced reporters. Clearly, all new reporters are inexperienced and
have to start somewhere to get experience. Equally clearly, some are far more
equipped to do the job and catch on more quickly than others. In a wellstaffed newsroom, where experienced reporters, particularly those who may
have covered the same beat, have some time to spend m entoring the less
experienced, inexperienced reporters do not usually adversely affect the
quality of coverage. But, w hen experienced reporters are overworked or, as in
the case of the Montana Standard, no longer working in the newsroom,
inexperienced reporters can present problems to coverage. The problems
related to inexperienced reporters are two-fold:
1. They have not developed the news instincts that set off alarms in
experienced reporters who have developed a familiarity w ith governmental
forms, have worked in a num ber of places and learned to recognize certain
patterns, and are acutely aware of the importance of what is not said.
2. Their output tends to be far lower than that of experienced staff.
Much of what shapes a reporter's coverage of issues depends upon that
reporter's familiarity with an area - who are the major players, w hat are their
connections, their political affiliations, their interests? What is the history
behind the issue at hand? Who can be trusted for direct information? Who
has an ax to grind and how does that color the inform ation this person gives
you? If the reporter is new to an area, he or she m ust rely upon experienced
reporters or clips in the paper's library. If the experienced reporters are not
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available for consultation a n d /o r coverage has been poor, an inexperienced
reporter can easily be duped. And, in the process, coverage suffers.
John Ray (10/24/95), who is also a political science professor at Montana
Tech, attributes the poor environm ental coverage to a com bination of
laziness on the part of some reporters, the inexperience of other reporters,
and understaffing on the part of the Montana Standard . Excepting laziness, a
former reporter for the Montana Standard confirmed Ray's assessment,
noting that the paper hired reporters out of school, gave no training to
reporters covering Superfund sites, and expected reporters to cover large
beats.
An experienced reporter, covering a Superfund site for the first time, is
usually not afraid to ask the questions he or she needs answered to get an
understanding of the process. Also, an experienced reporter generally has
developed a good news sense that will direct his questions, and is accustomed
to w riting about conflicts. In contrast, inexperienced reporters tend to be
tim id about asking questions and have not yet developed the news instinct to
ask the right questions, and many are uncomfortable w riting about conflict.
Unless there is a good editor, who is knowledgeable about Superfund and not
himself overworked, the inexperienced reporter's copy wiU consist of little
more than poorly connected quotes from authorities.
In the absence of investigative reporting, news personnel rely heavily on
organizational sources of information, w hich often possess their own
agendas, perspectives, and timetables and can shape m edia definitions of risk
and safety (Spencer & Triche, 1994:201). Inexperienced reporters are not
trained in investigative techniques, and experienced overw orked reporters do
not have the time to devote to digging.
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Because Superfund issues are complicated, good coverage takes time hours spent talking to governm ent officials, reading governm ent documents,
becoming fam iliar w ith the site and the jargon. An inexperienced or
overw orked experienced reporter w ith a large beat, no m atter how motivated,
does not have the time to do the research necessary to w rite coherent copy on
the subject, never mind do the additional w ork essential to supplying a full
range of voices and context. Additionally, many reporters, even those w ith
experience, are not inclined to question authorities too deeply. Greider, a
former reporter, writes:
For several generations...Americans have been systematically taught to
defer to authority and expertise in a complicated world. The m odem
political culture, transm itted by schools and universities and the news
media, teaches implicitly that those chosen to hold pow er have access
to special know ledge and intelligence not available to others and,
therefore, their deliberations and actions are supposedly grounded in a
firmer reality...(Greider, 1992:407).

In the Standard newsroom, as in many others, the staff relies upon
authorities and ARCO for information that is "safe." The result of reliance
on authorities as sources often affects which occurrences become news events
and, in turn, how these events are defined in terms of risk and safety.
The media's reliance on one particular news source may privilege one
set of definitions over other, competing definitions (Spencer & Triche,
1994:201).

This seems to be the case in the paper’s environm ental coverage from
1990 through 1993.
Standard managing editor Drew Van Fossen has inherited a difficult
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situation. N ew to the position himself, he is w orking w ith five
inexperienced reporters out of a total of six (Van Fossen, 11/14/95). And,
given the low rate of pay for reporters and "the impression that this paper is
not one of the best in the state," Van Fossen recognizes that the likelihood of
attracting experienced reporters is low. He knows, given the salaries the
new spaper offers, it is extremely unlikely he will be m anaging experienced
reporters in the near future, so he's trying to create a climate in which
"people will w ork hard (Van Fossen, 11/14/95)."
We'll give them autonomy. We'll provide as many opportunities as
we can and give them the chance to get good clips (Van Fossen,
11/14/95).

O utput am ong the Standard staff is not uniform. The two best of the staff
produce 15 stories apiece a week, but the others produce less. Van Fossen says
(11/14/95). The combination of understaffing and inexperienced reporters is a
recipe for disaster in any newsroom. In addition to grappling w ith a small,
inexperienced staff. Van Fossen, an Anaconda native, is also trying to find a
way to reach younger readers:
Thirty-five percent of our readers are elderly. They're careful
new spaper readers... They spend a lot of time w ith it. At least the ones
who call me do ...But I don't know if w e re picking u p readers from the
young age group (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).

Van Fossen is trying to instill a new approach in the newsroom. He has
just completed redesigning the paper and is now trying to upgrade the
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content, using a consensus, rather than the usual "vertical hierarchy of the
newsroom (Van Fossen, 11/14/95)." He has two prim ary goals: to make the
reporting less institutional and to "do a better job of looking back and
following up."
I’m looking for how this public official's decision affects real people.
So much that we write is controlled. People w ant to know how Jack
Lynch's city council decisions will affect their tax bills and their kids in
schools. I w ant to know when, say, a great reading program is cut, how
the mother of a kid in that program feels (Van Fossen, 11/14/95).

The need to follow up stories should extend from reporters to the copy
desk. Van Fossen says (11/14/95). H e’s stressing consistency in coverage and
good headline writing:
The motto everybody should have tattooed on them is "Words
M atter!"
By and large I’m happy w ith our staff. I’m trying to breathe new life
into them, to get a different thought process out of them, and
sometimes it comes dow n to using my ow n thought process (Van
Fossen, 11/14/95).

Van Fossen is handicapped by more than under staffing, reporters'
inexperience, and low salaries. He m ust grapple w ith the impact of the two
trends that Malone and fellow authors identified in 1976: the professionalism
of journalism and the concentration of m edia ow nership in the hands of few
corporations.
In the Standard newsroom, as in newsrooms across the country,
"objectivity ” is the goal. The insistence on objectivity which requires the
"meticulous certification of almost every phenom enon by an authority w ith a
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title," came about w ith the professionalism of journalism (Bagdikian,
1990:130). This has had a profound influence on the nature of reporting, both
print and broadcast:
American news, under that [objectivity] doctrine, has become
increasingly conservative, not truly neutral, and too often devoid of
meaning. The doctrine led journalists in the standard m edia to "safe,"
politically neutral subjects like crime and natural disasters, and it
delayed for decades intelhgent examinations into the causes of
events...It has given American standard news a profoundly
establishm entarian cast under the guise of a press independent of
established authority (Bagdikian, 1990:130).

The objectivity doctrine also keeps news coverage "superficial" to avoid
offending or boring readers by screening out interpretation and background,
which has resulted in a loss of context in much news coverage (Bagdikian,
1990). This is problematic. Mere recitation of facts is "inadequate" because,
although readers are bom barded w ith fact after fact they are given no clue
about how to put the facts together into any coherent reality (Bagdikian, 1990).
In addition, readers have difficulty understanding the relative importance or
unim portance of w hat they are reading because facts w ithout context "imply
that all facts are of equal value (Bagdikian, 1990:214)."
A nother im portant impact of the dependence on authority-sanctioned
facts and limitations on context is that American journalists are ill-equipped
to indicate w hen authorities lie or evade facts (Bagdikian, 1990).
U nfortunately, neither situation is uncom mon (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider,
1992).
It [objectivity] w idened the chasm that is a constant threat to democracy
- the difference betw een the realities of private pow er and the illusion
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of public imagery...(Bagdikian, 1990:180).

The professional standards of journalism bear a strong resemblance to
both the scientific and economic assumptions referred to in a previous
section: news stories that consist of recitations of facts out of context have
both an atomistic and reductionist nature in that they deal w ith complicated
subjects as isolated incidents reduced to scattered quotes or sound bites from
authorities; the removal of context effectively serves to abstract
knowledge and inform ation from the natural, and social, world; insistence on
objectivity denies that subjective decisions are made in the selection of news
items and the m anner in which they are reported; and the removal of context
leads to an illusion of value-free stories.
However, some argue, these stories are far from value-free. Greider
maintains over time, think tanks "have shaped the very language and
thought patterns of the m edia (1992:300)." He traces the flow of information
produced by corporate-sponsored think tanks and foundations into schools
and universities and the news media (1992). It is not surprising, he writes,
that reporters are so comfortable w ith authorities — the intellectual
frameworks of those producing the information and those reporting are
compatible - "ostensible rationality and objectivity of disinterested statistics
and abstract argum entation (Greider, 1992:300)." The press reports everything
in the m anner of objective academic inquiry, keeping its distance.
The stories of real people, while often told in compelling detail, are
treated as interesting "anecdotes" rather than hard evidence of political
failure. When they wish to know w hat the public thinks, the media
usually turn to opinion polling, a measuring device that is also
distancing because it reduces public opinion to an impersonal
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commodity. W hen the results are in, various influentials are invited
to debate w hat the polling statistics mean (Greider,-1992:300-301).

However, as is the case w ith risk assessments, the decisions about w hat to
include and exclude in news stories are clearly subjective, as are decisions
m ade about what to write about, how to write about it, and who to use as
sources. The reliance upon authorities and removal of context have political
consequences, and contribute to the creation of a landscape as removed from
reality as our Lady of the Rockies from the Berkeley Pit. This tends to serve
the status-quo because:
Inform ed social-economic context has unavoidable political
implications which may disturb some in the audience whose w orld
view differs. Those readers and viewers m ight grudgingly accept the
briefly announced, indisputable fact but not the display of its similarly
indisputable implications... (Bagdikian, 1990:214).

However, decisions about w hat is proper context require both experience
and an understanding of the issue at hand, as well as the history and political
economy in which that issue is considered. This dem ands an experienced
competent reporter who understands the difference betw een personal
opinion and legitimate historical and social background. There are
journalists who have the necessary skills but they are not used "for the wrong
reasons (Bagdikian, 1990:214)." Those "wrong reasons," are related to
ow nership of media outlets. In the 4th printing of his book The Media
M onopoly, Bagdikian reports that just 29 corporations ow n the major
m arkets - some 25,000 outlets - in the American m edia market. He connects
this concentrated ow nership to the sanitizing of the news. Just as the
consolidation of m ining interests u n d er the um brella of the Anaconda
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Company, and the subsequent entry of Standard Oil executives shifted
decision-making to outsiders interested solely in short-term profits, now,
rather than depending solely on their readers, new spapers m ust answer to
advertisers. Wall Street investors, and parent corporations (Bagdikian, 1990).
As the m edia monopoly developed and corporate ow nership sought
increased advertising revenue, the papers became blander to avoid alienating
readers (Bagdikian, 1990). Political expression, even that which was
sympathetic to corporations, was eliminated from coverage (Bagdikian, 1990).
Opinions in political columns were channeled into the mainstream: only
centrist positions, operating within a narrowly defined interpretation of
centrism, were seen (Bagdikian, 1990). Ideas questioning the operations of
corporations or capitalism as a system were not published in the mass media
(Bagdikian, 1990).
It was a clear dem onstration of neutralizing the news to make papers
more efficient carriers of advertising, but it produced social sterility and
silence on fundam ental forces behind major news events (Bagdikian,
1990:205).

That silence gave credence to the movements to limit taxes that surfaced
in the 1980s, Bagdikian notes. The major media, the prim ary sources of
inform ation and analysis of economic and political issues for the majority of
citizens, have, by dint of ownership, become "partners in achieving the social
and economic goals of their patrons and owners (Bagdikian, 1990:151)." And
the new "central authority over information" is the "national and
m ultinational corporation (Bagdikian, 1990:xix)." This is troubling because
news, information, and popular culture "shape the consensus of a society
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(Bagdikian, 1990:xx)." The American press has always served as "an
im portant and controversial m ediating voice for citizens, a corrective
m echanism that both speaks to pow er and sometimes checks its abuses,"
Greider writes (1992:277). Like other prim ary political institutions, such as
political parties, the press has lost connections to its ow n readers and no
longer speaks as reliably on their behalf (Greider, 1992). A lthough people may
sense the distance they may not recognize how connected the media has
become to elite interests and those who dom inate politics (Greider, 1992). Not
only does the news business have no economic incentive to exercise its
historical role of m ediator of social forces, it "faces economic risk if it tries
(Greider, 1992:305)."
The result is a pattern of media coverage that stresses the shortcomings of
the public tax-supported sector and ignores flaws in the corporate private
sector (Bagdikian, 1990). Over time, the public, and some journalists, have
come to believe the public sector is inherently flawed and private enterprises
function efficiently (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). The most common
manifestations of this belief can be found in the anti-tax campaigns and in the
cry for privatization of public service agencies (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992).
The Montana Standard's coverage reflects these interests. The paper's
lim ited environm ental coverage has stressed governm ent agency
incompetence and highlighted disputes betw een levels of government, while
sim ultaneously lauding the forw ard-thinking of the high-tech businesses
w orking on the Superfund waste. The result of elimination or vague
inclusion of corporate American from analysis is the production of a deficient
view of the socio-political w orld (Bagdikian, 1990).
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In Butte, this sense of something missing manifests itself as concern that
the paper is pro-ARCO. Suspicions of the paper's connection w ith ARCO run
deep, especially after the new spaper published a statem ent of ow nership on
October 1, 1994 which listed ARCO as one of the principal stockholders. After
a series of letters to the editor charging that ARCO’s stockholder status
colored the paper’s coverage of Superfund issues, the paper replied in an
editorial:
Yes, ARCO is a 'significant stockholder in Lee Enterprises. That is, it
holds more than one percent and less than five percent of Lee stock.
There are dozens of individuals, companies and organizations in this
category. ARCO is just one more largish investor in Lee Enterprises. It
has no special privilege.
Nobody from ARCO sits on the Lee Board of Directors or occupies
any corporate office.
ARCO’s advertising revenue is insignificant.
As far as we know, the publisher isn't being paid off under the table.
This paper makes its own editorial decisions. Reporters are given
no instructions on how to cover stories that involve ARCO, except to
report the facts. No editing is done to make a story conform to some
pro-ARCO opinion....
Assertions of an evil ARCO connection makes dram atic
accusations, but they're fiction {Montana Standard, 6/15/1994).

However, to look at the paper's ownership in terms of ARCO only is
much too oversimplistic. The composition of major stockholders is the story
here. The prim ary stockholders consist of banks, trusts, and insurance
companies - a group very sim ilar in composition to the Superfund Coalition
Greider wrote about. These are the interests which w ould be well-served if
the Superfund law were overhauled much along the lines that ARCO has
suggested (Barnett, 1994; Greider, 1992). These are the interests promoting the
efficiency of the corporation versus the inefficiency of governm ent
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(Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). The corporate practice of interlocking boards
of directorates (boards w ith shared members), leads to a frequent
commonality of political interests (Bagdikian, 1990; Greider, 1992). Charges of
conspiracy w ould be equally oversimplistic, but:
The absence of a conspiracy, however, does not m ean that large media
corporations lack pow er or fail to use it in a unified way. They have
shared values...[which] are reflected in the emphasis of their news and
popular culture. They are the prim ary shapers of American public
opinion about events and their meaning. A nd through that, and their
organization in large powerful corporate units, they are a major
influence on government(Bagdikian, 1990:9).

However, m edia owners deny that they influence the news. That may be
true for "most operators in day-to-day, hour-by-hour operations, but it is not
true for larger issues in which the media corporations have a strong interest
(Bagdikian, 1990:100)." It is naive to think, as the Montana Standard editorial
implies, that exercise of pow er is necessarily overt, e.g., m andating a certain
type of coverage in memos from the board of directors or as directives at
editorial meetings. Control in the news m edia is exercised far more subtly.
As previously indicated, owners can virtually assure simplistic coverage
by understaffing and offering salaries low enough to attract only
inexperienced reporters. Additionally, the passage of open meeting laws in
most states and the Freedom of Information Act, w hich allows the press
access to governm ent docum ents (unless they relate to Butte-Silver Bow's
landfill), makes it easier for the press to cover government. Because
corporations are private entities, w ith the status of persons, the press does not
have access to corporate records. Given a 40-hour work week and the
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dem ands of covering a given beat, new reporters will usually take the path of
least resistance, and focus their energies on government. And, by placing
strict boundaries around beats, editors can assure that reporters w ork within
fairly strict parameters. Also:
Every year there is a distressing list of reporters and editors of
newspapers and magazine who are fired or dem oted because they
stum bled on the private politics of their ow ner . Even w hen such
firings and demotions are clear interventions of corporate politics into
the editorial process, the worse damage is not in one particular incident
but in the long-lasting aftermath in which working professionals at the
editorial level behave as though under orders from above, although no
explicit orders have been given (Bagdikian, 1990:36-37).

A dditionally, given the profit motivation, the editorial's contention that
ARCO advertising money is "insignificant" is questionable. ARCO's
advertising has also become a source of controversy. ARCO sees it as a means
of public communication about the Superfund process. Activists see it as a
source of propaganda and subversion of public awareness and participation.
In response to complaints, ARCO operations manager Sandy Stash said:
The company will continue to advertise...it has increased its
advertising as more w ork gets underw ay. Advertising has proven to be
an effective method to increase public involvement (Montana
Standard:12l8ll993).

Even under the EPA's narrow definition of participation, the reading of an
advertisem ent w ould not constitute public involvement. Nor, short of
activists' angry response to the ads, is it clear how other more conventional
m ethods of public involvement came about as the result of the ads. C.B.
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Pearson, 1993 Clark Fork Coalition executive director, expressed concern to
ARCO that the corporation is shaping public perceptions in an attem pt to
avoid liability:
U nder Superfund law, ARCO is the major responsible party - not as
your advertisem ents say, "responsible partner." Your ’Shared D uties’
campaign ignores the reality that ARCO is legally responsible for the
massive dam age to our water, aquatic and terrestrial areas {Montana
Standard: 12/8/1993).

CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says that ARCO’s influence goes well past
its advertisem ents:
The biggest problem I have is the corrupting of public energy by ARCO
(Craig, 7/30/95).

Because the county has also been named a potential responsible party by
dint of its operation of the Metro Storm Drain through w hich wastes were
transported into Silver Bow Creek, it, like ARCO, w hich controls the purse
strings, has a stake in limiting the cleanup to avoid spending scarce county
resources, Craig (7/30/95) says. She points to possible of conflict of interest
betw een local officials and ARCO w hich may result in "not looking out for
the health of people (Craig, 7/30/95)." These issues are also not included in
the paper's Superfund coverage.
Unlike the activists, the county health director and chief executive have
no quarrel w ith the paper. Health Director Dan Dennehey (9/21/95) says the
paper does present the inform ation he wants, given the lim ited am ount of
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column inches that can be expended:
The media here has been very good. We use them for so many other
things - announcements, im m unizations. We've developed a good
working relationship over the years (Dennehey, 9/21/95).

The publication of press releases announcing im m unizations and health
screening events are an im portant part of a new spaper's role in a community.
But the press releases should not be a substitute for good reporter-generated
news coverage. And, apparently access to the media does not extend past the
county level. The EPA "can't get a story in the newspaper," public affairs
officer Sara Weinstock says (7/31/95).
Craig agrees. CTEC also has been unsuccessful at obtaining coverage:
We (she and one of CTEC's technical staff) w ould like to put an
educational feature in the paper about Superfund. We explained our
m andate and said we w anted people to participate more fully. We'd
put it together, weekly or monthly. He [former editor and current
publisher Norm Lewis] said, "It's not my job to educate people; this
paper is for news"....If we could give him news, he'd put it in (7/30/95).

George Waring notes that there are major gaps in the Montana Standard's
coverage:
Just the idea that there's an EPA office in town w here you can get
volumes of information. But people don't know that. I didn't know.
You don't have to hide inform ation - just overw helm people w ith
the am ount of material and level of expertise needed [to understand
the material]. The local new spaper has been terribly bad at doing this.
The connection is not made by scientific people (Waring, 10/21/95).
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G reider (1992) m aintains that new spapers have a role as educators. "The
erosion of democracy" is stark proof of new spaper editors failure to take on
this "responsibility for their ow n readers (Greider, 1992:303)."

That is, to speak frankly in their behalf, to educate them as citizens, to
create a space for them in the political debate and draw them into it...
From time to time, new spapers bem oan the ignorance of the general
public - citizens who do not know the name of their ow n senator or
hold grossly mistaken impressions about governm ent - but
new spapers w ould never blame themselves for the ignorance and
inertia of their readers. The decline of voting and elections is the
subject for regular sermonizing in the press, but new spapers w ould
never accept that their own performance as m ediating voices is
perhaps implicated in the decay. N otw ithstanding the usual civic
bromides, newspapers, like other political institutions, ru n away from
their ow n failure to communicate w hat matters to citizens, in a timely
context that citizens m ight understand and act upon... (Greider,
1992:303-304).

So, in Butte, CTEC and MEIC board member John Ray has developed a
different set of expectations for the Montana Standard's coverage.
Yes, I read it. Yes, it gives me the information I w ant because all I want
is to see how the paper's treating an issue. For example, if the Standard
had a neutral headline and the other papers had a m uch more
proactive headline...! w ant to know how the paper's presenting it (Ray,
10/24/95).

Activist George W aring adds:
If one relies on the new spaper you get very little or highly biased
information. I’m not convinced it's pro-corporate bias but you have
inexperienced people covering these stories. They can be m anipulated.
Sandy Stash [ARCO spokesman] and Don Peoples [former Butte-Silver
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Bow chief executive and current local businessman] take time to give
her [the reporter] a worldview, like a form of socialization (10/21/95).

Residents who are not involved w ith Superfund also find the paper
lacking:
No. I don't read the Montana Standard because it doesn’t give you
information. I go to the sources, to the departm ents involved (Crain,
9/21/95).
No, because I think the Montana Standard has totally missed the point
on what Superfund is all about. If there's something I felt had a lot of
relevance to my life I’d probably go to the EPA or Mary Kay Craig’s
group (Maney, 9/22/95).

Beyond the lack of relevance that results from removal of context and
local voices, the trend tow ard consolidating hosts of w arring weeklies and
dailies, each w ith their own unique voice that spoke to their own distinctive
readers, has led to blandness that pleases few (Greider, 1992).
Trying to hold the mass audience's loyalty, new spaper editors have
retreated from identifying with any single part of their readership especially the lower classes where reader attrition is greatest. This
strategy has not been especially successful in halting their decline. But
new spapers have adopted an angle of vision that presum es an idyllic
class-free community — a city where everyone has more or less the
same point of view on things (Greider, 1992:292).

Butte is far from idyllic. Nor, can a researcher find one prevailing point of
view. Neither fact is acknowledged in Montana Standard coverage. W hether
the result of understaffing, inexperience, ownership, consolidation, a definite
orientation, or a combination of any or all, the Standard’s coverage for the
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four years from 1990 through 1993 was poor journalism - the result of w hat
was not, rather than w hat was, reported. If Van Fossen can im plem ent his
goals, coverage will be greatly improved. It is ironic that Van Fossen's
background, which is in the area of graphics, rather than journalism, may
actually be an asset in the Montana Standard new sroom because he has not
been exposed to the "professional" standards of journalism. However, Van
Fossen will be constrained by the publisher and board of directors.
If Van Fossen cannot change the orientation of the new spaper, the
Standardized landscape will remain very sim ilar to Butte's geology - the
driving forces are unseen, underground. A nd the media-constructed
landscape above ground, like the city of Butte, will contain large gaping
vacant areas - among them spaces for public education, public health
information, and the political economy that directs decisions made. The next
section focuses upon operative perceptions of public health in Butte,
indicating w here there are gaps and w here there are indications that there
may well be legitimate causes for public health concern which are not being
addressed.
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1 As a reporter covering a small New England town of 11,000 people (roughly
one-third of the population of Butte), my environmental coverage of a small
state Superfund site and a potentially contaminated landfill consisted of four
stories a week, on average. In addition, the newspaper, a daily with a
circulation of 100,000 (roughly 3.5 times the circulation of the Montana
Standard, ran at least two state-related environmental stories a week, plus daily
environmental coverage from other towns, and federal environmental
coverage from the wire services.
2 Standard news reporting of contaminants always includes a paragraph or
two that tells the reader what types of cancers or illnesses are associated with
the chemicals at the site under discussion. Most reporters keep a previously
written "kernel" paragraph or paragraphs, if the site has numerous
contaminants, filed for use in every story on the Superfund site.
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PUBLIC HEALTH
Subterranean landscapes

One very noticeable vacant area in Butte is that w hich is, in other
Superfund sites across the country, often occupied by vocal groups of
residents w orried about the health impacts of contam ination (Kroll-Smith
and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988,1991; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992).
The previous sections addressed the historical landscape, as well as those
landscapes put forth by the EPA and local health officials, and the local
newspaper. This section considers the ways in w hich residents have come to
understandings of public health issues. It also points to data which indicate
that public health may well be cause for concern, and notes the failure of
governm ent agencies to conduct the health studies which are necessary to
determ ine if, indeed, a public health problem does exist.
The history of public health in Butte is an im portant factor in the
understanding perceptions of health issues in 1996. Unlike the situations in
W obum (Brown, 1991), Love Canal (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a; Greider,
1992), and Three Mile Island (Davidson and Baum, 1991), w hich have been
extensively studied, Butte residents were not shocked into the sudden
realization that their tow n was possibly unhealthy. Butte is a m ining town
w ith a history of health risks, both below and above ground. Further, health
issues were politicized early in Butte’s history.
A t the turn of the century, the W omen’s Protective Union, organized by
w om en w orking in the boarding houses and restaurants of the mining camp,
fought against the pollutants that spewed forth from the smelters in Butte,
and, as early as 1898, "called for national health insurance, unem ploym ent
218
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insurance and a retirem ent plan for all workers...(Maney, 1990:6). ” Shortly
after the tu rn of the century, miners and their families knew that m iners'
consumption, silicosis, was the result of w orking in dry, poorly- or non
ventilated mines:
The risk, however, was routinely assumed. From 1916 to 1919 a U.S.
Bureau of Mines study found that of 1,018 Butte m iners interviewed,
432 (42.5 percent) had miners' consumption, another 63 had
tuberculosis... As one Butte new spaperm an wrote, the m iners’ wives
w ere also "unhealthy from washing clothes saturated... with... bad air
and giant pow der smoke, and [being] compelled to inhale the... deadly
fumes (Emmons, 1990:150).

In addition to silica-laden dust, miners were exposed to carbon dioxide
levels m ore than 20 times that of "clean country air " and tem perature
extremes that ranged from tropical in the mine shafts to Butte’s above ground
tem perature, which was fiercely cold in the winter. The result:
...in the w inter, m en w ere hoisted, in five m inutes time, from 90
degree mine shafts into outside air that routinely reached a brittle 40
degrees below zero. One longtime Butte resident remembers m en
em erging from the mines "covered w ith sweat, ” hitting the cold air
and disappearing in balls of steam. Before the construction of change
rooms, or dries, the m en then walked home w ith their clothes frozen
on them (Emmons, 1990:150-51).

Along w ith this acceptance of risk, came prestige and, at least at certain
points in local labor history, high pay that indicated the danger of the work.
The m iners’ need for economic security sometimes came into direct conflict
w ith health issues, as was the case w hen the head of the Butte Miners Union,
disagreed w ith a concerned physician’s suggestion that consumptives be
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"quarantined" from the mines because the quarantine w ould interfere w ith
the m iners’ ability to support themselves (Emmons, 1990:158).
There was considerable strife among union m en about a company
decision that senior miners receive X-rays to determ ine the condition
of their lungs. Those whose X-rays showed "black spots ' w ould be
dism issed from their jobs, supposedly for health reasons. The union
interpreted this as a company ploy to get rid of senior employees who
cost them more in wages and benefits. The company w ould also be
insuring that the men retired before they were eligible for a full
pension. The men, knowing they w ould fail the health exams, w anted
to refuse the X-rays so they could continue working. The union's
challenge in this case was a boycott of the mandatory X-rays so that the
men and the company w ould not know who had "black spots" and the
company could not discriminate against senior workers. The report on
the issue indicated that it would be rare for an older w orker n o t to fail
the exam. It is ironic that the refusal of diagnosis of a chronic illness or
health risk w ould be turned into a union victory. The union w on the
right for men to risk their lives in unsafe conditions so they might a
get a full pension should they live long enough to retire (Finn,
1994:259-60). The underlining is the author's.

The m ining companies disputed the connection betw een consum ption
and silica dust, m aintaining it was the result of the miners' lifestyles or that
the num bers of m iners' consumption in Butte were skewed because younger
men left Butte to w ork in cooler mines (Emmons, 1990). The Anaconda
Company held sway.
Dad died of m iner's con. They called it TB to make the Company not
responsible. It was formerly silicosis. Uncle Pat, everybody I knew as a
kid, died of silicosis (Shea, 10/24/95).
"From the 1940s to the 1960s the M ontana State Welfare D epartm ent,
not the Anaconda Company, shared the burden of pensions for the
state's "silicotics (Finn, 1994:257)."
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The risky nature of life in Butte was known outside of Butte's boundaries.
H istorian D avid Emmons refers to a U.S. Navy recruiting advertisem ent in
1916, w hen W orld W ar I was raging in Europe, and American intervention
under discussion. The ad, w hich ran in the Montana Socialist, indicated that
miners stood to gain a better life in w ar conditions than in Butte's mines. 1
Later in the history, the A naconda Company operated a local hospital
(Malone et al, 1993). In Butte, the Company owned the tow n and this fact,
activist George W aring notes, has implications:
There's a psychological factor. The Company owns the whole town. It
really is a factory. You can live here in your little house b u t can be
kicked out at any time. You're living on borrow ed time. My property's
defined as part of the Old Plymouth Lode. It's described in mining
term s.
There's no idea of res publica. Everything is private property
ow ned by an absentee landlord. Not only isn't this your property; it's
the enemy's property (Waring, 10/21/95).
The mines, and the town, were privately owned (Malone et al, 1993;
Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990).
In Butte, the com pany enjoyed the right of em inent dom ain to exploit
m ineral resources beneath the surface lands. While many Butte
residents realized the American dream of ow ning their ow n home,
they were often living on borrow ed space and time (Finn, 1994:143).

The miners' bodies w ere private (Finn, 1995) so silicosis , like mining
accidents, was a personal "trouble " (Edelstein, 1988), a private problem which
could occur to anyone in the community. Unlike the m ore public approach
of the W omen's Protective Union (Maney, 1990), the m ale-dom inated
associations, w hich were supported by non-m ining residents of Butte,
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approached illness and death as private loss which, inadvertently, reinforced
the notion of private trouble (Emmons, 1990).
A lthough county health commissioners noted the poor w orking
conditions in the Butte mines in 1914 and recom m ended that m ining
companies provide toilet cars and covered steel w ater containers and health
checks of the horses w orking in the mines, they did not call for im proved
ventilation in the mines (Emmons, 1990). They called for ordinances
requiring more square feet for people living in the boarding and rooming
homes (Emmons, 1990). However, they m aintained that the workers were
primarily responsible for workers' health and advised the perm anent
residents to educate the transient miners (Emmons, 1990).
The pattern that emerges is clear and understandable. As im portant as
steady work, in fact an integral part of it, was w ork in cool, safe drifts
w ith congenial mates and a friendly shift boss. It may not need saying,
but a broken head or miners' con had the same effect on steady w ork as
a mine shutdow n. Certainly no one could have missed the point of
the sign posted on the N orth Butte Mine: "Don't Get H urt. There are
TEN MEN waiting for YOUR JOB (Emmons, 1990:154)."

Public health awareness in Butte historically was associated w ith the
hazards of mining which extended to the women w ashing the miners'
clothes (Emmons, 1990). But that illness was associated w ith the
underground workings; it extended aboveground only on the miners'
clothes. The landscape aboveground was threatening only to the extent that
children had to be kept away from abandoned mine shafts. A lthough the
community, in its funding of associational program s for miners, was
generous, the hazards were not perceived to be shared by the community as a
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w hole (Emmons, 1990). However, the EPA Superfund designation changed
that by labelling most of the community a toxic site, forcing a renegotiation of
the landscape, or denial. Researchers at other Superfund sites have noted
"secondary impacts" produced by the "social, technological and legal
responses to the contam ination (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991b:303)." Among
those "secondary impacts" are issues related to stigma.
In pollution cases, stigma routinely accompanies the announcem ent of
contam ination and the identification of its boundaries. The stigma can
apply to a variety of targets, including affected residents, objects...
...accordingly, one can evaluate how disruptive an exposure event
is, w hether its existence is concealable, w hether it affects aesthetic
qualities, w hether the victim is any way responsible for its occurrence,
w hat its prognosis is, and the degree of peril it portends... [victims’]
homes and neighborhood are dow ngraded by observers w ho exhibit
anticipatory fears' about the place (Edelstein, 1988:14).

Arguably, the cessation of mining activities, w hich resulted in years of job
loss in Butte, was far more overtly disruptive to the com munity than the
Superfund label and the accompanying stigma. Because of the risks that have
always existed in Butte, it is residents adapted culturally many generations
ago, adopting a way of life that stressed their ability to survive by
taking risks, and expressing pride in their difference. Outsiders, tended to
look upon Butte w ith some suspicion (Emmons, 1990). Very possibly, the
local pride in the risk-taking involved in mining, the pranks of Butte’s kids,
and the often noted clannishness of Butte’s people w as the com m unity's way
of talking back to the outsiders’ suspicion, both acknowledging the outside
perception of their community w hile sim ultaneously denigrating it by
m aking life in Butte far more exciting and Butte’s people far better at
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surviving than outsiders. If this is the case, EPA designation of the
community as a Superfund site w ould change little because the cultural
adaptations to stigma were already in place - the risks inherent in the place
had been internalized by the culture and those risks and differences celebrated
in the Irish designation of "Butte, America (Emmons, 1990)."
There was no way to conceal the mining landscape. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the land was degraded and, to outsiders, Butte was ugly
and, as such, already stigmatized. But to residents, this city am idst mine
waste, was home and, as such, was beautiful. Former state representative
Fritz Daily, explains:
I'm from Butte. I love Butte. I don't know a better place to live.... I
don't think the Pit's ugly. W hen I look at mine dum ps and mine
waste I don't think it's ugly. But w hen I drive through Kellogg, Idaho
[another former mining town] I think it's ugly (Daily, 12/8/95).
The waste in Butte is part of a familiar landscape - home; the waste in
unfam iliar communities is im m ediately apparent and aesthetically
displeasing to an outsider.
In the case of hazard agents that linger for seemingly indeterm inate
periods, these cultural adaptations to the invisible threat are especially
significant, as they may become routinized and a new way of life' for
affected populations (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b:301).

The toxic label was attached to familiar places, e.g., mine dum ps where
current Butte adults played as children. Butte-Silver Bow H ealth Director
D an Dennehey, who spent all but his college years in Butte, says:
Most people I've talked to about Superfund issues have lived w ith
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m ining scars for years. They played on mining dum ps and tailings. It’s
hard to get them to understand (Dennehey, 9/21/95).

John T. Shea says the tow n was a playground:
We played on the mine dum ps. We'd find m ercury and quicksilver
and pu t it in a jar and the bottom of the jar w ould fall out By the
M ountain Con [mine], the Centerville football team practiced on a
mine dum p, especially up here [in Walkerville]. All the mines were
up here (Shea, 10/24/95).

Sara Weinstock, EPA rem edial project manager, says:
I grew up right below Walkerville. Missoula Gulch w as filled w ith
dum ps, there were dum ps everywhere. We played on them
constantly. There were only two things - blasting caps and shafts- we
were told to stay away from. We had a bottle of m ercury from the Alice
Mill area.
On the other hand, my Dad always took a show er before he came
home. Because my m other was a nurse we didn't picnic on waste
dum ps (Weinstock, 7/31/95).

CTEC president Mary Kay Craig says she had been told to avoid certain
areas:
I lived two blocks from Silver Bow Creek as it goes through town. It’s
now called the Metro Storm Drain. I didn't play in it — my folks told
me to stay away from it. It was called Silver Bow Creek, Copper Creek,
Shit Creek. It was Shit Creek to most people. It had raw sewage in it.
The stench was so bad. We used to take our bicycles under the railroad
viaduct (bridge). There was a place w here there was a 2' by 10’ plank
across the creek. It w asn’t very w ide to get your bike across. We had fattired bikes. You had to do it or be called chicken. So, of course, we'd
take the dare and take the chance we w ouldn’t fall in.
Along the railroad tracks, boys w ould hitch rides on boxcars from
the Utah and Wyoming Street area, and then jum ping before they
reached Kew Avenue. It seemed like a fun thing but we didn't do it.
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We were told to stay away from the slag heaps which are now
dubbed by ARCO as an "historical mining landscape (Craig, 7/30/95)."

A lthough Craig points to ARCO’s attem pts to m inim ize cleanup and, thus, its
costs, the assignment of blame for the contamination is m uddied. One of the
many differences between natural disasters and CTDs is that in natural
disasters the survivors are often portrayed as heroes; how ever "cadmium or
lead pollution of soil or drinking w ater creates no heroes (Couch and KrollSmith, 1991b:304)." In Butte, there is a tw ist on this theme— the toxins are
the result of mining activities perform ed by miners who, because of the
dangers that accompanied their jobs, were local heroes who brought the
community to life and then sustained it economically, giving the place its
identity in the process. W ithin Butte, the respect for the miners, who are
often family members, w ould likely mitigate against assigning responsibility
to them. However, given the Anaconda Com pany’s control of the
community, it w ould be very possible to lay the responsibility at the corporate
door.
For three-quarters of a century the enemy was the A naconda Company.
The Company controlled the land and the local government, except for brief
instances w hen local officials and / or the union asserted themselves (Malone
et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959,1972). However, Company authority did
not forestall collective response, the most public in the form of strikes
(Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Toole, 1959, 1972). Because of the vast
differences in power, the collective resistance was conducted w ithin the
physical and social landscape established by the Company. The result of
operating w ithin such constrained terrain was often, ironically, to reinforce
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the oppressive structure. 2
However, it is im portant to note that resistance comes in many forms.
The challenge to the new ow ner (ARCO) w hen the corporation fought against
paying benefits to the laid-off miners, the appeal to ARCO stockholders for
reinvestm ent in the com munity, the organization of the Butte Family Union,
and the construction of O ur Lady of the Rockies can be seen as forms of
resistance. As im portant as, if not more than, success is the existence of a
tradition of community resistance and the resiliency involved in challenging
consistently (Finn, 1995).
There are observers who point to a despairing tendency to blame the
Com pany w hen things w ent w rong in its communities, Butte and Anaconda,
home to the Company smelter. Bob Vine, A naconda historian, sum m ed it
up.
In the past we could always blame the Company. N ow many have
shifted the blam e to our city-county government and our elected
representatives. In our inability to adjust to change, we have the
myopic tendency to continue to blame others and not ourselves
{Anaconda Standard, 11/10/90).

Anaconda psychologist Timothy Casey saw the greatest challenge for
Anaconda as "the need to discard the traditional and entrenched characteristic
of a company tow n.’ " Casey defined the problem as one of dependency:
The residents of Anaconda attem pted to cope w ith the stress of the
shutdow n by either attacking ARCO or denying the problem. The
attackers sought to fight big business. The drezuners preferred to
believe the smelter w ould reopen. U nfortunately neither approach
served to change individual or community circumstances. To
complicate m atters further, the people of A naconda had always been
taken care of by the Company {Montana Standard, 11/30/90).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228
Casey identified an additional complication related to the cessation of
m ining and smelting operations: the loss of jobs for skilled craftsmen.
From my training and experience, I really see one’s w ork as a major
factor in terms of creating and developing an identification. .. I know
there are skilled people working on jobs where they are unhappy
{Montana Standardill130190).

Both criticisms seem som ew hat harsh given the am ount of change to
which residents of Anaconda and Butte had to adjust. The criticisms seem to
miss the im portance of m ining-related activities w hich w ere far more than
an economic base. Mining activities provided the cultural identity; their loss
requires extensive renegotiation, as does the Superfund designation. More
im portantly, both criticisms fail to take into account the historically great
disparities in pow er between the communities and corporation and their lack
of traditions of independent governance. However, the issue of blame raised
by Vine is im portant in contam inated communities.
By assigning the blame the event becomes more controllable because
then someone should be able to avert it and similar events w ould be
escapable in the future (Davidson and Baum, 1991:37).
Researchers have found that who is blam ed is also im portant. A num ber
of researchers have correlated the loss of control experienced by victims of
toxic exposure w ith long-term stress in instances w here victims hold
someone else responsible (Davidson and Baum, 1991; Edelstein, 1988). In
Butte and Anaconda, w here the communities also lost control over the
industry that provided their economic base and identity, the stress levels may
well ru n deeper. Researchers at Three Mile Island discovered that symptoms
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associated w ith blam ing others included "more somatic complaints, anxiety
and depression, poorer concentration or motivation...(Davidson and Baum,
1991:48)." More than two years after the 1979 nuclear accident occurred in
1979, these sym ptom s were still manifesting themselves in some people
(Davidson and Baum, 1991). A lthough the notion of blam ing yourself may
seem contradictory, some researchers have found that self-blame restores the
lost sense of control inherent in toxic exposure situations (Davidson and
Baum, 1991). W orking at Three Mile Island two years after the accident,
sociologists Laura M. Davidson and A ndrew Baum (1991) found that theories
about different types of self-blame may have explained some of the earlier
discrepancies about the benefit of self-blame. If the self-blame is attributed to
behavior, e.g., such and such an action or series of actions on my part was a
mistake, the sense of control can be regained (Davidson and Baum, 1991).
However, if the self-blame is attributed to failings in character, e.g.. I'm too
dum b to do anything else, it simply deepens the depression (Davidson and
Baum, 1991). So, people who blame themselves for m aking a mistake are
more likely to cope better w ith CTDs (Davidson and Baum, 1991). But:
U nfortunately, because of the nature of technological mishaps, these
types of disasters are frequently accompanied by externalizing blame.
And, blaming others is likely to highlight the loss of control created by
the original m ishap and to lead to greater feelings of helplessness and
its accompanying stagnation (Davidson and Baum,1991:50).

Medical psychologist Michael Edelstein (1988) reports that activism also
serves to restore a sense of control. But, he adds, in challenging the system,
activists take on a different kind of stress:
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...in the preponderance of cases, toxic incidents move very slowly... As
a result, the life cycle of American community groups tends to be
prolonged through a gruelling period of study and evaluation. Groups
become exhausted as they enter slow-moving and protracted states of
the incident during w hich continued mobilization becomes difficult to
sustain... (Edelstein, 1988:148).

Further, activist groups often find their questions are not welcomed.
George W aring tells of receiving a "tongue lashing" from a local official at a
meeting on the Berkeley Pit after the activists had turned in a petition with
3,700 signatures that protested the local government acquiescence w ith the
EPA in allowing w ater to continue to flow into the Pit:
...It really m ade you feel w hat it was like w hen Anaconda ran the
place...He told me the key was to protect the 400 jobs of MRI. H e’d been
told MRI w ould be shut dow n if they couldn't p u t w ater in it. His
view was w e’d get the same, or better, level of cleanup by waiting...
That idea of job losses had been planted early in the process. We felt
the council of commissioners d id n ’t like being blackmailed but simply
had to cross their fingers and hope they were doing the right thing.
They’re w illing to put short-term profit ahead of long range (Waring,
10/21/95).
Also, activists frequently find themselves in conflict w ith other
segm ents of their communities:
For some residents the threat of contamination is remote or simply
nonexistent. For others, however, contam ination is not a remote
possibility but an imm ediate reality... For other residents, however, the
problem is not as imm ediate, perhaps not as severe, and calls for a less
volatile and drastic response». Biospheric contam ination creates a crisis
of requiring a choice as to which of several competing experiences of
the same world, each of which tacitly claims to have faithfully reflected
that w orld will be credited as the valid version...
People who define the problem as at worse a w arning or perhaps as
no problem at all are likely to begin viewing believers and their
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em ergent groups as threats to property values or jobs. Those w ho do
not find in the environm ental cues w arrant for extreme concern are
likely to see themselves as victims of a fictive or at best exaggerated
crisis (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a:64-65).

Because of the difficulty in establishing causal relationships between
contam inants and cancers and other illnesses, there is always an uncertainty
about w hether local illnesses are the result of exposure, so in most
contam inated com munities, there are "non-believers" and "believers
(Edelstein, 1988)."
"Non-believers" espouse a highly individualistic and meritocratic set
of values. They are defenders of the status quo, and subscribe to the
view that life in present-day American industrial society is inherently
and pervasively risky. Accordingly, they hold that the major burden of
responsibility legitimately resides w ith each family to secure the
information and resources necessary to safeguard its welfare...
The "believers" live in less privatized and more sociable worlds.
They articulate an inextricable linkage betw een individual and
collective welfare and an expectation that the polity properly stands for
the interests of the individual w hen these w ould be com promised or
jeopardized by the interests of the industrial order (Edelstein, 1988:47).

In Butte, because of the m ining identity and economics, the situation is
more complicated. A lthough she questions the priorities of Superfund,
M arilyn Maney of the AFL-CIO and Butte-Silver Bow Archives, is no
defender of the status quo. This points to a possible conflict that could affect
w hether and how Butte residents renegotiate their relationship w ith the
landscape as a result of the Superfund designation: residents both
internalized and celebrated the risk-taking nature of the place, w hile often
linking individual and collective welfare in both female and male union
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issues. However, the bottom line which both directed and lim ited, activity in
Butte, was always geared tow ard w hatever it took to keep the community
intact (Emmons, 1990).
Another difference between believers and nonbelievers is related to
personal experience w ith health problems. Believers generally have had
unusual health problem s or have had experience w ith others' illnesses and
believe that those health problems are directly related to toxic exposure
(Edelstein, 1988). Nonbelievers and their acquaintances have not had similar
experiences w ith illnesses and usually keep a distance from events and
sources of inform ation w hich tends to reinforce their denial (Edelstein, 1988).
In Butte, there are believers and nonbelievers, and people w ho take stands
between both poles. Convincing the nonbelievers that there are health risks
so they should become involved w ith the cleanup is close to impossible,
Mary Kay Craig says:
People told me if they w alked across it [toxic waste] and immediately
dropped dead they'd pay attention. All you can say is cadm ium may
cause this, lead may cause this, etc. (Craig, 7/30/95).

People w ith relatives working at the ongoing MRI m ine operation or for
others involved w ith local politics "are scared to speak out," CTEC president
Mary Kay Craig says. "Their relatives need their paychecks."
Nonbelievers interview ed dism issed a question asking if there is more
illness in Butte than in other places w ith a simple, "No. " W hen asked if they
w orry about their ow n or their children's health, there w as more variety in
the responses, from a sim ple "No" to:
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No, related to Superfund. I tend to worry about w hat happens if I lose
this job and I d on’t have health insurance (Maney, 9/22/95).

This response indicates an apparent lack of concern about illnesses
specifically related to the contaminants present in the com munity and
sim ultaneously returns to the ongoing problem of m aintaining jobs, w ith
benefits packages in the community. Some non-believers tend to return to
the theme of personal trouble, linking it w ith lifestyle choices, rather than
environm ental causes.
I don't think there’s any different sicknesses here. If we have an area
of high morbidity, it’s smoking. My uncle w orked in the mines but he
also smoked three packs a day. There's nothing statistically (Dennehey,
9/21/95).

Some researchers have noted a shift in the m eaning of the w ord "risk"
from a fairly neutral term based on mathematical probability w here "good ”
risks w ere possible, to a negative, meaning "danger" (Douglas and Wildavsky,
1983; Lupton, 1993). Risk discourse can be loosely grouped into two
perspectives: the first, as a "health danger , posed by environmental
hazards...over which the individual has Uttle control ”; and the second, as a
consequence of "lifestyle ” choices (Lupton, 1993:429). This is not a simple
issue. Clearly, public health officials w ould not be protecting public health if
they did not point out correlations between cigarette smoking and lung
cancer. A lthough cigarette m anufacturers refute the connection betw een
cigarette smoking and lung cancer, m ost physicians accept the correlation and
are adam antly opposed to smoking (Montana AHEC, 1989). Published 1989
estimates indicated a decrease in the num bers of M ontana smokers, however.
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lung cancer was the leading cancer among both m en and w om en (Montana
AHEC, 1989), which is not surprising because cancer often takes years to
develop (Lappé, 1991; Bates, 1994). What is im portant to note is: it is more
difficult to correlate an illness, such as lung cancer or emphysema, w ith
environm ental causes in the case of a person who smokes; conversely, it is
also easier to dismiss the possibility of environm entally induced lung cancer
in a smoker.
Just as a moral distinction is draw n between those at risk' and those
posing a risk,' health education routinely draw s a distinction between
the harm caused by external causes out of the individual's control and
that caused by oneself. Lifestyle risk discourse overturns the notion
that health hazards in postindustrial society are out of the individual's
control. On the contrary, the dom inant theme of lifestyle risk
discourse is the responsibility of the individual to avoid health risks
for the sake of his or her own health as well as the greater good of
society (Lupton, 1993:432-33).

The determ ination of w hether a risk is external or internal, and therefore
the personal "trouble (Mills, 1959) of the person who smoked, drank, used
drugs, or engaged in other risky activities, is often made by institutions which
have a stake in the m atter (Lupton, 1993).
H ealth education em phasizing risks is a form of pedagogy, which, like
other forms, serves to legitimize ideologies and social practices. Risk
discourse in the public sphere allows the state, as the ow ner of
knowledge, to exert pow er over the bodies of its citizens. Risk
discourse therefore, especially w hen it emphasizes lifestyle risks, serves
as an effective Foucauldian^ agent of surveillance and control that is
difficult to challenge because of its manifest benevolent goal of
m aintaining standards of health. In doing so, it draw s away from the
structural causes of ill health (Lupton, 1993:431).
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W hen the structural causes of ill health, w hich could include a unsafe
environm ent, poverty or both, are disregarded, public health issues become
privatized, a personal problem. There is a fine line here which, in light of
previously cited inform ation regarding the need of governm ent officials to
allay panic, is of potential concern.
W hen asked if he w orries about the health of his ow n or children's
health, Butte-Silver Bow H ealth Director D an Dennehey says:
I w orry about my children's future in terms of violence, suicide,
teenage pregnancy - the num ber one health issues in the U.S. and
Montana. I d on’t w orry that my children will get cancer because we
live in Butte instead of Missoula. We live in a lead-free house, try to
teach our kids about tobacco and pregnancy. We re w orried at
Congress taking away family planning funding. W orrying about
poverty and taking children off Medicaid. W orried about [whether] the
W omens, Infants and C hildren program can continue imm unizations.
Concerned about w here there is lead, but trying to improve and take
care of it. That's w hat our lead program does (Dennehey, 9/21/95).

Dennehey is locating protection from illness in individual family
practices, while also recognizing the impact that poverty and the
environm ent can have on public health. His beliefs about the possibility of
environm ental illness echo those of the EPA risk assessments. History and
economic concerns, other than as they affect the staffing of his departm ent, do
not appear to direct his comments.
O ther nonbelievers noted they w ould w orry more about their ow n or
children's health if they lived som ewhere other than Butte. Given a choice
betw een living in a more professional individualized culture or in Butte with
w orking class culture that takes care of its own, M arilyn Maney (9/22/95) said.
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"With the kinds of things I'm w orried about. I’d probably w orry a lot more [if
she and her children lived somewhere else less caring]."

Dennehey also

speaks to the strong sense of community in Butte w hen asked the same
question.
I w ouldn't w orry less. I love it here. The reason is the people here...
When w e have issues like Clean Up Butte Day, we had 60 tons of
garbage given to us in one day. When we had an outbreak of measles
we had over 3.500 kids imm unized - parents, physicians, the hospital
and the health departm ent w orking together. When we had a
meningitis outbreak we did 7,200 kids - 92 percent of the targeted
population had shots. The Centers for Disease Control said that was an
incredible rate. This community rallies around issues w hen their
children are at risk (Dennehey, 9/21/95).
It is precisely the issue of w hether children, or adults, are at risk that
separates the believers and nonbelievers. A further indication of conflicting
belief systems are disagreem ents about w hether more inform ation is needed
to accurately assess potential public health inputs. Nonbelievers, and some
believers, say they have sufficient information; other believers say much
more inform ation is required. Chief Executive Jack Lynch points to his
reading of "resource and inform ation journals, periodicals and publications
from both public and private sector agencies " w hich supplem ents additional
inform ation (10/25/95).
We derive our inform ation from both the federal government, the
D epartm ent of Environmental Quality as well as a variety of sources
that have done studies, both on a contract basis here for public health
agencies and from individual and private sources (Lynch, 10/25/95).
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Dennehey (9/21/95) says he has "all the inform ation I can get from CTEC,
EPA, ARCO and the state." Maney (9/22/95) agrees she also has sufficient
inform ation, but adds, "Again, I just don’t think it has any particular
relevance."
There is some m iddle ground. When asked if Butte has m ore illness than
other communities, if she w orries about her children’s health or w ould
worry less elsewhere, Ellen Crain said:
I do n ’t know about illnesses in the state. I look at other m ining
conununities like places in Colorado. We’re going to be different than
other places in Montana.
1 don't know about cancer. I w ould say we m ight have more
unusual cancers but the first cancer spot is Anaconda.
Of course I worry about my kids' health. When we did the lead
study I went over it w ith my doctor. 1 feel for quality of life we re in
better shape w ith Superfund (Crain, 9/21/95).

Crain (9/21/95) feels "informed to the nth degree" on Superfund issues and
"is on everyone’s m ailing list."
On public health that depends. My kids had low blood lead levels but
Sarah had a high arsenic level because she sucked her thum b. I go to
meetings, know people involved. I called my physician and he said he
did n ’t know. The doctor said she’s probably fine. So, yes on lead, but
not other related things that aren’t well know n (Crain, 9/21/95).

John Ray, a board m em ber of the M ontana Environm ental Information
Council w ho is also involved w ith CTEC, is comfortable both w ith the
inform ation he has and the ease of getting more.
I have no problem getting additional information. I was on the phone
this m orning w ith Jim Ford [a state official]. I can look at the Great
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Falls paper. It had two articles on streamside tailings; there were none
in the sub-Standard [a critical nick name for the Montana Standard]
(Ray, 10/24/95).

Ray, also, w ould not worry less if he lived somewhere else.
O ur house was built by the Anaconda Company; there's no lead, no
arsenic. They knew w here to build for their executives. Butte has
problem s w ith air pollution but it's worse on the Flats, We have a
w ater purifier. We eat organic vegetables (Ray, 10/24/95).

Some of the believers have had personal experience w ith illness:
Statistics show we have a exceptionally high cancer rate, lung diseases,
heart disease - here and in Anaconda. My wife's father died in his 30s
from a disease that attacked his brain. She [the speaker's wife] suffered
from really terrible asthma and she grew up right across the street from
a mine on East Park Street. Her neighborhood was devastated by the
Pit. H er house still stands. She was raised right next to an active mine.
The asthma and a spinal problem - a heart condition, 25 percent lung
capacity - all made worse by a spinal disorder. Death at 35. Her mother
died two years after her retirement of stomach cancer at 62 or 63
(Waring, 10/21/95).

In an editorial in CTEC's publication. Simply Superfund, Mary Kay Craig
writes:
...I've already had cancer thanks. And we all have friends and relatives
who ve had cancer of unknow n cause. We can't prove that any of us
contracted a disease from m ining wastes left by Anaconda/ARCO. But
health studies done in the 1970s revealed our Butte-Anaconda area had
the nation's highest per capita incidence of all disease,' and of heart
disease.' Lung disease claimed as many w om en as m en here, despite
only m en w orking underground. Why us? O ther towns have had the
same kind of hard working, hard drinking citizens. W ithout further
studies w e may never know.
W hat we do know is that there are plenty of toxins around us - and,
yes, in the floodplain of Silver Bow Creek — toxins causing specific
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diseases: Arsenic causes skin cancer. Cadm ium is a carcinogen and is
also associated w ith systemic lupus erythamatosis, a 'rare' blood
disorder which claimed tw o of my very good friends. Lead causes
learning disorders in children. Mercury is related to a host of hum an
health concerns. Unfortunately^ we don’t know w here else it is in the
floodplain other than the 12 (only) test samples ARCO produced for the
25-mile stream (June/July 1995: 5).

John T. Shea says:
Two years ago I had a lung taken out. I quit smoking in 1964 because I
couldn't keep up w ith eight- and nine-year-old kids w hen I
was smoking. I smoked cigars for a while. I had a slow-moving cancer.
I asked the doctor who operated on me, told him I quit in 1964, tried
chewing but didn't like it, tried cigars. Then the doctor asked me about
work, I was dow n in the mine. I w orked in the Kelley Mine every day.
D ow n there in dust. Then the Pit was nothing but dust. The doctor
said that combination plus whatever's in the air [was responsible for
the cancer].
There's a lot of cancer. My mother. My sister lost both breasts and a
leg. Everybody ... w hen we were kids most of the guys died of the con
and there was a lot of cancer...
In the last four or five years, we've had a lot of guys die of
Alzheimer's (10/24/95).
Janet Finn reports:
Each resident has her story of unexplained cysts. The presence of
inexplicable forms of cancer, and, as she tallü, she looks knowingly to
the mines for the cause (1994:266).

George W aring (10/21/95, a history professor at M ontana Tech, says whether
he w orries about living in Butte will "depend on w hat kind of a cleanup you
get. " He, like so many other Butte residents, is critical of the EPA's decision to
allow w ater to continue to flow into the Berkeley Pit.
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The decision at the Pit, the local government was coopted by m ining
interests, to accept a cleanup that no independent community would
ever deal with. It's as though the people at Love Canal w anted a
generation to clean up. I’m sure local government thought it did the
right thing. Grief can induce a level of fatalism (Waring, 10/21/95).

W aring (10/21/95), who attends pubUc meetings and the EPA Technical
Assistance Grant group (CTEC) meetings, says, "Of course not," w hen asked if
he has all of the inform ation on public health and the environm ent in Butte.
And Mary Kay Craig (7/30/95) w ould like to see a health study.
The believers consistently referred to the M oore/Luom a health study
which was presented at the Clark Fork Coalition Symposium in 1990 but
never referred to in the Montana Standard in any story that appeared in the
four years studied for this thesis, years which included the publication of the
study. University of M ontana geologist Johnnie Moore and Samuel N.
Luoma of the U.S. Geological Survey found, relative to the 480 largest U.S.
cities, for disease-caused mortality ratio^ showed^:
• All diseases - Butte had the highest mortality, ranked num ber 1 in 19491951 and 1959-1961, and num ber 5 in 1969-1971.
• H eart and kidney disease - Butte was ranked num ber 1 in 1949-1951,
num ber 2 in 1959-1961, and thirty-first in 1969-1971.
•

H eart disease - Butte was ranked num ber 2 in 1949-1951, number 18 in

1959-1961, and num ber 94 in 1969-1971.
• O ther than heart and kidney - Butte was ranked num ber 3 in 1949-1951,
and num ber 1 in 1959-1961 and 1969-1971. (179)
Their study also found that counties in the area of prim ary contamination
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w ere am ong the highest American counties in terms of rates of mortality of
both men and w om en from all types of cancer, and, more specifically, from
trachea, bronchus and lung cancer through 1979.
Moore and Luoma reported the following data on all cancers in Silver
Bow County:
• MEN - 211 deaths per 100,000 in 1950-1959; 202 per 100,000 in 1960-1969;
and 204 per 100,000 in 1970-1979 in comparison to 156, 170, and 180,
respectively, for the same periods in the state of Montana. The num ber of
male deaths in Silver Bow County in 1950-1959 was statistically significant,
e.g. greater than expected from national statistics. Silver Bow County was
ranked in the top 30 percent for male deaths in 1979.
• WOMEN -1 6 3 deaths per 100,000 in 1950-1959; 127 deaths per 100,000 in
1960-1969; and 156 deaths per 100,000 in 1970-1979 in comparison to 129,121,
and 119, respectively, for the same periods in the state of Montana. The
num ber of female deaths in Silver Bow County in 1950-1959 and 1970-1979
was statistically significant. Silver Bow County was ranked in the top three
percent for female deaths in 1979. (p.lBO)
For mortality rates from lung, cancer and bronchial cancer in 1970-1979,
the study found a rate of 65.2 deaths per 100,000 in Deer Lodge County, where
Anaconda is located, and 55.3 in Silver Bow County in com parison to 31.1 in
M ontana, 22.9 in Idaho and 26.7 in Wyoming. (p.lS l)
Also, the study reported that for the period 1970-1979 women in Silver
Bow County suffered from significantly greater rates than expected from
national statistics from the following cancers:
• Pancreas, 94th percentile
• Chorion-uterus, 91st percentile
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• H odgkins disease, 90th percentile
• Lung, trachea, bronchus, 96th percentile (p.l82)
Moore and Luoma noted that the high incidence of cancer in women
appeared to indicate that the illness was not related to workplace exposure
only. They called for "detailed local studies" to be "undertaken immediately
to determ ine if the risk of death from disease rem ained unusually high into
the 1980s"; to determ ine if the risks are environm ental or confounded by
smoking; to find if elevated incidence occurred outside of the areas of prim ary
contamination; and to examine relationships of illnesses w ith specific types
of contaminants (182-183). Cancers, which are a national issue, are
increasingly being traced to environm ental conditions.
In 1982, the N ational Cancer Institute w arned that one in every three
Americans w ould die of cancer. Cancer already takes more American
lives, each year, than were lost during all of World War II, the Korean
War, and the Vietnam War combined; it is responsible for eight times
as many annual deaths as automobiles.
A part from the m agnitude of such statistics, at least three facts about
cancer deaths are significant. For one thing, many epidemiologists
claim that about one-third of the fatalities are correlated w ith cigarette
smoking. Also, the deaths are occurring among the young, not merely
among typical elderly victims. Cancer is the leading cause of death for
all U.S. children between the ages of one and ten and for all women
between the ages of thirty and forty. It is second only to accidents as the
leading cause of death for all Americans under the age of thirty-five.
Cancer rates for all age groups have been increasing in the last three
decades. Most im portant, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
claims that up to 90 percent of all cancers are "environmentally
induced" and hence preventable (Schrader-Frechette, 1991:25).

A lthough originally his concerns w ere w ith the future economic
developm ent of Butte, former state Representative Fritz Daily has fought
consistently to low er the w ater level which will trigger pum ping and
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treatm ent of the 26 billion gallons of toxic w ater in the Berkeley Pit. Unlike
CTEC members and some other Butte residents who w ant im m ediate
pum ping and treatment. Daily's fears are targeted at a future point, at the
elevation at which the poisoned Pit w ater meets groundw ater. He w ants the
level at which the w ater is the Pit is treated to be lowered.
Every foot the w ater rises the danger becomes m ore imminent. I
personally think the Berkeley Pit and the Butte Mine Flooding Unit is
the m ost serious issue for Butte, the state of M ontana, and the whole
Pacific Northwest because the Pit lies at the headw aters of the
Colum bia River Basin.
1 believe the Pit and Mine Flooding Unit has the potential to destroy
my com m unity from an environm ental standpoint, an economic
standpoint, and a social standpoint. H ow difficult will it be, in the
future, to attract new businesses to employ people know ing we have
the largest body of contaminated w ater sitting in the m iddle of town?
Socially, the EPA says a major contaminant is arsenic and every time
they m ention arsenic they say it's a carcinogen. This can present some
problems in Butte, Montana. (Daily, 12/8/95)

There are miners who believe that the poisoned w ater w ill seep through
cracks and fissures in the rocks before it reaches the level at which the EPA
says the local groundw ater would be threatened. Daily (12/8/95) shows a
slide of metal railroad tracks in a mine shaft which are systematically being
eaten by the acidic water. John T. Shea (10/24/95) says the "copper w ater will
find seams — it eats rock, eats steam pipe."
The N ovem ber 1995 deaths of 342 snow geese in the Berkeley Pit sparked
public concern. Bonnie Im m onen of W alkerville w rote to the M ontana
Standard to question ARCO’s m anager of M ontana facilities, Sandy Stash,
w ho has insisted that there is insufficient proof to connect the birds' deaths to
the w aters of the Pit:
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My goodness if she had ever been m arried to a m iner w ho w orked his
entire life in the Butte mines, she w ould know that the w ater in the
lake’ is highly toxic.
My husband used to come home from w ork in the mines (even
w hen the pum ps were still going up on the hUl) w ith his legs just full
of copper sores. We treated them each night w ith zinc oxide and
w rapped them in plastic in hopes of keeping them dry through the
next shift. It never helped. He worked in w ater up to and over his
ying yang, w hich is now speckled w ith arsenic bum s (Immonen,
12/10/95).

The large color photographs of some of the autopsied snow geese
displayed at the Feb, 24, 1996 memorial for the birds were a gruesomely
graphic affirm ation of Immonen's letter. Speakers at the memorial protested
the EPA's refusal to take seriously public comments in 1993 and 1995 that
w arned of danger to m igrating birds. Caroline Byrd, a m em ber of W omen’s
Voices for the Earth, m ade the link between the death of the birds and the
public health of Butte, and asked people at the memorial:
How many dark birds have died in the dark w aters of the Pit? We
have no idea (Byrd, 2/24/96)."

In new spaper articles that appeared the following day in Lee newspapers,
the M issoulian and the Montana Standard, Sandy Stash^ of ARCO was
quoted as asserting the deaths were "a unique occurrence and that there is no
evidence of previous major bird kills (Missoulian, 3 /7 /9 6 ).’’ Byrd replied to
Stash’ comments pointing out inform ation in the state of M ontana’s report
on the incidence.
The report says that the snow geese's deaths were not an isolated
occurrence" and details an incident in November 1993 w hen six birds
w ere found. The report points out that the dead geese were discovered
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only because snow geese are w hite and people happened to be in the pit
checking water quality shortly after their deaths. According to the
report, it's likely that darker birds, such as loons, grebes, pelicans,
cormorants, geese and ducks have died unnoticed in the d ark w ater of
the pit.
...The G olden Sunlight Mine in Whitehall, not far from Butte, has
developed m ethods to keep birds from landing in its toxic tailings
ponds. H undreds of dead birds have been found in cyanide heap-leach
ponds in the Black Hills (Byrd, M issoulian,'M 7196).

Despite the warnings of seepage and the deaths of birds, health studies
have not been conducted in Butte. There are few health records on the local
le v e F .

The county relies upon the state for data and protocols, Butte-Silver

Bow H ealth Director Dan Dennehey says. The local health board has both a
m aternal child health assessment and breast and cervical cancer assessment.
We're surveying by mail. The state of M ontana has a task force of
breast and cervical cancer. How do they screen? What protocols do
they use? The state’s doing that; we re trying to make it community
and county specific.
A lot of women over 50 or 60 are not going to gynecologists. In the
initial phase we looked to the state for records and found nothing
out of the ordinary here in terms of incidence. But the hospital hasn't
reported for a num ber of years. Now we re hoping for better statistics
(Dennehey, 9/21/95).

No local studies have been undertaken; even worse, cancer reporting from
Butte has fallen behind, skewing state records (Hellhake, 9/15/95). Obtaining
recent cancer data from the state public health and hum an services
departm ent will not be possible until sometime in 1996 because St. James
Hospital, the only hospital now operating in Butte, has not reported cancer
statistics properly for the past three years or so, according to Debbi Hellhake of
the state Tum or Registry (Hellhake, 9/15/95). Until the reporting is up to
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date, the num bers for Butte-Silver Bow, and for the rest of the state of
Montana, will not be correct (Hellhake, 9/15/95).
An official at the state office of Vital Statistics Division says:
Cancer in Butte is probably a real issue. But it's a problem for
government. Epidemiologists say until w e know more about w hat
people have done and where they have been... ( 7/18/95).

And, the official says, because of a "smedl number" statistical problem, for
the first time since 1954 the 1995 Vital Statistics A nnual Report will not
include cancer morbidity rates "because people at the local level tend to
m isinterpret those num bers (7/18/95)." The "small num ber problem" he
refers to is related to w hat statisticians call "chance variation," the possibility
that one occurrence of the events being m easured can occur, at random, in
such a way that it changes the ratio of the events being m easured. For
example, a very intelligent person may take the Scholastic A ptitude Test on a
day he or she is feeling ill which results in a much lower score than he or she
would normally get. In a study of many test takers a total will not be changed
by one skewed test score; in small populations, like Montana, one random ly
sick person could alter the ratio, producing a rate that is misleading and could
appear to be well above or below the state or national average for the event
measured. So statisticians prefer to avoid working w ith small numbers. The
end result is that the statistical approach, which considers only the problems
inherent in numbers, can overlook a possible social reality and, thus,
perpetuate the status quo, even if that status quo is possibly unhealthy.
O ther states, such as N orth and South Carolina are w orking w ith
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Geographic Inform ation System technology to get a handle on health
statistics, the state official says.
We haven't touched that here - partly as a result of issues related to
geocoding and partly because of rigid confidentiality laws. So we
cannot or will not identify individuals who may have died of cancer by
address. We have, w ithin our constitution, very strong language about
the individual's right to privacy ( 7/18/95).

So, in Montana, it is well nigh impossible to determ ine areas of high
incidence, w hat epidemiologists call "clusters. " This identification of a cluster
is a first step in the process of determ ining a connection, or lack of it, to a
specific illness and the environm ent (Brown, 1991). A grouping of cancers
does not necessarily prove that connection - such groupings can occur
naturally, by random. However, if clusters are not identified, the studies
necessary to indicate if they are random or environm entally induced will not
take place. In the nam e of privacy, M ontanans have the right to suffer from
potentially high rates of environmentally induced illness. A nd the morbidity
figures that might give credence to calls for further study of public health will
not be published for fear of m isinterpretation.
There are two rem aining im pedim ents to data collection w hich could lead
to underreporting of Butte and M ontana cancers. The first is that many
M ontana residents go out of state both for cancer diagnosis and treatm ent so
some of these cases may not be reported to the M ontana Cancer Tum or
Registry (Montana AHEC, 1989). The second relates to Butte residents who
have relocated. Because of the latency period of cancers, the time before the
illness manifests itself (Lappé, 1991), and the m igration of families from Butte
in the years that m ining operations w ound dow n, the full public health
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im pact of exposure to contaminants in Butte will never be know n - any
illnesses experienced by those who relocated will be recorded as belonging to
the places of relocation. This causes two statistical problems: first, another
community's cancer rates will appear to be higher than they actually are; and,
second, Butte's will appear to be lower.
To date, no federal health studies are planned in Butte - in spite of the
Superfund Reauthorization of 1986 which directs "the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry [ATSDR] to perform a health assessment at
each Superfund site to assist in determ ining w hether to take additional steps
to reduce hum an exposure and to collect additional inform ation (Barnett,
1994:231)." Sara Weinstock, the EPA's rem edial project m anager in Butte,
says:
The agency has done no health studies here. They're expensive and
take a long time. Butte-Silver Bow did the blood lead study. There's a
small num ber problem, even on the blood lead study. I’d rather spend
money cleaning it u p than doing the studies ( 7/31/95).

The EPA will conduct a Baseline Risk Assessment for the Butte area, the
agency conducted the Time Critical Removal of lead-contam inated soil
concurrently w ith the risk study to immediately reduce the possibility of
adverse health effects of exposure, especially on children (Weinstock, 1996).
Weinstock is correct - cleanup operations should reduce the risk of
environm entally-caused illness in Butte and, assum ing a lim ited am ount of
dollars, money would likely be better spent on cleanup than tests. If, up
front, money w ere an issue, Weinstock’s approach w ould be the only
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reasonable alternative. However, under the federal Superfund law the costs
involved should be recoverable from the potentially responsible party(ies)
(Barnett, 1994). So, w ithout considering the unresolved structural issues
inherent in the Superfund law referred to in the previous chapter, it is
difficult to understand why the EPA is more concerned w ith reducing
expenditures than studying the full extent of health impacts involved w ith
the largest contaminated site in the country.
A nd there are other issues involved here: possible teratogenic (adverse
impacts on a fetus) and mutagenic (changes in individual DNA structure)
results of exposure will not be identified w ithout health studies.
Furtherm ore, residents, as was the case in W obum (Brown, 1991), w ho may
have been sickened from exposure, will lose the opportunity to w in a legal
claim for future medical costs w ithout health study data to buttress their cases
(Brown, 1991); and, given the num ber of applications for expansions of
existing mines and new mines in Montana, data about the potential health
dam ages of exposure to m ining-related contamination w ould be very useful.
U nder the reauthorization, citizens are allowed to petition ATSDR for health
assessment (Barnett: 231).
Mary Kay Craig says:
The agency [ATSDR] that m ight do an epidemiological study is too
dam n busy. W hen they came to town, the then board of C l EC asked
them to go away. I got them back here [in 1995]. They just don’t have
the resources to look at Butte closely (7/30/95).

CTEC has not heard from ATSDR. Craig is not alone in her criticism.
...studies of health risks at early 1,000 Superfund priority sites are
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'seriously deficient.' Because ATSDR health assessments have not fully
evaluated the health risks of many Superfund sites, com munities have
not been adequately informed about possible health effects... If the
agency can't im prove its performance. Congress should consider
abolishing the assessment program... EPA has seldom used the
assessments and m ost local officials and community residents do not
value the assessments highly if they know them at all^ (Montana
Standard: 9/4/91).

A researcher on the ATSDR performance in Butte and Anaconda found:
The so-called health assessment for Butte is a memo w ritten by an
ATSDR staffer regarding w hether people swam or w aded in Silver Bow
Creek w ould incur health problems. The memo doesn't address the
w idespread contam ination in Butte nor does it determ ine w hether
Butte's 34,000 residents m ight be exposed to lead, pentachlorophenol,
cadm ium or any of the other contaminants that lace the streets of the
tow n.
Likewise the ATSDR document labeled as the health assessment in
Anaconda is not a health assessment either. Instead, it is a letter from
an ATSDR physician confirming the EPA's 1985 decision to move the
Mill Creek families. As was the case for Butte, the so-called ATSDR
health assessment for Anaconda did not address the w idespread arsenic
contam ination in the community, nor possible exposure to arsenic
am ong A naconda residents (Tuholske, 1993).

It is not surprising that the health assessments have been discounted
outside of the agency; they have been discounted w ithin the agency too, partly
as a result of the agency's orientation. Since 1970 the EPA has been more
oriented to the concerns of engineers and technologies than to consideration
of the effects of toxic exposure on hum an health (Yeager, 1991).
In 1977 there were only some fifteen physicians on EPA's (relatively)
large professional staff, and EPA A dm inistrator Douglas Costle
suggested in congressional hearings that the agency's research on the
health effects of toxics was quite limited. Other congressional
testimony indicated that EPA experts tended to deal more w ith cities'
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and tow ns' treatm ent facilities' m anagers than w ith their public health
officials.... and that w ithin EPA there was poor coordination between
the dom inant engineering com ponent and the health effects
researchers (Yeager, 1991:225).

Physicians need a num ber of skills to answer questions about toxic
exposure and other health risks, including "the ability to evaluate and assess
the nature and the extent of a patient's exposure to an environm ental hazard,
the ability to assess the degree to which the hazard presents a health threat,
and the ability to communicate the extent of the risk to the patient or to the
community ... to minimize or prevent further exposure (Cortese, 1993:5)."
However, medical students receive little training in these skills:
One study that examined the teaching of occupational and
environm ental medicine concluded that current m edical students
receive less than four hours of education in these two areas during
their four years of medical school...The most likely candidate [to teach
these skills] is the course on epidemiology..., but in general this subject
is given little attention. The same situation applies to the education of
physicians after medical school - environm ental and occupational
health are rarely covered (Cortese,1993:5).
Most physicians lack an adequate background in statistical reasoning
and in environm ental and occupational epidemiology, and many risk
assessors have not been adequately grounded in hum an disease biology
or toxicology.... (Cortese, 1993:10).

The EPA was fortunate to have local physicians w orking on the Butte
cleanup, Weinstock (7/31/95) says.
We had a pediatrician helping ... the cleanup. We had a couple of
doctors here w orking w ith us; one died, another's moved on. We
have a gap there now. But we already have the Butte Lead Abatement
Program which will clean up all avenues [of lead]. Dr. McCarthy played
in an integral role in developing the lead plans.
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The current lack of physicians involved in the cleanup and studying data
is im portant. Given the lack of training in medical school, unless physicians
are willing to educate themselves, there is the very real possibility they will
not consider environm ental sources of illness.
D uring a period of health concern, the family is dependent upon
physicians reluctant to accept environm ental explanations for
symptoms, relying instead upon conventional explanation and
treatment. After being diagnosed as "normal," the illness becomes
demystified, and the victims have no reason to search for
environm ental causes. Even environm ental' diseases rarely prod
physicians to search for environmental causes. It is no w onder that
many victims have this jaded view of the medical establishment.
When doctors fail to "legitimize" toxic exposure as the cause of health
problems, claims by victims may be viewed as irrational. Furthermore,
establishing a rational basis for health impacts is epidemiologically
difficult under the best of circumstances. The resulting uncertainty
about health effects at Love Canal helped to split believers from non
believers (Edelstein, 1988:50).

In Butte, as in other contaminated communities, the uncertainty has
resulted in believers and nonbelievers. But Butte may differ from other
communities in that the Moore-Luoma research which indicates a need for
study of public health is not common knowledge. It is difficult to say if
awareness of the study w ould change nonbelievers’ minds; beliefs are
strongly held (M ilbum, 1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991a). However, it
does seem to be im portant that people in Butte have the right to all relevant
inform ation.
As it stands, there may well be a local knowledge about health issues that
is disregarded by government officials. As long as this local knowledge is
discounted and believers are ham pered in their attem pts to gather
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inform ation on public health, the public health landscape in Butte will
rem ain buried - will continue to be a private problem, an ignored local
know ledge expressed in rumors, whispers, knowing glances, and silences.
A lthough Butte residents have not been adequately inform ed of health
risks and limitations inherent in the risk assessment process, there is some
indication that the shocking deaths of the 342 snow geese have brought, at
least, the possibility of future health hazards into the public arena. W hether
the increased awareness of health hazards will mobilize residents to join the
few who have challenged w hat they believe to be inadequate cleanup plans
and an inequitable distribution of power, to influence the cleanup process
will depend upon a num ber of factors. One of those factors, the local
understandings (the social landscapes) of Butte will be considered in the next
section.

254
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1 "Mining jobs, said the Navy, were uncertain; there were strikes, layoffs, and
the omnipresent threat of illness; even a mild one meant lost wages and high
medical costs. The Navy promised steady work, paychecks that came whether
sick or well, and free medical and hospital care. A disabling illess or injury
meant economic catastrophe for the miner, no job, no prospect of a job, no
income. The disabled Navy man received a 'generous pension." Accidental
death in the mines, 'stuffy, gloomy places at best, left your family with only
what you've saved.' The Navy's death benefits were six months' pay and full
pension benefits to the survivors. In the mines, promotion was slow and
uncertain and marked by favoritism. In the Navy it was sure and quick and
'the best man wins.' Old miners were not just scarce, they were unknown.
Illness and age related debilities meant their jobs went to 'younger men.' Navy
men, on the other hand, retired after only thirty years' service spent,
moreover, in 'fresh air, sea, clean, healthful, athletic life,' at three-fourths
their pay at the time of retirement." (Emmons, 1990:167)
2 See Finn's discussion of the gender-based differences in resistance.
3 Michael Foucault, a psychologist and philosopher, is best known for his
work that stressed that "human sciences have become techniques of power."
(Farganis, 1996:419) He coined the phrase "carceral society" to denote that
power is embedded in relationships of people with teachers, doctors,
therapists, social workers and psychiatrists" who act as moral agents whose
discretionary power is based on their membership in the credentialed
knowledge elite." (Farganis, 1996:420)
Mortality ratio is the per capita mortality rate relative to that expected for
the nation.
5 Numbers have been adjusted for population to avoid what statisticians refer
to as "small number problems."
^ Stash has since been convinced that the water in the Berkeley Pit killed the
geese {Missoulian,4 / 2 5 /9 5 )
7 Health records from emergency room services of Silver Bow Hospital from
Jan. 19, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973, the latest year of records in Butte-Silver Bow
archives, indicate that, of a total 10,409 visits, 13.8 percent involved chestrelated complaints, and of these chest-related complaints, more than half,
50.51 percent, were children/young adults aged 20 or y o u n g e r . Of the 10,409
visits 1.9 percent (199) involved health exams and work releases, 22.5 percent
(2,341) involved trauma, and the remaining 75.6 percent (7,869) were medical
visits. Although, on their own, the records have no statistical weight, I spent
some time with them. Because of the illnesses associated with the contaminants
in Butte, I searched for references to convulsions, spontaneous abortions,
cancers, lesions, cysts, tumors, dermatitis, lupus, neuromuscular disorders,
headaches, urinary and kidney problems, liver, heart, chest-related visits,
nervousness and/or agitation, and flus and colds. All of these categories were
present (and would likely be present in any hospital emergency records for a
similar period). Of the 7,869 medical visits, those references that showed up as
one percent or more included: chest-related visits, 13.8 percent; flus and colds,
3.3 percent; heart-related visits, 3.2 percent; cancer and chemotherapy, 1.13
percent; dermatitis and rashes, 1 percent; and lesions, cysts, and tumors, 1
percent. Although less than one percent, during this period the hospital
treated four patients with lupus. Slightly more than half of the chest-related
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visits involved people under the age of 20. Although in 1973 there were two
hospitals in Butte, I am assuming that complaints seen in Silver Bow General
Hospital's emergency room in 1973 were representative of those seen at St.
James Hospital. Because St. James Hospital was larger ( 180 beds) it is likely its
emergency ward saw more people, proportionately, during the year than
Silver Bow General Hospital (140 beds). (State records for 1974 indicate St.
James Hospital treated almost twice the number of inpatients than treated by
Silver Bow General Hospital.) Although children in school are exposed to
outbreaks of communicable diseases, the large numbers of children seen in
the Silver Bow General Hospital's emergency room for respiratory problems
could indicate that the respiratory tracts of children in Butte may have been
weakened. Or a statistical comparison may find that in that year this was a
typical emergency room pattern in a similar-sized community. The only way to
put the health question to a test is to conduct a health study.
8 The report, "Superfund: Public Health Assessments incomplete and of
Questionable Value, was prepared by the federal Government Accounting
Office for the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, August, 1991.
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THE SOQAL LANDSCAPES OF BUTTE
Diverse Terrains

Butte w as founded on the notion of extraction of natural resources, and
was developed w ithin context of a W estern industrialized belief that the
environm ent w as background, that hum an activities w ere exempt from the
ecological constraints that acted upon "lower" animals and the landscape
(Catton and Dunlap, 1980). These beliefs are deeply em bedded in hum ans and
our social institutions, which are slow to change. The change, which
involves a renegotiation of the relationship w ith the land, involves both
"political disagreem ents about how to live in nature" and "divergent
discursive fram ew orks for understanding the environm ent' (Greenough
and Tsing, 1994:95)." Those frameworks are shaped by experience, both
personal, and historical.
History, however, is more than antiquarian reminisences of colorful
mining kings and of epic doings of yesteryear. Much more weightily,
history is the burden of attitudes, mores, prejudices, loves, and hatreds
rooted in the economic, social, and political milieu w hich formed over
100 years ago...
...Like the frontier itself, Butte was rich, unabashedly exploited,
turbulent — and endlessly fascinating (Malone, 1995:217).
The key w ord is was — Butte was rich, was unabashedly exploited and
turbulent, was endlessly fascinating. What is the Butte that is? What does it
m ean w hen the entire history of a community is intimately tied to current
notions of contamination? Does this necessarily disparage the lives of those
who lived and w orked and died in Butte? Will one of the most vibrant and
exciting histories in the United States be placed on a slag heap of
256
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contam ination to be scrapped as unenlightened, to be junked? There is a real
tension here w hich surfaces in the residents' justified love of the history and
of their place, their home. It is possible that the history is the locus of
com munity resistance, the site of "buried subjugated knowledges^ (Foucault,
1994)."
"...with w hat in fact were these buried subjugated knowledges really
concerned? They were concerned w ith a historical know ledge of
struggles. In the specialized areas of erudition as in the disqualified
popular know ledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters w hich
even up to this day have been confined to the m argins of knowledge
(Foucault, 1994: 203)."

Butte is no stranger to struggle. Given the extreme physical and social
landscapes of Butte, the process of negotiating new self-definitions will likely
be painful and slow. From the 6,500-foot elevation of Walkerville to the 3,500
miles of tunnels in the depths of Butte Hill, there is little m iddle ground.
The simple truth about Butte, Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) says, is "you either
love it or hate it." But, depending on w hether you were b om and brought up
in Butte or you are a outsider, you may be loving or hating something quite
different for various reasons.
Likely a result of the life-and-death nature of the forces that shaped Butte,
almost from its inception it assum ed metaphorical status. There are many
metaphorical Buttes. And the m etaphors are often contradictory — home,
poison, a disaster, an opportunity, ugly as sin, beautiful, fact, fiction, beloved,
despised. The metaphorical Buttes, as represented in discursive frameworks
w hich often border on the nostalgic, seem to diverge along the axes of history,
economics and the im port of the contamination. The Superfund designation
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may have exacerbated already existing divergences by dint of the stigma
inherent in the Superfund label and the uncertainty about the impact of the
contam ination upon public health. The Superfund process itself, w hich has
been characterized by "absences, silences, repression ideas, and marginalized
statem ents (Peet and Watts, 1993:230-01)," may have w idened the chasms.
Absences in the Superfund process in Butte include organized public
participation, health coverage in the local media, a study of the synergistic
effects of contaminants and sites, as well as accurate health records. Perhaps
the most im portant absence is that of social context in technocratic visions of
the landscape.
The issue of cancers and other diseases in Butte is cloaked in silence.
According to Mary Kay Craig, the notion of health studies has been repressed:
We don't have the health studies. Anyone who comes to town to do a
health study may get run out. When I was living in California
someone said they were doing a health study. I'm not sure if it was
this [Superfund-related contamination] or radon. It was something
about the slag heaps. Lately, I hear ARCO has done some new studies
— but that is proprietary information, so they aren't sharing w hat they
know (Craig, 7 /3 0 / 95).

It is possible to attribute ARCO's attempts to keep its cleanup costs dow n
to the structure of the "treadmill of production" (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994)
w hich m andates exploitation of both natural resources and labor to produce
profits for stockholders rather than to evil intent. However, it is impossible
to leave unquestioned the corporation's right to w ithhold health
information. Clearly the corporation's private rights in this respect should be
subordinate to the public right to know.
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Equally clearly, as evidenced by official reaction to the previously referred
to nurse's statem ent about illness in her neighborhood, some residents'
concerns about illness have been repressed in the Superfund process.
Throughout Butte's history, health issues have been m arginalized — from
the Anaconda Company's refusal to comply w ith state occupational safety law
to its ability to alter death certificates, to its changing the cause of death on
death certificates from miners' consum ption to tuberculosis to free the
company of responsibility, to the associations' efforts to provide health and
death insurance. In his research of a coal-based community in Appalachia,
Wolensky (1991) found:
This structure of dom ination, centered around the civic governm ental
order has m eant that the vast majority have been excluded from the
practice of economic and political decision-making. The benefits of
business productivity were tightly controlled by those w ith economic
position w hile the governm ent jobs and other factors w ere under the
direction of political leaders whose regimes were characteristically
corrupt and particularistic. H igh levels of poverty, unem ployment,
and underem ploym ent am id extremes of w ealth and inequality have
not only reflected political and economic exclusion but have reinforced
dependency (Wolensky, 1991:230).
THE HISTORY
The patterns of community developm ent in the area Wolensky (1991)
researched and Butte are similar. Imbalances of pow er have always existed
close to the surface in Butte. A lthough it is difficult to imagine that
politicians in the 1990s w ould have the autonom y of those in Butte's not-sodistant past, it is conceivable that the history has led to both a very narrow
definition of democracy, especially in terms of citizen participation in
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government. John Ray notes a lack of professional criteria for
governm ent office:
Jobs were set aside for blind people, like the justice of the peace
position... the debate was whoever was the blindest. The notion of
who could do the job was irrelevant. The notion of setting aside a job
for people, the sheriff's job was often set aside for Serbians. In the
history of these jobs, none were based on qualifications.
The first election, w hen we moved to Butte, there were three
criteria for public office: family man, union member, veteran. They
campaigned on the steps of various parishes. None of them needed
certain qualifications for office...(Ray, 10/24/95).

Lack of professional qualifications notw ithstanding, the criteria to which
Ray refers is understandable w ithin context of Butte's history. This setting
aside of jobs is the legacy of a community in which members took care of each
other, and recognized, given the dangerous nature of their work, any one of
them could be the next person who needed to be cared for. The criteria speak
to the need for local governm ent to reflect the community's w orking class
family values, shared by many American communities, w hich have been
discounted by the increasing professionalism of all segments of American life.
Clearly, an electoral system built solely on values which exclude notions of
job qualifications can be abused. This may be what local critics mean when
they charge Butte officials w ith "economic boosterism " and question their
competence.
The local governm ent operates the way machine politics or Southern
politics do, w here you have one party which is not particularly
accountable to the public and doesn't w ant it to participate. It operates
on graft or corruption. The approach of Butte governm ent to a
problem is, "Let's cut a deal. " Butte has never had good government.
It w as controlled by the company, on occasion by labor or been
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controlled by someone else, socialists in the early 20th century. The
notion of public responsibility is meaningless... The A naconda
Company did not sponsor a spirit of critical objectivism.
There's an interesting phenom enon in Butte. Maybe it's part of its
corporate past. Com petent people never get involved in government.
Maybe it's because if you were prosperous you could control w ithout
running for government. It's interesting, also, how elected officials get
family members jobs (Ray, 10/24/95).
The movers and shakers tend to be people who never left Butte or
w ent away to college and came right back. There are certain families
here in Butte, intertw ined w ith the M ontana Power Company [which
was founded by the president of the Anaconda Company] and
government. Their influence has been so pervasive (Waring,
10/21/95).

In any community, the dominance of one particular group is problematic.
However, the dom inance of "objective " professionals from community
values and hum an concerns about care leads to situations just as easily open
to abuse, as is the case w ith risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. The
trick is to find the m iddle ground, to think past a community / professional
duality. Given that the community is now associated w ith contamination
and the professionals w ith its cleanup, it would be easy to dismiss community
values but this w ould be wrong. There's much to be said for the the
operative values of Butte, Mark Reavis says:
This is one of the m ost generous towns around. W hen I first got here I
saw a brief m ention of need on a radio show get incredible results.
There's a level of generosity for providing for others here. Other
towns, like Bozeman, put their poor on a bus and send them to Butte
(Reavis, 10/24/95).

Some are concerned w ith preserving the quality of care associated w ith
Butte's w orking class life, as well as its history. In addition to w orking to
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create new jobs, M arilyn Maney (9/22/95) says the AFL-CIO is trying to
protect the 4,000 union jobs that still exist in Silver Bow County, jobs that
help to m aintain the com m unity’s w orking class^ nature. Some, like
M arilyn Maney (9/22/95), are concerned that the influx of professionals who
w ork in the high tech industries in Butte, will change the community for the
worse by making it more individualistic and competitive. Others believe that
the professional newcomers will adopt Butte’s values.
They put us dow n so many times... When they shut the mines dow n
they said they were going to bury us in that hole dow n there, the Pit.
But as long as there’s people like me, they'll have that Butte spirit. We
fought to go to work, to stay at work... I’ve seen this town go from good
to bad and bad to good. But it came back. There will always be a Butte.
If they come into Butte to live, give them a year and they’re Butte
people... I d o n ’t think people can change this town - they get the same
values I got about Butte (Shea, 10/24/95).

Those values cannot be separated from the history and practices of the
place.
People growing up in communities of memory not only hear the
stories that tell how the community came to be, w hat its hopes and
fears are, and how its ideals are exemplified in outstanding men and
women. They also participate in the practices — ritual, aesthetic,
ethical — that define the community as a way of life. We call these
’practices of commitment ” for they define the patterns of loyalty and
obligation to keep the community alive (Bellah et al, 1986:154).

There is m uch vitality and commitment in the local struggles to redefine
Butte and develop a new way of life, w ith its ow n ritual, aesthetic and ethical
practices. At stake are both the history and health of the place. Although the
closing of the mines threatened both the livelihood and identity of the
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com m unity, the stigma attached to the Superfund designation, has the
possibihty to denigrate its entire history. So Butte natives hold onto their
history, a sim pler time w hen the opposition w as clearly understood as the
Company, and talk back to the stigma through their history. The Butte that
natives describe is not a contaminated community; it is a rich tapestry of past
and present, people and history, diverse neighborhoods of colorful ethnic
groups clustered around that mines that sustained them, "big shots" (Finn,
1995) and laborers, held together by caring communities of women.
It’s dynamic, able to adjust. When things get throw n at us we just grab
the ball and go w ith it. We're really strong people w ith good moral
fiber. The people here w ork hard, live decent. It's a wonderful,
fascinating place. It's the best example of industrial America, small
enough to study w ith all the components of a larger industrial
community (Crain, 9/21/95).
This is the greatest m elting pot of ethnic culture in the U nited States.
We have everybody from every community in the world. Now, w ith
the School of Mines [Montana Tech], we have people from India. Up
here in Walkerville was Irish, a few English, Italian and a few Slavs. In
Centerville w here I live, w ere Irish and English. In McQueen and
M eaderville w ere Italian. East Main and Granite are Finnlanders.
People lived where they worked. People in W alkerville w orked at
the M ountain Con, the Lex, or Badger. Neighborhoods developed
around the mines. On the lower side of Park, the big shots lived.
A lot of people on the east side w orked at the Belmont and the
Emma. Everybody w orked around the mines. I w orked w ith guys
from Norway. W hen 1 started, it was just me and another Irishman;
all the rest were Swedes and Norwegians. 1 belonged to the Iron
W orkers' Union. We had Italians, Irish, Englishmen, Finnlanders at
lunch. Most guys could say hello in a half dozen languages. If you
were Irish and lived in Finntown, you could talk Finnish. All the kids
w ere taught to talk the language of the neighborhoods. Most
everybody in Butte could talk at least two languages. Everybody in
Butte knew how to swear in five or ten languages (Shea, 10/24/95).
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It's a concrete example of feminist rhetoric. A n ideal w orking class
culture that has created such a nurturing place for wom en and
daughters. All they have to do is come to Butte. 1 raised two daughters
as a single mom. I have absolute confidence, believe if something
happened to me, 1 have no doubt that the wom en of Butte w ould have
cared for them, and taken good care of them. It goes on in Butte all the
time, caring (Maney, 9/22/95).

The history of Butte that is so interw oven into the present is not an
abstraction; it is an emotional reality, a terrain bounded by resistance and loss,
a proud inheritance to be claimed by survivors. In a letter to the local
new spaper, w ritten to support the preservation of the rem aining gallows
frames on Butte Hill, Nicholas J. Bedovenac wrote:
Most of them [the miners] died at very young ages, like my dad who
w ent to w ork in the mines at the age of 16 and died at the age of 40 in
the county hospital.
...These gallows frames are not only a picture of history, but are also
memorials. 1 am positive they are tombstones.
1 do believe that to even think of destroying them for a profit is
totally sacrilegious (Montana Standard,91 111 92).

A lthough large num bers of Butte residents have not been involved in the
preservation of Butte’s history, they are passionately attached to it. Mark
Reavis says:
I've never seen so many am ateur historians in my life. You just ask a
question and off they go.
People call me and w ant me to talk about family histories and
dates. But I'm an architect. I'm dealing w ith the importance of the
structures and the way they tell the story of the factory, the working
m an (Reavis, 11/29/95).

Anyone who spends any time at the Butte-Silver Bow Archives in the old
fire station on Q uartz Street can confirm Reavis' assessment of the
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im portance of the local history. Here, surrounded by bound copies of
new spapers dating back a hundred years, coroners' records, birth records, it is
possible to look out the large w indow s dow n Butte Hill and imagine an older
Butte. On any given day there is a constant stream of traffic, quiet
conversations betw een people searching through old new spapers for
references to family members, w riters researching events and details to add
"local color" in the form of descriptive passages in planned papers and books.
People are lined up w aiting for help from the friendly staff. The quiet of the
place is frequently broken by m uted exclamations of delight w hen a reference
to a family m em ber or event is located, bringing smiles to fellow researchers
and staff.
Archives Director Ellen Crain reports that the dem and for archival
services has increased dramatically. Time was w hen Butte's harsh winters
kept visitors away; now increased num bers of visitors are hunched over
records year-round. A nd w ritten requests for inform ation have doubled. But
the budget, hard-fought every year, has not increased and Crain is seeking
grant money to organize the material, much of w hich is still unsorted and
uncatalogued, in the boxes that are piled from floor to ceiling in the vast cold
basement that used to house fire departm ent trucks and apparatus. Local
politicians have little interest in the archives; even a 1995 national labor
history aw ard did not attract their attention, never m ind an offer of
additional funding from the county (Crain, 9/21/95).
Because this history was such hard-fought terrain, this love of local history
entails more than a sim ple recounting of past events — it is also a form of
resistance, a telling of a story very different than that told by the Anaconda
Company, local, state, and federal government the captive press, and the toxic
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label represented by Superfimd. In this context, Butte’s history may be seen as
a geneaology of intransigience which may be difficult for outsiders to
understand. Butte may also be hard to comprehend for someone who was
not brought up w orking class. "If you're not bom in Butte it’s hard to
understand the com munity,” George W aring (10/21/95), w ho grew up in a
’lower m iddle class individualistic community," notes.
Different constructions of the physical landscape continually surface in the
descriptions of Butte and the telÜng and meaning of its history. Non-natives
tend to describe Butte in physical terms. Waring, who has lived in Butte for
28 years, tells of first fully experiencing Butte:
It was the second or third year I was here. The first few years I lived in
a residence hall, in walking distance of Tech. I didn't have a car. One
night someone took me to see them working on the Berkeley Pit...
There was always noise - in the day it was background; at night it
seemed much louder. It came to me that Butte was really a outdoor
factory. You can go from one machine to another but there's no roof.
All the debris is scattered everywhere. We were living in an outdoor
factory - slag heaps, discarded machinery, mini dum ps. It was never
picked up at that time (Waring, 10/21/95).

I tell him that he is the first person I have interview ed who was not bom
and brought up in Butte and that he is also the first who described the place in
physical terms. He replies, "My use of physical description reveals how
alienated I still am from this community." M ark Reavis, another non-native,
agrees w ith W aring's factory metaphor:
It really is a big machine. And you have the conscious knowledge
there are all these tunnels under you. There were the sounds, the
lights. People miss that level of activity here - that’s w hat they mean
w hen they say it’s dead. People hear the pit [the East Continental Pit]
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trucks still — it's a pleasant little growl, b u t it's not the same (Reavis,
11/29/95).

Is it possible that Butte natives may not really see the physical landscape
unless they leave for a while? N ot necessarily, Sara Weinstock says. "Maybe
you don't have to leave to see it, but just be educated to a different point of
view, another way of thinking (Weinstock, 7/31/95)."
Some non-natives see Butte very differently than natives. Twenty years
in Butte notw ithstanding, John Ray has not been charm ed by Butte.
Physically, it's one of the ugliest towns I've ever been in. It rem inded
me of some of the coal mining towns in Pennsylvania. Politically, it
rem inds me of the South, w here I grew up, because we had one party
based on personality. Being psychologically macho was compensation.
A lot of people here feel second-rate. There’s a proclivity to boosterism
to compensate. The Democratic politicians play into that to motivate
Butte's voters to vote for them. Critically and sociologically, it's sort of
an ossified turn of the 19th century into the 20th century (Ray,
10/24/95).

Certainly the architecture, economic and political structures are
reminiscent of the turn of the century w hen Butte came into its own;
however, there are very contemporary aspects to Butte operating in the cracks
in the structure, such as groups like the Butte Com munity Union, Marilyn
Maney s w ork w ith the AFL-CIO, and CTEC. The issue here is that the
structure constrains these groups to the perimeter.
Non-natives stress aspects from the history that are very different than the
w orking class culture and ethnic mix which are stressed by natives.
There's a level of distrust against government. It's [the local
Democratic party] a Jacksonian, small businessmen, protection of
laissez faire, rather than a New Deal kind of party. Government was
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seen as belonging to the Company and the laws were a foreign
language of those occupying Butte (Waring, 10/21/95).

Reavis (11/29/95), a self-described "new immigrant" of 15 years, reports his
first response was:
W hat the hell happened here? The stunted junipers, the environm ent,
the dryness... This is a hard place - the w eather and family ties. You’ll
always be a new immigrant... They ask you if you were born in Butte.
They need to know if you lived through it. Do you understand?
But Butte is extremely diverse and so tolerant.... You’re tolerated
here if you’re a decent hum an being (Reavis, 11/29/95).

However, the outside w orld has far less tolerance for Butte than Butte has
for outsiders. Butte, America is the d ark side, the "other" in the eyes of
outsiders, both in M ontana and beyond, who do not understand. Weinstock
(7/31/95), who lived with her son for 10 years in Helena before returning to
Butte, reports w hen she and her son were preparing to move to Butte "the
kids in school told him he’d be beat up. ” Others report:
There is antipathy tow ard Butte. People d on’t even w ant to come to
Butte. When w e were moving here a professor at M adison who grew
up in Great Falls said, "Why do you w ant to move to Butte? It’s the
arm pit of Montana (Ray, 10/24/95)?"
I grew u p in W ashington state. Sight unseen I moved here. People
said, "You're m oving to Butte?" They knew about it in Washington...
Nobody from Bozeman, at the architectural school, w anted to come
here. I moved here in 1981 during the economic decline (Reavis,
11/29/95).

Mary Kay Craig, a self-described "Butte kid ”who left Butte for 27 years.
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says that Butte's poor image is the result of the degraded landscape, of the
stigm a of being a contaminated community.
...the moonscape w hen you fly into Butte. It's hard to attract
professionals. I think Butte should be as attractive an area as Bozeman
and KalispeU, the Bitterroot - all the places that people are moving to.
Why don't they w ant to move to Butte? Just look at it. If you remove
the contam ination and make it a healthy place it will automatically
become a pretty place and people w on’t be afraid to move here (Craig,
7/30/95).

M ark Reavis, like M arilyn Maney, believes that Butte as history — its 100
years of raw, sometimes violent, labor strife — is the real Butte, the Butte that
m ust be preserved. That Butte was never pretty - to sanitize the history, and
the landscape that embodies that history, w ould trivialize the lives of those
who paid the price for living it. It is out of fear of gentrification, of the
"prettying up" of the raw m ining city, that Reavis fought for the ERA and
ARCO to comply w ith the National Historic Preservation Act. In 1962 six
square miles of Butte containing roughly 4,000 buildings and num erous mine
workings were designated a National Historic Landmark. (See m ap of
National Historic District in the appendix.) As a result, any federal
governm ent agency m ust approach any structure older than 50 years as a
potential "resource. " The conflict between history and cleanup surfaced about
mine dum ps and slag heaps.
The EPA said "We're w orried about kids dying," but we have to look
at the whole picture, it's much more complicated than that. It was
balanced out. The N ational Preservation Act says you m ust consider
history, even the piles of d irt in the National Historic Landm ark
district [most of U ptow n Butte]. They have something to do w ith the
developm ent of the industrial revolution (Reavis, 11/29/95).
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Reavis knows he cannot save it all:
We’re destroying the way this place looks. We've acknowledged
certain sites to preserve it, but the whole thing was im portant. O ur
losses are defined in m itigation [remediation of contaminated sites].
The whole basis was on the regional preservation plan.
It w as an amazingly long process. We started cranking out concepts
and things in 1991. The Granite M ountain Overlook [the scene of the
Speculator Mine Disaster of 1917] is a process we started. The EPA was
supposed to put up signs and do the photo documentation. The county
got a grant for a major memorial to disaster. But the EPA screwed up
and I blew the whistle - they'd signed a M em orandum of
U nderstanding....
You just can't do a standard process in Butte, Montana. The photo
just laid on the shelf. This formed my philosophy - let's start w ith a
new concept, just fund the signage and interpretation. 1 got a VISTA
volunteer. The EPA funded the plaques. We are almost there (Reavis,
11/29/95).

Funds to construct and maintain the memorial will come from the sale of
bricks w hich will make up the floor of the memorial, the sale of artw ork
related to the site, and fundraising, as well as grants. Reavis says:
By autonomously going for grants, working w ith the agency, and
fundraising, we got it going. This is a life's work. When an
opportunity shows up, I draw pictures and convince people. We've got
a A00,000 grant to fix up the Belmont [mine] to use if for a senior
citizen center (Reavis, 11/29/95).

U nder the historic Programm atic Agreement, Butte-Silver Bow struck
w ith the EPA, Anaconda-Deer Lodge, ARCO, and Walkerville, ARCO
supplied $175,000 which was used to construct the Visitor Center. Although
he can count on some Butte natives to turn out to fight for preservation of
specific buildings, the more general attitude tow ard w hat he is doing is one of
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"that’s nice" and well-wishing (Reavis, 11/29/95).

Reavis attributes the

passivity tow ard preservation to an overall lack of self esteem. The Company
used that lack of self-esteem to its benefit w hen it developed the Berkeley Pit
— it w as not difficult to get people to move to the Flat, Reavis says:
There was a perception that you were poor w hite trash if you couldn’t
move off the Hill. But, still, some people kept their family houses and
have been proud of it.
They're seeing a little more that they should be proud; not ashamed
(Reavis, 11/29/95).

Reavis set out to develop a regional historic preservation plan, which
w ould include Anaconda, home of the Com pany’s sm elter operations.
Reavis (11/29/95) describes Anaconda as "the closest thing to a sibling. It’s
probably a sister - it’s a little cleaner and more organized because it was
supposed to be the state capitol ” The plan was established w ith five key
gateway interpretive sites which will be ultimately connected by a railroad
line:

1. The American Indians and early settlers, including buffalo kill sites,

transport routes, and camps.; 2. The period of gold and silver; 3. The Richest
Hill on Earth, m ining operations in Butte; 4. The smelting of the ore in
Anaconda; and 5. The reclamation and ongoing technology (Reavis, 11/29/95)
The community is pushing for a national historical designation, hoping to
attract tourists and the revenues they bring — something akin to m ining the
history. U nder the program m atic agreement, open space will include (ButteSilver Bow, 1992):
1.

Parks, improved open space w ith grass and trees. Uses may include

parks, parkw ays, tot lots and recreational facilities such as tennis courts, ball
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fields, golf courses, skating rinks, m unicipal swim m ing pools and picnic
areas.
2. A rid landscapes, naturally occurring open areas that may include
vegetation but require little or no maintenance.
3. Historic m ining landscapes, including non-vegetated landscapes as well
as those that are reclaimed.
4. W etlands, both existing and im proved areas.
5. Heritage Rail trails, which will run beside active rail lines.
6. N eighborhood buffer trails which will separate neighborhoods from
congestion in historic and park areas.
7. Controlled trails, w here access and usage will be monitored.
8. Drainage control trails, which will ru n parallel to drainage troughs and
provide recreational and interpretive experiences as well as access for
drainage m aintenance (Butte-Silver Bow, 1992).
Most of the support of ongoing preservation efforts comes from the "new
immigrants," but they appear to love a more gentrified Butte (Reavis,
11/29/95).
They w ant to preserve w hat’s nice about the history. Maybe it relates to
past experience they liked growing up. But I don’t w ant to sanitize it.
That really scares me.
You can be m ore responsible but how can you criticize or condemn
or w ant to cover it up (Reavis, 11/29/95)?

The problem that the EPA and CTEC saw was that, especially in heavy
spring rains, unvegetated contaminated soil, also know n as historic mining
waste, will run off dow n the steep slops of Butte Hill tow ard Silver Bow
Creek, depositing contaminated soil in yards and the creek, thus spreading the
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contamination. Reavis disagrees (11/29/95). The lead program , which will be
adm inistered as part of the Institutional Controls by Butte-Silver Bow officials
and be overseen by ARCO and the EPA, will protect the public. Reavis says.
With the lead program now in place, the EPA now agrees that the conflict
betw een history and cleanup has been resolved. Sara Weinstock says:
There are other yards w ith a potential to be contaminated. But ButteSilver Bow will continue to track the contam ination through testing of
kids (Weinstock, 7/31/95).
ECONOMICS
Others are not so sure that institutional controls will protect public health.
The Clark Fork Coalition charged that preservation of "historic mining
landscapes" w ould limit the cleanup of Butte. It is difficult to cleanly separate
the historical im portance of preservation from the economics and politics of
the cleanup, activists say (Craig, 7 / / 30/95; Waring, 10/21/95). They question if
im plem entation of the controls will allow ARCO to fund a lesser cleanup
effort. A nd they have little faith in the local governm ent w hich will
im plem ent the controls in perpetuity.
The further rem oved from local governm ent, the better off you are.
I've see the local governm ent here blackmailed. The economy’s so
vulnerable to blackmail (Waring, 10/21/95).
In terms of the EPA, they are trying to do the right thing. They are
constrained by the law. The state people in the trenches are good
people too, but you run into problems w ith political appointees. I’ve
no confidence in the local government, elected or appointed. (Ray,
10/24/95)
...They have a lo v e/h ate relationship w ith ARCO. It’s 0/10,
heaven/hell, b inge/purge (Ray, 10/24/95).
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Faith in the judgm ent of local officials was likely further eroded w hen
zoning was dow ngraded from residential to commercial at the M ontana Pole
site which led to a lesser cleanup of w ater than w ould have been required if
the original residential zoning had been kept (Curran, 1994). In her
comments to Jeff M errifield, counsel to the federal Subcommittee on
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment in W ashington, D C., Craig
(7/9/95:2) wrote:
Here, in exchange for ARCO-promises of ballparks, RV parking
facilities and an industrial park, etc. over the top of contaminants, local
governm ent has changed a zoning provision from residential to
industrial thereby decreasing degree of cleanup of PCPs at the Montana
Pole Treatm ent Plant. To appease a local employer PRP [potentially
responsible party], local government has ignored a petition signed by
over 10 % [sic] of the population asking that the volume of
contamination at Butte’s Berkeley Pit not be allowed to double. Instead
local government voted to put off real cleanup for 30 years. For a Jack
Nicklaus golf course over the top of the toxics, 100% of contamination
has been allowed to rem ain in the floodplain in Anaconda. O ther
examples of local governm ent being coopted tow ard perpetual
m anagem ent of w astes — not cleanup — can be cited in parallel w ith
their contracts to PRPs for creation of Institutional Controls.
We have even seen the very people [Jon Sesso] who exclude our
EPA grant-funded citizen group form involvement in local
governm ent Superfund meetings receive an aw ard from the EPA for
creating "consensus am ong diverse groups." As PRPs and local
governm ent officials in this area know w ell, consensus can always be
obtained w hen those w ho m ight disagree are not allow ed to participate.
Boldface type is Craig's.

Ray expressed his concern about local officials' relationship with, and trust
in, ARCO, in a letter about the lead study sponsored by ARCO:
...I am concerned about the relationship of the H ealth D epartm ent and
ARCO. The H ealth Departm ent has embraced the results of this study
w ith unquestioned enthusiasm. Yet, the H ealth D epartm ent should
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rem em ber that any corporation such as ARCO protects the corporate
interest. The two interests are often in conflict. Consider: The quality
of any study depends on quality data and quality analysis of that data. If
the data or analysis is faulty, the results are faulty. In assessing the
analysis and evaluation of data, questions of source willingness to
report and interpret a situation accurately m ust be considered. If there
is a potential bias on the part of the source or the source's sponsor,
independent corroboration m ust be sought. In this light the following
questions m ust be asked: W hat is the nature and extent of the
relationship between the University of Cincinnati's Institute of
Environm ental Health, which conducted the study, and ARCO?
ARCO paid for the study. Was any information processed through
ARCO? Did ARCO have any influence on the conduct of the study or
the release of results? How do the findings of the study relate to
ARCO's possible Superfund responsibility? These questions have yet
to be answ ered satisfactorily. 1 am not accusing or implying that
anyone deliberately falsified information. N or am I questioning
anyone's competence or integrity. I am saying that we need
independent verification of this study before we assume there is only a
negligible lead problem in Butte. The lead exposure study m ust be
scrutinized by the EPA as well as by independent peer reviewers w ith
no industrial bias {Montana Standard, 5/15/91).

In light of complaints that the agency historically left the testing that
determ ined the extent and composition of contam ination to the corporations
responsible for the pollution (Barnett, 1994), it is difficult to understand why
the agency initially left the study to ARCO. A lthough the EPA later refused to
accept the lead program the county and ARCO developed from the study,
there was no indication that peer review was ever
accomplished. However, as Weinstock (1996) notes, testing was done and a
baseline risk assessment will be issued.
CTEC members have also questioned the county-ARCO institutional
controls proposal which, its authors maintain, will protect Butte people from
the contam ination that will rem ain after the cleanup efforts are completed
(Craig, 7/30/95). What ARCO, local officials and EPA refer to as institutional
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controls are generally referred to by planners as land and resource
m anagem ent — zoning, subdivision control, w etlands and aquifer protection.
Clearly, some institutional controls will be necessary in Butte, which is
honeycombed by mines, has buildings built on tailings, and is ravaged by
m ining waste — it is not possible to completely clean the m ining waste. The
state's N atural Resource Damage Program m aintains, even under the best
rem ediation alternative, baseline conditions will not be restored for a few
thousand years (Montana NRDP, 1994).
The ARCO/Butte-Silver Bow Planning D epartm ent institutional control
proposal has identified seven areas, w ith the possibility of additional controls
to be added at a later date, as critical to monitoring hazardous waste that will
rem ain after cleanup of Superfund sites in Butte (ARCO/ Butte-Silver Bow,
1993). The seven areas are: surface and groundw ater controls; development
standards; lead poisoning/abatem ent program; historic preservation; waste
repository; operation and maintenance of reclaim ed/restricted sites; and a
Geographic Information System to m onitor the other six controls
(ARCO/Butte-Silver Bow, 1993). The use of institutional controls raises two
im portant questions: 1. Will they be used to minimize the am ount of
cleanup that ARCO will have to provide; and 2. Will they adequately protect
public health?
Sara Weinstock (7/31/95) believes the institutional controls will work
well:
...W ere looking at ARCO versus Butte-Silver Bow as the contractor.
Therefore they [ARCO employees] will always be overseeing at ButteSilver Bow. We can rest assured that the money will be spent the way
we w ant it. EPA has a five-year review forever on this. We'll review

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277
every five years... EPA will continue to pressure ARCO to get the job
completed (Weinstock, 7 /3 1 / 95).

A lthough the local environm entalists concerned w ith the Superfund site
are not sure the EPA review will be sufficient, some natives do not judge
local governm ent as harshly; others point to the various levels of
governm ent that are w orking together as a positive.
1 believe you should let the people in Butte w ith ideas do it w ith
ARCO...You shouldn’t have people from Missoula or Helena. It's [the
contamination] been here for 100 years. The ARCO retirees believe the
same way. Keep the state out of here. Keep it local and keep it simple
(Shea, 10/24/95).
They [federal, state and local government officials] w ork so
cooperatively. They’re working as a team which is a good approach. It
will give us the best overall solutions to these problem s (Crain,
9/21/95).

Public health Director D an Dennehey points to differences both in the
roles of levels of governm ent and in resources the levels can bring to the
cleanup. He, also, believes the tiered levels involved in the cleanup will offer
more protection to the people of Butte.
I have faith in the EPA, the state and us. If you look at EPA from the
street, they’re seen as rigid. If you ask about us, people will say free
imm unizations, family planning, w ater quality district, air quality. We
aren’t one-dimensional. We w ear so m any hats here - it's
m anagem ent by crisis...
I don’t w ant to spend 90 percent of my time on Superfund. We
should be the Superfund D epartm ent. But I don't think Superfund
w as on anyone's m ind w hen they created health departm ents. We re
sewers, food quality....
From the industrial revolution on there w ill be a w hole lot of
problems. EPA's huge. We re fortunate enough to get grants to hire
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people. W hat if you're in a community w ithout a health departm ent?
(Dennehey, 9/21/95)

Weinstock says Superfund works in Butte because the parties involved
cooperate:
Here we re all equal partners. The lead abatem ent program was
developed by Butte-Silver Bow. We attended the meetings and helped
them w ith information, but it was them who said this is w hat we can
live w ith.
Things will happen here that w ouldn't happen anyw here else. Not
just the feds, but the PRP [ARCO] who will do some work, and we
allowed state and local governm ent participation. If you don't have
local governm ent at the table you might as well forget it. That’s
another reason Superfund works here. Many of the people who work
w ith the federal governm ent will help you get through the mess. We
have credibility in Butte (7/31/95).

Given ARCO's law suits and challenges, Weinstock's definition of
cooperation may be questionable, and best understood in her role as mediator,
as the person who casts oil upon troubled waters. In her role as the local EPA
rem edial project manager, Weinstock becomes the locus of all disputes, a
tense and tiring job. A lthough the CTEC activists disagree w ith EPA's failure
to seek perm anent solutions as m anifested in the institutional controls, they
give the agency and the state far higher marks than local government. They
com plain of being excluded from local governm ent meetings w ith ARCO and
representatives of former county chief executive Don People's company,
Merdi. (See the anonym ous cartoon that this incident precipitated in the
appendix.) Craig says:
I had to advise CTEC to crash the meeting... A governm ent person
became so concerned that M erdi was meeting w ith agencies and local
officials and w ould be negotiating on Silver Bow Creek without
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anyone know ing that I was called and told to go to the meeting and
bring the m edia w ith me. I thought it out and thought w hy escalate?
What I w ant is to be part of things (Craig, 7/30/95).

Dennehey counters that it's difficult to understand the process. He also
stresses the im portance of local governm ent involvement.
We thought the public comment on it [the M erdi Green way proposal
for Silver Bow Creek cleanup] w ould come later. The Superfund
coordinating committee com plained they w eren't at the table.
If we p u t it on a referendum it would probably be okay. There has to be
some catalyst, so local government's had to be the catalyst to get both
to the table — the environm entalists and those concerned w ith
aesthetics. We can reach a compromise as w e did w ith the lead
(9/21/95).

But CTEC members question the need to compromise and fear that the
Butte-Silver Bow governm ent will not push too hard for a stringent cleanup
because because it, too, is a potentially responsible party party (PRP) and hopes
to avoid cleanup costs. Thus, there is a sizable financial incentive for the
county to go along w ith ARCO's attem pts to reduce the scale of cleanup,
activists charge. The problematic economics of Butte add to their concern.
Beyond loss of revenue from m ining taxes, future economic developm ent
is an issue because of the lack of buildable land in the U ptow n area.
Unemployment, is high - 9.7 percent, about three points higher than the state
average of 7.0 (U.S. Dept, of the Census, 1990). Reavis points to buildings in
the U ptow n — w onderful examples of stone and brick architecture.
A lthough the first floors of many buildings have been restored and are used
by small businesses, most of the upper floors are decaying (Reavis, 11/29/95).
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However, as difficult as Butte's economics are, the com munity has been
spared the depreciation of property value that is often experienced by
contam inated communities (Edelstein, 1988). Because Butte was always "the
other and often shunned by outsiders long before the Superfund designation
(Emmons, 1990), its property values were judged by different standards, which
were established by those who lived in the community. Homeowners
interviewed said they had not experienced a loss of property value.
... [my home has] increased value. Realtors have told me that sites that
are cleaned up or don't have liability are w orth more. (Ray, 10/24/95)
We lived in Walkerville and sold our house there and it d id n ’t reduce
the value of our property (Crain, 9/21/95).
People who have bought property in Butte are doing it to be in close
proximity to their job. I never looked at that property as having value
beyond that. The values of M ontana property are not associated with
the value of property in Butte. It has to be south of Butte. The people
on the Hill w ant to be close to w ork or participate in Butte's historic
ethos. I w asn’t investing; never considered the house im portant to the
quality of life (Waring, 10/21/95).

Ironically, the lack of buildable land on Butte Hill, where blocks were
rezoned to open space and commercial, has created a seller’s m arket for
homes un d er $100,000 in Butte. One realtor claims if he "had the land, ” he
could sell 10 homes under $100,000 "in 10 days (Montana Standard, 6/15/95).’’
The costlier homes are not selling as quickly, the realtor added (Montana
S ta ndard, 6 /1 5 / 95).

HEALTH
Even if financial concerns do not color the local governm ent agenda, the
lack of specialized professional staff occasionally creates a problem, as it did
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w ith the original lead agreem ent betw een the local governm ent and ARCO.
The lead strategy came under criticism from both environm ental advocates
and the EPA.
In Butte there are a m inim um of 36 identified sites of significant lead
contamination. Even low levels of lead exposure can cause metabolic
problems, neuropathy, reduced grow th and intellectual developm ent,
increased hypertension, blood disorders, and possible cancer. Children
are particularly susceptible to lead's toxicity. H arm ful health effects
from lead and other heavy metal contaminants are a health disaster
w aiting to happen in Butte.
As indicated by their comments on ARCO's lead study, our County
H ealth D epartm ent officials have apparently decided to intervene only
after health problem s develop as a result of exposure to heavy metal
contamination. Prevention of health problem s from heavy metal
contam ination before they occur should be the goal and emphasis of
the H ealth Departm ent, not intervention after the fact. Once people
show the effects of lead poisoning, it is too late....
A nother shortcoming of the lead study is that this study does not
adequately cover the synergistic/cum ulative health effects of exposure
to lead along w ith other heavy metals in Butte soils... (Ray, M ontana
Standard,5/15/91).

The EPA m onitored developm ent of the county/A RCO plan, refusing to
accept the plan's original use of the term "trigger " levels, which require
further investigation, rather than "action " levels w hich require im m ediate
rem oval of the contam inant (Montana Standard, 1/17/90). Six months later,
the EPA declared the county/A RCO plan inadequate on four counts
(Montana Standard,? / A /93). The county/ARCO plan was based on a
m isunderstanding of statistical probability: under the county’s plan, less than
five percent of children in Butte w ould be exposed to risk; the EPA
requirem ent was that each child in Butte have less than a five percent chance
of exposure (Montana Standard, 7/4/93). The county/A RCO plan would
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have possibly p u t five percent of Butte children at risk. The EPA also noted
the plan allowed almost twice the am ount of lead to rem ain in Butte soils,
failed to develop a schedule for cleaning yards, and did not provide for future
cleanup of yards if children moved into homes w ith lead-soaked soil
(Montana Standard,71Af93).
Craig asks:
Why are we negotiating w ith ARCO who's arguing for less cleanup?
W hen you've got the Butte local government called a PRP they're not
looking out for the health of the people. The health departm ent just
hired a new Superfund hydrologist — he's not a hydrologist. He's an
industrial hygienist who w orked as a contractor to ARCO w ith his
office in the ARCO building in Anaconda. Earlier, I spoke up against
his appointm ent to the board of health because of conflict of interest.
There were qualified people for the hydrologist position...(Craig,
7/30/95).

Dennehey says local officials struggle w ith differences of opinion and
ARCO's clout but maintains that his staff is competent:
There's a diversity of opinions in the community. We re m ediating
differences. ARCO has a huge staff and purse; w e don't. We have an
environm ental health director, a chemist on w ater quality, an
environm ental engineer and soils person. We w ork as a team. We got
some money from the EPA for lead and ARCO for [lead] screening and
abatem ent. There's no federal money and no state involvement.
ARCO calls on hydrologists, geohydrologists.
It's im portant w e continue to look at w hat will be environmentally
feasible, w hat public health concerns will be addressed on scientific
inform ation, and done in my lifetime. We've had an operable unit for
stream side tailings since 1983 and now we re ... bickering about w hat
could be done — there's ARCO, the state, the EPA. We w ant to get
things done. They [the public] say, 'Quit studying and move some dirt.'
People get upset and cynical. We try to get involved and they say we're
in the pockets of ARCO because we get money from ARCO...
(Dennehey, 9 / 21 / 95).
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The cumbersome Superfund process came under criticism by 1990. Four
years after the Superfund designation, M ontana Senator Conrad Bum s
criticized the length of time EPA spent on studies and praised ARCO's
w illingness to begin the cleanup. John Wardell, EPA head, said the agency
was under pressure from "civic groups, sportsmen, senators and others... to
accept ARCO’s Colorado Tailings plan w ithout going through public
m eetings (Montana Standard, 3/8/90)." Peter Nielson, director of the Clark
Fork Coalition in 1990, also complained that ARCO was attem pting to "force"
its rem edial proposal through "without public participation (Montana
Standard, 2/18/90)." Nielson said the public has the incorrect perception that
the state D epartm ent of H ealth and Environmental Science and the EPA are
responsible for causing cleanup delays.
ARCO's strategy is to w ear the public dow n and w ear the agencies
dow n to w here we accept the first thing — the public will become so
frustrated they will accept anything that comes along (Montana
Standard,1! \S! 90).

Nielson added that he did not blame ARCO because it was understandable
that the corporation w anted to m inimize costs (Montana Stan da rd ,!!IS f90).
N or did he begrudge ARCO's pitches for its proposal to groups and politicians
before the EPA actually asked for formal plans (Montana Standard,!! 18190).
But, N elson questioned the fact that many people, including Senator Conrad
Bums, w ere treating ARCO's proposal as the reclamation plan and urging its
adoption (Montana Standard,!! 18!90).
Issues of cooperation versus cynicism, ARCO's machinations and the slow
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pace of cleanup notw ithstanding, the county/A RCO planned institutional
controls, w hich include the lead program , have serious shortcomings related
to issues involving accountability, staffing, and jurisdiction (Curran, 1994).
To accommodate the controls, the county revised the M aster Plan, rezoning
over 78 city blocks. This has a major impact on the am ount of cleanup
because under state law the new zoning classifications — public/open space
and commercial — require less stringent w ater quality standards than the
former residential classification. This greatly reduces the am ount of cleanup
required by ARCO and runs the risk, in heavy spring rains of moving
contamination about on Butte Hill. The zoning dow ngrade of
land from residential to public/open space also reduces the municipality's
future tax revenues because the land is precluded from development. More
serious than economic losses is that the rezoned areas have not been
designated as Superfund districts (Curran, 1994).
Given the need for controls in perpetuity and routine employee turnover,
failure to clearly tie rezoning, new bylaws, and operations to contaminated
sites is problematic because there is nothing to ensure future employees
understand the reason for strict enforcement of controls (Curran, 1994). Also
missing from the institutional controls agreement are (Curran, 1994):
1. enforcement policy communicated clearly to and then implem ented by
every county board involved in maintenance and enforcement of the
controls;
2. specific w ritten guidelines and published operating procedures related
to m onitoring and enforcement; and
3. specific chains of command to establish a clear line of accountability,
w ith the identification of the position or positions ultim ately responsible for
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ensuring both m onitoring and enforcement.
If the EPA monitoring is not adequate, and reports cited in an earlier
section indicate that this is a distinct possibility, the state is not likely to pick
up the slack as there are additional enforcement problem s on the state level.
As indicated by the Legislative A uditor's 1994 performance audit of the
enforcement of the state's W ater Quality and Public D rinking W ater Supply
Acts, a law or ordinance on the books is no guarantee of enforcement
(Montana Office of the Legislative A uditor, 1994). The audit identifies
accountability, staffing, and jurisdictional issues as im pedim ents to
enforcement. These are the same issues that have not been addressed in the
Butte-Silver Bow Planning D epartm ent/A R C O institutional controls
(Curran, 1994). A nd they are the same issues that led to the state’s cessation of
mine capping w ork in Butte in 1991 {Montana Standard, 10/2/1991).
N ew federal regulations prohibit the state from sealing off abandoned
mines in Butte, including new shafts created by collapsing tunnels (Montana
Standard, 10/2/1991). There are 4,000 known shafts, ranging from 20 to 2,000
feet deep in need of w ork in the U ptow n section of Butte — shafts above the
w ater line will deteriorate as a result of exposure to the air (Montana
Standard, 10/2/1991).

I don't think we have any answers as to who's going

to correct this problem, " Sara Weinstock has said (Montana Standard,
(10/2/1991).
Further, pollution related to m ining is not restricted to Butte. A report
prepared by the W estern Interstate Energy Board for the W estern Governors’
Association stated that the state of M ontana has m ore than 20,000 inactive
and abandoned non-coal mines that have dam aged 153,800 acres and 1,118
miles of stream (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). The cleanup costs are
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estim ated at $912 million (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). Montana's
inventory included 19,757 mine sites, 1,057 smelters, 14,038 acres of mine
dum ps, 20,862 acres of disturbed land, 466 miles of high walls (in open pit or
strip mines), 4,868 mine openings, 1,845 acres over shallow mine workings,
and 1,747 hazardous structures (Montana Standard, 11/7/1991). Also listed
were, 147,150 acres affected by exploratory drill holes, five mining-related EPA
Superfund sites, and acres of contaminated stream bank sediments and soil
contam ination from sm elter emissions (Montana Standard,lll7ll991).
Staffing is also an issue for the state's H ard Rock Mining Board which
helps communities analyze the adequacy of m ining impact plans (Montana
Standard, 1/16/90).

A Montana Mining Association report identified staffing

as the "single greatest problem facing the D epartm ent of State Lands H ard
Rock M ining Board. According to the report, the board does "not have
enough people to do its job, cannot recruit new employees because of low
wages, and cannot retain current employees (Montana Standard,? 111190).''
As a result, the report concluded that the remaining departm ent employees
are often not competent to regulate m ining (Montana Standard,? 111190).
The state waste bureau is also understaffed, w ith just 2.5 employees to travel
the state to m onitor landfills (Montana Standard, 1/17/90). The state has 112
dum ps and seven of the seven landfills that are regularly m onitored are
leaking (Montana Standard,!I\? 190).
So, both in Butte and in the entire state, there is a substantial m argin for
error in the form of w hat sociologist William Freudenburg refers to as
"recreancy^," the possibility that the intricate division of labor in technicallyoriented bureaucracies may lead to situations in w hich duties are not carried
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out properly and "im portant responsibilities may fall through the
institutional cracks (Freudenburg, 1993:915)." In Butte, the institutional
cracks could well be threats to public health.
Often, in fact, the most significant failings are not so m uch those of
individuals or organizations... The key question is sim ply w hether
experience shows that the behaviors of specialized individuals and
institutions can be counted on (Freudenburg, 1993:917).

W hen the notion of recreancy is factored into the equation, the complaints
of technocrats about public irrationality "could be seen as efforts to divert
attention away from institutional failings, doing so in part by calling into
question the legitimacy of citizen concerns about these failings (Freudenburg,
1993:917)." Because "government inactivity or failure is an im portant form of
recreancy," (Freudenburg, 1993:926) there is a "need to examine the
assum ption that the only serious' risks are the ones having im m ediate
implications for physical health (Freudenburg, 1993:927). " There are many
potential institutional cracks in the controls planned to m inimize exposure to
contam inants that rem ain in Butte. However, there is little common ground
on w hether the EPA-designated contaminants are serious threats to public
health.
Most natives interview ed expressed no fear that the Superfund
designation has affected their quality of life or poses a serious health hazard,
and have not w arned their children away from Superfund areas.
...My girls and I spent practically every Saturday and Sunday roaming
around the St. Lawrence and Granite M ountain Mines. I'm more
concerned about the history (Maney, 9/22/95).
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No. [They were] w arned only where active mining [was ongoing],
w here trains or trucks may have posed a threat, not from any inactive
site. The fact is that children have frequently played on many of the
mine dum ps (Lynch, 10/25/95).

MINING
W ithout inform ation to the contrary, — inform ation that has not been
forthcoming from the EPA, ATSDR, or the local new spaper — it is
difficult to believe that a landscape so familiar to generations of Butte
families is dangerous. It is equally difficult to consider the Mining City
w ithout m ining operations. If not mining, w hat is Butte’s identity? If not
a diverse mixture of ethnic neighborhoods held together by shared risks
and a sense that no one outside could possibly understand their world,
w hat is Butte? Is more m ining desirable, or possible? Some favor new
m ining because the industry has been associated w ith higher-paying jobs
that are desperately needed by the community.
I w ould be absolutely delighted if a mine opened here, if I could take
my 230 displaced workers from Rhone Poulenc [the closure of this
plant is discussed later in this section] and they could continue to make
a living wage (Maney, 9/22/95).

Others point both to the economic im portance of mining historically and
to the state's historic role as a resource colony. A lthough he has w arned that
the poisoned w ater in the Berkeley Pit will contaminate Butte groundw ater,
form er Representative Fritz Daily says:
I'm pro-mining. It was the lifeblood of the state and will be the
economic lifeblood of the state again. M ontana is a natural resource
state. For us to survive and function we have to use those natural
resources... (Daily, 12/8/95).
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W hen asked if he w orries that the current MRI operation in the East
Continental Pit could become another Berkeley Pit, Daily (12/8/95) s a y s ,
"I like mining. I don't w ant to think about that. "
H ealth Director D an Dennehey believes Butte is "mined as m uch as we
can be m ined, " but believes that technological advances may ensure that
m ining has a place in the state's economy:
I think we can manage it environm entally but I don't think we can
afford any more fiascos like Anaconda. MRI's an opportunity. We
have a petrie dish incubator, a scientific lab here in Butte. It's looking
at issues concerning heavy m etal soils. We're em phasizing how to get
technologies here to deal w ith environm ental issues. If we got the
technology there may be room for additional m ining here.
It's a huge state. There's room for more mining. Crow n Butte's
[mining operations proposed in eastern M ontana w here
environm entalists charge it w ould dam age Yellowstone National Park]
problematic, it could dam age "the last best place." In an area where
there's low environm ental impacts to the community and landscape, I
think there's a possibility. If technology can make strip mines look
better, it should be done. It's a siting issue. I don't w ant to see
w ilderness areas succumb to mining. I don't w ant tailings where I
hunt or fish. I think there's a happy m edium between tourism and
m ining, concerning money and environm ental im pacts (Dennehey,
9/21/05).

The "happy m edium " may be very difficult to located in a state which has
not yet decided if it is 'T he Treasure State" or "The Last Best Place. " In the
1980s, in efforts to attract tourists to the state, it billed itself as "The Last Best
Place," a title im m ortalized in an anthology of literature from and about
M ontana edited by William Kittredge and Annick Smith. The "Last Best
Place" is a romanticized version of wilderness studded w ith cozy rural
com m unities filled w ith resourceful, and often, exceptional, people. But the
lack of staffing of state agencies and enforcement of state environm ental laws
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make it look as if the ’T reasure State " is being resurrected.

N ow here is the

tension betw een the "Last Best Place"" and the "Treasure State" more apparent
than in the battle over the state’s w ater quality laws. In 1995 the state
Legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, several bills that
changed the state's w ater quality laws significantly, allowing more pollutants
in M ontana’s w aters {Missoulian, 8/13/95). The changes increased the
previous standard for each of the more than 100 carcinogens, except arsenic,
monitored by state regulators from a one in one m illion risk of cancer for
people drinking the untreated w ater over a lifetime to one in 100,000
(Missoulian, 8/13/95). The new standard for arsenic has been relaxed to a
cancer risk level of one in 1,000 (Missoulian, 8/13/95). Some find the
statistical risk of possible death by cancer an affront. Lois Gibbs says:
"W ould you let me shoot into a crowd of one hundred thousand
people and kill one of them, " Gibbs asked. "No? Well, how come Dow
Chemical can do it? It's okay for the corporations to do it, but the little
guy w ith the gun goes to jail... (Greider, 1992:56)."

The changes in M ontana's w ater law also allow more nitrates in the
groundw ater, which has been a problem in Butte, as discussed in the previous
section; narrow ed the definition of high quality water, w aters which cannot
be degraded with state authorization after regulatory review; eased
restrictions on placing waste next to streams; and limited challenges to the
issuance of discharge permits (Missoulian, 8/13/95). Prior to the revised law
regulating challenges to the issuance of discharge permits, anyone who
subm itted an official comment during a hearing on the discharge perm it was
allowed to appeal the issuance; the revised law allows appeals only by
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someone w ith a property interest, w ater right, or a direct economic interest in
the perm it decision (M issoulian,S113195).
The vision of the "Last Best Place" is operative in an initiative campaign
conducted by a grassroots coalition that includes business people,
conservationists, w ater quality specialists and others, to strengthen water
quality laws by requiring new metal mines, expansions of existing mines
w hich use cyanide leaching processes, and metal mine exploration activities
to treat their waste w ater before it is discharged to surface or groundw ater
(Bachman, 1996). The change proposed by this coalition, M ontanans for
Clean Water, w ould affect mines that do not have perm its by November 1996
— likely including N oranda's N ew W orld Mine near Yellowstone National
Park, Phelps Dodge's McDonald project on the Blackfoot River near Lincoln
and ASARCO’s Rock Creek Mine near Noxon (Bachman, 1996). Mines
considering expansion that w ould be affected include Pegasus’
Z ortm an/ Landusky complex near the Fort Belknap reservation and the
Golden Sunlight Mine near W hitehall (Bachman, 1996).
M ining companies are "all but claiming the end of m ining in Montana" if
the initiative is passed (Bachman, 1996:1). However, even if the initiative
were passed, small mines which disturb less than five acres or move less than
36,500 tons a year, will be exempted, and some of the state's largest mining
operations — including Stillwater's platinum mine near N ye and its
proposed East Boulder Mine near Big Timber, MRI's copper/m olybdenum
mine in Butte, and Pegasus's M ontana Tunnels gold mine near Clancy —
w ould be unaffected (Bachman, 1996).
The non-natives, who arguably have less invested in the history of Butte
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and mining, are less convinced than Dennehey that technology is sufficient to
protect the state from further mining-associated pollution.
I w ould support any m ining activity conducted in an environmentally
sensitive m anner. From w hat I’ve seen that's rare. None of the
proposed mines are conducted in an environm entally sensitive
m anner. Mining engineers are not trained to worry about
environm ental concerns. "If you can't grow it, you've got to mine it "
is a bum per sticker at Tech.
In principle I'm not opposed but since mining companies do such a
terrible job at protecting the environment... One of the biggest
problems with gold mining is the cyanide leaching (Ray, 10/24/95).
No, definitely not. Because I've w orked for 28 years w ith mining
engineers and they'd strip mine the planet if they could and feel
perfectly justified doing it (Waring, 10/21/95).
A lthough he w ould support more mining in Butte and the rest of the
state. Lynch (10/25/95) says the community is looking "to expand our
economy, diversify our economic base, and introduce or reintroduce a
num ber of good-paying blue collar jobs ... through a strong economic
developm ent program . "
Obviously, Butte-Silver Bow has, through the substantial dow nsizing
of m ining and other changes in our basic economy, lost a significant
num ber of well-paying blue collar jobs. We need to reestablish these
jobs and I think that overall w ould provide a greater benefit to people
in our community (Lynch, 10/25/95).
MORE ECONOMICS
In June 1995, Rhone Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. announced it w ould
stop production at its Silver Bow phosphorous plant and lay off all but 50 of
200 employees by early 1996 (Montana Standard: 6/15/95). The plant's
average payroll was about $10 million a year - the average worker's wage and
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benefit package am ounted to roughly $50,000 a year (Montana Standard:
6/15/95). The result will be a further erosion of Butte’s w orking class
population because most of these w orkers w ill have to relocate to receive
retraining and find new jobsiMontana Standard: 6/15/95). From 1980 to 1992,
Butte’s population dropped 9.8 percent, a loss of 3,650 people (U.S. Census,
1994)
W ith federal and state governm ent assistance, local governm ent has
sought high technology companies w hich employ highly educated well-paid
specialists, and sim ultaneously, through local tax incentives, companies
w hich will provide large num bers of low er-paid production-type jobs which
do not require specialized education. But, critics note, this approach ensures
the continuation of the past history of wealth in the hands of a few and
financial uncertainty for many, in the form of lower paid jobs, which are
always subject to elim ination as technology develops. M arilyn Maney
questions officials’ search for $6-an-hour jobs, the salary offered by the pasta
plant w hich officials unsuccessfully spent more than $100,000 trying to lure to
Butte in 1995 (Maney, 9/22/95). She agrees that jobs are im portant, but insists
the jobs m ust provide adequate salaries.
.... we re [labor organizations] involved in the creation of a family
wage, decent jobs - not $6-a-hour crap. We’re certainly concerned w ith
the political climate, the whole economic w ar on the w orking class,
and reclaiming our heritage and our right to speak for ourselves...
We re concerned not only about a family wage, but the kind of jobs that
males in our class can w ork and regain their sense of dignity, their
sense of having worth...(Maney, 9/22/95).

In their willingness to provide concessions to any company that will
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em ploy large num bers of Butte's people, even w hen salaries are low, Butte
officials may well be acting from lessons learned from the history of
interaction w ith the A naconda Company. Sociologist W illiam Freudenburg
(1992) notes that resource dependent com munities have:
...a tendency for local leaders to represent a grow th machine
orientation, w orking vigorously to attract increased employment,
business, and real estate development., in ...isolated, resource
dependent regions... these tendencies tend to be amplified, if not raised
to a level of desperation. While the desperation needs to be seen as
understandable, however, it does not need to be treated as inevitable...
(Freudenburg, 1992:329).

A dditionally, traditional local attem pts to improve their business climates
- tax cuts, weakened regulations and incentives - have had no or a negative
effect on the communities that undertake such efforts. This may well be a
manifestation of a more global economy a n d /o r an indication of the
relatively small percentage of the total cost of doing business represented by
any community (Freudenburg, 1992). Although, in the past, extraction of raw
materials was a viable path to economic development;
... societal relationships w ith environm ent and technology have
changed so fundam entally that extractive industries today appear more
likely to lead rural regions to economic addiction (Freudenburg,
1992:305).

The change is the result of increased costs of extraction and dow nw ard
trends in global commodity prices in tandem w ith the geographic isolation of
extractive communities, their lack of pow er vis a vis that of the extractive
industry, and the lack of realistic alternatives for other developm ent paths
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w hich w ould provide more com munity independence (Freudenburg, 1992).
There are three basic reasons that the volatile m arket for extractive products
w ill encourage economic addiction:
1. Frequent and dram atic price swings may mask the long-term,
dow nw ard trend in commodity prices (Freudenburg, 1992). As was the case in
Butte, the community and workers, accustomed to the rise and fall of copper
prices, may grant concessions w hen prices are low, assum ing that they will
benefit w hen prices rise again.
2. The instability of w orld markets may increase the m arginalization and
exploitation of w orkers and host communities (Freudenburg, 1992). The
Anaconda Com pany was able to w rest concessions from both Butte and
Chilean employees, playing one group against the other (Finn, 1995).
3. The volatility of extractive commodity price trends, w hich are both
interm ittent and irregular, function to encourage resource-dependent
w orkers and communities to gamble on the payoff by overadapting to the
needs of the extractive industry (Freudenburg, 1992). This seemed to be the
case w hen Butte residents relocated to make room for the Berkeley Pit.
...when seen in this context, a dependence on resource extraction
resembles nothing so m uch as the (other) forms of gam bling that are
officially recognized.... W hether the relatively random positive
reinforcem ent comes from the slot machines or the com modity
markets, the payoffs tend to come just often enough to keep substantial
num bers of social actors hooked in gambles for new riches
(Freudenburg, 1992:320).

Once the industry is established, as in the case of Butte, to m aintain or at
least m inim ize the decreasing em ploym ent base, the com munity tends to
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overadapt to the industry, investing community resources into facilities and
support services that have value only to the extractive industry
(Freudenburg, 1992; N orgaard, 1984). That overadaption has led to the loss of
tax revenues which are now desperately needed in Butte. Further, this
overadaption extends to the state level. In November, the state D epartm ent
of Environmental Quality granted Pegasus Gold, Inc., operator of the Beal
M ountain Mine, a new w ater discharge perm it that will allow groundw ater
from an area under the mine's open pit to be discharged and released into
German Gulch. The gold mine employs about 120 workers, and has a payroll
of more than $6.3 million. The permit, which will allow the mine to
continue operation for another, is possible only because of the previously
mentioned dow ngrade of w ater quality criteria {Montana Standard, 11/14/95).
The end result of overadaption to an extractive industry, given any
com m unity's lim ited financial and physical resources, is that other
alternatives are excluded, making other forms of developm ent unlikely or,
especially in instances of environm ental degradation, sometimes close to
impossible (Norgaard, 1984). However, Freudenburg (1992) points to three
other characteristics of addiction that are equally serious.
First, because many extractive industries pay higher salaries in terms of
the communities in which they locate, there is little incentive for local youth
to develop "entrepreneurial skills." Yet these are the skills necessary to
respond to the traditional w arning that communities avoid overdependence
on one enterprise by focusing "heavily on the developm ent of local
enterprises (Freudenburg, 1992:322-23)."
Second, the relatively high pay can subvert "the typical economic rew ard
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structure for education" because, in the short-term, "high school dropouts can
often earn more through extractive jobs" than many of the best-educated
people in the com munity (Freudenburg, 1992:323).
Third, w orker protections and benefits can w ork to increase addiction
because the most senior workers learn to rem ain passively in the community
to w ait for the return of the good times.
Ironically, each time this logic works, its apparent validity increases,
while the long-term dow nw ard trend in prices may mean that the real
validity gets shakier each time, u p to the point w here the shut-dow n
proves in fact to have been perm anent (Freudenburg, 1992:323).

Disagreem ents about the future of m ining in Butte notw ithstanding, some
are concerned that w orried that local officials will seek another relationship
sim ilar to that w hich the community had w ith the A naconda Company (Ray,
10/24/95; Waring, 10/21/95). The distrust of local government and fear of
governm ent collusion w ith ARGO recalls the history of local government's
ties to the A naconda Company. The suspicion runs through the political
landscape like a fault line under Butte Hill. It is noteworthy that everyone
interview ed believes it is possible to change Butte for the better; no one has
given up. But there are differences of opinion about w hat m ight im prove the
quality of lives of people in Butte.
Ellen Crain (9/21/95) maintains the answ er is "education, education
education." A lthough they differ about the types of jobs that are needed.
Lynch (10/25/95) and Maney (9/22/95) see jobs as the solution. John T. Shea
agrees that jobs are needed but thinks children in Butte need more
com m unity activities, too:
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A nd something for the youth of today to do. When I was a kid
everyone learned to skate, sledded on Big Butte, w alked to the creek to
go fishing, w ould have a bologna sandwich on the top of Big Butte.
Every kid in Butte climbed up the East Ridge, played baseball, marbles,
entered soapbox derbies on West Park Street... (Shea, 10/24/95).

Mary Kay Craig (7/30/95) and George Waring (10/21/95) believe a good
cleanup is the answer. W aring adds that a renewed connection with nature
m ight be the best improvement:
Coming from Seattle — so many parks, a sense that nature should be
protected and people deserve to recreate. W ouldn’t it be great to have a
stream w ith trees to give you a sense of place and increase your own
sense of worth? I thought, "We don’t need urban revitalization but
nature brought back into the city to restore hum an dignity."
I had spent summ ers in Oxford. When you go through the gate out
of the city you're in the gardens w ith a w onderful 18th and 19th
century village. It really influenced my view on w hat this city needed.
There, on bus tours, even gasoline stations are buffered and thatched.
It’s very pleasing.

Dennehey says his departm ent’s focus on public health, incorporated into
institutional controls, will im prove residents' lives:
We re coming u p w ith ideas and public policy to: first, remove public
health threats and w e’ve created new lead screening and abatement
program s to take care of children and remove lead from homes; and,
second, the w ater quality district. Improved enforcement of w ater
quality problems deter people from drilling into Superfund sites
(Dennehey, 9/21/95).

It is not surprising that the visions of an im proved Butte are based in
history, economics, and health — since the smelter smoke first masked the
physical landscape and Butte’s miners fought to stay alive in the threatening
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tunnels under Butte Hill, the physical landscape of Butte has been obscured
above ground and a threat below ground. Because of the Anaconda
Com pany's dominance in Butte and the state of M ontana, economic security
has always been the issue in Butte. Given the centrality of the notion of
developm ent in W estern thought, it is likely that economic themes will
continue to play a dom inant part in the reconstruction of Butte.
The W estern, m odernist discursive formation, form ulated during
mom entous changes in global pow er relations, in control over nature,
and in science and technology, has as its dynam ic theme the core
concept of "development (Feet and Watts, 1993:231).

O n the local level, aw areness of the hum an interrelationship w ith the
land, in particular, health impacts, has been subverted by government
officials’ attem pts to balance economic developm ent and cleanup and by
ARCO's legal obstructionism. The inadequate and uncritical new spaper
coverage has further constrained local activists. Terms of participation have
alienated Butte's people, keeping local public health know ledge under the
surface.
The conflict is not geographically contained in Butte. ARCO's
m aneuverings are also below the surface, conducted in underground tunnels
throughout Butte H ill to W ashington D.C. and corporate headquarters in
California. The state of M ontana and federal governm ent are also deeply
involved. Given the scale of contamination and costs of cleanup, the stakes
are high — socially, as well as financially. The possibilities of social change in
Butte are considered in the next, and concluding, section.
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1 Foucault defined subjugated knowledges as "those blocs of historical
knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist
and systematizing theory and which criticism... has been able to reveal," as
well as "a set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their
task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity..."
(1994:203)
2 For a full treatment of class in Butte, see Finn.
3 Freudenburg writes that his use of the word "recreancy" is "intended to
provide an affectively neutral reference to behaviors of persons and/or
institutions that hold positions of trust, agency, responsibility, or fiduciary or
other forms of broadly expected obligations to the collectivity, but that behave
in a manner that fails to fulfill the obligations or merit the trust." (1993:91617)
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CONCLUSION
Renegotiating Community, Landscapes of Sodal Change
A lthough Butte bears strong similarities to sociological studies of
contam inated communities, Butte has its ow n particularities w hich may
provide both im petus for and constraints on the opportunities for social
change that researchers have noted in other Superfund communities (Couch
and Kroll-Smith, 1991a).

Butte is subject to the same structural issues

em bedded in the federal Superfund law (Barnett, 1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider,
1992) and environm ental protection in general (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994;
Peet and Watts, 1993) as were other communities studied. Issues related to
institutionalized practices of governm ent technocracies (Weber, 1996; Barnett,
1994; Yeager, 1991; Greider, 1992; Lupton, 1993; Schrader-Frechette, 1991; KrollSmith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b; Edelstein, 1988; Freudenburg, 1993; Brown,
1991; Fiorino, 1990), discursive practices (Schrader-Frechette, 1991; Connolly,
1993; M ilbum, 1994; Edelman, 1964; Greider, 1992; Greenough and Tsing, 1991;
Brown, 1991), and public health issues related to contarnination (Lappé, 1991;
Cortese, 1993; H u and Kim, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Castleman and
Ziem, 1988; Bates, 1994) are also similar.
However, the community's experience w ith corporate practices over a
hundred years differs from that of some other contaminated communities by
dint of the Anaconda Mining Com pany's economic and political pow er in
both Butte and the state of Montana (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993; Toole,
1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990; Firm, 1996; Gunther, 1947). Company tactics often
entailed brute force, as was the case w ith its hiring of goons to infiltrate and
spy upon union memberships and thugs to break strikes (Malone, 1995;
301
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Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990). Challenges to the Com pany’s autonomy
were dangerous business. In Butte, there is still an undercurrent of
retribution exacted from those who challenge the powers that be. M arilyn
Maney (3/19/96) teUs of a member of the W omen’s Protective Union who
lived w ith the anxiety that the Anaconda Company w ould realize that she
was the little girl holding her mother's hand in a well-know n picture of the
m urdered Wobbly Frank Little's funeral.
Even u p to the time of her death at 82, she was afraid of retaliation on
her and her family if the Company knew she was that little girl. That
speaks volumes about w hat their [the w orkers’] relation was to the
Company. A lthough they d id n ’t have that fear in a group in the
parade... [there was throughout the] 40s, 50s, 60s, still that fear if the
Com pany knew she was actually that little girl there w ould be
retaliation for her, her family, and her union (Maney, 3/19/1996).

The retribution continues. CTEC learned in March 1996 that the group’s
arrangem ent for office space and accounting w ith M ontana Tech w ould not
be renewed. There are silences here, the result of dom ination and the
exercise of pow er as "repressed ideas (Peet and Watts, 1994:230). ” Speculations
persist that, in light of the press coverage and statewide participation in the
snow geese memorial, CTEC is being punished for taking an activist role. The
intim idation that results from the exercise of pow er may be the greatest
detrim ent to collective action in Butte.
A dditionally, the notion of stigma (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991;
Edelstein, 1988) is important. For a hundred years Butte w as the other, a
m ining community in a largely rural W estern state, and, as such, was
stigm atized both by its physical appearance and the "spooky" (Emmons,
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1990:62) nature of thousands of m en burrow ing under Butte Hill. Further,
that otherness, in tandem w ith an im m igrant population, and the
occupational danger of m ining led to the creation of a culture that both
internalized and celebrated risk that is different from some other well-studied
contaminated communities in the East, such as Love Canal (Greider, 1992)
and W obum , Mass. (DiPema, 1985; Brown, 1991). It is possible that
communities founded on extraction of natural resources, especially those that
have lasted for a great many years, have very different dynamics than those
which were not reliant upon such extraction. Further, there may be
differences in communities w ith different types of extractive practices.
A lthough logging communities also lived w ith great occupational risk
(Dietrich, 1992) and were subject to radical union activity (Toole, 1959, 1972;
Emmons, 1990; Malone et al, 1993), m ining communities may differ from
logging communities in that loggers, working above ground, were more
connected to the landscape than were miners, burrow ing below ground or
carving out huge open pits. Mining may have alienated communities from
the natural w orld more than other extractive activities.
...Well, these loggers live in the woods and w ork in the woods and play
in the woods. They are out in the chill rain and the hot sun. They see
deer while driving to the logging job in the morning and eagles on the
w ay home. The fish, they hunt, they hike. These forests are to them a
mosaic of memory a city dw eller can’t imagine, a hundred places cut
and regrown. To them, a clearcut isn't an end. It is a beginning
(Dietrich, 1992:45).

A nother difference betw een Butte and other contam inated communities,
such as Love Canal and W oburn, Mass., is related to the activity of the press.
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Love Canal became a subject of investigation for the national press which
activists, such as Lois Gibbs, quickly learned could help them publicize their
struggle (Greider, 1992). In Woburn, a small weekly new spaper uncovered
and published a story about the extent of the contamination (DiPerna, 1985).
The people of Butte do not have that asset. There is no indication that the
Montana Standard will suddenly undergo a transform ation which would
result in the practice of responsible journalism, which is both critical and
educational.
Much of the research in contam inated communities indicates that
discovery of contamination in soil, air or w ater offers an opportunity to
challenge the existing pow er structure, as expressed in governm ent agency
and corporate action.
...The point is that in reacting to w hat is seen as inadequate behavior by
large-scale organizations in relation to technological hazards,
adversarial groups may emerge which challenge the actions, and even
the legitimacy, of these organizations. In adapting to hum an caused
hazards, these groups may alter the pow er relationships within
communities, as well as betw een communities, corporations and
governm ents (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a:314-315).

The notion of recreancy (Freudenburg, 1993) is particularly helpful because
the keystone of the adversarial groups' challenges are generally based on the
disillusionm ent that sets in w hen victims of pollution decide that large-scale
organizations are reacting inadequately in relation to technological hazards
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a, 1991b, Edelstein, 1988, Brown, 1991). There is
a great deal of uncertainty associated w ith contam inated communities — "It
can't be that dangerous. I'm not sick " as opposed to T he risk is likely worse
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than officials say, look at how many people I know are Ul." In the face of
uncertainty:
...individuals are apparently not content to rely solely on their
perceptions of risk. Social factors frequently provide a fram ework for
selective perceptions and judgm ents about the hazard. People will seek
out others to confirm their assessments of danger....
Several studies of technological crises found a direct relationship
between the construction of shared beliefs about danger and the
emergence of citizens' groups. These groups organized around
something more than the mere perception of risk. A shared set of
ideas about threat, accountability, and the necessity for immediate
rem edial action served as the basis for group legitimation and
membership, setting the believers apart from the non-believers. From
a sociological point of view, beliefs more profoundly influence the
believer than perceptions influence the perceiver. This is largely
because belief systems are socially constructed, socially inherited, and
exercise considerably more control over the appraisal of events than
perceptions do... (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991a:306-307).

However, for this challenge to materialize, there m ust be a sufficient
num ber of disillusioned victims w ho have reached some consensus on the
nature both of the threat and of their grievances. This has not been the case
in Butte w here few local activists struggle against the combined weight of an
historically- and economically-shaped landscape of beliefs, as well as the
contamination that is the real legacy of the exploitation of Butte’s people and
the land. However, this is changing — a cluster of miners sat quietly together
at the snow geese memorial, a possible expression of the beginning of a wave
of concern flowing through the community like the groundw ater under
Butte Hill. It is possible that public awareness of Moore and Luoma’s study
could initiate a groundsw ell of concern. It is crucial that this inform ation be
dissem inated in Butte.
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A lthough his w ork has been perform ed in the context of "natural
disasters," such as earthquakes and floods, sociologist Dennis E. Wenger's
notions of the internal and external ties of organizations that constitute the
com m unity's structural relationships are helpful in considering the
possibility for social change in Butte. W enger (1978:21) defines internal ties as
those that "include the various institutionalized patterns of relationships
betw een local organizations operating at the local level." External ties, which
reach beyond local boundaries, can be hierarchical, w ith layered tiers of
authority, one higher than the next, or horizontal, w ith equal authority
(Wenger, 1978). Butte's external hierarchical ties included Eastern
corporations and banks which supplied capital (Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et
al, 1993; Malone, 1995), the Anaconda Company which controlled the state
political apparatus (Toole, 1959,1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995), the
union's ties w ith regional and national organizations (Emmons, 1990) and
and national organizations (Emmons, 1990), and the federal governm ent
which had an interest, especially in wartime, in keeping the mines open
(Toole, 1959, 1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Emmons, 1990). D uring
the traum atic years from the late 1970s w hen mining operations were
discontinued, until the early 1980s w hen the federal governm ent became
involved on an environm ental basis, the most im portant external ties were,
for the m ost part, ties to ARGO and state government. W ith designation of
Butte as a Superfund site, the external hierarchical ties to the federal
governm ent became became param ount. The resulting conflict between
federal Superfund law, state governm ent and ARCO then took center stage,
directing local response. However, even w ithout the Superfund status, the
trend is tow ard a predom inance of external hierarchical ties:
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...external-hierarchical relationships are becoming increasingly more
extensive and intensive in contem porary society. Conversely, internal
ties, the integrative mechanisms of exchange and coordination at the
local level, are becoming w eakened (Wenger, 1978:34).

In Butte, these new external hierarchical ties also include the influx of
professionals and outside environm entalists w ith different value systems
than those of the community. The professionals, who w ork w ithin the
param eters of technocracy, are oriented to a more individualistic culture, and
the outside environm entalists tend to impose visions of a healthy landscape
divorced from the history of the place. These responses of organizations with
external-hierarchical ties to biospheric contamination, usually in the form of
"social, technological and legal responses," tend to produce "secondary
impacts," which often include social isolation and stigma, in the
contaminated com munity (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1991:303). Because of its
differences w ith the rest of the state, Butte’s history is of one of chronic
"secondary impacts." Yet, although the combined authority of the Anaconda
Company and federal, state, and local governments was often brought to bear
against Butte's people, the control over their political desires and interests "
(Wolensky, 1991) was never complete (Finn, 1995). This analysis has pointed
to varying forms of resistance, including both miners' union and the
Women's Protective Union activities, struggles to save the uptow n from the
expanding Berkeley Pit, the creation of the Butte Community Union and the
Coalition for Benefits which was formed to pressure ARCO for decent
treatm ent of laid-off workers, the construction of O ur Lady of the Rockies,
and citizen takeover of CTEC. Further, the analysis has indicated that the
failure of many Butte people to participate on the county's and EPA’s terms
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in cleanup efforts may be in part explained as a boycott, another form of
resistance. Butte has a history of both public and private resistance (Finn,
1995) that local activists can tap into. W hat is needed, is creativity:
...com munities m ust rely on organizational resilience or innovation
to bounce back from the insult of contamination. Such creative ability
to recover from unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest
may be present in structural arrangem ents designed for m anagem ent
of non-emergency conditions, but it w ould surprise us it is was. The
teleological nature of com munity social structures, their manifest
design and purpose, their customary and methodical arrangem ents are
more suited to anticipation than resihence. Thus, faced w ith the
dangers of environm ental contaminants, but w ithout the benefit of an
anticipatory organization response, local community organizations are
apt to be perceived by victims as inadequate to respond in a timely and
effective manner... successful adaptation to extreme uncertainty
dem ands mitigative adjustm ents that are likely to be inconsistent with
routine social arrangem ents (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991b:309).

It is im portant to keep in m ind that strain and conflict are the norm in any
local structure, however, integrative mechanisms, e.g., the norm ative
structure, tend to m ediate the conflict (Wenger, 1978). In Butte the normative
structure, the com munity-sanctioned guidelines for behavior w hich are
em bedded in the community's value and belief systems, is w orking class.
People in Butte judge people on their "work ethic, ability to be honest and
willingness to commit to the com munity (Crain, 3/19/95)." These are very
different values than those of the technocracy w hich is now working in Butte
and m aking decisions that will have a major im pact on the com m unity’s
future. Yet, despite historical and current pow er imbalances Butte has a
pow erful history of asserting community values, of w orking in the interstices
of pow er relations to create space for community. How ever, in the past, the
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spaces may have been more comfortable because they were familiar and
patterns of assertion were well established in com m unity/corporate
relationships. Also, the community values were derived, to a great extent,
from the relationship w ith the Company, in which the Com pany dom inated
and set the norms for allowable action (Finn, 1995). Those norms, and the
price of challenge, were well understood. The w orld that faces the people of
Butte in 1996 is not as clearly defined or obvious, which may explain some of
the nostalgia that pervades the town. Because of this lack of definition, it may
be difficult to discern where the values should be brought to bear, where and
how the resistance should be conducted.
A necessary first step in the renegotiation of community and the gathering
of resources to fight to m aintain that renegotiated community entails a search
for some common understanding of the origins and meanings of the
contamination. This analysis argues that the origins are not simply the result
of mining, but of structural inequalities and a w orldview that does not take
the land into account. The land is further distanced by the influx of
professionals who treat the pollutants as a marketable commodity out of
social context, and, because of the difference in values, pose another kind of
threat to the working class culture. A dditionally, members of the community
m ust decide to w hat extent its history becomes a commodity. These are far
more subtle and m urky issues than those that the com munity has
traditionally faced.
The ecological-symbolic perspective joins environm ental sociology’s
assum ption that biospheres and social structures are interdependent
w ith a key assum ption of symbolic interaction that people act on the
basis of the meanings they attribute to events and conditions. From
this perspective, social responses to hazards and disasters are affected by
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both the nature of the disruption in h u m an / environm ental
relationships and the appraisals people make of those disruptions
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28).

Their appraisals are made w ithin context of belief systems, both collective
and individual. Because their voices are yet to be heard, the m eaning of the
contamination to the people of Butte is not yet clear. However, changes in
belief systems are slow because there is a narrow latitude in which messages
divergent to a person's beliefs may actually act to alter those beliefs. The
more strongly held the belief the narrow er the latitude of acceptance for
divergent messages (M ilbum, 1991). Further, if people are disinterested or
not knowledgeable about an issue, the only possible way to change beliefs or
attitudes is a peripheral route, rather than a direct challenge. Some have
charged Butte's people w ith disinterest (Weinstock, 7/31/95; Kirkpatrick,
7/31/91; Dennehey, 9/21/95). This analysis argues that resident disinterest is
not the sole issue; instead, there are structural reasons that Butte's people
have not been adequately informed, or, possibly protected, and that the
process of renegotiation is occurring w ithin structural constraints, both
historic and present. Further, because the community's history and identity
are so strongly tied to mining, the contamination and cleanup, as presented
by the EPA and m ainstream environm ental groups like the Clark Fork
Coalition, represent a real threat to strongly held beliefs about the m eaning of
their family histories and struggles. The technocratic approach to
contamination is that it is a technical problem that has occurred and will be
cleaned u p completely out of social context. By this definition of
contamination, the Butte people who are so actively engaged w ith their
m ining history and way of life are apathetic or ignorant.
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Because the technocratic approach screens out social context, the linkage
betw een the ruthless exploitation of the land and of Butte's people has not
been m ade in EPA documents or in the local new spaper coverage. The
extraction process, which was early intensified w ith financing provided by
Eastern and West Coast capitalists, typified the functioning of w hat
Schnaiberg and Gould (1993) refer to as the "treadmill of production" —
accumulated wealth produced by extractive activities led to
developm ent of technology to extract resources more rapidly and replace
labor w ith machinery. Government support for the extractive industry was
essential to m aintain tax revenues to fund national developm ent and social
welfare program s (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1993). As extraction intensified in
Butte, the resource base was depleted and the environm ent became more
degraded, which, in turn created socioeconomic disorganization (Schnaiberg
and Gould, 1993) as miners were laid off and the mines began to close.
To forestall the inevitable, to keep the mines operating, the political and
social system m ade the necessary concessions to the Company and, later,
ARCO. All of Butte's systems w ere oriented to supporting mining, leaving
few resources available for alternative use after mining ceased. As the land
became more m arginalized (less resources and more degradation), Butte's
people became more economically marginalized (poorer) and politically
marginalized. W ithin this context, the contamination is a social problem:
the extent of the contamination can be directly correlated to the inequities of
pow er between the actors involved, in this case, the Company, local, state and
federal governments, and the people of Butte. As a rule, the greater the
differences in pow er, the more contam ination or environm ental degradation
(Boyce, 1994).
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So, w hen the EPA or environm ental groups treat contam ination as a
technical problem only, they are treating a symptom, rather than the disease.
Further, the technical approach denies the people of Butte a real voice in the
process by relegating local knowledge to unprovable superstition. And, even
worse, the technocratic ahistorical approach implicitly blames the victims for
their plight — after all, the argum ent goes, they were the miners who made
the mess, they profited from it. This argum ent completely denies the
structural inequalities that always existed in Butte. Thus, the situation is
polarized and the people of Butte who are denied a place in the present, and
uncertain of the future, are left w ith a past that is denigrated. In situations
like this, belief systems will be adhered to more rigidly, (Edelstein, 1988; KrollSmith and Couch, 1991a, 1991b) thus leaving less latitude for change.
The less latitude, the more need for the use of peripheral routes to get
across a divergent message, e.g. the cleanup planned may not be sufficient to
protect public health in Butte, or public health is a valid concern and should
be investigated. Peripheral routes are commonly used by advertisers, e.g, the
use of well-like experts of popular figures a n d /o r pleasant background music
while the message is delivered (Milburn, 1991). The idea is that if the
person's thoughts are positive during the message, the person’s attitudes will
tend to shift tow ard agreem ent w ith the message. However, the attitude
change in response to messages delivered through a peripheral route tends to
be tem porary (Milburn, 1991). Peripheral routes are more successful if the
messages are presented w ith more pow erful positive em otional images that
deal w ith the substantive issue (Milburn, 1991), in this case, the need for a
more stringent cleanup, or health studies.
The approach planned by Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice
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may w ork on a peripheral level by turning the rem ediation into a positive, in
the form of well-paying jobs. The new group has forged an alliance w ith state
labor groups to press for the hiring of union members on the many cleanup
projects that are planned (Ray, 10/24/95; Hadley, 10/5/95). Kathy Hadley, with
John Ray and others, have been involved w ith the Clark Fork Superfund
sites since the toxins were first discovered. (CTEC president Mary Kay Craig
and activist George W aring are also active and involved members of the new
group.) Because the EPA had neglected to include the Clark Fork River in the
constellation of Superfund sites, Hadley and others formed the Clark Fork
Coalition to fight for the river's inclusion. (See m ap of stream side tailings in
the appendix.)
My interest w as Superfund. The river w asn't in the Superfund site; it
was just Silver Bow Creek to Warm Springs Ponds... The river
transports all the tailings dow n the river.
Lots of times people join groups because they have a problem they
w ant to solve... It was the Clark Fork Coalition that got the river into
the Superfund sites. It took meeting after meeting. We even w ent to a
meeting in D.C. I took my sister [Lois Gibbs^] w ith me. I think they
[government officials] were scared. Shortly after that they included it
(Hadley, 10/5/95).

Since its founding the Clark Fork Coalition has actively pressed for a
stringent perm anent cleanup and supported the state’s N atural Resource
Damage claim. In the early 1990s the Coalition funded a Butte office and
hired Mary Kay Craig as the Upper Clark Fork Coalition representative to
organize Butte residents to support the cleanup. But Craig's activities w ere
circumscribed threefold: by the Coalition's insistence she w ork part time
only; its organizing style which stressed fisheries and aesthetics which are
more m iddle- than working-class concerns; and its organizational orientation
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tow ard technocracy. This orientation applies standard operating procedures
uniform ly, disregarding particularities, w hich is problem atic because Butte is
particular. So, given the Coalition's failure to design a cam paign that took
into account Butte's identity as the "Mining City " and its w orking class ethos,
it w ould have been surprising if the Coalition’s organizing approach had
been effective. A dditionally, the more institutionalized the approach, the less
likely it is to change social relations in a community.
We propose that adaptive responses that are emergent, lessinstitutionalized and exist for extended periods of time are more likely
to be incompatible w ith preexisting patterns of social life. What was
structural, in other words, w hat routinely acted to constrain and limit,
ceases to be so, becoming instead subject to hum an agency in the form
of alternative leadership, em ergent groups, beliefs, and so on (Couch
and Kroll-Smith, 1991b:299).

To engage people in Butte, Hadley and Ray are trying a more specific
strategy, oriented tow ard the community's working class history, a strategy
that offers a challenge to the status quo:
Everybody has different ideas about environm ental justice. To me, the
cleanup is a trem endous opportunity for jobs. The cleanup will take 10
years and produce thousands of jobs — not $6-an-hour jobs. But the
state can't require the jobs here to go to local people.
Originally we w anted to do a job analysis for the cleanup but
couldn't get it done in time. The EPA doesn’t look at economic
impacts. We w ere working w ith union groups and had to do it [the job
analysis] in a 60-day period.... Some [grant organizations] were
interested in it but even w hen we were asking for emergency money
they couldn't w ork that fast (Hadley, 10/5/95).

Members of the environm ental justice group had hoped that the job
analysis w ould generate some press coverage, and, that the ensuing publicity
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about the possibility of well-paying jobs, would motivate people to press for a
better cleanup (Hadley, 10/5/95). Additionally, workers on the cleanup would
receive the equivalent of on-the-job training about environm ental hazards.
But because the federal Superfund law is not designed to consider economic
impacts, it does not address the issue that Citizens for Environmental Justice
group has identified. U nder the federal law there is no allowance for issues
that the public identifies and, further, public participation is constrained as
the ability to respond to an official definition of the problem and officially
designed solutions to that definition of a problem only.
A dditionally, there are high transaction costs in the Superfund
inform ation-driven process. The 60-day comment period is often difficult for
activists to meet because most w ork fuU time w hile raising families, and
many require assistance to translate the technical jargon used in governm ent
reports. Unlike corporations w hich have the money to hire full-time
employees to prepare comments, citizens frequently have to seek grant
money to hire experts. So activists m ust seek grant money to fund their
efforts. However, even in emergency situations, the time period involved in
seeking grant money is longer than the public comment period allowed
under the federal Superfund law.
A lthough Citizens for Labor and Environm ental Justice found potential
grant support from labor organizations, the group ran out of time — the
comment period expired before they could complete the grant application.
Hadley says:
We learned our lesson, learned at least the state labor organizations
w ere interested. They put staff time into it. We should be able to do
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this for the next comment period. But it’s too late for Butte (Hadley,
10/5/95).

It's too late in the sense that many of the cleanup plans for Butte have
already been form ulated; the cleanup of Silver Bow Creek, called streamside
tailings, rem ains to be determ ined. And, the EPA is reconsidering its plans
for the Berkeley Pit in light of the deaths of the snow geese.

However,

through a job analysis and press coverage, it may be possible to develop
support to employ the people of Butte (and Anaconda) in the rem ediation of
the creek — this w ould help to reduce local unem ploym ent rates while
providing a m inimal environm ental education. Also, a m ore
environm entally-aware base of support could be used to encourage residents
to scrutinize the effectiveness of planned institutional controls, which will
include the siting of one or more waste repositories for m ining waste that
will be ru n by local officials. Unlike situations of existing contamination
w hich divide a community, siting issues often bring the com munity together
(Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994).
If Citizens for Environmental Justice can obtain a grant from labor
organizations, they may avoid some of the other constraints associated w ith
both governm ent and private foundation grant money^. As members of
CTEC discovered, there are often strings attached to grant money, as is the
case w ith the EPA’s Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs). The end result is an
officially limited scope of participation which can leave activists vulnerable to
charges of advocacy beyond the allowed param eters, as was the case w hen a
Montana Standard editorial inaccurately charged CTEC w ith overstepping
EPA boundaries. So, funding from labor organizations may allow Citizens for
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Environmental Justice a broader area in w hich to work. A nd the group’s
"back door" approach — using the cleanup as a way to provide needed wellpaying jobs — should be more effective than direct confrontation w ith
operative beliefs w hich are often difficult to change.
The connections between CTEC and the Citizens for Labor and
Environmental Justice should also be helpful. Research indicates that
collective action in rural communities and regions is often dependent on the
nature of strong and weak tie networks, which are necessary for "effective
com munity response and developm ent (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28)."
The strong tie usually consists of "an interactional resource based on
familiarity, emotional intensity, repeated face-to-face contact, and the
reciprocal exchange of services (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994:28)." In Butte,
where people often belong to the same associational or social groups, there is
much face-to-face contact on a daily basis. It is here that the links with labor,
history, economics, and cleanup m ust be m ade for any kind of agreement to
occur.
The w eak tie is often a bridge between strong-tie groups, e.g. a person who
belongs in two unaffiliated groups who provides opportunities for m utual
exchange between them (Couch and Kroll-Smith, 1994). In a rural
community, the w eak ties w ould supply "im portant links in the relationship
between the local setting and extra-local aid and assistance (Couch and KrollSmith, 1994:29)." These ties may be individuals or groups, such as John Ray
w ho is also a board m em ber of the M ontana Environm ental Information
Council and Citizens for Labor and Environm ental Justice, which link the
local com m unity to regional or national organizations (Couch and KrollSmith, 1994). Research indicates a strong tie com munity group becomes
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particularly im portant if it can establish a weak tie betw een local groups and
cosmopolitan resources because this enhances "the adaptive capacity of the
local community (Couch and KroU-Smith, 1994:29)." However, because of the
uncertainty inherent in contam ination cases, several strong-tie groups w ith
different interpretations of risk associated w ith the contam ination are likely
to form regarding the environm ental risks of local pollution (Couch and
Kroll-Smith, 1994). The local lead committee’s ties to ARCO, the
EPA and county governm ent represents another strong tie group in Butte.
The external strong tie groups should be chosen carefully. A lthough local
environm ental activists need support, there is a suspicion of
environm entalists in Butte, largely the result of the class difference between
the predom inantly m iddle class m em bership of many environm ental groups
and the people of Butte. The m iddle class w ilderness orientation of some
environm entalists is denigrated in Butte by the epithet ’Trustifarian,"
(Reavis, 11/29/95) which wittily connotes a preachy activist who has never
had to w ork a day in his or her life, but is, instead, supported by a trust fund.
The im plication is that environm entalists d on’t have to pay the price for
their principles. A lthough this is not always the case, given the
environm ental m ovem ent’s historic lack of understanding of the social
repercussions of the policies they espouse, the criticism is reasonably wellfounded.
References are often m ade to the women's leadership of the toxic
grassroots movement (Edelstein, 1988; Brown, 1991; Greider, 1992) which is
composed of local groups working in their own, often poor or blue-collar,
communities. Typical members of grassroots groups are "wary of elections
and formal politics, and even large civic organizations, cynical about
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governm ent at all levels. Instead of political activism...they normally
concentrate their energies on nurturing and defending their own small
private spaces — family or church or imm ediate neighborhood (Greider,
1992:214)."
In contrast, the members of the national environm ental organizations are
"the offspring of the affluent managerial class, people w ho will feel at ease in
the higher realms of politics and skilled at the rationalistic policy analysis.
Many are idealistic professionals, committed to large intellectual conceptions
of the environm ental problem but not personally confronted by the risks of
poisonous industrial pollution (Greider, 1992:214)."
In attem pt to bridge the gulf in priorities between grassroots and more
traditional national environmentalists, Lois Gibbs tried to bring both
together.
"It w as hilarious...People from the grassroots movement were at one
end of the room, drinking Budweiser and smoking, while the
environm entalists were at the other end of the room eating yogurt.
We w anted to talk about victim compensation. They w anted to talk
about ten parts per billion benzene and scientific uncertainty. A couple
of times, it was almost war.
"We were hoping that, by seeing these local folks, the people from
the Big Ten would be more apt to support the grassroots position, but it
didn't w ork that way. They went right on with the status quo position.
The Big Ten approach is to ask: What can we support to achieve a
legislative victory? O ur approach is to ask: What is morally correct?
We can't support something in order to w in if we think it is morally
w rong (Greider, 1992:214)."

The bottom line is that there is little incentive for Butte people to
participate in the cleanup as participation is structured by the EPA and local
government. Some w orking class communities created their ow n notions of
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participation. They have mobilized the citizenry around conducting their
ow n health studies. This approach, generally referred to as lay or popular
epidemiology, serves four purposes simultaneously: it accomplishes needed
research; educates; mobilizes the public; and challenges authority (Brown,
1991). It is interesting that official efforts to correct, at least partially, the abuse
of the land does not extend to that w hich may have been done to people.
A lthough the degradation of the land has been well-chronicled by the
state's N atural Resource Damage Program there has been no such tallying of
hum an cost. N or is any such tallying, in the form of health studies, planned.
As indicated earlier, this official oversight, combined w ith the failure of the
local press to pursue health issues, is significant:
...such studies [epidemiological] are vitally important. They provide
inform ation on the scope of the problem, and they serve to educate
communities about the hazards and the possible (if not exact) risks.
Moreover, m ethods of exposure assessment and outcome
ascertainment are constantly improving, as is dem onstrated by a recent
study in w hich slight but significant increases in m alformation rates
were associated w ith residential proximity to hazardous-waste sites in
New York State (Hu and Kim, 1993:43).

Given official failure to investigate, popular epidemiology, "the process by
which laypeople involve themselves in detection of and action on
environm ental health risks and diseases," (Brown, 1991:134) may be the only
alternative to determ ine if, in actuality, Butte's people have been and
continue to be, at risk from exposure to contaminants in soil, air, and water.
The most im portant precedent is the w ork done by W obum residents in
collaboration w ith sympathetic professionals (Brown, 1991). Research
conducted by the lay public tends to be more inclusive than that
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done by professional scientists, sociologist Phil Brown (1991) reports:
Popular epidemiology takes into account social structural factors,
involves social movements, utilizes political and judicial approaches
to remedies, and challenges basic assumptions of traditional
epidemiology, risk assessment, and environm ental regulation.
Lay observations are crucial components for the general society's
awareness of health and environm ental risks. Q uite simply, people
know of data concerning their daily lives that may be inaccessible to
scientists. Lay observation has been largely responsible for the major
gains m ade in community and workplace hazard identification.
Scientific and governm ent sources have largely failed in this area, due
to uncertainty and controversy surrounding new frontiers of
knowledge, and to corporate and governmental resistance to threats to
private enterprise and government bureaucracy (Brown, 1991:135).

In m any communities — among them, Pittsfield and W oburn, MA;
Yellow Creek, KY; Love Canal, NY; and South Brunswick, NJ — residents
pinpointed im portant inform ation before health problem s w ere evident
(Brown, 1991). People use "their observations to develop "common- sense
epidemiology," attributing "disease to pollution (Brown, 1991:135)."
W oburn residents, like those in other contam inated communities,
quickly found that professional epidemiology was in fact a value-laden
endeavor. Government agencies sometimes hid data, and other times
failed to report it to relevant parties in a timely fashion. In addition,
governm ent opposition to com m unity involvem ent has sometimes
led to disciplinary action against scientists who aid citizen initiatives
(Brown, 1991:144).
'T he movement is outside the system." [Lois} Gibbs explained,
"because that’s the way to win. If you w ork within the established
system, doing the right thing, more often than not you will lose. The
system is put together by the powers that be so they will win. To be
outside means not to accept that we will lose (Greider, 1992:168)."
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Popular epidemiology, the outsider of the medical establishment, poses a
direct challenge to professional control over environm ental health
inform ation and to professional standards of proof necessary before action is
taken (Brown, 1991). Lay people argue that public health, rather than
statistical significance should trigger action (Brown, 1991). Scientific
insistence upon statistical significance and fear of uncertainty, combined w ith
the social aspects of contamination, pose serious barriers to public
participation (Brown, 1991). In the process of confrontmg their ow n political
agendas, lay epidemiologists also challenge scientists to adm it that they too
have agendas, "even if covert, unconscious, or unrecognized (Brown,
1991:148)." Fortunately, there are scientists like Mary O'Brien (1993), who
m aintain that scientists should take not be "afraid to stand beside those who
knew far less... as they w orked to halt toxic assaults on the world."
Popular epidem iology is an im portant part of environm ental activism
because it is em powering (Brown, 1991).
This challenge to traditional science is particularly significant since the
toxic waste m ovem ent is a new type of social movement, unlike even
the older environm entalist movement. In contrast to the largely
middle-class and upper middle-class composition of older
environmental groups, toxic waste groups are typically composed of
lower middle-class to middle-class members. They are less educated
than members of most other social movements, and are largely led and
populated by women...(Brown, 1991:149).

Mary Kay Craig, CTEC president, has proposed to research health issues
through the M ontana Technical U ndergraduate Research Program to
determ ine if illness has lessened w ith the closing of the mines (Craig,
3/26/96). In her proposal she notes that the federal Agency for Toxic
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Substance Disease Registry has never been funded sufficiently to carry out its
m andate, however a toxicologist as the Denver ATSDR office has agreed to
oversee her research to ensure "scientific objectivity (4)." This may be a start.
Craig indicates an employee of ATSDR has indicated her research may
possibly enable the agency "to conduct a more in-depth epidemiologic
research on hum an health problem s in Butte (6-7)." However, it is difficult to
com prehend how, if the agency has been insufficiently unfunded, any
additional health inform ation w ould result in additional funding, especially
in light of Congressional cuts to environmental agencies. A dditionally,
because there is a very fundam ental difference between epidemiology as
practiced by government agencies and lay or popular epidemiology, the
question of the intent of the research needs to be addressed because the intent
will determ ine the study's structure. Unlike governm ental epidemiology,
which is conducted by epidemiologists considering only narrow statistical
determinations of cause and effect, lay epidemiology is designed to be both
broader in scope and to be conducted by members of the community. In the
case of Woburn, residents used the results of the research to buttress their
lawsuit for paym ent of future medical costs (Brown, 1991; DiPema, 1985),
rather than as a means to pressure governm ent agencies. The health survey
questions, which I had compiled in 1995, which Craig has proposed to submit
for consideration to ATSDR, are designed broadly to encourage both
participants and respondents to think historically as well as in the present,
which goes back to the educational and em powering nature of lay
epidemiology. This is a very different orientation than the agency’s.
Also problematic is that Craig has received a only $500 grant. Given that
the W oburn study operated on a $10,000 grant, obtained by the medical
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researchers, Craig may find it very difficult to accomplish sufficient research
w ith such a small grant. The W obum study was conducted under the
supervision of a full-time person selected by the medical personnel (Brown,
1991; DiPema, 1985), so, unless a qualified person volunteers his or her time
to Craig's research, her grant money will not be sufficient. However, these
questions notw ithstanding, Craig's proposal may be an im portant beginning.
Throughout its history, which has for the most been p art been recorded as
the struggle of im m igrant risk-taking male miners against capital, the state
and federal government, and the land itself (Malone, 1995; Malone et al, 1993;
Toole, 1959, 1972; Emmons, 1990), Butte has always relied upon its women
(Finn, 1995, 1996; Maney, 1996; Crain, 1996). In the background of these
histories, Butte's w om en "crafted the everyday (Finn, 1996)," creating the
comfort of a routine in a place w here the routine was often dramatically
altered every three years w hen union contracts ran out. The members of the
W omen's Protective Union set the tone for the com munity (Maney, 1996).
My interpretation of their history is they saw themselves less as
feminists as we use the w ord today, but as working class in a social
structure that tried to deny basic hum an dignity to this particular group
of people. They were very comfortable w ith the w ord class. Most of us
are not comfortable w ith class today. They talked about their allegiance
to other working class members, they were comfortable w ith that
relationship (Maney, 1996).

These are the operable values in Butte today, the values discussed by Finn,
Maney and Crain (1996). In her mem bership in com m unity groups, such as
the Ladies Ancient O rder of Hibernians, Craig (3/26/95) is an active volunteer
in this tradition. These are also the characteristics of the toxic waste
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movement. However, there are differences at work, the toxic waste
movement stresses its w orking class nature and this is undercut by term s
established by the EPA and ATSDR. which ignore class issues, social context,
and are not designed to empower. Those differences may be very im portant
in a place like Butte.
A lthough there are organizations, such as Lois Gibb s N ational Toxics
Campaign, which assist local groups, there are no national membership
organizations like the large middle-class groups, e.g. the Sierra Club,
A udubon. The toxic waste movement is grassroots because this is the way
that communities can retain their identities. The w orking class toxic waste
groups "are part of a social trend which considers that science and technology
cannot be viewed as automatically beneficial and omniscient... (Brown,
1991:150)." Their challenge to science reaches out to include regulatory
agencies, "since these agencies represent a collaboration of government,
science, and industry in defense of the status quo (Brown, 1991:150)." The
status quo may not be conducive to m aintaining the values of Butte — it may
be a threat both culturally and physically.
There are also interesting gender issues in contam inated communities.
The Big Ten’s rationalistic or technocratic approach has been characterized as
the "male" position by feminists who question them (Griffin, 1978;
Plum wood, 1993); the grassroots' insistence upon values, the devalued
female (Griffin, 1978; Plumwood, 1993; Greider, 1992). These m ale/fem ale,
objective/subjective, status quo/change dualities are also deeply em bedded in
W estern culture (Griffin, 1978; Plum wood, 1993).
It is ironic that the traditionally female role of cleanup (Griffin, 1978;
Plum wood, 1993) has, in contaminated communities, been usurped by the
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"male" discourse (Griffin, 1978; Plumwood, 1993) of clean as defined by
technocratic rationality. A lthough som ew hat simplistic a m etaphor, the
female notion of clean, as expressed by female-led grassroots groups, entails a
"cleaning" that extends to moving furniture, clearing out closets and attics,
and then moving out in the neighborhood itself; the male notion, as
expressed by technocrats, entails w hat women often refer to as "a lick and a
promise," a speedy wiping of cloth across table. The female cleaning
challenges the arrangem ents of the status quo; the male cleaning merely
polishes the surface.
A lthough they are m ore concerned w ith the environm ental quality of the
Clark Fork River than the future of Butte, the environm entalists
dow nstream know that the fate of Butte also has a direct im pact on them. As
Hadley (10/24/95) points out, the contaminants flow dow n Butte HiU, into
Silver Bow Creek w here they reach the Clark Fork River and back up at the
Milltown Dam, a dam w ith a crack, just east of Missoula. (See m ap of the
M illtown Reservoir in the appendix.) The fears of dow nstream ers, who have
w arned of the threat that the arsenic-laden sediments piled u p at the
M illtown Dam, pose to Missoula's w ater supply, were given credence in
February 1996 w hen the M illtown reservoir was draw n dow n because of
flooding and ice jams, leading to violations of state w ater quality standards
dow nriver (Missoulian, 3 /1 /9 6 ). Ice jams are not uncom m on in cold
climates, such as M ontana's. The EPA has proposed that the contaminated
sedim ents be left in place, rather than removed or disinfected {Missoulian,
3/1/96).
As a result of the February draw dow n, samples taken dow nriver from the
dam , showed: copper levels of 630 to 770 parts per billion (ppb), compared
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w ith a state standard of 18 ppb; zinc levels of 1,140 to 1,310 ppb, compared to a
state aquatic life standard of 120 ppb; and 97 ppb arsenic, compared to the
state's newly increased 18 ppb hum an life standard iM isso u lia n ,3 lII96).
D raw dow ns can and will happen again, Russ Forba, the EPA Milltown site
manager, said (M issou lia n,3H I96).
"We realize that if you have an episode where there is scouring like
this, there can be a release of metals that pulses dow n the stream,"
Forba said. "We realize that can happen. But we don't think the
releases are going to accumulate in places that will cause threats to
ground w ater or long-term threats to aquatic life (M issou/ian, 3/1/96)."

Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition scientist Geoff Smith challenged Forba’s
statement, charging that the "toxic sediments behind M illtown Dam pose a
direct and long-term threat to the biological integrity of the Clark Fork and
the safety of Missoula's aquifer {Missoulian, 3/1/96)." Given the review of
EPA records of decision that indicates the agency's tendency tow ard partial or
ineffective treatm ent remedies, the Coalition and environm ental activists
may have a tough fight on their hands to alter the agency's stance at
Milltown. Also troubling are the num bers of abandoned mines in the state
{Montana Standard, 10/2/1991) and problems w ith state enforcement of water
quality laws (Montana Office of the Legislative A uditor, 1994). Further, the
ongoing battle over Superfund reauthorization, which, environm entalists
charge, could result in the weakening of the law, is a real concern for people
in Butte and dow nstream ers as well.
Also problematic are Republican plans to cut the EPA budget by one-third
and cut its enforcement budget by $130 million {Missoulian, 7/17/1995). Ellen
Crain (9/21/95) sum m ed the concern up neatly: "The governm ent's shutting
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dow n Superfnnd. This is a huge economic and major health problem. "
County Chief Executive Jack Lynch (10/25/95) worries about the state's claim
for damages:
My biggest concern right now as it relates to Superfund is on a national
level w hile reauthorization is uncertain, the opportunity for natural
resource claims is threatened and there is clearly no defined directive
as to how this very critical national program will continue in the
future.

Equally im portant is that M ontana does not exist as an isolated state; it is
part of a national and global economy w hich has historically been dependent
upon commodity and capital markets located beyond state boundaries (Toole,
1959,1972; Malone et al, 1993; Malone, 1995; Kemmis, 1991; W. Robbins, 1994).
Butte, as a small W estern town, is not alone in its struggle to redefine its
economic base.
W hat appears to be changing in the post-cold w ar era, then, is a new
West, a region characterized by dram atic dem ographic movement, the
persistent restructuring of local economics, and a future that promises
more of the same.
But that emerging new West is at one w ith the past. Success and
failure, prosperity and misfortune, expansion and decline, boom and
bust, after all, were components of the broader developm ent and
evolution of capitalism at the local and regional, national, and global
levels. To grasp the essence of the transform ation of the American
West during the last century and a half therefore, one m ust look to the
m ainstays of material relations in the region: the perpetually
changing, even revolutionary character of its political and economic
culture; the inherent instability of its resource sector and its relation to
larger centers of capitalist decisionmaking; the dynam ic and alwayschanging dialectic over time between country and city; and the larger
mosaic of global conditions and circumstances (W. Robbins, 1994: 18990).
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Inherent in the tension betw een the "Treasure State" and the "Last Best
Place" is the notion of industrial salaries versus low er service-oriented ecotourism -type wages as well as the notion of mining dum ps, slag heaps and
clear cuts versus more natural open areas. M ontana, like other resource
dependent areas of the West, relied upon those higher salaries and the tax
revenues from resource exploiting corporations w hich w ere capitalized
outside of the West. With the exception of San Francisco, the centers of
capital, are still in the East and in large international m etropolitan centers
(Robbins, W., 1994). In other words, the West is still as vulnerable to
exploitation as it was in the 1860s.
The influx of capital that is triggering the creation of the N ew West is
also leaving in its wake a two-tiered society: (1) on one level the
"equity refugees" or "equity bandits," well-to-do- newcomers w ith
sizable capital savings or independent sources of income: and (2) on the
other, low-wage service workers and longtime residents dependent on
relatively fixed incomes. The juxtaposition of new money and dying
industries on such a scale is relatively new to the West, but it is a
specter that will probably continue to haunt smaller communities. In
terms of real income, service sector jobs bring a poor return in
comparison w ith older forms of industrial work. The consequence is a
sharpening of class divisions on a scale never witnessed in the old,
more traditional West w ith its agricultural and industrial base (W.
Robbins, 1994:194)

This description is strikingly sim ilar to w hat w orld systems theorists,
w orking in the T hird World, refer to as disarticulated economies,"
peripheral economies characterized by low-skill production and export of
prim ary goods reliant upon the core economies w hich control the flow of
capital and developm ent of technology. A lthough w orld systems theorists
posit a core and periphery, there are peripheries w ithin the northern core
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itself. This analysis presents Butte and the American West (W. Robbins, 1994)
as a periphery w ithin the core. The result of the periphery's dependence
upon the core is a disarticulated economy, w hich relies upon low-cost labor
combined w ith a m odern technological industrial base, and suppresses
developm ent of local internal m arkets, depresses local consum ption
standards, and orients the m ost "dynamic sectors" of the local economy to
export production (Moberg, 1992:6), such as timber, wheat, beef, and ore in the
case of Montana.
This economic imbalance is m irrored by political imbalances which makes
it very difficult for community and state officials to w rest concessions from
those w ith capital, thus swinging the balance back to the Treasure State.
These imbalances are played out in a num ber of ways: Eastern
capital/W estern resources; state governm ent/national governm ent;
w orkers/capital; foreign interests/dom estic among them. So, faced w ith the
possibility of new proposed large-scale m ining operations, it is unlikely that
the localities selected or the state of M ontana will be able to negotiate terms
favorable to the community (W. Robbins, 1994; Freudenburg, 1992), such as
diverting some of the capital flow back into the community to buffer the
inevitable booms and busts of global competition, or m andating procedures to
protect the environm ental and public health. It is w orth noting that mining
companies make gross profits of 47 percent and net profits of 26 percent, that
of the 34 largest W estern metals mines, located on public land or land
acquired under the 1872 Mining Law, over 30 percent are foreign owned, and
that 60 percent of the largest gold mines in the United States are foreign
ow ned (Montana Standard, 4 /6 /9 4 ). N either Butte, the state of M ontana nor
the West has the resources to mitigate against current global terms of trade.
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W ith a relatively low tax base and a w ork force marginalized as a result of
the decline in industrial jobs, rural areas are providing unique opportunities
for mobile, capital intensive, computer-age companies (W. Robbins, 1994).
H istorian W illiam Robbins recounts the story of a developm ent engineering
company that relocated from Californian to M ontana w here the ow ner noted
a "certain lack of business drive in the local w ork force, a strong w ork ethic
and a lack of hustle ethic,’ he calls it." (1994:195) The owner, who hopes to
"help reverse the flow of jobs and capital to Latin American counties and
assist in the rebuilding of the American West, " (W. Robbins, 1994:195) says
his com pany is "promoting M ontana as the newest N orth American
em erging nation." Emerging from the yoke of colonization, like the Latin
and Central American countries to which capital has been fleeing? Emerging
as a peripheral economy, subject to the terms of trade and vagaries of global
capitalism on the same ground as the Third World? If this is, indeed, the
ground that M ontana now occupies, it is very difficult to conceive that ButteSilver Bow officials or state officials can turn the economy around.
Despite the popularity in recent years of policies that, in effect, call for
rural communities to lift themselves by their ow n bootstraps, evidence
to date suggests that, in reality, such a feat may be as unlikely in
community affairs as in physical ones. Increasingly the forces that
buffet rural communities are far broader than those that originate
w ithin or can be controlled by the communities themselves. In one
sense, the most im portant policy implications are for decisions m ade
not just at the local or state level but also at the national or
international level. To prescribe local solutions for such structural
problem s may be sim ply the community-level analogue of ineffective
argum ents that those who are addicted to drugs should "just say no."...
A nything less than a comprehensive rural developm ent approach that
addresses both local and extra-local dimensions of their resource
dependency cycle will inevitably fail (Freudenburg, 1992:328).
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Butte, like the rest of the West, has always faced these structural
constraints but, against all odds, the people of Butte have created and
m aintained a culture that has survived the corporation that formed it
(Finn, 1995). Their culture, constructed about a w orking class core, was built
in the periphery, in the shadow of the Company. What is im portant, and
ignored by technocrats and many environmentalists, is that the culture was
the result of interactions w ith their landscape as em bodied in historical and
social relations. Once this accepted, it is clear that any cleanup of the
landscape that does not include the social landscapes of Butte is "irrelevant
(Maney, 9/22/95)." As problematic as the lack of inform ation given to Butte's
people is that the full range of social landscapes has not been explored.
Further, those landscapes that emerged during the interviews for this analysis
are as fractured and stratified as the rock formations that underlay Butte.

TERRAINS OF ACTION
Given the num ber of Buttes, no one plan of action could possibly address
them all. A necessary first step, then, m ust include a dialogue designed to put
forth information, m aking connections between w hat has been presented as
disassociated facts, and to listen, consider and seek common threads of
experience. Given the failure of journalism in Butte, the dialogue will have
to take place in other arenas. This may well be a positive.
Strange as it may seem to an era governed by mass-market politics,
democracy begins in hum an conversation. The simplest, least
threatening investm ent any citizen may make in dem ocratic renewal is
to begin talking w ith other people about these questions, as though the
answers m atter to them. Harm less talk around a kitchen table or in a
church basem ent will not affect anyone but themselves, unless they
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decide that it ought to. When the circle is enlarged to include others,
they will be embarking on the fertile terrain of politics that now seems
so barren (Greider, 1992:411).

Clearly there is a need for a num ber of dialogues to occur simultaneously.
Citizens for Labor and Environmental Justice can bring a connection to state
labor organizations but, at the same time, local labor leaders such as Marilyn
Maney and former union workers who have lost their jobs m ust be involved
as equals. CTEC, which has developed the expertise to speak with federal and
state agencies m ust continue its struggles for a more stringent cleanup,
however, because CTEC is constrained by its reliance upon an EPA grant
which defines the term s of the debate, grassroots support from Butte is
essential to address the social aspects of contamination. Because that support
did not spring into being, as was the case in Love Canal and W obum, Mass.
some organizational skill will be necessary both to identify and mobilize
possible grassroots support, and to w ork with Citizens for Labor and
Environmental Justice and CTEC. Equally im portant is that participants
understand that some conflict is inevitable because "Change means
movement. Movement means friction (Alinsky, 1989:21)." At stake is the
em powerm ent of the only people who can legitimately decide the future of
Butte — the people of Butte.
Because of this, although I think of myself as an environmentalist, I
w ould argue that any action plan for Butte m ust be based on Saul Alinsky's
principle of organizing rather than that typically em ployed by the m ainstream
environm ental movement. Alinsky recognized that the ultim ate goal of
organizing m ust be to em power those organized to make their ow n decisions.
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We leam , w hen we respect the dignity of the people, that they cannot
be denied the elementary right to participate fully in the solutions to
their ow n problems. Self-respect arises only out of people who play an
active role in solving their ow n crises and w ho are not helpless,
passive, puppet-like recipients of private or public services (Alinsky,
1989:123).

In situations w here corporations and governm ent have systematically
denied that right to participate, people m ust relearn their rights to dem and
participation on equal terms, which includes the right to define the problem
they are addressing. The only proper role of an organizer is to facilitate the
relearning process. This type of facilitation takes time, likely years. The goal
of this facilitation is to "convert the plight into a problem (Alinsky,
1989:119)," a problem that people can attem pt to solve on their own terms.
This means that the plight cannot be presented as something determ ined by
pow er imbalances but as injustices that can be addressed in political action
defined by members of the community. This was the program of the Butte
C om m unity Union.
Given the history of Butte and the unrecognized contributions of its
women, an organizer m ight start w ith conversations about how w om en have
survived the boom and bust of Butte, and about the skills they developed
during those times, skills of w hich wom en are often unaw are because their
skills have been so undervalued in the popular culture (Plumwood, 1993;
Griffin, 1978).

An organizer might seek wom en involved w ith social

services, public health, education, history and labor and talk w ith them about
their histories, about their ow n and their families' health, of the MooreLuoma study, and of the connections between the exploitation of the land and
people in Butte. Additionally, an organizer m ight seek out epidemiologists
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and other medical professionals who have expressed concern about
environm ental illnesses in the hopes of interesting them in conducting lay,
rather than traditional, epidemiological studies in Butte because lay studies
engage and empower.
Equally im portantly, an organizer in Butte m ight act on two of Alinsky's
fundam ental beliefs. The first, 'that you don't communicate w ith anyone
purely on the rational facts or ethics of an issue...It is only w hen the other
party is concerned or feels threatened that he will listen.. (1989:89)." Second,
tactics m ust be carefully planned, not responses to the powers that be.
Throughout my year and a half in Butte's unfam iliar landscape my own
vision of the landscape has changed. 1 find myself seeking the right light to
photograph the ever-changing Montana sky at different times of the day
through the metal structures of the gallows frames on Butte Hill. 1 marvel at
the view of Butte from Walkerville and imagine Christmases past w hen the
entire hill was covered in gallows frames strung w ith Christmas lights. 1
think this is not nostalgia but rather a recognition of and respect for the
history that the people of Butte have survived and for their hum an spirit that
found space to celebrate in such a harsh dem anding place.
1 have found myself enraged at the affronts committed upon Butte's
people and the land, and im patient w ith environm entalists whose
romanticized landscape seems to be devoid of humans. I have delighted in
the black hum or and wit of Butte, a hum or bom of a w isdom and struggle
that the m iddle and upper classes have not shared. 1 find myself w orrying if
the com munity can retain its working class ethos and standards while
transform ing itself into an economically and physically healthy place. Of far
greater value than the copper under Butte Hill are the people who
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tenaciously clung to life above and below ground, creating a vibrant culture
in the process. Butte's greatest resource has always been its people — tough,
determ ined, risk takers, survivors. In a more just w orld, they w ould beat the
odds again.

FUTURE STUDY TOPICS
A study of the correlation of suicide and busts in Butte, M ontana and other
m ining tow ns m ight be useful to convey the hum an costs of exploitation.
Also, although issues related to mining and the health of m iners in Butte are
being explored, there is a real need for a retrospective study of the health of
wom en and children and a fuU health study today. And, on the local level,
the functioning of the institutional controls should be investigated over time
and state enforcement of w ater quality control laws and m ining reclamation
should be m onitored as well.
Additionally, on the local level, a study of the community response, with
emphasis on both strong and weak tie groups, to the siting of the waste
repository w ould be useful to com pare w ith community response to the
existence of contamination. And, research into the role of the Catholic
Church, especially as manifested from parish to parish, historically in Butte,
and a study of how the children in Butte understand the history and its
relevance to their constructions of landscape w ould be of great interest.
On the state level, a study that integrated data from federal and state
Superfund sites, w ith contam ination from landfills, m unicipal w astew ater
treatm ent facilities, ongoing industrial operations, and private wells, would
be helpful to determ ine exactly how much of the state has been degraded.
O n the federal level, an updated investigation into EPA records of
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decisions, w ith particular control on im perm anent solutions and the use of
institutional controls is needed. A dditionally, a study of the actual
functioning of institutional controls in operation m ore than five years m ight
be enlightening. And, perhaps most important, w ould be an analysis of the
num ber and location of aquifers the EPA has w ritten off to date on a national
basis.
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1 Gibbs became a national figure for her activism at Love Canal, the site that
precipitated passage of the federal Superfund law, and later as the founder of
Citizens’ Clearinghouse on Hazardous Waste.
2 The strings are often even more tightly drawn with grants from non
governmental organizations, such as foundations. William Greider
attributes these restraints to the federal tax code which allows tax
deductions for wealthy corporations and individuals to conduct "activities
that are really self-interested expression." "Under the federal tax code, taxexempt grants are fully deductible for the donors only if the recipients stay
clear of partisan politics, and many organizations accept these limitations
on their politics. They may develop ’educational issues’ or create ’civic
projects’ for citizens but they cannot take these concerns into the arena of
accountability that matters most to those in power — elections.
"... Every organization that relies on tax exempt contributions lives
constantly with the complications of what it can or cannot do; many flirt at
the edges of what the Internal Revenue Service would allow.
"The tax-exempt financing provices still another means by which wealth —
including corporate wealth — defines the political agenda for others. In
the arena of public affairs, private wealth exerts enormous scope and
direction and defines the political agendas of others. In the arena of public
affairs, private wealth exerts enormous scope and direction of what citizens
will undertake, because the defining is conditioned by the givers' own
sense of what is an appropriate political cause... The overall effect of
political charity, as one might expect, is mostly conservative — guaranteed
to preserve the status quo. Charity is another form of political power."
(Greider, 1992:220-221)
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LIST OF CHEMICALS AND ASSOCIATED ILLNESS
at the Mine Flooding Operable Unit (Berkeley Pit), Lower Area One,
Area One and M ontana Pole Site
ACENAPTHTHENE — (COG) at Montana Pole Site
ACENAPHTHYLENE — M ontana Pole Site
ACIDITY — Berkeley Pit
ALUMINUM — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site — b ladder cancer in
workplace exposures, teratogenic; association w ith the "tangles" in the
brains of Alzheimer’s patients (Lappé, 1991)
ANTHRACENE — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
ANTIMONY — M ontana Pole Site
ARSENIC* — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site — Cancers of the
bladder, lung, liver, kidney, skin, and colon (USEPA, 12/15/93);
Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system effects
ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); Nasal, throat,
lung, skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal mucosa irritation; abnormal
decrease in w hite blood cells, altered electrocardiograms; anemia;
anxiety; birth defects; blackfoot disease (loss of circulation in fingers and
toes; brain dysfunction; bronchitis; skin and lung cancer; cardiac
arrhythm ias; cardiopulm onary collapse; chromosomal aberrations;
coma; confusion; contact dermatitis; convulsions; cyanosis; death;
dehydration; depression; depression of red or white blood cells;
dermatitis; destruction of red blood cells’ diarrhea; distal axon
degeneration; elevated serum enzyme levels; emotional lability;
fatigue; garlic breath; hallucinations; headaches; heart rate over 100
beats per minute; hoarseness; hyperpigm entation of skin with
interspersed spots of hypopigm entation; im paired memory; im paired
respiratory function; insomnia; irritability; kidney inflammation;
lassitude; loss of reflexes; low birth weight; metal fume fever; metallic
taste; nasal mucosa inflammation; nausea; nervousness; numbness in
hands and feet; numbness, tingling, or prickling sensation;
overgrowths of the skin; painful 'pins and needles' sensation;
paralysis; peripheral ventricular contractions; pulm onary edem a and
hem orrhagic lesions; Raynaud's disease; removes the m yelin sheath
from nerves; sexual disorders; shock; skin disease and lesions;
spontaneous abortions; swollen and tender liver; tissue damage;
ulceration of nasal septum; vascular lesions; vomiting; weakness; wrist
or ankle drop (Chemical Injury Information Network, 1996);
miscarriages, teratogenic (Lappé, 1991)
BARIUM — M ontana Pole Site
BENZO(a)ANTHRACENE* — M ontana Pole Site
BENZO(a)PYRENE* — M ontana Pole Site — the risk of this chemical
in particulate form is frequently overlooked, can reach the hum an
339
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embryo and fetus transplacentally (Lappé, 1991)
BENZO(b)FLUORANTHENE* — M ontana Pole Site
BENZO(ghi)PERYLENE* — M ontana Pole Site
BENZO(k)FLUORANTHENE* — M ontana Pole Site
BERYLLIUM — M ontana Pole Site
CADMIUM — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site— Lung cancer (USEPA,
12/15/93); Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system
effects ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); evidence of
carcinogenicity, adverse reproductive effects, neurotoxicity or other
chronic effects, birth defects (Chemical Injury Inform ation Network,
1996); testicular cancer; teratogenic; low birth weights; at low levels,
cadm ium functions as a behavioral teratogen, at low levels causes bone
m arrow dam age, but this can be reduced w ith sim ultaneous exposure
to zinc (Lappé, 1991)
CALCIUM — Berkeley Pit, Montana Pole Site
CARBAZOLE — Montana Pole Site
CARBON DISULFIDE — M ontana Pole Site
CHLORIDE — Berkeley Pit —linked w ith Epstein-Barr activation and
higher incidence of liver disease which increased in relation to num ber
of years of exposure (Environmental Access Research Network, 1996)
4-CHLORO-3-METHYLPHENOL — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
2-CHLORONAPHTHALENE — Montana Pole Site
2-CHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
CHROMIUM (COC)— Montana Pole Site — Toxic effects to respiratory
tract and lung after inhalation, hypersensitivity skin reactions
following derm al exposure (USEPA, 2/10/93); suspected of causing
hum an cancer (Lappé, 1991)
CHRYSENE* — M ontana Pole Site
COBALT — M ontana Pole Site
COPPER — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montana Pole Site —
Porphyrinogenic which can have a variety of organ system effects
ranging from the central nervous system and gastrointestinal to
cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); short term
effects to 30 ppm in w ater include vomiting, diarrhea, stomach cramps
and long-term exposure to 3 ppm in w ater causes Ever dam age in
infants (ATSDR)
DIBENZO(a,h)ANTHRACENE* — M ontana Pole Site
DIBENZO(k)FLUORANTHENE* — M ontana Pole Site
2.4-DICHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
2.4-DICHLOROPHENOL — M ontana Pole Site
2.4-DIMETHYLPHENOL — M ontana Pole Site
2.4-DINTTROPHENOL — (COC) at M ontanan Pole Site
2.4-DINITROTOLUENE — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
DIOXINS/FURANS* — M ontana Pole Site — im m une-suppressive
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effects at low-level chronic inhalation exposures (Environmental
Access Research Network, 1996)
FLUORANTHENE — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
FLUORENE — M ontana Pole Site
FLUORIDE — Berkeley Pit
INDENO(l,2,3-cd)PYRENE* — M ontana Pole Site
IRON — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic which
can have a variety of organ system effects ranging from the central
nervous system and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney and liver
effects (Duehring, 1996)
LEAD — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at Montzma Pole Site — Im paired or
delayed mental and physical development, im paired heme
biosynthesis, decreased serum vitamin D levels (EPA, 2/11/94);
im paired hearing or learning (EPA, March 1994); evidence of
carcinogenicity, adverse reproductive effects, neurotoxicity or other
chronic effects, birth defects (Chemical Injury Inform ation Network,
1996); can cause deficiencies in essential metals, calcium, iron, and zinc,
severe lead intoxication is associated w ith sterihty, abortion, stillbirths,
and neonatal morbidity and mortality from exposure in utero (Coyer,
1993); testicular cancer; teratogenic; low birth weights; at low levels
causes bone m arrow damage, but this can be reduced with
sim ultaneous exposure to zinc (Lappé, 1991)
MAGNESIUM — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site
MANGANESE — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
2-METHYLNAPHTHALENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
2-METHYL-4,6-DINITROPHENOL — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
NAPHTHALENE — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
NICKEL — Montana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic w hich can have a
variety of organ system effects ranging from the central nervous system
and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney and liver effects (Duehring,
1996)
NITRATE — Berkeley Pit
2-NirROPHENOL — M ontana Pole Site
4-NITROPHENOL — M ontana Pole Site
PAH (Total non-carcinogen)(a) — M ontana Pole Site
PENTACHLOROPHENOL* — Montana Pole Site — soft tissue
sarcomas and colon cancer (Lappé, 1991)
PHENANTHRENE — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site
PHENOL — M ontana Pole Site
POTASSIUM — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site
PYRENE — (COC) at Montana Pole Site
SELENIUM — Lower Area One — teratogenic; at low levels
dram atically activates defensive proteins such as m etallothioneins
(Lappé, 1991)
SILICONE — Berkeley Pit — in particulate form exposure causes
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silicosis w hich has been linked w ith rheum atoid arthritis and, w ith
some coal miners, scleroderma (Lappé, 1991)
SILVER — M ontana Pole Site
SODIUM — Berkeley Pit, M ontana Pole Site
SULFATE — Zinc, severe diarrhea (USEPA, 12/15/93) Berkeley Pit
2.3.5.6-TETRACHLOROPHENOL — (COC) at M ontana Pole Site —
Decreased body weights, increased kidney and liver weights, and
centrilobular hypertrophy in livers (USEPA, 2 /1 0 /9 3 )
2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO - P - DIOXIN* — M ontana Pole Site
THALLIUM — Lower Area One
TOLUENE — M ontana Pole Site — Potentially toxic (Chemical Injury
N etw ork, 1996)
2.4.6-TRICHLOROPHENOL* — M ontana Pole Site
VANADIUM — M ontana Pole Site
XYLENE — M ontana Pole Site — Potentially toxic (Chemical Injury
N etw ork, 1996)
ZINC — Berkeley Pit, (COC) at M ontana Pole Site — Porphyrinogenic
w hich can have a variety of organ system effects ranging from the
central nervous system and gastrointestinal to cardiac, lung, kidney
and liver effects (Duehring, 1996); m etal fume fever which is
characterized by difficulty in breathing and flu-like symptoms in
exposures at 600 m g /m for 10 minutes and digestive problems with 80
ppm in food for six weeks, decreased serum HDL-cholesterol levels
w ith 90 ppm in food for five weeks, altered im m une system and
anemia at 153 pp, in food for six weeks(ATSDR)

* indicates EPA-designated carcinogenic
(COC) indicates EPA-designated Chemical of Concern
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